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





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PREFACE.

THESE Outlines of Military History are simply extracts from various writers.

The Author publishes them with a hope that they may be useful to the military student in his studies.

It would appear that nearly all the text books now in use suppose that the reader possesses a full knowledge of military history, whereas the Author ventures to think that this is seldom the case; no doubt it would be far better if every officer was to acquire such knowledge by reading the standard works; but some have not the time, whilst others have not the inclination to do so; to such, this volume may be of assistance.

In the following pages, the movements of the troops in the several campaigns under consideration, are given in as concise a form as possible, and are not at all times positively accurate, but it is thought that they are sufficiently so to give a general idea of the strategy. The plan recommended to the student is to cut out cards the size given below,* number them,



* These are only suggested as a convenient size, and are not drawn to scale to suit the maps.

and colour them with a red and blue pencil (they may be taken to represent army corps, but may also be used for divisions), he should then move them to the various places on the maps, as indicated in the text; by this means it is hoped that he may be enabled to understand the object of the various manœuvres.

The outline maps contain only the names of the places mentioned in the text; they are drawn to a scale of about forty miles to the inch. The diagrams of the battles are drawn very roughly, and do not pretend to be plans, but are merely to illustrate the tactics referred to.

The notes herein given are only samples of the remarks that may be made on the subject, and are in many cases by no means the most important. The student is advised to look for further lessons to be adduced from the various battles and manœuvres, and make his own comments.

It is also thought that this book may be useful to travellers; there is no better way of acquiring military knowledge than by visiting battlefields, where the student can see for himself the actual ground, with its advantages and difficulties.

The details of the Crimean War are so well known to British military students, that the Author has not considered it necessary to give an outline of this campaign.

it is said to be operating parallel to its communications.





It is obvious that the former is the safest and the latter the most dangerous.

Sometimes armies, from their size, or on account of their being allies, or other causes, have to operate from different bases; this may be an advantage, but sometimes it is otherwise.





When one army is divided and operating from different bases, and the other is operating from a single base, the latter is said to be on Interior Lines, and the former on Exterior Lines. It is obvious that if the armies are in any degree equal in numbers, that on the Interior Lines can mass a greater number of men at a given point more rapidly than the army on Exterior Lines.

On the other hand, a portion of an army operating from different bases may be so situated as to be able to threaten the adversary's line of communications, and thus paralyze his movements.

The army of a nation that has command of the sea operating near a coast, has an opportunity of changing its base, which



may be of great advantage, more especially if its operations are on a peninsula, as was the case with the British army in Spain, under Wellington.

The natural obstacles which affect the movements of armies, are impassable mountains and rivers.

If an army has any of its corps separated by such obstacles, it is obviously prevented from concentrating them. This may



be a source of great danger; for whilst so situated, its adversary may, if he is himself clear of the obstacle, which will probably be the case, fall on one of the corps with a superior force, defeat it before it can be reinforced, and then similarly turn on the others.

Napoleon called this "beating the enemy in detail."

On the other hand, such obstacles may be an advantage to an army in protecting its flank or in covering its retreat, also in the defence of a Frontier Line.

In order to carry out successfully military operations, it is absolutely necessary to have correct information of the enemy's movements; such knowledge is obtained by the cavalry with patrols pushed on well in advance, who by personal observation and by the examination of the peasantry, gain as much information as they can. Intelligence of the enemy's strength and the disposition of his troops are also obtained by the capture

of prisoners, by the interception of despatches, and by means of spies.

The cavalry thus sent in advance of an army, acts as a screen to its movements, and it should use every endeavour to prevent the enemy from penetrating its line.

Tactics is the art of manœuvring troops in the immediate presence of an enemy.

The three arms, namely, the cavalry, the artillery, and the infantry, have generally been used as follows:—

The cavalry, in the first instance, in advance to reconnoitre and gain intelligence of the enemy's movements or positions; the artillery (when acting on the offensive) to prepare for the attack by the infantry, which takes place supported by the other arms. If the attack is successful and the enemy is defeated, the cavalry pursue.

A portion of all arms is held in reserve, generally one-fourth of the entire force, to complete a victory or cover a retreat.

To know when to use this reserve requires the greatest tactical skill. It has been said, that as a rule victory is for the general that has the strongest reserves in hand at the crisis of the battle.

The turning of a flank, or the penetration of the centre, or the capture of a point in a position which renders it untenable, and which is therefore called the key, is generally the object of the commander of troops acting on the offensive.

Whereas the object of the commander of troops acting on the defensive, is to beat off the enemy's attacks wherever they may be made, and when he is thoroughly exhausted to advance against him and complete his defeat, pursuing him as long as possible.

The commander who is acting on the offensive, endea-

vours to deceive his adversary as to where he intends to make his real attack, in hopes that his opponent may be induced to strengthen these parts, and thus weaken the real point of attack.

On the defensive, the entire line is held lightly throughout, whilst troops are kept in hand in rear of the position to reinforce the points assailed by the enemy when such attacks are fully developed, and also on the flanks to make counter attacks.

The arrangements of the troops both for attack and defence can only be determined by the circumstances of the time, the situation of the ground, and the armament and national character of the opponent.

The various arms, however, should always be placed on ground most suitable for their action.

In the campaigns which we are about to consider, there have been various methods of forming and organizing troops.

Frederick the Great inherited from his father, who was called the "Drill Sergeant of Europe," a most perfectly drilled and disciplined army. His infantry could march in columns long distances, under such fire as could be brought to bear on them in those days, with so much steadiness and precision that when required to wheel into line and advance against the enemy, their intervals were found to have been most accurately preserved; when at close quarters they fired some volleys, which they were able to do more rapidly than their adversaries owing to their having iron rods, and then charged home with the bayonet.

Frederick's infantry was organized in battalions each of 10 companies, and formed in 3 ranks; the cavalry into regiments and squadrons two deep.

The infantry were deployed in two lines, having cavalry on

each flank and artillery in front. The army was divided into two wings.

His troops could manœuvre so much better than any other nation, that he nearly always attacked his adversary. His great movement was to march secretly round his opponent's flank in



column, wheel into line, and attack the enemy obliquely, so as to drive him back in confusion before he could change front: this was called his "oblique order of battle."

The French, in the time of Napoleon, were organised in brigades and divisions, and afterwards formed into army corps. Each corps being itself complete in cavalry, artillery, and infantry.

The formations of infantry underwent a considerable change. The steady drill of the Prussians did not suit the character of the French conscripts, many of whom were intelligent and full of enterprise. An infantry regiment was divided into three battalions, each of ten companies in two ranks; the two flank companies skirmished, and the others were formed into double company columns on their centre.

These advanced at deploying interval, covered by their skirmishers, and if checked they deployed to fire, but as a rule they resumed their column formations to continue the advance.

When the old soldiers became exhausted, and their places had to be taken by young conscripts, Napoleon was afraid to trust such men in these small columns; he therefore formed the columns of a greater number of troops. Sometimes several battalions were deployed one in rear of the other, with battalions in columns on each flank.



These large columns were generally preceded by artillery and supported by cavalry.

He always retained his corps of Guards (who were picked old soldiers) in reserve.

After the 1806-7 campaign, the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians gave up their line formations, and formed their troops into battalion columns with skirmishers.

The British adhered to their line formations, but covered their front with skirmishers. They usually stood on the defensive, behind the crest of a hill, waited until their adversaries

came close to them, then enveloped the columns with fire, and charged with the bayonet.

The introduction of long range, more accurate, and quick-shooting arms, has necessitated some change in infantry formations. To approach a position defended by troops armed with modern rifles in close formation, in the day time, is impossible, and therefore in most cases it has to be won more by fire action than by the bayonet.

To obtain a greater development of fire the numbers in the first or skirmishing line have been increased, which necessitates a reduction in the second, or assaulting line.

Battalions are divided into four companies (or double companies) of about 200 men each, and on coming under artillery fire company or double-company columns at deploying intervals are formed, so that with these smaller columns moving independently, cover can be more easily obtained from the undulation of the ground during the first advance.

When within small-arm fire two of these companies, or double companies, of a battalion are generally employed to commence the attack.

With modern arms, which are so quickly loaded, it becomes necessary to keep under control the expenditure of ammunition; portions of these companies, called sections or "fire groups," are therefore sent forward, each under the immediate charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer, in extended or skirmishing order, to get as near the position as possible, and under cover of these the other companies advance in as close a formation as practicable, to a convenient spot in the front line, from whence the final assault is made.

The cavalry have retained their squadron formations, and the artillery their batteries of six guns, throughout the armies of Europe.

OUTLINES
OF
MILITARY HISTORY.

FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAMPAIGNS.

THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR.

TOWARDS the end of 1740, Frederick, King of Prussia (afterwards called the Great), laid claim to the possession of the country of Silesia, as having been granted to his ancestors by treaty. It was at the time occupied by Austria, but only with a few troops, who were stationed in fortified towns. General Browne (of Irish extraction) was the Austrian general in command. He had about 7,000 infantry and 600 cavalry: 1,000 of these men occupied the fortress of Glogau, which was under the command of General Wallis (a Scotchman).

Frederick being unable to obtain any satisfactory reply to his claim, determined to invade Silesia.

On the 16th of December he put his army in motion, 40,000 men with 166 guns: he marched in two columns. His right column, under the command of Field-Marshal Schwerin, moved on Leignitz, and his left, which he accompanied, marched on Glogau. A reserve of 10,000 men under Leopold, the young Prince of Dessauer, was posted at Crossen.

22nd December. Frederick arrived in front of Glogau, and after reconnoitring the fortress, determined to invest it. With this object he ordered up his reserve from Crossen.

27th December. The reserve arrived at Glogau. Schwerin occupied Liegnitz.

28th December. Frederick, leaving Leopold to invest Glogau, marched on Breslau, which town he reached in three marches (70 miles), and occupied it unopposed.

January 1st, 1741. Schwerin joined him at Breslau.

January 6th. They marched up the River Oder on Ohlau and Brieg. Finding this latter town in occupation of the Austrians, it was invested, but they passed on up the river, Frederick to Niesse, whilst Schwerin was directed on Glatz.

January 15th. Finding Niesse occupied by the enemy, Frederick bombarded the fortress, and at the same time ordered Schwerin to join him there.

January 24th. Leaving Schwerin in command of the troops in Silesia, he returned to Berlin.

NOTE.—Thus in seven weeks Silesia had been occupied by the Prussians; but as yet they had taken no military posts; the seizure was thus far easy, but the retaining of it was most difficult.

February 19th. Frederick returned to Silesia, and found the fortresses still invested, but none of them captured.

February 27th. A cavalry skirmish took place at Baumgarten, at which the King was nearly taken prisoner. Both the Prussians and the Austrians were collecting stores and making preparations for the anticipated operations in the spring.

March 9th. Leopold captured Glogau, and marched for Neisse. At the same time trenches were opened before Neisse, and a regular siege commenced.

April 2nd. Seven Austrian deserters came into the Prussian camp, and stated that an Austrian army under Neipperg was within a few miles of Jägerndorf and marching on Neisse.

April 4th. Frederick raised the siege of Neisse, and concentrated his army at Neustadt.

April 5th. He retired to Steinau, and the Austrians moved on Neisse.

April 6th. The Prussians continued their retreat to Michelau. Frederick ordered the siege of Brieg to be raised and the investing army to join him.

April 8th. The Austrians marched to Grotkau, and the Prussians reached Michelau.

BATTLE OF MOLLWITZ.—(See Plate 1.)

April 9th. The Prussians halted in consequence of a heavy snowstorm, but the Austrians succeeded in reaching Mollwitz.

April 10th. The Prussians continued their march towards Brieg. About mid-day, on nearing the town, they came on the Austrians. Neipperg, not being aware of their close proximity, was surprised. He, however, took up a position hastily, in two lines in front of the village of Mollwitz, with cavalry on both flanks. His right rested on a sluggish, boggy brook, called Laugwitz, and his left on the hamlet of Grüningen, with a front of about two miles. He had intended to have placed his left at Hermsdorf, but the Prussians occupied that village before he could reach it.

Each army consisted of about 20,000 men, but the Austrians had a superiority in cavalry, whereas the Prussians had 60 guns against their adversary's 18.

When the Prussians reached Hermsdorf, the Austrian left had formed, but their right was still in the course of formation. The Prussians, however, were very slow in deploying, and their distances were so bad that they had to be corrected, and by the time they were ready to advance the Austrians had formed their line, and thus the Prussians lost the advantage of surprise.

At about 2 p.m. the Prussians moved forward to the attack with their artillery in front, their infantry in two lines and their cavalry on each flank with bands playing. The ground was covered with snow. When within range the artillery opened fire on the Austrian left. The Austrian cavalry on that flank under the command of Römer suffered severely. Neipperg was on the right arranging his line, so Römer without orders put his cavalry in motion and charged the Prussian cavalry on their right, 30 Austrian squadrons against 10 Prussian squadrons.

The Prussians gave way and fled, Schulenburg, their commander, being killed. Frederick tried to rally them, but without success. They passed down the infantry lines, and to the rear, followed by the Austrians. The Prussian infantry stood

fast, and fired from line into the Austrian cavalry as they passed. The Prussian cavalry could not be rallied, and, taking the King with them, they went 35 miles to the rear, to a Prussian post which covered a bridge over the Oder. Five times did Römer try to break the Prussian infantry, but without avail; in the last charge he was killed, and the Austrian cavalry rallied behind their infantry. Neipperg now ordered the Austrian infantry to advance, but the Prussian fire was so steady, and so much more rapid than the Austrians', that they had to retreat to their former position.

The Prussians had iron rods, whereas the Austrians had wooden ones, which enabled the former to fire five shots to the latter's two. Fresh Austrian cavalry were now brought forward to charge the Prussian infantry, but still they were unable to break them. The Austrian infantry piled up their knapsacks and knelt down behind them, but the Prussians had left theirs at Pampitz.

The Prussians continued their fire till about 7 o'clock, when Schwerin, seeing the Austrian battalions breaking up and getting into groups of ten or twelve deep, ordered his lines to advance, which they did with bands playing.

The Austrians did not await the charge, but fled through Mollwitz, and over the bridge at Laugwitz. It was now about a quarter to eight, and the Prussians, having no cavalry, were unable to pursue.

The Austrians lost 4,400 men killed and wounded, and nine guns.

The Prussians lost 4,600 killed and wounded.

Schwerin received two wounds.

An orderly was sent with the news of the victory to the king, who returned next day.

NOTES.—Here we see information of the Austrian movements obtained from deserters. The Austrians were covered by an irregular corps of mounted men, who were in such numbers that they completely hid the movements of their columns; altho' unable to discover the position of the Prussian troops, they did good service in preventing the Prussian cavalry from observing the Austrians. Frederick, no doubt, was surprised in the first instance by Neipperg, and commenced his concentration late, but Neipperg did not know the direction

of Frederick's march, and when he placed himself between Frederick and his base, Neipperg was marching on Breslau, and performed this really strategical movement accidently.

It is said that Neipperg was sitting at dinner on the day of the battle at Mollwitz, quite unconscious of the close proximity of the Prussians, and quite unprepared for an engagement, when an officer of Hussars came galloping to the camp and reported "the Prussians advancing." Reconnoitering must therefore have been badly conducted. Each army deployed for action facing its base, but the Austrians had an impassable muddy brook on their right flank, and a bridge over it by which to gain a road leading to their rear, and being stronger in cavalry than the Prussians, they had a better chance of making good their retreat, whereas defeat to the Prussians would have been ruin, as the nearest bridge they held over the Oder was 35 miles off, and supposing they had succeeded in gaining that they would have had much difficulty in moving northward, as the Austrians held Brieg and the passage of the river there. Neipperg placed his cavalry on his left exposed to artillery fire, and does not appear to have left anybody in command of his left wing, when he went to arrange his right. Thus when his cavalry made a successful attack it was unsupported. Had the infantry advanced at this time they also would probably have been successful.

April 26th. Frederick again besieged Brieg, and on May 4th the town capitulated.

The Prussian cavalry was re-organised, and they made some good reconnaissances under Colonel Ziethen.

Both armies were now employed in recruiting themselves, the Prussians in a camp at Strehlen, and the Austrians near Neisse.

August 1st. Neipperg marched for Breslau along the right bank of the river Oder, and so tried to get northward of the Prussians; information as to his march, however, was brought to Frederick by an old woman. Whereupon 8,000 men were despatched to Breslau under Schwerin, at which place they arrives on the 10th August.

Neipperg, finding the Prussians in motion, hesitated to advance, and eventually turned back.

August 16th. Frederick manœuvred towards Neipperg, but was unable to bring him to action, and he got back to his old camp behind Neisse in the hills. The Prussians encamped before Neisse.

October 9th. A treaty was made by Frederick with Neipperg. Neisse was given up to the Prussians, who retained

Silesia, whilst the Austrians were to be allowed to retreat through the Moravian mountains unmolested.

Frederick was, however, unable to come to terms with the Austrians about the Silesian frontier, so he marched his army into Moravia, meeting with very little opposition; he also induced the Saxons to join him, but they were not very strong allies.

May 11th, 1742. Frederick at Chrudim heard that an Austrian army, under Prince Charles, was marching against him. He had magazines at Prague, and expected that Prince Charles would try to get between him and that fortress; he therefore ordered his troops to concentrate, and march on Kuttenberg.

May 16th. The leading column of the Prussian army reached the town, but the rear column could get no farther than Chotusitz. The Austrian army was this night at Rounow. Leopold, who was in command of the Prussian rear-guard, sent to Frederick at Kuttenberg a report of the Austrian advance, and asked for orders. They were as follows:—

Battle of Chotusitz.—(See plate 1.)

May 17th. "Hold Chotusitz for centre; left wing to rest on brook or park wall; right wing westward, till you lean on something. Two lines. Leave room for me and my force on the corner nearest here. I will start at four, and be with you at seven or eight o'clock."

Leopold did not post his left wing well; the ground here is boggy and full of holes, quite unfit for cavalry, and instead of deploying his infantry up to the park wall he placed cavalry on this flank.

At 7 o'clock the Austrians came in sight; they had been marching all night. They deployed in two lines, with cavalry on each flank, in a concave formation, and were about 30,000 strong.

Almost at the same time Frederick arrived, which made the Prussians about 28,000.

Frederick ordered his artillery to fire at the Austrian cavalry, and this time his own cavalry to charge them.


R. Oder.
Grüningen
BRIEG
MOLLWITZ
Laugwitz
Hermsdorf
Pampitz
BATTLE
OF
MOLLWITZ.
2 miles.
CHOTUSITZ
Chotusitz
BATTLE
OF
CHOTUSITZ.
Scale &c. as above

The Austrian cavalry of the first line were repulsed, but that of the second line charged the Prussians and drove them back. The Austrian infantry now attacked the village of Chotusitz, and after a severe struggle took it; their cavalry at the same time got round the Prussian left flank by the park wall. The Prussian cavalry were so situated here that they were unable to oppose them. Chotusitz was set on fire by the Prussians; the Austrians had therefore this burning village in their centre. Frederick, on observing this, ordered his right wing to advance. The Austrian left wing was defeated and separated completely from the right. Prince Charles then ordered his right wing to retire, and under cover of it retreated through Czaslau.

The Austrians lost about 1,000 men killed and wounded, and 18 guns.

The Prussians lost about 1,900 men.

Pursuit was carried on for about five miles, but the retreat was well conducted.

Frederick was now desirous of Peace, and made overtures to the Austrians which they accepted.

June 11th, 1742. Peace was signed at Breslau. Silesia was handed over to Frederick, who arranged the frontier according to his own wishes.

NOTES.—Frederick had not an opportunity of choosing a position from which to give battle to the Austrians, the delay in the march of his rear column obliged him to turn about, re-inforce it, and fight where it was. Probably he had a somewhat vague recollection of the ground about Chotusitz, which he only passed in marching; he was obliged to leave the arrangement of the troops to Prince Leopold, and he arrived too late to make any alterations. The Austrians adopted the same formation as before, their cavalry deployed on each flank was exposed to the Prussian artillery fire. Frederick seized the opportunity of the burning village in the Austrian centre to attack their left wing. It was this prompt decision, together with the steadiness of the Prussian infantry, and the great advantage of iron ram-rods, that won the day. In this battle the Prussians were fighting parallel to their lines of communication, namely Prague and Glatz, and were again placed in a worse position than their enemy, whose retreat was straight to the rear, but the Prussians might have made for the mountains, had they been defeated, and retired through Saxony.

THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR.

In 1744 Frederick again declared war against Austria. The Austrians had sent a force, under Prince Charles, across the Rhine against the French, and Frederick to draw them back determined to invade Bohemia. He obtained leave from the Kaiser (who was king of Bavaria) to pass through Saxony, and although the Saxons were more inclined to grant favours to the Austrians than the Prussians, they were unable to resist the march of Frederick's troops.

August 15th. The Prussians marched in three columns on Prague. No. 1 column, under Frederick, through Dresden and Saxon Switzerland, No. 2 column through Bautzen; these two columns were to unite at Leitmeritz, and No. 3 column, under Schwerin, was to be formed of troops in Silesia, concentrated at Glatz, and from thence marched on Prague: this latter column consisted of about 20,000 men, and the other two of about 30,000 each, in all about 80,000 men. The supplies for No. 1 column were taken up the river Elbe in 480 boats.

September 2nd. Frederick arrived at Prague, Schwerin having reached the neighbourhood of the town one day before him.

September 8th. Trenches were opened and batteries established on a hill to the east of the town called the Ziscaberg, on which there was a fort.

September 12th. This fort was taken.

September 18th. The town of Prague capitulated.

Frederick then marched south to seize or destroy magazines which he heard were being prepared for Prince Charles. He reached Tabor, but being surrounded by Hungarian irregular horse, he was cut off from his communications, and unable to gain any intelligence of the enemy.

Suddenly, Prince Charles with his army of 50,000 Austrians and 20,000 Saxons appeared between Frederick and Prague.

With Prince Charles was old Field-Marshal Traun, who, it is said, virtually conducted these operations.

October 14th to 18th. Frederick moved to Beneschau, and tried to give the Austrians battle, but owing to Traun's skill, he did not succeed. The Field-Marshal knowing that the Prussians' supplies were low, manœuvred against them, so as to keep them off their magazines.

Frederick himself writes that "old Traun" was here his schoolmaster in the art of war.

November 19th. After a month of manœuvring and skirmishing the Prussian army was completely worn out, and Frederick decided to march for Silesia. He sent an order to General Einsiedel, who was in command at Prague, to blow up the bastions, spike the guns, and march for Friedland.

November 23rd. Frederick commenced his march, and reached Glatz without much molestation.

November 26th. The Prague column, consisting of about 10,000 men, marched in the first instance towards Leitmeritz, and then struck off to the eastward under the mountains. As soon as the Saxons heard of the march of this column, they sent a force under Chevalier de Saxe to intercept it.

December 9th. Einsiedel, on entering the passes about Friedland, suddenly came upon the Saxons entrenched, the Prussians thus surprised were defeated, and only a small part of the force who received assistance from the Duke of Nassau, who had been sent to Einsiedel's aid, managed to escape.

Frederick himself acknowledged that he was completely beaten in this campaign by Field-Marshal de Traun. He now handed over the command of the army to the old Prince of Dessauer, and went to Berlin.

December 19th. No sooner had Frederick left, than the Austrians attempted the invasion of Silesia, but Dessauer marched down on Traun and offered to give him battle, the latter, however, refused the encounter, and withdrew from Glatz during the night.

NOTES.—This was a campaign won without a battle, and entirely by manœuvring.

The Prussians had two bases, namely, Dresden and Glatz, at right angles to each other, and this saved them from ruin.

Frederick having lost his line through Prague, and being unable to regain it either by fighting or manœuvring, retired on Glatz.

The Prague garrison at first went north, with an endeavour to deceive the Austrians as to their line of retreat, and then made for the mountains on the Silesian frontier. Einsiedel was blamed for allowing himself to be surprised. Having gained the foot of the mountains, he thought he had succeeded in escaping his enemy, and neglected his scouting duties at the very moment they were most necessary.

No more movements took place during the winter months.

March 15th, 1745. Frederick again left Berlin for Silesia.

May 28th. Information was brought to the Prussians that the Austrian and Saxon armies, 75,000 strong, were reassembling under Prince Charles at Schatzlar. Frederick therefore ordered a concentration at Frankenstein.

May 30th. The Austrians moved to Landshut and the Prussians to Reichenbach, and the next day to Schweidnitz (40 miles in the two days).

June 1st. Frederick, who had about 70,000 men, occupied a line from Schweidnitz to Striegau, about nine miles in extent, with head-quarters at Jauernik.

BATTLE OF HOHENFRIEDBERG.—(See Plate 2.)

June 3rd. He saw the Austrian army coming over the mountains, and he ordered that as soon as it was dark the troops were to be closed on their right at Striegau, but that the picquets and sentries were to retain their positions and keep the watch-fires alight all down the line, so as to deceive the enemy.

The Austrians, on coming over the mountains, bivouacked in a somewhat extended order opposite the Prussian watch-fires, with the Saxons on their left in front of Striegau.

June 4th. At daybreak Frederick passed over the Striegau water by a wooden bridge, deployed and attacked the Saxons, drove them back from their ground, and separated them from their allies. The Austrians now formed hastily, and Frederick turned to attack them. Some delay, however, occurred by the

breaking of the bridge; but a ford was discovered by Ziethen, through which he passed his cavalry, and charged and defeated that of the Austrians. The Prussian infantry also advanced steadily before the Austrian infantry could form; and at 8 a.m. Prince Charles was defeated, and commenced his retreat through Hohenfriedberg back into the mountains. The allies lost 9,000 killed and wounded, and 7,000 prisoners, with 66 guns.

The Prussians lost about 5,000 killed and wounded.

Frederick did not pursue vigorously, as he said his troops were worn out by the night's march.

NOTES.—Frederick seems to have profited by his lessons from Field-Marshal de Traun. He must have had his troops well in hand to be able to concentrate and march from Frankenstein to the line Schweidnitz-Striegau in five days, by which manœuvre he intercepted the allies.

When he saw the Austrians coming over the mountains he did not instantly put his troops in motion, but at once decided on a plan to deceive Prince Charles as to their position, which was admirably carried out.

It is said that Prince Charles, after examining the Prussian outposts on the night of the 3rd June, came to the conclusion that the line was so extended that the army could not be in force in the neighbourhood, but must be retiring in front of him, and so went to bed in a chateau.

The Saxon engagement awoke him in the morning, and even then he thought it was only an affair of outposts. It was not until an officer came to tell him that the whole Prussian army was crossing the Striegau Water that he roused himself to action.

June 5th. Frederick marched to Bolkenhayn, following up the Austrians and pushing them back on Königgratz, but was unable to bring them again to battle.

July 20th. The Prussians encamped at Chlum; here they remained drawing their supplies from the neighbourhood, partly to save their own, and partly to prevent the Austrians from benefiting by them.

Skirmishes took place almost daily, but no serious engagements.

September 18th. Frederick broke up his camp, crossed the river Elbe, and with part of his force marched on Trautenau, the rest being spread out that they might more easily draw supplies. He halted at Sohr, and there formed a camp.

September 30th. An Austrian deserter brought the information that Prince Charles was at Arnau, and marching on

Trautenau; this report was confirmed by the Prussian cavalry. Frederick therefore gave orders for his troops to move on that town. They were to march at 10 a.m.

Prince Charles had, however, planned an attack on the Prussians' right flank to take place that morning.

Battle of Sohr.—(See Plate 2).

The Prussians, about 18,000 strong, were encamped facing south, and occupying a front of about two miles. The village of Staudentz was in front of their centre; on the slopes of the opposite heights on the right flank was the village of Deutsch Prausnitz, beyond there was a forest and another village called Sohr; this high ground on the Prussian right commanded their position. On the left flank there were brooks and broken ground, and the village of Eypel.

Frederick had not enough men to occupy the high ground on his right flank, and only had a picquet there.

Prince Charles's plan was to march with 35,000 men through the forest, occupy the high ground and come down on the Prussian right flank, whilst 10,000 men under Nadasti moved round to Eypel to take the Prussian camp in rear.

Early in the morning Frederick was in his tent with his generals arranging for the march, when an orderly arrived with the information that the Austrians were advancing in force through the forest.

He at once ordered his troops to get under arms and proceeded to the high ground opposite his right flank to reconnoitre. He made out the Austrian army to be about 30,000 or so, and gave orders for a change of front to meet them with the centre at Burgersdorf; they were to be drawn up nearly at right angles to their former position, and with more men in the first line, so as to show as long a front as the Austrians.

The Austrians managed to get 28 guns into position and fired on the Prussians whilst they were changing front, but they completed their movement without any confusion or serious loss.

Frederick now finding himself at a disadvantage as regards

position decided to attack the Austrians, which he did before they were completely formed.

His cavalry on the right, under Buddenbrock, were the first to advance against the Austrian cavalry, whom they defeated, driving them back on their infantry which were in the act of deploying, and thus caused confusion. The Prussian infantry taking advantage of this, advanced, pressed back the Austrian left flank, and took the 28 guns. The Austrians now made a vigorous attack on Burgersdorf, which they managed to set on fire, but were driven back to the high ground and into the forest. Buddenbrock's cavalry were now moved to reinforce that on the left flank, and there again the Prussian cavalry defeated the Austrian cavalry, driving them back on the infantry, there being no room to manœuvre there.

Nadasti, whose force consisted chiefly of irregular horse, advanced through Eypel, but he could get his men no farther than the Prussian empty camp. This they plundered, burnt, and utterly destroyed, killing some Prussian sick and women, and carrying off Frederick's papers and his Secretary.

Prince Charles, after fighting for five hours, withdrew through the forest, unpursued by the Prussians.

NOTES.—"Prince Charles's plan of surprise was good, but it was ill-executed," wrote Frederick.

The Austrians ought to have attacked vigorously before the Prussians had completed their change of front, but the Austrian Generals at this time seem to have had such a dread of the Prussians that they feared to attack them.

It certainly was a most desperate undertaking of Frederick to attack 30,000 men with 18,000, but he saw that the Austrians were waiting to complete their formations before attacking him, also that they had not enough space to manœuvre; and so by attacking them at once he might throw them into confusion.

Seizing these opportune moments in action shows that a man is a General.

The employment of irregular troops is always uncertain, as is fully exemplified in this battle.

Frederick remained five days at Sohr re-equipping himself, and Prince Charles fell back on Königgratz. The Prussians then moved to Trautenau.

In November Prince Charles made one more attempt to concentrate, but Frederick surprised him whilst he was in an

BATTLE
OF
HOHENFRIEDBERG.





BATTLE
OF
SOHR.
Scale &c. as above

extended position, and on November 23rd, by an action at Hennersdorf, near Naumburg, he divided the Austrian army in two, on which Prince Charles retired.

There was also an engagement between the Prussians under the old Dessauer and the Saxons at Kesselsdorf, near Dresden, in which the former were successful.

This terminated the war, and peace was signed at Dresden.

THIRD SILESIAN WAR,

OR, AS SOMETIMES CALLED, THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

In 1756, Austria, Russia, Saxony, and even France agreed to act together to subdue Frederick. Austria and Russia commenced to arm, and Frederick, seeing that war was inevitable, considered that he had better take the initiative. He therfore sent an embassy to Austria to ask why she was arming, and at the same time assembled his own army and moved towards Saxony. An evasive answer was received from Austria, whereupon, on September 1st, the Prussians crossed the frontier in three columns, Duke Ferdinand on the right, Marshal Keith (a Scotchman) in the centre, and the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern on the left. The King was with the centre column. They marched on Dresden without any opposition.

September 9th. Frederick occupied Dresden with about 65,000 men. Schwerin with 40,000 men was in Silesia ready to march into Bohemia from thence.

The Austrians were not ready for war, but were now making every exertion to assist the Saxons, who had collected all their troops, about 18,000 men, and taken up a position about Pirna.

SAXONS INVESTED AT PIRNA—(See Plate 3.)

Frederick finding the Saxon position too strong to attack, invested it with 30,000 men, and moved with the rest of his available army, about 32,000 men, up the river Elbe to meet the Austrians whom he heard were approaching under Field-Marshal Browne.

BATTLE OF LOBOSITZ—(See Plate 3.)

September 30th. He observed the Austrians with their right on the village of Welhoten, and their left at Sulowitz. Lobositz in their right centre was also strongly occupied; their left front

was protected by a brook, which however separated the wings, but Browne had endeavoured to connect them by means of a bridge. The river Elbe protected their right flank.

In front of the Austrian position were two hills, called Lobosch and Homolka, with a road from Welmina village, running over the neck; these were unoccupied by Browne.

During the night Frederick seized these hills, and posted his infantry on each, and his cavalry in the neck.

October 1st. At daybreak there was a thick fog, and neither force could see each other, but each commander sent their cavalry to the front; they came in contact and exchanged shots, but were unable to obtain any information. Frederick, however, thinking Browne was retiring across the river Elbe, sent forward twenty squadrons: they advanced over very difficult ground, and came upon some Austrian batteries, a round from which caused them to fall back behind the hills.

At 11 o'clock the fog cleared and Frederick was able to see the Austrians. He observed that both flanks were strongly posted, and that Lobositz was the key of the position, he therefore decided to attack it.

He ordered the second line of the right wing to occupy Lobosch Hill, and both lines of the left wing to advance to the attack of Lobositz. During this attack the artillery of the right wing was to keep the Austrian left wing engaged.

After desperate fighting Lobositz was taken, and the Austrians who were driven out of it, retired southwards. The Austrian left wing, however, remained in their position, and covered the retreat. Browne rallied his right wing about a mile in rear, and continued his retreat in good order, covered by his left wing. The Prussians lost 3,300 men killed and wounded, and the Austrians about 3,000.

In this battle the Austrians were beaten, but not entirely defeated; there was, therefore, no pursuit.

NOTES.—The Austrian position was not a good one, with two commanding hills so near in front of it unoccupied.

Frederick, finding the flanks too strong, attacked the key of the position.

The brook in front of the Austrian left wing was an advantage for its own

protection; but it prevented them from attacking Frederick's right wing whilst he was engaged in assaulting Lobositz; this is an example of the rule that no position is a good one where there are obstacles in its front which prevent the defenders from taking the offensive at any time that may be required.

AUSTRIANS ENDEAVOUR TO RELIEVE THE SAXONS.—(See Plate 3.)

Field-Marshal Browne made another desperate attempt to relieve the Saxons in Pirna.

He arranged with them that he would be at Lichtenhayn with 8,000 men on the night of the 11th; that they were to throw a bridge over the Elbe at Königstein, cross the river, and join him; the signal of their readiness was to be two guns fired from the fortress.

Browne punctually fulfilled his part, but the Saxons had not their bridge ready in time.

October 13th. The bridge was ready, and the Saxons made the effort; but Browne, being short of provisions, was compelled to retire on this day.

The Prussians observed the movements of the Saxons and strengthened their post opposite Königstein, and when the Saxons attempted to cross they drove them back into their entrenchments.

October 17th. The Saxons, having exhausted their supplies, capitulated. Frederick's terms were that the King was to be removed to Warsaw, that the officers were to be put on parole not to serve against the Prussians during the war, and that all the men were to be pressed into his service. The Prussians returned to Dresden for the winter.

NOTES.—The Saxons rendered the Austrians good service by going into camp above Pirna—they delayed Frederick. Had he been able to have marched into Bohemia, as he did before with his full force, he would have overrun the country.

The camp at Pirna was well chosen, and it was certainly the best position the Saxons could have taken up under the circumstances.

There was now a combination of all the European Powers against Frederick. He was threatened by the Austrians in his

front, by the Russians on his left, by the French on his right, and by the Swedes in his rear, all were aiming to overthrow him. As soon as the winter was over, he determined to commence operations by marching on Prague. Three columns were to advance on the fortress.

1st, under his own command, up the valley of the Elbe, by Pirna, about 60,000 strong.

2nd, under Bevern, 23,000, by Zittau and Reichenberg.

3rd, under Schwerin, 44,000, from Silesia.

April, 1757. 1st column advanced and reached Prague on 2nd May without fighting, Field-Marshal Browne falling back before them. Frederick encamped on Weissenberg, to the left of the town, and the Austrians took up a position to the east of it.

2nd column came upon an Austrian force of 30,000 men under Königseck, at Reichenberg, and on April 21st, the Prussians attacked and defeated them, whereupon they retired towards Prague.

3rd column crossed the mountains by Landshut, and was on Königseck's flank after the engagement at Reichenberg.

April 24th. Schwerin and Bevern united at Turnau and advanced to Jung Buntzlau, where they captured magazines.

Prince Charles was at Prague in command of the Austrians, who were about 65,000 strong.

Frederick's problem now was to join with Schwerin.

May 4th. Leaving 30,000 men under Keith on the Weissenberg, he moved north, and threw a bridge across the river Moldau, at Seltz; the Austrians remained in their position to the east of the town.

May 5th. Frederick heard from Schwerin that he had crossed the river Elbe, and was close by. It was agreed that both armies should unite at Prossik at 6 a.m. on the following morning.

Battle of Prague.—(See Plate 4.)

May 6th. Frederick and Schwerin reconnoitred the Austrian position, the left rested on the Ziscaberg, and the right on the village of Kyge, with a front of about four miles. The position was strengthened with redoubts and gun epaulements.



PIRNA



BATTLE OF LOBOSITZ.

About the right flank were lakes and marshes; they had 80 heavy guns in position and 150 field pieces, with cavalry on both flanks, although the ground on the left was unsuited for that arm.

Prince Charles desired to hold the Prussians in check until the arrival of 30,000 men, who were advancing from Vienna to reinforce him under Field-Marshal Daun, whilst Frederick was anxious to defeat Prince Charles before Daun joined him.

Frederick considered the Austrian position too strong to attack in front, and the left flank impossible, so he determined to march round their right flank. Accordingly, he directed his columns on Podschernitz, and from thence on to Sterbohol. On reaching that village they were to wheel into line and advance against the Austrian right flank.

As the Prussians marched to their left, so the Austrians took ground to their right, wheeling opposite Kyge, almost at right angles to their original line.

At about 9 a.m. the Prussian left wing, under Winterfeld, seized the village of Sterbohol before the Austrian right wing, under Browne, could reach it; the Prussians tried to storm the hill behind the village, but were repulsed, and, being followed by the Austrians, were driven back through Sterbohol. Winterfeld was here wounded.

The ground about Sterbohol is bright green and boggy, which the Prussians mistook for meadows.

Schwerin, reforming the left wing, ordered it to retake the village. As it advanced over this boggy ground the leading ranks suddenly sank up to their knees, which, under a heavy fire, caused confusion and hesitation. Schwerin, seeing this, seized the colours of the regiment which was hesitating to advance, and, riding a-head, cleared the bog and reached firm ground; the men followed him and retook the village; but the general (aged 73) was shot dead.* The Prussians then stormed the high ground behind the village, which they carried: in this

*The Prussian Government have erected a monument on the spot where Schwerin fell. The custodian, who is paid by Prussia, is an old Austrian soldier. This most interesting object is well worth a visit.

attack Field-Marshal Browne was mortally wounded. The Prussian cavalry of the left wing now charged the Austrian cavalry, which they defeated. Prince Charles tried to rally his cavalry, but was unable to do so, and in the endeavour he was wounded, and had to be carried off the field.

It was now 1.30 o'clock, and the Austrian right wing, which was at right angles to its left, being defeated, retired in disorder towards Prague, thus leaving the flank of their left wing exposed. The Prussian right wing, under Prince Henri (Frederick's brother), attacked this angle of the Austrian line, and thus taking the Austrian left wing in flank, defeated that also, which, being thrown back on their retiring right wing, caused the utmost confusion. Prince Charles, recovering somewhat from his wound, endeavoured to rally some of his defeated army, and moved up the river Moldau, but he was headed by Keith, and thus all the Austrian army was driven into Prague.

The Austrians lost 13,000 men killed and wounded, and the Prussians 12,500.

NOTES.—When Frederick advanced on Prague in three columns he was on the "exterior lines." Had the Austrians, who were on the "interior lines," been more active they might have made an attempt to beat the Prussians in "detail."

The Austrian position was prepared for a direct attack, but it had only one flank fully protected, the Prussians by marching round the right flank were able to turn the position and render all the forts, gun epaulments, &c., by which it had been strengthened, useless.

The Austrians, no doubt, would have done well to have attacked the Prussian army whilst it was taking ground to its left flank, instead of following its movements. Circumstances brought the Austrian wings at right angles to each other at the moment of attack, with a salient angle towards the enemy; this was a great defect in their line, as it rendered their wings liable to be enfiladed, also contracted their manœuvering powers. If one wing had advanced it would have left a gap, and when one wing retired it left the flank of the other exposed, and a change of front impossible on account of the retiring wing.

There were 46,000 Austrians shut up in Prague, well supplied with provisions.

Field-Marshal Daun on hearing of the result of the battle retired. Frederick detached 20,000 men under Bevern to follow him up.

May 23rd, 24th. The Austrians in Prague made a desperate sortie, but were driven back.

June 9th. Frederick heard from Bevern that Daun had been reinforced, and now had 60,000 men, and that he was therefore obliged to retire before him.

June 13th. Frederick, with about 14,000 men, taken from the investing army at Prague, marched to join Bevern.

June 15th. Daun was close to Kolin. Frederick having joined Bevern, marched to Planian, just to the north of the Austrians.

June 16th. They observed one another.

BATTLE OF KOLIN.—(See Plate 4.)

June 17th, 18th. Daun moved into a position with his right wing at Kreczor, centre at Chotzemitz, and his left towards Hradenin, thrown back, with a front of about five miles; cavalry in rear of the centre. The front of the position and left flank were very strong, so Frederick determined to attack the right flank. Just above the village of Kreczor was a small wood.

June 18th. Frederick ordered his van-guard under Ziethen, consisting of 55 squadrons of cavalry and 7 battalions of infantry to attack this wood. The army in two lines as usual was to march along the road to Kolin until near the right of the Austrian line, then change direction half-right, march in rear of the village Kreczor, wheel into line and attack in oblique order of battle, the left wing supporting the van-guard, and the right wing forming a reserve.

About 2 p.m. the Prussians marched along the road. The Austrians fired on them with artillery, and the Pandours* riding up close to them annoyed them with musketry.

Ziethen's cavalry engaged the Austrian cavalry under Nadasti, and drove them back. The infantry of the van-guard carried the village of Kreczor, but they failed to clear the wood, and waited in the village for reinforcements. The leading division of the Prussian left wing was commanded by Prince Moritz of Dessau.

* Name given to the Hungarian irregular horse.

Frederick was on the hill by Kolin, and seeing that the van-guard required immediate support, galloped down to Moritz and told him to wheel into line and move half-left. Moritz hesitated to obey, not understanding, probably, the king's directions, and said, "It is impossible to attack the enemy here, your Majesty," whereupon the king drew his sword upon him and told him to obey orders. Moritz then wheeled into line and advanced straight against the Austrian position. The King whilst returning to the hill looked back and saw Moritz was going straight for the position, he therefore sent to tell him to move half left, which order Moritz then obeyed, but it was too late. His division cleared the village Kreczor, instead of being in rear of it, and became engaged with the Austrians independently, without giving any support to the van-guard.

Mannstein, who commanded a division of the right wing whilst on the march as above described, ordered the Colonel of his leading battalion to drive off the Pandours, who were annoying them, whereupon the Colonel wheeled his battalion into line; all behind him, thinking a new order had been given did likewise, and the right wing thus having formed line advanced towards the Austrian position and attacked in the centre.

The Prussian army was thus engaged in three separate bodies, neither supporting each other.

They all fought desperately for four hours, but without success. At about 7 o'clock, Daun collecting the Saxons in the wood on his right flank, made a furious attack on the Prussians in the village of Kreczor: they gave way, and Frederick not having any troops in hand, was unable to give them assistance. Their retreat was followed by the others, and although Frederick made every effort to rally his retiring army, it was to no purpose, the battle was lost.

Finding this so, he gave Bevern and Moritz orders to conduct the retreat to Nimburg across the river Elbe, and himself rode for Prague.

Daun made no attempt to pursue, and the Prussians retreated in good order, covered by a rear guard under Ziethen, at their leisure.

The Austrian force, which was about 60,000, lost 8,100 killed and wounded, and the Prussians, who were about 34,000, lost 13,800 (including 5,400 prisoners) and 45 guns.

NOTES.—Napoleon blames Frederick for marching across an enemy's front in this manner, and quite excuses the rear wing defending itself by wheeling into line. He says Frederick ought to have attacked the Austrian left flank, which was more convenient to him in every way. Any flank movement of this sort should be made out of sight of your adversary.

Frederick's interference with Prince Moritz, so unlike his usual behaviour, was probably the real cause of the defeat. Had the infantry of the van-guard received support, it is more than probable that the Prussians would have carried and maintained their hold of the wood; indeed, as it was, Daun had given orders for a retreat before the Saxons attacked, which was to have been the last effort. Had Frederick been a little more explicit, or Moritz not quite so brief in his answer to the King, which seems to have excited him to an action he had never been guilty of before, all might have prospered with the van-guard and left wing.

This was Frederick's first defeat, and it was a lesson to him and his army.

Daun could not believe he had defeated Frederick, and was afraid to pursue. He would not allow any of his troops to leave their posts lest they should get into the valleys in their front, and be fallen upon to a disadvantage by the Prussians. He seems to have thought that Frederick had retired to induce him to leave his position. So cautious and suspicious of his enemy was he that he made no use of his victory.

June 19th, 20th. Frederick raised the seige of Prague; he sent a part of his troops, under Keith, towards Leitmeritz, and with the others he marched himself to support Bevern and Moritz.

June 27th. All the Prussian columns joined at Leitmeritz unmolested. Daun and Prince Charles united their armies, but they made no attempt to follow up their enemy. Frederick therefore spread out his army in the mountains so as to ration it more easily.

July 22nd. The Austrians, under Prince Charles, advanced to Zittau, and the Prussian force here, under Henri, fell back in front of them.

Frederick, leaving Moritz and Keith to hold the passes about Pirna, marched on Bautzen.

July 29th. Frederick and Henri joined forces at Bautzen, about 56,000 strong. It was now reported that the French

were marching on Prussia by Erfürt, and that the Russians were also advancing from the East.

August 15th. Frederick moved to Bernstadt, and the Austrians to Eckartsberg, but being unable to bring Prince Charles to action, he left a force, under Henri, to observe him, and with Moritz he returned to Dresden to make arrangements for marching against the French.

September 7th. Winterfeld was killed in an action.

September 15th. Bevern moved into Silesia, with the Austrians manœuvring against him.

August 30th. Frederick, with 23,000 men, marched from Dresden, and in twelve days reached Erfurt.

Mayer had command of the van-guard. Keith, Ferdinand (of Brunswick) and Moritz were with the main body, and Seidlitz commanded the cavalry.

September 15th. Frederick was at Gotha, and sent Ferdinand to Magdeburg, and Moritz to Torgau.

October 15th. Frederick, at Leipsic, heard that a force of Austrians under Haddick, had evaded Bevern, and were marching on Berlin: he ordered, therefore, Moritz to move on Berlin.

October 16th. Haddick, with 4,000 Austrians, entered Berlin, and demanded £45,000. He received £27,000, and hearing of Moritz's approach he left on October 17th, at 5 a.m.

October 18th. Moritz arrived at Berlin.

October 26th. Frederick, hearing of the advance of the French, ordered a cencentration at Leipsic.

October 30th. He moved to Lützen, whereupon the French retired behind the river Saale.

October 31st. He moved to Weissenfels, and the French retired to the village of Mucheln.

November 2nd, 3rd and 4th. The Prussians, unmolested, threw a bridge over the river, and encamped at Bedra. Frederick reconnoitred the French, and intended to attack them on the following morning, but during the night they changed their position; Frederick thinking the new one difficult, fell back, and himself took up a position between Bedra, and Rossbach, deter-


Prossik
Kyge
Podschernitz
Sterbohol
Dwarberg
R. Moldau
PRAGUE
BATTLE
OF
PRAGUE.
1 0 1 2 3 4 miles
R. Elbe
Planian
KOLIN
Chotzemitz
Kreczor
Hradczin
Radenitz
BATTLE
OF
KOLIN.
for Scale & N point see above

mined to wait for his opponents to move, which he expected they would shortly have to do, that they might get nearer to their supplies. The French army, with some German allies, were under the command of Soubise, and were about 60,000 strong; their left rested on Mucheln, and their right on Branderode. The Prussians were only 22,000, and most of them were encamped out of sight of the French general.

Battle of Rossbach.—(See Plate 5).

November 5th. Soubise, thinking the Prussians to be weaker than they actually were, and that Frederick was contemplating a retreat, decided to move round his left flank, and so cut him off from the river.

At 8 a.m. Frederick observed the French moving to their right in column, but being uncertain of their object, and thinking they might be marching on Freiburg, where they had a magazine, he simply ordered his troops to stand to their arms.

The French and German troops took some time to get into formation, and at noon Frederick, as usual, sat down to his dinner. At 2 p.m. it was reported to him that the enemy were at Pettstädt, by which he came to the conclusion that Soubise's intention was to turn his flank. He therefore ordered the cavalry under Seidlitz to move behind Janus Hill, and his infantry to form columns to the left, and by changing direction to the left to march round it. The order was given at 2, and at 2.30 all the tents were packed, waggons loaded, and the columns on the march. The movement was covered by cavalry, and concealed by the formation of the ground from the French.

Soubise, seeing that the Prussians had moved, thought that they had been alarmed by his march, and were hastening to cross the river; so he directed his troops to push on with all speed.

Seidlitz reached Janus Hill at 3.30 o'clock, and thus headed the French van-guard, which was somewhat in advance of the main body. The Prussian cavalry formed line and charged the French down hill, who, being taken quite by surprise, were defeated. The Prussian artillery came into action on Janus

Hill and fired on the heads of the French column. The Prussian infantry now wheeled into line to the right, advanced to the brow of the hills, and fired into their flank. At the same time Seidlitz, reforming his cavalry, charged them whilst in confusion, upon which they were completely routed and fled for Freiburg. This latter part of the battle lasted only 25 minutes.

The French and German armies lost about 3,000 killed and wounded, besides 5,000 prisoners and 67 guns.

The Prussians lost only 165 killed and 376 wounded; they had, besides their cavalry and artillery, only seven battalions engaged.

The French cavalry tried to cover the retreat, but were hard pressed by the Prussians, and the army was not rallied until they got to Langensalza, 55 miles from the battlefield.

NOTES.—Frederick had now got such a reputation as a General, that Soubise with his 60,000, hesitated to dispute the passage of the river with Frederick and his 22,000.

Soubise thought to imitate Frederick's movements at Prague, and this battle shows how a skilful General with an army capable of manœuvring can easily defeat a flank turning movement.

Such offensive tactics, to be successful, must either be performed unknown to the enemy, or he must be held fast in his position by an attack on his front, whilst the turning movement is being carried out.

We see here Frederick is in no hurry to order the movement of his troops, he had them formed in such a manner, that he could manœuvre them readily, as soon as he was certain of his opponent's object. When he saw the French were marching on Pettstädt, there could be no doubt of their intention, he then carefully covered the movement of his own force, and being on interior lines, headed the French, and surprised them whilst they were marching in column.

His coolness, and the thorough confidence reposed in him by his troops won him the battle.

Frederick, having now checked the French, turned his attention to affairs in Silesia. During his absence Prince Charles and Daun had been having it all their own way; they found manœuvring against Bevern much easier than against Frederick. They had succeeded in taking Schweidnitz and Breslau, and driving the Prussians across the river Oder. They had also taken Bevern prisoner, but the Empress of Austria

sent him back to Frederick, who ordered him to Stettin to take charge of an invalid depôt.

The Prussians had lost all their stores and 98 guns, and had been driven northward, with Kyau in command.

November 13th. Frederick, with about 13,000 men, marched from Leipsic, by Torgau, on Bautzen, leaving his brother Henri on the river Saale. He sent orders to have Kyau put in arrest; he placed Ziethen in command in his stead, and directed him to march by Glagau on Parchwitz, at which latter place both forces were to concentrate on or about the 2nd December. Frederick arrived there on the 28th November, and Ziethen on the 3rd December. The Prussians thus united were 30,000 strong; the Austrians, under Prince Charles and Daun, who were about Breslau, were 80,000 strong. Frederick called his Generals together, and made them what has ever since been considered a famous speech, in which he told them of all the bad fortune that had befallen them: of their small numbers in comparison with the enemy, of his determination to conquer or die, and at the same time offering discharge without reproach to any who were unwilling to participate in the dangers of the enterprise he was about to undertake.

All swore they would serve him to the last.

December 4th. The Prussians marched from Parchwitz towards Breslau; the Austrians also marched from Breslau to take up a position west of Schweidnitz Water.

Battle of Leuthen.—(See Plate 5.)

Frederick on reaching Neumarkt found there some Austrian cavalry, a bakery at work, and some engineers marking out a camp, which party he captured. On hearing of the proximity of the Prussians the Austrians took up a position at once across the high road. With the right resting on the village Nypern, around which were impassable peat bogs, the centre was close behind the village of Leuthen, and the left at Sagschütz, which flank was somewhat thrown back and entrenched.

December 5th. Frederick marched along the high road, and on reaching Borne his van-guard came on Austrian cavalry

which he drove in, and was thereby enabled to reconnoitre his opponent's position. He determined to attack the left flank in oblique order, in the same manner in which he intended to have done at Kolin. The Prussians were not to be seen from the Austrian position, a valley and hills intervening.

Frederick, moreover, covered his front with cavalry to prevent the possibility of the movements of his columns being discovered by a reconnaissance. Just before the Prussians reached Borne they were to change direction half-right, march behind the hills on Lobetintz, and when the van-guard was opposite Sagschütz they were all to wheel into line, and advance to the attack of the Austrian left flank.

Lucchesi was in command of the Austrian right, and, on seeing the Prussian cavalry in front of him, he made up his mind that Frederick was going to attack his wing. He therefore sent pressing messages for reinforcements. After several applications, Prince Charles sent Daun with the reserve cavalry to the right flank.

At 1 p.m. the Prussian van-guard reached the Austrian left and wheeled into line. The Austrian cavalry charged that of the Prussians; and, having the advantage of a slope and pace, defeated them. Ziethen, however, soon rallied his squadrons, and, charging the Austrians, drove them back behind their position.

The Prussian van-guard then advanced against the entrenchments, which they entered, taking a battery of 14 guns.

On this occasion the entire army wheeled into line in good formation, and, vigorously attacking the Austrians, rolled up their left wing as far as Leuthen.

Prince Charles now sent for his reserve cavalry, but they were nearly five miles away on the right flank. He endeavoured to form a new line parallel to the Prussians, holding on to Leuthen. The right wing was ordered to change front half-left on Leuthen, but whilst in formation the Prussian left wing attacked them, causing much confusion, during which the Prussians captured the village of Leuthen, and the Austrians were pushed back at all points. At this crisis the Prussian


BATTLE
OF
ROSSBACH.
Mucheln
Bedra
Janus Hill
ROSSBACH
Branderoda
Pettstadt
Freiburg
miles
R. Saale
WEISSENFELS
Nopern
Barne
to Naumark
to Breslau
LEUTHEN
BATTLE
OF
LEUTHEN.
For Scale & North point see above
Lobetinitz
Sagschutz
Schweidnitz

cavalry charged the Austrian infantry, which caused them to turn and abandon the field. They were pursued to the river.

The Austrians lost about 6,500 killed and wounded, together with 21,000 prisoners and 116 guns. The Prussians lost about 6,200 killed and wounded.

On the following day the Prussians advanced to Breslau, which they found occupied by 17,000 Austrian troops. Resistance was offered, but the place was taken in seven days.

The Austrian army dispersed and was followed by the Prussian cavalry. After ten days Prince Charles succeeded in rallying 37,000 men at Königgratz; the Austrian Government, however, recalled him in disgrace, and gave the command to Daun.

The Prussians thus regained the possession of Silesia, and held all the country and fortresses except Schweidnitz.

NOTES.—The Austrian position was not a good one, as the front could be approached without observation. They ought to have pushed forward with their full strength of cavalry, to have ascertained for certain the Prussian movements.

The Austrians deployed their entire army, although they were far, numerically, superior to their opponents. This was a great error, part of their force should only have been deployed, and the remainder held in hand to support that part of the position which was assailed, to make counter attacks, or to manœuvre on the Prussian flanks. "To immobilise troops not engaged is to forget the first principles of tactics." Napoleon says: "This battle is a masterpiece of movement, manœuvre and resolution, enough to immortalise Frederick, and rank him amongst the greatest generals." The oblique order of battle was here perfectly carried out; the Prussian flank movement was made quite unknown to the Austrians, and they were completely surprised. The Prussian left wing supported their right wing, and when the Austrian right wing attempted to change front, the Prussian left wing was in a position to attack it, whilst in motion, defeating its several parts as they came up; Prussian artillery also enfiladed the newly formed Austrian lines.

Frederick remained at Breslau during the rest of the winter recruiting his army.

1758, March 15th. He besieged Schweidnitz, which town was carried by storm on the 15th and 16th April.

Daun with the Austrian army remained inactive at Königgratz.

The French showed no signs of moving, and the Russians were advancing slowly, so Frederick determined to operate

against the Austrians. His plan was to take Olmütz, a fortress in Moravia, and at the same time to cause the force under his brother to march on Prague; by this he hoped so to alarm the Empress of Austria as to induce her to make peace.

April 27th. Frederick concentrated at Neisse and marched south.

May 5th. Daun also marched south, and this day reached Leutomischl.

May 13th. Frederick arrived in front of Olmütz, which fortress he invested, and leaving Keith in command he took up a position from which he could observe Daun.

May 22nd. Daun moved to Gewitsch.

The siege of Olmütz was progressing, but it was calculated that the fortress could not be taken for a fortnight, and it became necessary for the Prussians to have another convoy from Silesia. Frederick ordered the convoy of 4,000 waggons to be escorted with 7,000 men under Colonel Mosel; he also detached a force from Olmütz under Ziethen to meet him.

The escort was divided into van-guard, rear-guard, and main body, which latter kept about the centre of the convoy: the waggons were four abreast and covered several miles.

Daun heard of the march of this convoy, and he detached two columns to intercept it.

One under General Loudon was to move on it from the west, and the other under General Ziskowitz from the east.

June 26th. The convoy left Troppau.

June 27th. Mosel halted to close up his rear, which had been rather irregular at starting.

June 28th. He resumed his march: after passing Bautsch he found Loudon posted in the defile. The Prussians attacked the Austrians, and the latter retired to Domstädt, where there was a better defile for defence, and where by preconcerted plans Ziskowitz was to join Loudon.

Mosel continued his march and reached Neudorf, where he was joined by Ziethen.

June 29th. Ziethen now took command of the convoy, and halted this day to re-arrange it.

June 30th. The convoy continued its march, and on reaching the defile of Domstädt they found it occupied by the Austrians. The Austrians attacked the Prussian van-guard, but Krockow, who was in command, not only succeeded in beating them off, but he also cleared the defile, and 250 waggons passed through. The Austrians now with all their force attacked the Prussian main body, which they defeated, and Ziethen abandoning his convoy had to retire fighting all the way to Troppau.

Krockow with his 250 waggons continued his march, and succeeded in reaching Olmütz.

July 1st. News of this disaster reached Frederick. He ordered the seige to be raised.

July 2nd. He marched on Leutomischt. Daun did not venture to attack him.

July 8th. The Prussians reached Leutomischt and on

July 14th. Königgratz.

Daun followed leisurely, and about a week afterwards was in front of Königgratz.

NOTES.—The Austrians managed their attack on the convoy very cleverly. Daun kept Frederick engaged whilst he detached two powerful columns to intercept the convoy. It seems strange that Frederick should not have been informed of the march of these columns, more especially that going eastward under Ziskowitz; reconnoitring must have been neglected, probably the Prussians, thinking the Austrians inactive, became somewhat careless.

In this case the convoy was very large and unmanageable, the drivers were undisciplined, they cut the traces at the first alarm and rode off, it was therefore impossible to make any attempt to park the waggons for defence.

It is not the duty of the van-guard to push on at all hazards, but its object is to keep the enemy in check until arrangements can be made for the defence of the convoy, or for the attack of a defile by the main body, so as to clear the way for the passage of the waggons.

Daun seemed to be quite content with his convoy adventure, and did not attempt any more enterprises against the Prussians.

Frederick, however, heard that the Russians were approaching Berlin.

August 2nd. He therefore marched on Landshut.

August 10th. Leaving Keith, with 40,000 men in Silesia, he marched for Frankfurt on the Oder.

August 20th. Frederick, with about 15,000 men, reached Frankfurt and found the Russians, under Field-Marshal Fermor, beseiging Cüstrin.

August 22nd. The Prussians were reinforced by another 15,000 men, and Frederick moved to Görgast.

August 23rd. He marched down the river to Güstebiese, and leaving his baggage there, he crossed the river and bivouacked at Klossow.

August 24th. He destroyed all the bridges over the river Mützel, crossed at Neu Damm, and took up his bridge.

The Russian Commander Fermor now called in all his detachments, raised the seige of Cüstrin, and formed up to the north of Zorndorf, in a rectangle, with the baggage in the centre—in all about 50,000 men.

Battle of Zorndorf.—(See Plate 6).

August 25th. Frederick marched through the woods round the Russians to the south of Zorndorf, and after making a reconnaissance, he decided to attack the angle of the Russian formation which was opposite to him.

He directed his left wing to advance to the attack, and the right wing to follow in echelon, forming a reserve.

As the Prussians advanced, the Cossacks set fire to Zorndorf and retired; the left division had therefore to pass on one side of the village, and the right division on the other. This caused a gap between the two divisions of the left wing, which they were unable to rectify, both being engaged. Fermor seeing this collected his cavalry and supporting them with infantry thrust them into the gap, thus separating the Prussian divisions. The Prussian left division was so hard pressed that it was compelled to retire, but Seidlitz, who was in command of 5,000 cavalry on the Prussian left flank charged the Russians, completely defeated them and drove them in disorder to Kutzdorf (Fermor was carried with them) but they were unable to cross the river as the bridge there had been destroyed.

Frederick now ordered his right wing to attack, but before they could do so, the Russians advanced against the Prussian

right. Some of Frederick's battalions here were defeated; they broke and fled to the woods about Wilkersdorf. Seidlitz on seeing this, collected all the Prussian cavalry, and bore down on the flank of the victorious Russians. This compelled them to retire again to their height. Shortly after 4 p.m., the ammunition on both sides being expended, the firing ceased.

The Russians were now in the greatest disorder, breaking open brandy casks, getting drunk, and killing their officers, the Cossacks pillaged the dead and killed the wounded, but they still remained on their ground.

Frederick sent for his tents and encamped.

At daylight the Russians opened fire with their artillery, to which the Prussian guns replied. The firing continued all day, and until midnight, when the Russians moved off towards Landsberg. In the morning Frederick followed them as far as the river, where he halted. Fermor having rejoined his disorderly army, marched it back to his own country.

The Russians lost 21,500 killed and wounded, and the Prussians lost 11,400 killed and wounded.

The Russians lost also 103 guns and 27 standards.

NOTES.—This was one of the bloodiest battles ever fought. Frederick's plan, although somewhat venturesome is considered to be good. He thought that the Russian army, when defeated (which he had no doubt of being able to effect), would surrender if they could not retire, so he broke the bridges in their rear to prevent their escape.

At the same time he had bridges at Cüstrin by which he could retire across the Oder in case of need. He took the liberty of marching round his enemy, knowing his own superior manœuvring powers, and despising the tactics of Fermor.

At this time the Russians were almost uncivilised, and most formidable when brought to bay. Under such circumstances it is a doubtful advantage to cut off your adversary's retreat entirely.

A burning village which separated two (Prussian) divisions we again see caused the defeat of the unsupported one.

Seidlitz here gained an immortal reputation. It is a duty of a cavalry commander to take advantage of every opportunity he has without always waiting for orders; as a rule there is not time in action to send orders to cavalry. If a commander of cavalry invariably waits for orders, by the time they reach him the advantageous moments may be gone.

September 2nd. Frederick heard that Daun and the Germans

under Dombale were closing in on his brother Henri, who had taken up a position and formed a fortified camp at Kesselsdorf; he therefore immediately marched for Saxony.

September 9th. He arrived at Grossenhayn, but in the mean time Daun, hearing of his march, moved to Stolpen.

September 12th. Frederick and Henri joined forces at Dresden. The Austrian and German armies thus just miss their junction.

October 1st. Frederick marched on Bautzen and encamped at Hochkirch. Daun drew his supplies from Zittau, thus his lines of communications were threatened.

On October 5th, therefore, he moved to Kittlitz.

October 10th. Frederick was moving north towards Weissenberg, when the Austrians, following him somewhat closely, caused him to halt and take up a position; the right on the heights above Hochkirch under Keith, the centre and head-quarters at Rodewitz, and the left nearly to Kotitz.

The Prussian van-guard, under Retzow, failed to seize the Stromberg, which was occupied by the Austrians, and had marched on to Weissenberg; thus, when the Prussians halted, the van-guard was considerably in advance of the main body.

Frederick's force consisted of about 28,000 men, and the van-guard under Retzow of about 10,000.

The Austrians took up a position immediately opposite the Prussians, only separated by a valley about half a mile broad; their right rested on the Stromberg, which commanded the Prussian position, and their left on high ground to the south of Wuischke; their reserve was at Reichenbach and the head-quarters at Kittlitz.

They were about 90,000 strong.

Battle of Hochkirch.—(See Plate 6.)

Frederick waited in this exposed position, under the very nose of Daun, rather it would seem from bravado than from anything else, for four days. He was to have marched again on the 14th, but Daun made arrangements to attack him on that morning at daylight.

Plate 6.


Neu Damm
Klossow
R Mutzel
Kutzdorf
R Oder
tr Landsberg
Hilkersdorf
Zorndorf
R Warta
BATTLE
OF
ZORNDORF.
miles
CUSTRIN
Belgern
Krieschwitz
Wiesenberg
BAUTZEN
Kotitz
Radewitz
Stremberg
Standerbel
HOCHKIRCH
Kittlitz
Wuischke
BATTLE
OF
HOCHKIRCH.
Scale & N point see above

Daun, with 30,000 men, on the night of the 13th—14th marched round the Prussian right flank to Steindörfel; at 5 a.m. he was to commence the attack; as soon as he was in action the rest of the Austrians were to attack in front, and the reserve under Baden-Durlach was to advance against Retzow, and prevent him from rejoining Frederick.

The Austrians from Steindörfel, after very severe fighting, succeeded in carrying the right of the Prussian position; in this encounter Keith was killed and Moritz mortally wounded.* Frederick sent orders to Retzow to come to his aid, but being engaged with Baden-Durlach he was unable immediately to comply; eventually, however, he succeeded in beating off the Austrians, and joined Frederick at 8 a.m. But Daun was now in full possession of the Prussian position, and Frederick, being unable to improve matters, ordered a retreat by Kreckwitz and Belgern, which was admirably conducted. The Prussians passed a brook, and took up a new position at Doberschütz without opposition. The Prussians lost about 8,000 men and 101 guns, and the Austrians lost about 6,000, killed and wounded. Frederick stayed 10 days in his new position, and refitted himself from Dresden; he also received a re-inforcement of 6,000 men.

The Austrians fell back to their old position.

October 23rd. Frederick marched at night round their right flank to Görlitz, and from thence into Silesia. Daun, being unable to intercept the Prussians, besieged Dresden. The sieges of the Silesian fortresses were raised at the appearance of Frederick.

November 15th. He again marched for Saxony, and Daun, hearing of his approach, raised the siege of Dresden, and retired into Bohemia. Finding the Austrians had evacuated Saxony, Frederick returned to Breslau for the winter.

NOTES.—The approach of Frederick to Saxony seems to have paralysed the efforts of the Austrian and German commanders; they might have easily united before his arrival, and would probably have overwhelmed Prince Henri.

* He was taken prisoner and died in Austria.

Daun became extremely cautious, and Frederick, by way of tempting him to action, placed his army in a dangerous position immediately in his front. This foolhardiness is acknowledged to have been very reprehensible on Frederick's part, for which he paid dearly; not only did he lose a large number of men and guns, but two of his best generals.

The way he afterwards marched round Daun's flank and gained Silesia, there to raise the siege of Neisse, and other places, is much admired, as is also his rapid return to Saxony.

During the spring of 1759, great preparations were made to subdue Frederick. There were five armies placed in the field against him—the Swedes, the Russians, the Austrians, the Germans, and the French; altogether upwards of 300,000 men.

Nearly all Frederick's old soldiers had disappeared, and the most he could muster, of all sorts, amounted to no more than 150,000; under these circumstances, he decided to remain on the defensive. This being very unusual on his part, Field-Marshal Daun was quite unprepared for an offensive campaign, and did not move till the end of June.

July 6th. Daun marched to Mark Lissa, where he made an entrenched camp. Frederick placed a force opposite to him in camp at Schmöttseifen; he also sent a column under General Dohna, to watch the movements of the Russians. Daun remained at Mark Lissa; but from thence he detached two columns, 20,000 men under Haddick, and 16,000 men under Loudon, to move towards Berlin. Frederick sent Prince Henri to watch these columns. In June, the Russians, under Soltikof, commenced their advance, General Dohna falling back before them.

Frederick, not being satisfied with Dohna's arrangements, and being somewhat alarmed at the approach of the Russians, sent Wedell to command the Prussians there.

July 20th. Wedell arrived, and on taking over the command from Dohna, attacked the Russians, whilst on the march, at Züllichau. The Russians were about 70,000 strong, and the Prussians 26,000; the latter were defeated, with a loss of about 6,000 men, and had to retire. Soltikof continued his march to Crossen.

On hearing of Wedell's defeat, Frederick himself marched against the Russians. He left Prince Henri to oppose Daun, and with all the men he could venture to take from before the Austrians, he joined Wedell's army, near Frankfurt. The Austrian column under Loudon, about 18,000 men, being thus left free, marched to the assistance of the Russians, whom they joined near Frankfurt on August 3rd.

The Russian army was encamped on the Judenberg, a hill to the south-east of Frankfurt; here Soltikof had taken up a position to oppose Frederick, whom he knew was advancing against him.

August 7th. Frederick encamped on the left bank of the Oder, below Frankfurt, and reconnoitred the Russian and Austrian army.

Battle of Kunersdorf—(See Plate 7.)

The Russians and Austrians were 90,000 strong; they were drawn up facing north-west. On the left were the Austrians, on the Judenberg; and in the centre and on the right were the Russians, on the Grosse Spitz and the Grosse Mühle Bergs; they also occupied Frankfurt and the island in the river. The Prussians were only 40,000 strong, and Frederick observing the strength of his adversaries' position, sent to Berlin for 10,000 more men, who were there under the command of Finck.

August 10th. Finck arrived. During this delay the Allies remained quietly in their position. On this night, bridges were thrown over the Oder by the Prussians, about twelve miles below Frankfurt, and Frederick marched to Leissow and Bischofsee, where he halted, and again reconnoitred the allied position. He decided to leave Finch with 12,000 men at Bischofsee, to march with 32,000 men through the woods to the enemy's rear, and to attack the Grosse Mühle from the south-east, by Kunersdorf. To deceive the Allies, Finch was to make dispositions at daylight, as if the Prussians were about to attack from the north-east, near Bischofsee.

August 12th. Frederick marched at 3 a.m., but found the woods very difficult to pass through; he could advance but

slowly; his guns also got stuck in the mud, which caused further delay, and he did not arrive opposite Kunersdorf until 11.30 a.m.

Finck had been manoeuvring in front of the Russians for five hours, and Soltikof, seeing thereby that this was not the real attack, sent the Cossacks to reconnoitre, and they discovered Frederick's advance, whereupon the Russians changed front. At last Frederick's guns got into action, and together with Finck's, opened fire on the Grosse Mühle; but the distance, being nearly 2,000 yards, was too great to silence the Russian batteries.

The Russian guns on the Mühleberg, however, were badly placed, and did not command the ground in their immediate front. Frederick, seeing this, after about half an hour's cannonade, ordered the hill to be stormed. The Prussian battalions got into the hollow, and advanced up the slopes of the Berg without receiving any fire, until within 100 yards of the batteries; they then delivered a volley, fixed bayonets, and charged. The Russians fled to the Grosse Spitz, and the Mühleberg was taken. The Russians on the Grosse Spitz changed front towards the Mühleberg; they were in several lines deep, and somewhat in confusion. The Austrians came up on the Russian right flank.

Frederick made every endeavour to get his guns up the Mühleberg, but at this time only succeeded in bringing four into position, the ground being very boggy, and intersected with ditches.

It was about one o'clock, when Frederick formed up his troops to attack the Spitzberg. The Prussians made repeated endeavours to take the position, but were unable; Seidlitz with his cavalry charged the Austrian right flank, but he was wounded, and carried off the field. Frederick, in person, three times led his battalions to the attack, but on each occasion he had his horse shot under him, and a bullet struck a gold box he carried in his waistcoat pocket; at last he was dragged out of action by two of his Adjutants.

The Prussians retired to the Mühleberg, and another attempt

was made with the cavalry against the Russian left flank, but without success.

The Austrians now advanced to the attack of the Prussian left flank. The Prussian ammunition was nearly exhausted, and, after a feeble resistance, they gave up the Mühleberg, leaving on it their own guns, as well as those they had taken from the Russians; they all disappeared into the woods, and from thence back over their bridges to the left bank of the Oder. The allies did not make any vigorous pursuit—Frederick arrived at Goritz with only 3,000 men, and the next morning, at Reitwein, he could only muster 23,000.

The Prussian loss is said to have been 6,000 killed, and 13,000 wounded and prisoners.

The Russians and Austrians lost nearly 18,000.

NOTES.—Frederick did not know the ground through the wood, he had been misinformed about it; consequently the flank march, which was to have been a surprise, was delayed and discovered. This may be considered one of the causes of failure.

When the Mühleberg was attacked, it was found that the ground in front of the Russian batteries was undefended; this rendered the capture of the Berg easy.

The ground, however, was such that the Prussian artillery could not be brought up in time to fire on the Russians whilst they were in disorder.

It has been thought that Frederick did wrong in attempting to attack the Spitzberg after he had taken the Mühleberg. It was contrary to the advice of Seidlitz, who was of opinion that, had the battle ended here, the Austrians and Russians would have retired across the river.

August 16th. Frederick moved to Fürstenwalde to protect Berlin; neither the Russians nor the Austrians made any attempt to advance.

August 30th. The Russians moved to Lieberose, and Frederick to Waldau, with 32,000 men. Daun also moved to Triebel, but Daun and Soltikof could not agree as to operations.

The German army was approaching Dresden.

September 4th. The German army arrived in front of Dresden, and the Prussian force there under Schmettau capitulated.

Wunsch and Finck were detached to observe the German army.

Frederick had with him now about 24,000 men, and Prince Henri about 38,000; whereas the Russians and Austrians had 120,000, and Daun 75,000 Austrians.

Prince Henri moved to Sagan to observe Daun, but, being thus separated from Frederick, he could only communicate with him by means of spies.

Henri took several Austrian magazines to the south of him, and thus interfered with their supplies.

Daun was therefore obliged to move to Bautzen.

Soltikof was much vexed at Daun's inactivity, and September 15th he marched into Silesia.

Frederick now moved to Sagan, and came into communication with Henri, who moved to Görlitz.

September 22nd. Daun arrived in front of Gorlitz with the intention of attacking Prince Henri, who was in position there. On arrival he reconnoitred the Prussians, and arranged to attack at daybreak the following morning. Henri, however, leaving his sentries with watch-fires at their posts, marched that evening at eight o'clock down the valley to Rothenburg.

September 23rd. The Austrians advanced to the attack, but found their adversaries gone, and so secretly had Prince Henri conducted his march that Daun was unable to discover the direction he had taken, and, fancying he intended to make a stroke at Bautzen, Daun directed his columns on that town.

Prince Henri, however, marched by Klitten to Hoyerswerda, and there surprised an Austrian force under Wehla, attacked and defeated it; the general was killed and most of the Austrians taken prisoners.

He thus regained possession of the north of Saxony. This is one of the most celebrated marches on record—50 miles in 50 hours, through an enemy's country.

By this Daun was drawn away to Saxony, and thus became separated from the Russians, whom Frederick kept well engaged and constantly in sight; but he cleverly avoided fighting, having only 21,000 men.

October 24th. Soltikof, being unable to get the Austrians to co-operate with him, and being short of rations, marched for Posen; thus Silesia again became free.

Daun tried to operate against Henri, but was completely outmanœuvred.

November 13th. Daun was encamped near Meissen, opposite to Henri. Finding that his supplies were running short, he ordered a retreat towards Bohemia.

Frederick was in his brother's camp, and hearing that the Austrians were on the march, he immediately proceeded to the Prussian van-guard. Seeing his adversary in full retreat, he formed a plan to intercept him; and although entreated by his brother to "let well alone," he could not resist the temptation of carrying out his design.

Finck was directed, with 12,000 men, to throw himself across Daun's line of retreat at a village called Maxen. Daun here surrounded him, and compelled him to capitulate with his entire force.*

Daun would probably have continued his march to Bohemia had he been let alone, but now he determined to winter at Dresden. He remained there with 72,000 men; and Frederick, who had the greater part of Saxony in his possession, took up a position at Freyberg, with 32,000 men, menacing Daun.

Each army recruited itself during the winter months, and Frederick managed to collect 100,000 men, but his enemies still numbered upwards of 280,000.

The allies' plan for the coming campaign was to keep Daun in Saxony, whilst 50,000 Austrians, under Loudon, were to unite with 40,000 Russians, and overrun Silesia.

Frederick's only chance against such overwhelming odds was to use his superior powers of marching and mobility, in keeping his antagonists apart, and, if possible, in capturing their magazines.

April 25th, 1760. He broke up his camp at Freyberg, and

* On Finck's return from captivity, Frederick ordered him to be tried by court-martial, which was presided over by Zeithen; he was sentenced to a year's imprisonment, and subsequently dismissed the Prussian service.

moved to Meissen, whilst Prince Henri moved to Sagan to observe the Russians.

It was not, however, until the beginning of June that the Russians arrived at Posen, and that Loudon entered Silesia.

June 7th. Loudon blockaded Glatz.

June 17th. A Prussian force of 13,000 men, under Fouquet, was detached to Landshut, and Frederick also marched towards Silesia to support it.

June 23rd. Loudon attacked Fouquet at Landshut and defeated him, taking his entire force (except 1,500 men) prisoners. Silesia was thus left open to the Austrians.

July 2nd. Frederick, on hearing of this, fell back. Daun moved to Görlitz.

July 6th. Frederick reached Bautzen, and marched from thence on Dresden, where he commenced siege operations.

July 19th. Daun arrived at Dresden, and the Prussians raised the siege.

July 29th. Frederick again encamped at Meissen.

July 26th. Loudon captured Glatz, and marched on Breslau, at which place he arrived on the 30th.

August 1st. Loudon, finding his line of communication had been intercepted, and some convoys captured by Prince Henri, had to retire.

The Russians, under Soltikof, were also marching on Breslau, but on August 8th they found Prince Henri in an intrenched position, ready to dispute their advance.

August 1st. Frederick again marched to the assistance of Prince Henri.

August 9th. At Goldberg he found the Austrians in position across his line of march.

Daun had marched parallel to Frederick, and had ordered Loudon to join him.

August 10th–11th. Frederick marched down the left bank of the river to Liegnitz, and the Austrians followed him down the right bank; on becoming aware of the Austrian movements, he returned to Goldberg.

August 12th. The Austrians returned, and endeavoured to

surround Frederick, but he got clear of them, and on the night of the 13th he took up a position at Liegnitz.

Battle of Liegnitz.—(See Plate 7.)

August 14th. The Prussians, about 30,000 strong, had their right on Schimmelwitz, and their left on Liegnitz; they had only two days' more provisions.

The Austrians, 90,000 strong, were marching on them. Daun from the west, Lacy from the south, and Loudon from the east.

Frederick, seeing the Austrians reconnoitring his position, expected to be attacked on the following morning. He therefore ordered that the sentries and drummers, with the watch fires, should remain on the ground, and that at nightfall, his army should pass over the Schwartzwasser, and take up another position on the heights to the north of Liegnitz with the right on Pfaffendorf, and the left on Wolfsberg. He pointed out the new position to be occupied to his Generals before dark, and at midnight, without any interference, all were posted. He took the immediate command of the left, and Ziethen was placed in charge of the right.

Daun had ordered an attack to be made on Frederick at daylight; he was to take the Prussians in rear, Lacy on the right flank, and Loudon was to leave his camp fires burning, start at nightfall, march down the Katzback, cross it, come up the left bank, and so down on the Prussian left flank.

At 2.30 a.m., the Prussian patrols were driven in by Loudon's advance guard. It had been reported to Loudon that Frederick had sent off a waggon convoy the evening before. Thinking, therefore, that he had come on the escort of it, he pushed on with all speed to capture it. Suddenly, however, the Austrians coming under the Wolfsberg, received a discharge of canister from the Prussian batteries, and also musketry, upon which they withdrew, but Loudon reformed his lines for another assault. He made several attempts to take the position, but without success, and eventually, at 5 a.m., retired. He was

pursued by Frederick's cavalry, driven across the Katzback, and completely routed.

Daun advanced at daybreak. He found the Prussian old camp evacuated, but he continued his march with a view of attacking Frederick in his new position.

The Austrians, however, were unable to cross the Schwartzwasser; the banks were boggy, so they could not ford, and the bridges were all commanded by Ziethen's guns. Daun, seeing Loudon in full retreat, himself drew off.

Frederick was thus almost miraculously saved; he now found himself free. At 9 a.m., putting all the wounded, both Austrians and Prussians, into his empty waggons, and giving the spare muskets to the cavalry to carry, he marched for Parchwitz, and finding that the Austrians made no attempt to follow or intercept him, he continued his march on Breslau, at which place he arrived on August 17th.

The Austrians, in this engagement, lost 4,000 killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners, with 82 guns; the Prussians' loss being only 1,800 killed and wounded.

NOTES.—The escape of Frederick on this occasion seems to have been more by good luck than skill.

No doubt his idea was to march again at daylight for Glogau, but if he had not had the good fortune to defeat Loudon, he would have been attacked, whilst on the march, by Loudon in front and Daun in rear.

The news of this action caused the Russians to retire; Prince Henri followed them.

August 27th. Prince Henri, being ill, handed over the command to General Forcade.

In September Frederick ordered Forcade to join him, which brought his force up to 50,000; with this he operated against the Austrian lines of communication.

The Russians now finding themselves unopposed, sent a force under Tottleben to Berlin; the Austrians also sent Lacy with a column to cooperate with them.

October 9th. They occupied the town.

October 11th. A report reached Berlin that Frederick was


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R. Katzbach
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Hoffendorf
LIEGNITZ
Schimmelwitz
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BATTLE
OF
LEIGNITZ.
for Scale & N point see above

coming, upon which Lacy marched on Torgau, and Tottleben on Frankfurt.

October 15th. Frederick, on his way to Berlin with 44,000 men, received information that the Russians and Austrians had left his capital; he accordingly changed the direction of his march towards Torgau. Daun was at this town, and having been joined by the German army, now mustered 100,000 men.

October 20th. Frederick marched on Jessen, and prepared to cross the river Elbe.

October 26th. The Prussians crossed the river, and Daun moved to Eilenburg to protect Leipsic.

October 29th. Frederick moved to Düben. Daun, hearing of Frederick's advance, returned to his camp at Torgau with 65,000 men.

This camp, to the west of Torgau, on the height called Siptitz, had been entrenched by Prince Henri the previous year; and Daun, although he had made several attempts, had been unable to take it.

November 2nd. Frederick marched to Schilda, with a view of attacking the Austrians from thence.

Battle of Torgau—(See Plate 8.)

November 3rd. At 6 a.m. Frederick marched through the woods to the west, in four columns, but being afraid lest his plan of attack should be made known to Daun, he issued no orders on the previous evening.

He took Ziethen into his carriage, and explained to him *en route* that he was to take the right column along the Eilenburg road to Klitschen, then up the Butter Strasse to the Siptitz height, whilst he himself led the other columns through the woods, and attacked the height from the north-west.

The attack was to be simultaneous, and as Frederick had to march ten miles further than Ziethen, the latter was to wait for the former, before commencing.

Frederick's flank march was reported to Daun; he accordingly changed his front towards the north, and detached Lacy, with 20,000 men, towards the lake, to protect his rear.

Ziethen very soon came on the Austrian picquets, which he drove in, and eventually on Lacy's force, which retired eastwards, towards Torgau, and which he followed. On reaching the brook Röhrgraben the Austrians halted, and taking up a position on the Torgau side of it, they turned about to dispute the further advance of the Prussians.

Frederick was with the right column, and hearing Ziethen in action, fancied he was attacking the Siptitz height; he therefore hurried forward the march of his column, and emerged from the wood about Neiden, meaning to attack from thence; but on reconnoitring he observed that the strong abbatis which Prince Henri had put along the front of the position in the previous year had been removed at the north-west angle (it had been taken by the Austrians for firewood), he therefore took ground to his right, and marched through the wood, until opposite this corner; he then came out of the wood, and wheeled into line, about 800 yards from the Austrians.

The Austrians had 400 guns in position and from them opened a terrible fire on the Prussian line; Frederick sent to hasten the march of the other two columns, but they had some difficulty in getting through the wood; he heard Ziethen still engaged, and becoming impatient, he ordered the 8,000 men he already had in line to attack the position.

It was about two o'clock; they advanced under a very heavy fire, and succeeded in reaching the crest of the hill, but were then hurled back and pursued to the wood. Frederick, not having any cavalry with him, was unable to charge the pursuing Austrians. They, however, returned to their position, and Frederick reformed his line.

At about 3 p.m. the Prussian column, under Hülsen, arrived, and Frederick formed up these fresh troops for another attack, although the cavalry had not yet come up. The Prussians made a most desperate effort to gain the height, but were again driven back. In this attack both Frederick and Daun were wounded, but neither severely.

At 4.30 p.m. the Prussian cavalry, came in sight about

Neiden, and Frederick again formed up his infantry for the purpose of making another attempt, and this time it was supported by the cavalry.

The Prussians, although not driven back on this occasion, were unable to take the height; they continued fighting till dark, when they fell back to the the woods, leaving the Austrians in full possession of their position. Each force bivouacked on their ground, facing each other. Frederick gave over the command to Hülsen, going to the village of Elsnig to have his wound dressed, intending to renew the attack on the following morning.

Daun also handed over the command of the Austrians to O'Donnell (an Irishman), and went to Torgau.

Ziethen's generals (who had been very impatient at not being able to assist the King in his attack) urged upon him the necessity of moving to the left, so as to join on to Frederick's right; at six o'clock, therefore, Ziethen did move up the brook, and on reaching the Butter Strasse a bridge was discovered over the brook, immediately opposite the Siptitz.

Ziethen passed all his force over the bridge, and, having done nothing all day, he thought to improve matters by storming the height in the dark.

This he did with success. Hülsen, hearing the firing, immediately advanced, and ordered his drummers to beat the Prussian calls, so as to make himself known to Ziethen's troops. The Austrians were driven back somewhat in confusion, and, having lost their height which commanded their position, they retired, and formed up in a semi-circle round Torgau, with the Prussians opposite to them.

At nine o'clock, when Daun heard that Siptitz had been lost, he ordered a retreat across the river. It was well conducted, and it was not until 1 a.m. that the Prussians became aware of what was going on; they then pushed into Torgau.

Lacy retired by the left bank of the Elbe, so as to cover Daun's retreat, and thus they both reached Dresden.

The Prussians were in great disorder and did not pursue.

Frederick did not know of the victory until late in the morning, when Ziethen, who went in search of him, met him with the joyful news.

On hearing of this battle the Russians retired to Poland.

Daun went to Vienna on account of his wound.

The Austrians lost 11,000 men killed and wounded, 8,000 prisoners and 45 guns.

The Prussians lost 14,000 killed and wounded.

Frederick took up a position near Meissen, and the Austrians occupied Dresden, where both forces remained for the winter.

This was Frederick's last battle.

NOTES.—The idea of the attack, as conceived by Frederick, would undoubtedly have been successful, if it had been fully developed, but when columns are separated in this way, without telegraphic communication between them to report any unlooked for contingency, a plan such as this is difficult to carry out.

It may be said that Ziethen should not have left the Butter Strasse, but, under any circumstances, he could not have advanced, with Lacy on his flank, without detaching a large part of his force to keep the Austrians in check, and then he would have had very few to storm the Siptitz.

The Prussians were greatly assisted by the wood in front of the Austrian position, both in covering their march and in rallying their repulsed troops. We hereby see the defect of a wood in front of a position.

It is a matter of note how the Prussian generals then, as now, support each other. Hülsen, on hearing the firing, immediately advanced, making himself known in the dark with familiar national calls.

Next year Frederick moved his army into Silesia, leaving Prince Henri to defend Saxony. He manœuvred against Loudon, who was in command of the Austrians, and the Russians, but came to no battle. The Austrians, however, captured Schweidnitz.

Christmas Day, 1761. The Empress of Russia died, and her successor, Peter III., made peace with Frederick.

In 1762 Frederick manœuvred against Daun, who having recovered himself, again assumed the command of the Austrians, but only a few minor engagements took place.

August 7th. Frederick laid siege to Schweidnitz, and on October 7th he retook the town.

Thus the Prussians again became possessed of Silesia.


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October 29th. Prince Henri fought a battle at Freyberg against the Austro-German army, in which he was successful. This finished the Seven Years' War.

November 24th. The Austrians made a truce; and on February 5th, 1763, peace was signed. Silesia was to remain Prussian, and Saxony was to be restored to the Saxons.

NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, 1796-7.

THE French Republic declared war against every nation, with a view of exterminating all kings in Europe.

In 1796 Napoleon was given the command of the French army, which was assembled in the Riviera, with the object of invading Italy.

His force was a follows:—

1st division—8,000 men, under La Harpe, at Savona, with an advanced brigade of 4,000 men, under Cervoni, at Voltri.

2nd division—8,000 men, under Massena, at Cadibona.

3rd division—8,000 men, under Augereau, at St. Giacomo.

4th division—7,000 men, under Surrurier, at Ormea.

5th division—4,000 men, under Macquard, at Col di Tenda.

6th division—3,000 men, under Gariner, at Col di Tenda.

A force of about 20,000 men, under Kellerman, was to operate in conjunction with this army, crossing the Alps at Mont Cenis.

Napoleon held the passes, and his line of communication was by Nice.

The English had command of the sea.

The force opposed to the French consisted of Austrians and Sardinians.

20,000 Sardinians, under Colli, at Ceva.

12,000 Austrians, under Argenteau, at Sassello.

14,000 Austrians, under Lebottendorf, at Voltaggio.

General Beaulieu, an Austrian, was in command of both armies—46,000 men and 84 guns.

The allies were spread out over nearly 70 miles, watching the approaches over the mountains.

The Sardinians' base was Turin, and that of the Austrians by the river Mincio.

Their plan of operations was to advance from their left, closing on their right, and thus drive the French out of the Riviera, communicating with the English fleet.

The object of the French was to separate the Sardinians from the Austrians, make an alliance with the former, and so gain a footing in Italy for further operations against the Austrians.

April 10th. Both armies assumed the offensive.

The Austrians attacked the French brigade at Voltri and drove it back to Savona; Beaulieu thus established his communication with the English fleet.

The French picquets at Montenotte were also driven in by the Austrians under Argenteau.

The French advanced at the same time:

1st division on Monte Legino.

2nd division on Cairo.

3rd division on Cairo.

April 11th. The French continued to advance.

April 12th. French 1st division attacked the Austrian force under Argenteau in front, and the 2nd division on the flank.

The Austrians were defeated, losing 2,000 men, and retreated on Dego.

April 13th. Beaulieu, hearing of the defeat of his right wing, ordered all to retire on Acqui.

French—1st division moved on Sassello.

2nd division moved on Cairo.

3rd division moved on Millesimo.

April 14th. The French 1st and 2nd divisions again attacked the Austrians at Dego, and obliged them to continue their retreat.

The Sardinians concentrated at Ceva.

April 15th. Napoleon determined to advance against the

Sardinians; he ordered the 1st division to watch the Austrians at Acqui, and he directed the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions, to march on Ceva.

April 19th. The French attacked the Sardinians at Ceva and turned their position, upon which Colli retired in good order to Mondovi.

April 22nd. The French followed them up and again attacked and defeated them, whereupon Colli retreated to Fossano.

April 23rd. They made overtures for peace, but the French continued to advance.

April 24th. The Austrians moved on Alba, with a view of rejoining the Sardinians.

April 25th. The Sardinians retreated on Turin.

April 28th. They concluded peace with Napoleon, giving up to him the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona and Coni. He then advanced against the Austrians, who retired across the river Po.

NOTES.—Napoleon here first distinguished himself by his strategy. He drove his army, like a wedge, into the centre of his opponents, and thus separated their forces; he detained one part of them with a division, whilst he fell with his main body on the other, and having defeated that, he returned to complete his victory by reinforcing his detaining division, and attacking the other portion of his enemy.

Napoleon's rapidity of movement astonished both the Austrian and Sardinian commanders, and when they were once separated he gave them no time to re-unite. Each commander had to look to his own line of retreat, which it may be said were at right angles to one another.

Napoleon now found himself in possession of large stores and supplies, and was in a position to equip his army, which was very ill provided, for a further advance against the Austrians.

In the treaty with the king of Sardinia, a clause was inserted by which the French army was permitted to cross the Po at Valenza. Beaulieu therefore was prepared to dispute the passage of the river at that point, but Napoleon moved on Piacenza, and crossed there without opposition.

The river Ticino was thus turned.

The Austrians reinforced assembled at Pavia 40,000 men, with 120 guns, and Beaulieu advanced against the French.

The French 1st division was surprised at night, and La Harpe killed, but the Austrians were eventually compelled to retire.

Before advancing however against the Austrians, Napoleon, to secure his rear, occupied Parma, and there raised more contributions of supplies and equipment.

May 8th. He again set his army in motion towards Milan.

The Austrians had their right wing in front of Milan, and their left at Crema, with 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 20 guns, holding the bridge of Lodi over the river Adda.

Napoleon thought that, by carrying the bridge, he would cut off the Austrian force at Milan.

He arrived opposite the bridge with his van-guard, and sending the cavalry across the river by a ford, he formed up 6,000 men in close column, under cover of the houses, to storm it. He placed his artillery in position and opened fire on the Austrian guns, and when their fire was somewhat slackened, he ordered the assault. The leading ranks were swept away, but Napoleon, rallying them, placed himself at their head and carried the bridge. Other infantry waded the river, and the Austrians being driven back, retired, leaving their 20 guns in the hands of the French. Whilst this engagement was being fought, the Austrian main body retired on Brescia, and afterwards behind the river Mincio, leaving Milan to its fate.

May 15th. Napoleon entered Milan. The 4th division was posted at Cremona, to observe Mantua, and the 3rd division occupied Pavia.

There were 2,000 Austrians left in Milan citadel, which was invested.

Napoleon moved his head-quarters to Lodi.

May 28th. The French continued to advance, and entered Brescia.

May 29th. They forced the passage of the Mincio, attacked the Austrians at Valeggio, and defeated them, taking 1,200 prisoners and 5 guns.

Beaulieu retired up the valley Adige, and took up a position.

Peschiera was evacuated by the Austrians, and occupied by the French.

The French 2nd division was advanced to Verona, which fortress was occupied by Venetian troops. The Venetian Republic hesitated whether they should fight for the Austrians, or endeavour to make terms with the French; they eventually decided on the latter course, and Massena entered Verona in the beginning of June.

Mantua was occupied by an Austrian force of 14,000 men, and the French blockaded the town with 15,000, under Surrurier.

Napoleon now determined to march south, towards the states of the Church. He left 20,000 men on the Adige to cover the blockade of Mantua, and crossed the Apennines with the 3rd division. He occupied Modena, Bologna, Genoa, Leghorn, and Florence, raising contributions at each place. The Pope sent an ambassador to offer his submission, whereupon an armistice was agreed to. Bologna and Ferrara were to remain in the hands of the French.

Beaulieu retired to Roveredo, where he intrenched himself, and awaited reinforcements.

By the middle of July the Austrian reinforcements arrived, 30,000 men under Marshal Wurmser, who assumed the chief command.

This made the Austrian army now 60,000 strong. Napoleon had only 55,000 men in Italy, of whom 15,000 were employed in blockading Mantua, and 10,000 men in keeping open his communications. He had not, therefore, more than 30,000 men to operate with against the Austrians.

He placed Massena, with 15,000 men, at Rivoli; Despinoy, with 5,000, at Verona; and Augereau, with 8,000, at Legnago

The Austrian General's plan was to make a demonstration towards Verona, and march down on both sides of the Lago di Garda, so as to enclose the French.

20,000 Austrians were sent by the west of the lake under Quasdanovick, and Wurmser took the command of the other

40,000. He marched a division on Verona by the left flank of the Adige, and with the remainder, on July 29th, he attacked Massena, who was compelled to retire on Peschiera.

Quasdanovick took Brescia.

July 31st. Napoleon ordered Surrurier to raise the siege of Mantua, and join him.

The French army was concentrated near Peschiera, and Napoleon, leaving the 2nd division under Massena to watch Wurmser, crossed the river Mincio, and marched against Quasdanovick. He attacked and retook Brescia, and drove the Austrians back towards the mountains. Wurmser, evading Massena, marched on Mantua, which fortress he entered on the 1st August.

Wurmser, on hearing of Quasdonovick's retreat, ordered him to advance again, in conjunction with himself.

Napoleon now concentrated his army, including the 2nd division, on the river Chiese.

August 3rd. The Austrians, advancing from Mantua, occupied Castiglione and Lonato.

Napoleon moved forward to attack Lonato with 23,000 men. The 3rd division was sent to detain the Austrians at Castiglione.

Battle of Lonato—(See Plate 9.)

The fighting at Lonato was severe; the Austrians at first drove back the French, and captured three guns. They however weakened their line by extending to their right flank, with the object of enveloping the French, and opening communications with Quasdanovick, whose guns they heard.

Napoleon, on seeing this, seized the opportunity of attacking the Austrian centre. He took Lonato, and thus divided their line; the left wing retreated to the river Mincio, and the right moved towards Salo. But this place was in possession of the French; the retreating Austrians were stopped here and surrounded; 3,000 of them had to surrender with 20 guns.

Augereau attacked the Austrians at Castiglione. He sent a regiment (three battalions) round their right flank, and himself attacked with all his force in their centre. After hard fighting

the Austrians gave way, and being surprised by a French battalion, which succeeded in getting in rear of them, they retired towards Mantua.

NOTES.—The Austrian General, by dividing his army, gave Napoleon an opportunity of placing himself in between the parts. He was thus able to fall on each separately, before they could come together sufficiently near to act conjointly.

At the engagement at Lonato, the Austrians made the great mistake of weakening their line, by over extending, with a view of outflanking. This enabled Napoleon to penetrate their centre, and so defeat them.

BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE.—(See Plate 9.)

August 4th. Napoleon concentrated his troops at Lonato, and sent two divisions against Quasdanovich.

August 5th. Wurmser collected 25,000 men and took up a position, with his right on the heights of Solferino and his left on a mill at Medola.

Napoleon formed up his troops, 23,000, to attack him. The 1st division (which was now under the command of Verdier) on the right, 3rd division in the centre, and the 2nd division on the left.

The 4th division was in the neighbourhood of Mantua, and Napoleon sent orders to Surrurier to attack the Austrian rear, whilst he engaged them in front.

The Austrian line was extended beyond the heights, and occupied more ground than they could properly defend.

Napoleon, after concentrating his artillery fire on Medola Mill, ordered it to be attacked with three battalions of Grenadiers. The post was carried. Just at this time the 4th division arrived to attack the Austrian rear, which caused great confusion amongst them. Napoleon seized this opportunity to make a general advance. The Austrians, unable to resist these attacks, fell back to the high ground, and retired across the river Mincio.

The French did not pursue the Austrians vigorously, as their troops were much fatigued.

August 6th. The 2nd division marched on Peschiera and took the town.

Napoleon moved on Verona.

The Austrians retired to their old position at Roveredo.

The fortress of Mantua had been revictualled, and a garrison of 15,000 Austrians left there.

The French 2nd division was moved up to Rivoli, and Mantua was again reinvested.

NOTES.—The advance of the French 4th division was fatal to the Austrians; their left flank, assailed on all sides, was necessarily obliged to give way, and Wurmser had no alternative but to fall back to the high ground.

Had the Austrians been less extended, they might have opposed the advance of the French 4th division.

The Austrian manœuvres, which had for their object the relief of Mantua and the surrounding of the French, were not successful; after several days severe fighting, they found themselves in just the same position that they were before they advanced. Wurmser succeeded in revictualling Mantua, but in doing so he lost several thousands of men. His cause of failure was the division of his forces in such a manner as to render the combined action of the parts impossible.

During the next three weeks, the troops on each side remained inactive.

The French were augmented from Kellerman's army; the Austrians also received reinforcements, and by the end of August each army was about 50,000 strong. In the beginning of September operations recommenced.

Wurmser's plan was to leave 20,000 men, under Davidovick, to guard Roveredo, and with 30,000 to move by the Brenta pass to Bassano and Padua, to the relief of Mantua.

Napoleon also decided to assume the offensive about the same time.

He left garrisons at Legnago and Verona, 10,000 men to invest Mantua, and with 30,000 he advanced up the river Adige, with a view of attacking the Austrians.

September 2nd. He attacked Davidovick with the 2nd and 3rd divisions, and took the position at Roveredo; he pursued the Austrians and drove them through Trent; they retired into the Tyrol.

Wurmser continued his advance, thinking to seize Verona


LAGO
DI
GARDA
to Salo
to Peschiera
R. Chiese
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CASTIGLIONE
Solferino
2
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1
Mill
4
to Mantua
Medola
for Scale and N point see above

whilst Napoleon was in the mountains, and close the passes to prevent his return to Italy. Napoleon decided to follow Wurmser over the Brenta Pass, and thus take him in rear.

September 7th. He came upon the Austrian rear-guard at Primolano, which he attacked.

The Austrian van-guard had this day reached Verona, and was engaging the French picquets, when Wurmser heard of the attack on his rear-guard. He immediately returned to Bassano, and there took up a position with 20,000 men.

The French 2nd and 3rd division, on issuing from the defiles, advanced to the attack of the Austrians, and drove them from their position. They were separated; Quasdanovick, with about 3,000, made for the mountains, and Wurmser, with the remainder, moved towards Mantua.

Wurmser, having no pontoons, would not have been able to cross the river Adige, had it not been that the French garrison was withdrawn from Legnago to reinforce the garrison at Verona on the approach of the Austrians to that place. As it was, however, he succeeded in reaching Mantua, although closely pursued by the French.

The French 3rd division retook Legnago.

September 19th. The French 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions attacked Wurmser, who was in front of Mantua, and drove him into the town.

During these operations the French lost upwards of 15,000 men.

Both forces now remained inactive, and recruited themselves.

NOTES.—Napoleon decided to advance against the Austrians before he was aware of their movements, and it was not until he became involved in his enterprise amongst the Tyrol mountains, that he discovered the object of Wurmser's manœuvres. He immediately determined on the bold course of following his adversary, instead of falling back on Verona. This was very hazardous, insomuch as a failure would have left him no retreat; but the very boldness of the movement so surprised the Austrians, that they were defeated by a smaller force than they themselves had.

These manœuvres scarcely afford us an example of strategy, but show what may be done by a bold stroke, and that an able commander, if he has confidence in himself and his troops, may sometimes take such liberties with success.

By the end of October the Austrians had 40,000 men, under

Alvinzi, in the mountains about Brenta; 18,000 men, under Davidovick, in the Tyrol; and about 16,000 men in Mantua, of which, however, 10,000 are said to have been in hospital.

The French had also received reinforcements from the army in the Alps.

Napoleon placed 12,000 men in front of Trent, under Vaubois; 20,000 men, under Massena, at Bassano, observing Alvinzi; and 10,000 investing Mantua.

November 1st. Alvinzi advanced towards Bassano.

Massena fell back before the Austrians, being outnumbered, to Vicenza.

November 6th. The French concentrated and formed up, under Napoleon, to resist Alvinzi's advance.

The Austrians were defeated, and had to retire back to the mountains.

November 1st. The French, under Vaubois, attacked the Austrians in the Tyrol under Davidovick; they were, however, repulsed, and driven back through Trent towards Verona. On receiving this intelligence, Napoleon, instead of following up the Austrians, retired on Verona, and Alvinzi again assumed the offensive.

Napoleon hastened in person to Vaubois, taking with him what troops could be spared from Verona. He found Vaubois at Rivoli; here he reinforced and reformed his troops, and by showing a strong front caused Davidovick to halt.

Napoleon, hearing of Alvinzi's advance, returned to Verona.

November 10th. He reached Verona, and found his army in position on the heights of Caldiero, covering the road to Verona. Alvinzi was immediately in front, with his right on high ground and his left on the marshes of Arcole.

November 11th. Napoleon attacked the Austrians, but was repulsed, and had to draw back to his old position at night-fall.

The next two days the armies remained inactive.

Battle of Arcole.—(See Plate 10.)

November 14th. At night Napoleon retired to Verona, crossed the river Adige, and marched down the right bank to

Ronco, where there was a bridge. Here he recrossed the river, with a view of turning the left flank of the Austrians, who were still in the same position that he had attempted to carry by a front attack.

The village of Arcole stands on marshes, and is approached from the river Adige by a road on a narrow causeway, whilst another leads from the river to Verona.

Napoleon considered that by advancing along these roads his leading troops would be able to drive back any the enemy could bring against him, and by this means he could surprise and turn the Austrian flank.

November 15th. At daybreak the 2nd division advanced on the left road towards Verona, the 3rd division on Arcole, and a force, under Guieux, crossed the Adige lower down and moved up the left bank of the river Alpon.

At the bridge leading over the Alpon, at the village of Arcole, the Austrians were found to be in force, and the fight for its possession was very severe. The firing here attracted Alvinzi's attention; he sent two divisions to arrest the march of Massena, and directed other troops on Arcole, whilst he changed his position.

The French fought desparately for the possession of the bridge at Arcole, but were unable to gain it. Napoleon himself sieZed a standard, and, under a terrible fire, led his grenadiers; but they could not carry the bridge. It was not until Guieux arrived and took the Austrians in the rear that they abandoned Arcole; but it was too late for Napoleon. Alvinzi had changed his front, and was now drawn up facing the village.

At nightfall Napoleon drew back his troops to the right bank of the Adige.

November 16th. The Austrians advanced along the causeways to the attack of the French, and assaulted the village Ronco; but after fighting all day, they were driven back, and had to retire across the river Alpon.

November 17th. Both armies advanced, and met in the middle of the causeways.

Massena was only just able to hold his ground, but the centre

column gained an advantage. Napoleon secreted a battalion amongst some willows, and retired, thus drawing the Austrians into the ambush; and when they were surprised in flank, he took the opportunity of the panic to drive them back.

He now passed the greater part of his troops over the Alpon. He formed with his left on the river and his right towards Legnago. He sent orders for a part of the garrison of Legnago, with four guns, to issue forth and march on the enemy's rear; he also sent all his trumpeters into some willows on his left flank, to sound the charge as soon as he became fully engaged.

He then advanced to the attack, and Alvinzi hearing the guns in his rear and the trumpeters sounding on his right flank, thought it advisable to retire, which retirement he continued till he reached Vicenza, and on the following day he retreated across the Brenta.

Whilst these three days' fighting had been going on in the marshes of Arcole, Davidovick attacked Vaubois at Rivoli, and compelled him to retreat towards Verona.

Nov. 18th. Napoleon advanced to the assistance of Vaubois, Davidovick was driven back into the Tyrol, and the French took up their position again at Rivoli.

In these actions the French lost 15,000 men, and the Austrians 18,000.

The garrison of Mantua, under Wurmser, made several sorties during these eventful days; but were unable to break through the French lines.

NOTES.—The Austrians were nearly double the number of the French about Verona. It was only natural, therefore, that the latter were unsuccessful in their direct attack. It would seem that Napoleon expected to be attacked by the Austrians on the 12th and 13th November, and why Alvinzi did not make an effort it is difficult to understand. Napoleon's design of turning the Austrian's left flank is an instructive example. It would probably have been successful had he carried Arcole at once, but the delay caused by the stout resistance of the Austrians, who held this outpost, gave Alvinzi time to change his position

These Austrians, who devoted themselves to this service, by their gallantry probably saved their army from utter defeat.

Napoleon now made overtures for peace, which caused a sus-

pension of hostilities until the beginning of January, 1797. During this time each army received considerable reinforcements.

The French had 46,000 men; 10,000 investing Mantua, and the remainder on the river Adige.

The Austrians had 55,000 men in the Tyrol, and Wurmser, with his garrison, locked up in Mantua.

Alvinzi decided to make another attempt to relieve Mantua. He again divided his army into two parts; 15,000 men under Provera he sent by Bassano, and with 40,000 men he marched down the Adige.

January 12th.—The Austrian advanced guard reached Monte Baldo above Rivoli, and drove in the French piquets. On the same day the Austrians at Bassano drove back the French videttes.

January 13th.—Napoleon having ascertained that Alvinzi was approaching from the upper Adige, moved the greater part of his troops to Rivoli; he collected there about 30,000 men and 60 guns, and took up a position in front of the village facing Monte Baldo.

Alvinzi's force was formed into five divisions, and his plan of attack was as follows.

One division, under Quasdanovick, was to move along the high road on the right bank of river to turn the French right; three divisions were to attack the front of the position; and the other division, under Lusignan, was to move down the left bank, cross the river, and thus gain the plateau, taking the French in rear.

Battle of Rivoli—(See Plate 10.)

January 14th. The Austrians advanced, and drove in the French skirmishers.

At nine o'clock the French left was attacked, and gave way. Napoleon had to send his reserve, under Massena, to their support. The French right, under Joubert, was also driven back, and at the same time Quasdanovick's division appeared

coming up the height on their right flank, and Lusignan in their rear. All seemed at this moment lost to the French, but Napoleon, to gain time, sent a flag of truce to Alvinzi, stating that a courier had arrived with despatches from Paris, and he had some propositions to make. By this means he gained a suspension of hostilities for an hour, which time he employed in rearranging his troops. Massena's division strengthened the front line, Joubert's was drawn up to oppose Quasdanovick, and a battalion was sent to some high ground at Tiffaro to check the advance of Lusignan.

When Junot, who had gone to the head-quarters of the Austrians returned, the fighting recommenced.

The head of Quasdanovick's column was fiercely attacked, with artillery fire and musketry, and charged on the flank with cavalry. The leading columns broke, and were thrown back upon those in rear, which caused considerable confusion.

Napoleon now being relieved from the attack on his right flank, turned his attention to his front. He brought back Joubert's division to the support of the front line, and ordered a general advance; the Austrians were repulsed, and retired to Monte Baldo. Lusignan had now gained the plateau, but it was too late. The Austrian front and flank attacks having been repulsed, the French were left free to engage him. For some time his division stood its ground, but at last he was compelled to retreat, and, in so doing, met a French division under Rey, which was coming up the Adige to reinforce Napoleon.

Lusignan thus became surrounded, and his division were all made prisoners.

The rest of the Austrians retired up the Adige.

NOTES.—One can scarcely admire the artifice by which Napoleon gained the battle of Rivoli. Had he not obtained the hour's suspension of hostilities his army would probably have been defeated.

The Austrians' attack seems to have been well planned, and well carried out, until the time came when the fighting was stopped, by what no doubt Quasdanovick thought was a surrender.

As soon as the Battle of Rivoli was over Napoleon hastened


to Verona
Caldiero
to Vicenza
St. Bonifacio
to Verona
R. Alpone
R Adige
ARCOLE
Ronco
1 2 3 4 miles
to Legnago
Monte Baldo
Tiffaro
RIVOLI
R Adige
for Scale and N point see above

to Verona to the assistance of his troops on the lower Adige, taking with him part of the 2nd division.

Provera was fast approaching Mantua.

January 16th. Both Provera and Napoleon arrived before the fortress at the same time; with the aid the latter brought to the investing army, the French were enabled to defeat Provera and drive back the Austrians, who made a sortie from the fortress.

Alvinzi reformed his troops about Trent, and Provera retired to Bassano.

February 2nd. Mantua capitulated; Napoleon allowed Wurmser to return to Austria with all his staff and 500 men; the remainder of the garrison were sent to Trieste to be exchanged for French prisoners.

Napoleon's army now received considerable reinforcements, and by the end of February numbered 71,000 men.

He placed—Massena,	2nd	division,	at Bassano.
Serrurier,	4th	„	at Castelbaldo.
Augereau,	3rd	„	at Treviso.
Bernadotte,	7th	„	at Padua.
Joubert,	1st	„	in the Tyrol.
Delmas	8th	„	„ „
Baraguay d'Hilliers,	5th	„	„ „

and 16,000 men on the line of communications.

The Austrians were also reinforcing their army, and it was placed under the command of the Archduke Charles.

By the beginning of March the Archduke assembled 35,000 men on the river Piave, and 15,000 men in the Tyrol, but the greater part of the reinforcements had not yet arrived.

March 10th. The French 2nd division advanced from Bassano, crossed the Piave, and attacked and drove back an Austrian division under Lusignan, who was himself taken prisoner. This exposed the Austrian right flank; the Archduke accordingly retired behind the river Tagliamento.

March 16th. Napoleon, with the 4th, 3rd, and 7th divisions, advanced against Archduke Charles, and on reaching the right

bank of the Tagliamento, he found the Austrians in position on the opposite side.

After reconnoitering the position, he deemed it too strong to attack, so he ordered a retreat. Having retired a short distance he halted, formed a bivouac, and began to "cook dinners." The Archduke, thinking that Napoleon had decided not to attack him that day, allowed his men to leave their positions and return to their camp. When Napoleon saw the Austrians quietly settled down, he ordered his men to get under arms, and advance in échelon from the left. The French moved forward with great precision aud rapidity, and crossed the river before the Austrians could reoccupy their position. The Archduke, finding his flank turned, retired.

Massena, with 2nd division, was advanced to Ponteba.

March 17th. Napoleon occupied Palma Nova, and on the following days pushed forward to the river Isonzo, the Archduke falling back before him.

The French still continued to advance.

7th division occupied Laibach.

4th division marched up the Isonzo, and Trieste was occupied.

2nd division reached the ridge of the Tarvis Mountain. The Archduke made a desperate effort to dislodge Massena from this position, but without avail; he held his ground, and the 4th division coming up the Isonzo, compelled the Austrians to retire.

Klagenfurth was occupied by the French, the fortifications restored, and a magazine formed there.

The French in the Tyrol also advanced with success under Joubert; they occupied Bolzano after severe fighting, and leaving the 8th division there, Joubert pushed on to Brixen, and from thence to Klagenfurth, where he joined Napoleon about the beginning of April.

Napoleon now endeavoured to make terms of peace with the Archduke, but being unable to get a satisfactory reply, he continued to advance.

April 7th. The Austrians, becoming alarmed for the safety

of their capital, agreed to a suspension of arms, by which the French were to occupy the Simmering Pass and Gratz.

Shortly afterwards a peace was concluded: Flanders and Savoy were given to France, and the French frontier was extended to the Rhine. A Cisalpine Republic was to be established in Lombardy and Modena, and the Austrians were to reoccupy the north of Italy as far as the river Oglio.

NOTES.—Napoleon's rapid advance gave the Archduke no time to bring up his reinforcements. He lost the best chance he had of checking the French at Tagliamento; it seems difficult to understand how the Austrians can have been so easily taken in, more especially after their experience at Rivoli.

The object of advancing in echelon at the battle of Tagliamento was not only to gain the enemy's flank, but also that the entire front line might not be committed to the passage of the river at the same time, the flank that was retired was prepared to protect the one advanced whilst crossing, and when across the advanced flank protected the rear in their passage.

Napoleon did not stop the march of his troops for a moment until the suspension of arms was signed.

THE MARENGO CAMPAIGN.

March 12th, 1799. Russian troops having been brought into Austria, the French again declared war.

Melas was in command of the Austrians in Italy, and he drove the French back over the Apennines into the Riviera; in these operations Joubert was killed.

The French invaded Germany, but were unable to make much progress, and towards the autumn they retired, and took up positions on their own side of the Rhine.

June 4th. A French force, under Massena, defeated an Imperial force at Zurich, which caused the Russians to make peace with France, and left the French in possession of Switzerland.

During this time Napoleon was in Egypt, on a fruitless and unsuccessful expedition. He returned to France 8th October, but was unable to bring his troops back with him, as Nelson had destroyed all the French ships at the Battle of the Nile.

On Napoleon's return to Paris he assumed the direction of the operations.

He sent Massena to take command of the army in the Riviera, which consisted of 30,000 men—namely, 18,000 men on the right under Soult, 12,000 in the centre under Suchet, and 6,000 on the left under Thurreau; this last division watched the passes over the Alps.

Massena's orders were to hold on to Genoa at all costs.

The Austrians had three corps opposed to the French, consisting of 100,000 men.

Right under	Kaim ...	... 35,000.
Centre „	Melas ...	... 40,000.
Left „	Ott ...	... 25,000.

Melas being the Commander-in-Chief.

The winter was very severe, so that no operations could be undertaken in the mountains.

Towards the end of March, 1800, Melas concentrated at Acqui, with a view of attacking the French centre; Ott was ordered to march on Genoa, and Kaim was to be left in Italy to watch the Alps and cover the communications.

April 20th. Melas, passing the Apennines, reached Savona, driving Massena into Genoa, and Suchet back towards France (Soult was wounded in the thigh and made a prisoner); Genoa was invested by the Austrians under Ott.

May 11th. Suchet crossed the river Var, and took up a position, which he entrenched.

May 22nd. The Austrians attacked him, but they were repulsed, the French holding their ground in two successive attacks.

The French Army of the Rhine, under Moreau, advanced on the 25th April against the Austrians under Kray, and by manœuvring and engaging in some successful actions compelled them to fall back upon Ulm. During these operations Napoleon made secret arrangements to collect an army in Switzerland, to pass the Alps, descend into the Italian plains, and cut Melas's lines of communications.

The left wing, 16,000 men, under Moncey, detached from Moreau's army, was to cross the St. Gothard.

The centre, 40,000 men, under Napoleon himself, was to cross the Great St. Bernard.

The right wing, 5,000 men, under General Chabran, was to cross the Little St. Bernard; and Thurreau, with 4,000 men, was to descend from Mont Cenis.

In order to conceal his intentions, Napoleon proclaimed that the army to relieve the siege of Genoa would be assembled at Dijon, and march from thence to the Var. Here he got together about 8,000 invalids and conscripts, and reviewed them in the presence of Austrian spies. Melas, by this means, was completely deceived.

May 16th. Napoleon's army commenced the passage of the mountains.

It was divided into four corps:—

1st under Lannes.

2nd under Duhesme.

3rd under Victor.

4th under Murat; this corps consisted of one division under Monnier, and two brigades of cavalry.

The guns had to be taken off their carriages and placed on sledges, and the carriages were taken to pieces and packed on mules.

In four days the army had crossed the mountains and reached Aosta.

May 20th. The advanced guard, under Lannes, was brought to a check by the Fort at Bard, which stands on a rock in the middle of a narrow valley.

May 21st. Lannes, unable to take the Fort, passed his corps round it by mountain paths at night, the guns being dragged by artillerymen round the Fort with muffled wheels.

May 22nd. Lannes attacked and took Ivrea. The rest of Napoleon's army passed Fort Bard as the 1st corps had done.

May 27th. The army concentrated about Ivrea, with advanced posts on the river Po. Chabran arrived in the Aosta valley, and was ordered to invest Fort Bard (which capitulated on 5th June).

Thurreau attacked and took Susa.

Melas, on hearing of the passage of the French army over the Alps ordered his corps to return across the Apennines, leaving only Elsnitz with 18,000 men in the Riviera. He proceeded himself with all speed to Turin, where he massed together Kaim's corps, and formed them up to dispute the passage of the Po, and prevent the advance of the French on the capital, which he conceived to be the design of Napoleon.

May 28th. Napoleon, leaving Lannes at Chivasso to engage the attention of the Austrians, marched for Milan.

May 29th. Lannes moved his left across the river Sesia, and marched on Pavia, which place he took and occupied.

May 31st. Napoleon crossed the Ticino, driving back a division of the Austrians under Wukassowich, who, pressed

in front by Napoleon, and on the right flank by Moncey's corps, which was coming down from St. Gothard, retired behind the river Adda. Melas ordered Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, Elsnitz to retire by Coni and Asti, and a concentration of all his troops at Alessandria.

June 2nd. Napoleon entered Milan.

Suchet attacked Elsnitz in his retreat across the Apennines, and the Austrian general on reaching Ceva had only 8,000 men.

Ott was, at the time he received Melas' order, on the point of entering into negotiations with Massena for the capitulation of Genoa: anxious to effect this, he did not move until June 4th, the day on which Massena surrendered. Massena was allowed to join Suchet, which he did at Savona.

June 6th. Fort Bard having capitulated, Chabran moved down to Chivasso to watch the river Po. Moncey's corps occupied Milan and Pavia, and carried on the observation of the river from the left of Chabran's force; they also observed Wukassowich. The other French corps moved to their left, and crossed the river Po: 1st corps at Belgiojoso, and others at Piacenza and Cremona.

June 9th. Ott on his march came upon the French 1st corps, and took up a position with about 15,000 men at Motebello, his right resting on the mountains and his left on the plains.

Lannes had only 9,000 men, but his back was to the river, and he thought that his best plan was to advance boldly to the attack at once, trusting that he would be supported by the corps coming up from Piacenza and Cremona. He advanced in echelon against the Austrian right, and took some of the hills on which they were posted, but eventually the French were driven back. At this critical moment the French 3rd corps arrived on the field, and the French columns being reformed, the attack on the Austrians was renewed. Towards the end of the day, Napoleon, with fresh troops, came up, and the Austrian right flank was turned.

Ott then retreated behind the river Scrivia to Alessandria.

After this engagement Napoleon remained for the next three

days in position at Stradella, rearranging his troops and outposts with the full expectation of being attacked, or that an endeavour would be made to break through his line.

General Desaix joined the army from Egypt, and Napoleon placed him in command of the 2nd corps. The French now here amounted to about 29,000 men.

June 12th. Napoleon, impatient at this delay, advanced across the river Scrivia to Voghera.

June 13th. The van-guard (3rd corps), under Victor, reached Marengo, which village they occupied, driving the enemy's outposts back to the bridge heads over the Bormida, opposite Alessandria; the 1st corps followed somewhat echeloned to the rear.

Napoleon being unable to ascertain the exact position of the Austrians, and thinking they might be retreating, ordered the 2nd corps (under Desaix) to reconnoitre towards Rivalta and Novi.

Melas had about 31,000 men in Alessandria; Napoleon was between him and his base, Massena and Suchet coming up from the Riviera, and an unknown force at Susa; under these circumstances he determined to attack Napoleon.

During the night Napoleon became aware of Melas' intention, and sent orders for Desaix to rejoin him, and the 4th corps to close up.

Battle of Marengo.—(See Plate 11.)

June 14th. At daybreak the Austrians issued from their two bridge heads, opposite Alessandria, across the river Bormida. The van-guard consisted of 3,000 men under O'Reilly; he advanced and drove in a French piquet at Pietrabona to Marengo; then, according to his instructions, he marched on La Stortigliona. A division under Haddick, followed by another under Kaim, came next across the river, but it took them three hours to deploy; it was eight o'clock before their artillery opened fire, and the attack on the village of Marengo commenced. This gave Victor time to make full arrangements. He occupied the line of the muddy stream Fontanone in front of the village.

The Austrian front line was supported by a second line, composed of two divisions, under Morzin and Elsnitz, whilst Ott was detached with another division to take the French in flank by Castel Ceriolo.

The Austrians advanced against Marengo, but the French succeeded in driving them back; in this attack Haddick was mortally wounded.

At 10 o'clock the French 1st corps came into line on the right of the 3rd corps, and a brigade of cavalry formed up on each flank—that on the left under the command of Kellerman, and that on the right under Champeaux. Melas received information that Suchet had reached Acqui, and although this was several marches from the scene of action, he despatched 2,000 cavalry from his reserve to reconnoitre in that direction. Ott's division now made its appearance on the French right, which obliged Lannes to show a front to that flank. At the same time another desperate attack was made on Marengo. The French 3rd corps was driven back through the village, and retired in disorder upon Spinetta. The 1st corps being thus exposed on both flanks, also had to retire, which it did in admirable order. The Austrians advancing, pressed their enemy hard, with Ott's division on one flank, and O'Reilly, who had reached La Bolla, on the other.

At 11 a.m. Napoleon arrived on the field with two battalions of Guards. He immediately directed them to the right of the 1st corps, to relieve it from the attack of Ott. Lannes was by this enabled to make good his retreat, but the Guards were driven back to Li Poggi. At this critical moment Monnier's division of the French 4th corps reached the field, and was directed against Ott, one of its brigades under St. Cyr being detached to Castel Ceriolo, which place it occupied unknown to Ott.

The French 1st and 3rd corps retired to St. Juliano, where they were reformed under cover of the left brigade of Monnier's division.

The Austrians had won the battle, but Melas had been wounded, and handing the command over to Zach (who was

his chief of the staff, and second in command), he returned to Alessandria.

The Austrian cavalry had been roughly handled by the French during the day, and being much reduced by the force detached to observe Suchet, were unable to pursue their enemy. The ground about St. Juliano is undulating, and the French infantry were thus able to rally unperceived behind these hillocks.

Zach rearranged his troops with a view of following up the French, whom he thought were completely routed. On the high road to St. Juliano he formed his main column, with his advanced guard deployed and cavalry on each flank.

O'Reilly was directed on Frugarolo, and Ott on the road leading to La Ghilina, about two miles to the north of the St. Juliano road. Whilst these Austrian preparations were being made at about 4 o'clock, Desaix, with his 2nd corps, arrived at St. Juliano. Napoleon on seeing him, said "What think you of the day?" upon which Desaix replied "The battle is completely lost, but it is only 4 o'clock, there is time to gain another one." Napoleon, encouraged by these words, re-arranged his corps to oppose the advance of the Austrain main column.

On the left he placed the 2nd corps, next the 1st corps, and on the right the Guards and the left brigade of Monnier's division. The third corps was held in reserve. Kellerman's cavalry was drawn up on the left, and the other cavalry brigade under Champeaux was in the right rear.

All were concealed from the Austrians by the undulating ground.

The French had only 12 guns remaining: these were placed so as to open on the head of the Austrian column as it advanced along the high road. The Austrians, advancing somewhat carelessly, with bands playing, were completely surprised when the French guns opened upon them. Desaix's 2nd corps advanced in echelon from the left (columns on each flank and the centre deployed) and made a furious assault on the Austrian columns; Kellerman's cavalry attacked and routed the Austrian

cavalry; and then, wheeling to the right, charged the Austrian columns, which were much shaken by Desaix's advance.

2,000 Austrians, with Zach, were taken prisoners. The French now made a general advance; Kaim and Haddick's divisions were thrown into confusion, and retired in disorder to their bridge heads.

O'Reilly and Ott on hearing the firing moved towards it, but only arrived on the field in time to cover the retreat of their main body across the river Bormida.

Ott was much surprised to find the French brigade at Castel Ceriolo, and having to attack this village to clear his road back to Alessandria, he was prevented from rendering much assistance to his retreating main body.

At 7 o'clock the French attacked and carried Marengo, and by 10 o'clock the Austrians had all passed the river.

The Austrian losses were about 7,000 killed and wounded, and 3,000 prisoners.

The French losses were about the same number of killed and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners.

Desaix was amongst the killed.

On the following morning Napoleon made preparation for an assault on the bridge heads, but Melas sent overtures for a suspension of arms. Berthier, Napoleon's chief of the staff, and Zach, went into Alessandria, and terms were agreed upon.

June 24th. The Austrians were allowed to retire behind the river Mincio, evacuating the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy.

NOTES.—The entire success of these operations depended on secrecy. Had the Austrian Commander become aware of Napoleon's design earlier, he could easily have prevented its being carried out.

By moving the two columns over the Alps to his right, Napoleon engaged the attention of the Austrian Commander, who, as a matter of fact, thought the main column was coming over Mont Cenis.

By moving a column over St. Gothard, the river Ticino was turned, and the Austrian force there was obliged to fall back, which gave Napoleon a free passage over that river.

The French, by these secret movements, were actually in Italy, and had cut the Austrian line of communication, before Melas could concentrate his troops to oppose them.

Plate II


1st Engagement
2nd Engagement
R. Janaro
Fontanone
Castel Ceriolo
ALESSANDRIA
to Ghilina
Pietra Bona
1st
MARENGO
3rd
la Barbottona
Spinetta
R. Bormida
La Bella
St. Juliano
2nd
1 ¾ ½ ¼ 0 1 2 miles

Had Ott obeyed his instructions and raised the siege of Genoa on the day he received the order to do so, he would have been at least two days earlier at Novi, and might have been at Stradella before the French, and in a position to oppose their crossing the river Po—and thus, perhaps, secured a line of retreat for the Austrians.

The French army was much better situated for action than the Austrians, in so much that if they had been defeated, they could have made good their retreat over the Alps, behind the river Po; whereas the Austrians had no way by which to retire, their faces being turned towards their base; defeat to them was irretrievable disaster.

The first part of the Battle of Marengo does not afford us much tactical example. For defence, the echelon formation is certainly not desirable, and the detaching of Desaix's corps at such a moment nearly lost Napoleon the day.

One can scarcely understand how Zach was so careless as to advance in the manner he did. A few scouts in his front would have given him warning of the French position.

Desaix and Kellerman's attacks have always been much admired, the columns on Desaix's flanks were to resist the anticipated attacks of the Austrian cavalry.

The French army in Germany, under Moreau, had succeeded in causing the Austrians to fall back to Ulm, but although the French were able to march round the Austrian right flank, Kray managed to evade Moreau, and made good his retreat to Vienna. In consequence of the affairs in Italy an armistice was signed on the 15th July.

This, however, did not lead to peace, and in September operations commenced again.

The French defeated the Austrians at Hohenlinden, near Munich, on the 3rd December, and the Austrians retired behind the river Inn.

In Italy the Austrians also lost ground; General Macdonald, with 15,000 men, crossed the Splügen, and, uniting with the French forces already in the Italian plains, compelled the Austrians to fall back to Verona.

Moreau continued to push the Austrians back; he crossed the river Inn, and approached Vienna. On the 9th February, 1801, peace was agreed upon; the Austrians were to occupy the North of Italy, as far as the river Adige; the Cisalpine Republic was to be re-established; and the Rhine was to be the boundary between France and Germany.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1805.

First Part: Ulm.

In 1805 a treaty was made by England, Austria, and Russia, to endeavour to overthrow the French Empire.

Four attacks were to be made on France.

1. A force of Russians, Swedes, and English were to attack from the North.

2. The united grand armies of Austria and Russia were to advance down the valley of the Danube.

3. An Austrian force was to advance in Lombardy.

4. A united force of English, Russians, and Neapolitans was to operate in the South of Italy.

In the autumn the Austrian armies began to assemble on their frontier, and the Russian troops, 116,000, were moving through Poland towards Vienna and Bavaria.

Bavaria was asked to take part in the approaching struggle, by both Austria and France. She declared to side with Napoleon, whereupon the Austrian troops entered her territory, which had the effect of precipitating the war, and brought the Austrians into conflict with the French before the Russians could come into line.

The Austrians, 84,000, under the command of Archduke Ferdinand nominally, but really commanded by General Mack, crossed the river Inn on the 8th September, and occupied Bavaria. The Bavarian troops, 30,000, retired to the north of the Danube towards the French.

An Austrian Reserve of 30,000 was formed at Vienna; 30,000 men, under Archduke John, were assembled in the Tyrol; and 90,000, under the Archduke Charles, were in Italy.

Napoleon had under his command to oppose this invasion:—

The grand army, divided into seven corps, which had been assembled and trained at Boulogne, 180,000 strong, with 340 guns; and 50,000 men in Italy, under Massena.

In the beginning of September, on learning of this coalition which had been made against him, Napoleon put his grand army in motion, and moved it towards the Rhine, determined to strike a blow at Austria before the Russians could join her armies.

The seven corps of the grand army were commanded as follows:—

1st corps by Bernadotte.
2nd corps by Marmont.
3rd corps by Davoust.
4th corps by Soult.
5th corps by Lannes.
6th corps by Ney.
The Imperial Guard by Bezières.
The cavalry by Murat.

They marched to the Rhine within a month, averaging 15 miles a day, and on the 24th September were in position as follows:—

Cavalry, 5th corps and Guard, at Strasburg.
6th corps at Weissenberg.
4th corps at Spire.
3rd corps at Manheim.
2nd corps at Mayence.
1st corps at Wurzburg.
Bavarians at Bamberg.

The Austrians, under Mack, had moved up the valley of the Danube, and were in occupation of Ulm, Memmingen, and Kempten, with an advance guard at Biberach, and cavalry in the Black Forest; detachments also held the passage over the Danube on their right flank, and a reserve was stationed at Landsberg.

Napoleon's plan of operations was to march round Mack's right flank, so as to cut him off from Vienna and the approaching Russians.

September 25th. The French cavalry, under Murat, crossed the Rhine, and advanced into the Black Forest, driving in the Austrian patrols.

September 26th. The French commenced the passage of the river.

5th corps, Guards, and 6th corps moved on Stuttgard.
4th corps moved on Heilbronn.
3rd corps moved on Neckar Els.
2nd corps moved on Wurzburg.

The cavalry and part of the 5th corps made demonstrations to the south to induce Mack to expect a front attack, whilst Napoleon with the other corps brought his left forward.

October 5th. 6th corps was at Heidenheim.
5th corps was at Aalen.
Guards in rear.
4th corps at Ellwangen.
3rd corps at Œttingen.
2nd corps, 1st corps, and Bavarians at Eichstadt.

Mack now became aware that his right flank was being turned, and accordingly changed his front. He placed his left at Ulm, his centre at Gunzburg, and his right at Rain.

October 6th. The French continued their advance towards the Danube, and Murat's cavalry, having done their work on the right flank, again covered the front.

October 7th. The 4th corps seized the bridge at Donawerth, and the cavalry moved on Rain. The 3rd, 2nd, and 1st corps advanced to Neuburg, and gained the passage of the river there.

October 8th. The 1st corps moved to Ingolstadt, the 3rd corps advanced on Aicha, supported by the 2nd corps. The Austrian right was thus pushed back and moved towards the Isar. The 4th corps, having crossed at Donawerth, moved on Augsburg, and the 5th corps, having also crossed the river, moved on Ulm, with the cavalry in advance.

The 6th corps remained on the left bank of the Danube at Dillingen.

The 5th corps became engaged with an Austrian force at Wertingen, which they defeated.

The French cavalry moved on Zumarshausen.

October 9th. The French corps were in position as follows:—
1st corps and Bavarians moving on Munich.
3rd corps following in support.

2nd and 4th corps about Augsburg.

5th corps on the right bank, and the 6th corps on the left bank of the Danube, moving on Ulm.

Guards at Donawerth.

The Russians were now about 180 miles from Munich. Mack marched on Augsburg, but finding such a large force of French in front of him he tried to cross the Danube at Gunzburg, here he was opposed by the 6th corps, and after losing 2,000 men he returned to Ulm.

October 10th. Mack showed a front behind the river Iller, with his right towards Memmingen facing his base.

October 11th. The 4th corps was moved towards Memmingen, and the Guards were brought up to Augsburg. Mack decided to attempt a march on Heidenheim. The Archduke Ferdinand started with 25,000 men, and came on a division of the 6th corps, which they defeated at Haslach; this French division had to fall back on the main body.

This engagement, however, together with the indecision of Mack, only had the effect of delaying the Austrian march.

October 14th. The Austrian columns were moving towards Heidenheim when the right column was attacked by the 6th corps in flank, defeated, and driven back into Ulm.

October 15th. The 5th corps passed over the river at Elchingen, and the 2nd corps and Guards closed up.

October 16th. The 4th corps crossed the river Iller, and came down the left bank; thus the Austrians in Ulm were surrounded.

The French cavalry pursued the Austrian columns which had effected their escape, harassed their rear, and made many prisoners.

October 19th. The Austrians in Ulm capitulated. Of this Austrian army of 84,000 men only 20,000 escaped.

In these operations the French lost about 6,000 men killed and wounded, and the Austrians about 10,000.

NOTES.—Murat's numerous cavalry probably prevented Mack from gaining accurate information of the French movements, until it was too late for him to save his position in the valley of the Danube, but it is difficult to under-

stand why he did not march for the Tyrol, and so endeavour to make good his retreat. This is what Napoleon expected him to do, and why he brought so much of his army to the right bank of the river.

After the 12th October, he might, it has been thought, have got away by the north of the river.

At the conclusion of the war Mack was tried by a Court Martial, and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

As soon as the advance of the French had become known, 30 battalions were detached from the Archduke Charles's army in Italy, to the Tyrol, to assist in extricating Mack.

The Archduke Charles was therefore unable to advance across the river Adige.

October 18th. Massena attacked and endeavoured to carry the bridge at Verona, but without success; again on the 28th and 29th he renewed his attack with all his force, but was unable to drive the Austrians out of the forts on the east side of the town.

October 30th. The Archduke Charles, hearing of Napoleon's success on the Danube, retired, and was followed by Massena. On the river Tagliamento the Austrian rear guard and the French advance guard had an engagement.

The Archduke Charles joined forces with those of Archduke John, coming from the Tyrol, at Salzburg, and both moved on Vienna.

CAMPAIGN OF 1805 (CONTINUED).

SECOND PART: AUSTERLITZ.

The French found large magazines at Ulm and Augsburg.

October 24th. Napoleon, with the Guard, was at Munich, he sent the cavalry, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th corps to Braunau, on the river Inn.

The Austrians retired in front of them.

October 25th. The 4th corps moved down the right bank of the Danube, the 6th corps, the Bavarians, and the 7th corps, under Augereau, brought up from the South of France, were sent to the Tyrol.

November 2nd. The French reached Linz.

The Prussians now entered into a coalition against Napoleon.

November 5th. The French advanced guard came on the Austrian rear guard in position at Amstetten; this delayed the French, and enabled the Austrian army to take up a position at St. Polten to cover Vienna.

November 7th. Napoleon formed to attack St. Polten. 1st corps was directed through the mountains on the right to turn the Austrian left flank.

2nd and 3rd corps were on the French right.

4th corps and Guards in the centre; and the 5th corps and cavalry on the left.

The Austrians, however, did not wait to be attacked, but retired across the Danube, destroying the only bridge between that and Vienna.

Another French corps had been brought into the field, the 8th, under the command of Mortier. Napoleon had directed this corps to move down the left bank of the Danube, but it was to keep in rear of his flank.

After the Austrians retreated from St. Polten, Murat pushed his cavalry on towards Vienna, and Mortier followed him.

November 11th. The French 8th corps came on a Russian force at Dürrenstein, by which they were defeated, and had to retire across the Danube.

November 13th. The French cavalry and 5th corps entered Vienna, and seized the bridges over the river.

The Emperor of Austria retired to Presburg.

The Archduke Charles's army from Italy and the Tyrol had not yet reached the capital; on hearing of the French occupation he was therefore obliged to alter his march towards Hungary, with an endeavour to regain his communications by that route. The Austrians and Russians about Vienna fell back towards Brunn.

November 14th, 15th. Napoleon sent forward the cavalry and 5th corps under Murat to reconnoitre.

November 16th. The French came on some Russians at Zuaim, Murat attacked them, but they made good their retreat.

November 19th. Russians and Austrians concentrated near Olmütz 85,000 strong. The French cavalry and 5th corps halted at Brunn.

The 6th corps was at Salzburg, and there joined Massena.

7th corps moved to Ulm, to observe the Prussians.

Nov. 20th. The French 2nd corps was sent to the right to observe Archduke Charles, and connect with Massena's army. The 3rd corps was sent to Presburg.

The 1st corps and Bavarians moved towards Iglau to observe the Archduke Ferdinand, and keep open the line by Ratisbon in case of the necessity of a retreat.

The 4th and 5th corps and Guards concentrated at Brunn, and the cavalry reconnoitred towards the allies. The 8th corps was in Vienna.

The Austrian and Russian armies at Olmütz were placed under the command of a Russian General, Kutusoff, but the Czar was in the camp, and interfered much in planning the operations.

Nov. 27th. Murat reported that the allies at Olmütz were on the march towards Brunn, and would be there in about

three days. Napoleon had already selected a position to the east of Brunn, on the Brunn-Olmütz road, behind a small river named Goldbach, to oppose the advance of the allies, and as soon as he received this information, he ordered an immediate concentration of troops on the selected ground.

THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.—(See Plate 12.)

Dec. 1st. The French army which assembled here amounted to 73,000 men, and consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th corps, the Guards, and cavalry. The 8th corps was brought up to Brunn.

The left of the position was to be on a hill to the north of the Olmütz road, called Santon, which was entrenched and occupied with guns; and the right towards Ottmarau Lake.

The troops bivouacked about Schlapanitz in rear of this line.

The Austrian and Russian army reached Austerlitz this day, and took up a position in front of the French, on some high ground to the east of the river Goldbach.

Advanced guard, under Keinmayer, at Aujesd.

1st corps, under Doctoroff } both being under Buxhowden, left
2nd corps, under Langeron } at Aujesd and extending to Pratzen.

3rd corps, under Przybyszewski, in the centre.

4th corps, under Kollowrat, 2nd line in rear of the centre.

5th corps, under Bagration, across the Olmütz road.

Guards, under Grand Duke Constantine, in rear of the interval between the 3rd and 5th corps.

Cavalry, under Lichtenstein, some on the extreme right, and the rest in rear of the 2nd and 3rd corps.

Kutusoff, Commander-in-Chief, and the two Emperors, namely of Austria and Russia, were at Kuzenowitz.

The Austrian plan was to attack Napoleon's right flank on the morrow, and so drive him off the Vienna road, northward, away from his line of communication.

The 5th corps was to engage the French front, whilst the others crossed the Goldbach.

1st corps at Tilnitz.

2nd corps at Sokelnitz village.

3rd corps at Sokelnitz Castle.

4th corps above it.

They were then to change front to the right, on the right of the 4th corps, about Kobelnitz Lake, and advance against the French.

Napoleon, reconnoitring the allied army, divined their plan, and made the following dispositions to meet it :—

3rd corps was posted with the left on Kobelnitz Lake, with its right thrown back on some high ground, and outposts on the river at the points of passage.

4th corps was formed up between Puntowitz and Girzikowitz.

5th corps continued the line to the Santon hill.

1st corps in rear of the 4th and 5th corps.

Guards in reserve near Latein.

Cavalry on the left rear.

December 2nd. At daybreak there was a thick fog. The allied columns moved as directed, and, on reaching the Goldbach, found the passages occupied by the French. At 9 a.m. the allies, after severe fighting, carried Tilnitz, and at 9.30 they gained possession of the other passages. 40,000 Russians were now across the river, and attacked the French 3rd corps, but did not succeed in forcing the position.

About 9 o'clock the fog lifted, and the movements of the allies became clear to Napoleon. He ordered the 4th corps to advance in echelon from the right, with a view of separating that part of the allied army which was still on Pratzen heights from that which had crossed the river; the 5th corps followed, and the 1st corps in rear acted as a support; the cavalry also accompanied the forward movements to protect the flanks.

The French 4th corps crossed the river, and reached the heights before the allied 4th corps had left them; that corps therefore remained to receive the French attack.

The French were everywhere successful, and by 11.30 the allied 4th and 5th corps, although reinforced by the Guards, were compelled to retreat to Austerlitz. Napoleon now sent his Guards and a portion of the 1st corps, which had not been

Plate 12


BRUNN
Latein
Schlapanitz
Santon
Girzikowitz
Pantowitz
Pratzen
Kobelnitz
Ottmarau
Schlapanitz
Castle
Abbey of Raigern
Augesd
Telnitz
R. Goldbach
to Vienna
to Arnuts
AUSTERLITZ
Krzenowitz
N
1 ½ 0 1 2 3 4 miles

engaged, to assist the 3rd corps, which was being hardly pressed by the allied 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps.

The French reserve artillery was brought into action on the heights on which the 3rd corps stood, which caused the allies in the valley to retire, and they had much difficulty in recrossing the river. Some of their battalions broke up, and the men tried to effect their escape by crossing the lakes which were covered with ice, but this gave way and many were drowned.

The allied army lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 30,000, with 180 guns. The French lost 12,000 killed and wounded.

NOTES.—After the occupation of Vienna Napoleon spread out his forces, but had them in such a position that they could concentrate on a given point for battle, in case of necessity, before the enemy could attack. To do this the exact position of the enemy's columns must be known, and the commander must be kept well supplied with information of his adversary's movements.

On this occasion the French 3rd corps had to march the longest distance, and was only just in time to take part in the battle; it did not arrive at the Abbey of Raigern until the night of the 1st December.

Although Napoleon had prepared the ground on which he intended to make a stand in case of necessity, he did not move his troops into their respective positions until he became aware of the intention of his adversary. The Austrian-Russian army was drawn up parallel to the French, and in their turning movements they had to show their flank to their enemy at striking distance, and wheel round him on an exterior line.

This was obviously a false manœuvre, and gave Napoleon the opportunity of attacking them on the march. With the 3rd corps he kept the left wing of the enemy in check, whilst he attacked the right wing with his main body; then, having defeated that wing, being on the interior lines, he was able to turn the weight of his force on the allied left wing.

Time was a most important element in this tactical operation, as it was necessary that the allied 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps should be well across the river, and engaged, before the attack was made on Pratzen Heights. The French 4th corps was halted down by the river bank at about 9 o'clock, hid by being enveloped in mist. Soult was with Napoleon on the heights above, watching the enemy's movements. He was most anxious to advance his corps to the attack, and asked Napoleon if he could do so. Napoleon asked him how long it would take him to reach Pratzen Heights; he replied, "Twenty minutes." Napoleon then said to him, "Then wait twenty minutes." It is certain that if Soult had made the attack before he did he would have met the 3rd allied corps, and thus detained it on the east side of the Goldbach, which might have made a material difference. This battle illustrates well the danger of a flank movement in front of a vigilant enemy.

It is said that both Kutusoff and Langeron were much against these tactics; the latter foresaw, and actually pointed out, what would probably be the

result; the plan was drawn up by Weirother, who was chief of the Russian Imperial staff, and was presented by him to the Czar, who insisted on its being adopted.

At midnight Prince Lichtenstein arrived at the French head-quarters to propose an armistice; Napoleon agreed to meet the Emperor of Austria on the following day, but would not suspend his orders for following up his defeated adversaries, who being pursued continued their retreat.

December 3rd. Agreeable to appointment Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria met at a windmill near Sarutschitz.

A suspension of hostilities was here agreed to, and terms of a peace were drawn up and signed at Presburg. The Russians marched back to their own country.

Prussia entered into a treaty with France, by which Prussia was to have Hanover. All the other expeditions against Napoleon were given up.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

In 1806 Napoleon deposed the King and Queen of Naples, and appointed his brother Joseph to that kingdom. The King and Queen retired to Sicily, and England sent an expedition there to assist them in regaining their lost dominions.

Sir John Stuart, with about 5,000 men, endeavoured to relieve the fortress of Gaeta, which was occupied by Neapolitans and invested by the French.

Having effected a landing in the south of Italy, Sir John Stuart, whilst marching towards Gaeta, came on a French force at Maida, which he engaged and defeated; but Gaeta capitulated and fell into the hands of the French before he could reach it. The British troops therefore retired to Sicily.

Napoleon was anxious to make peace with England, as her fleet did much injury to the French shipping. In order to do so he offered to hand over to her Hanover, which he had already given to Prussia.

When this became known to Prussia, having secured the assistance of Russia, she declared war against France in October, 1806.

Napoleon's army had not as yet left South Germany, and on the 3rd October the corps were in position as follows:—

1st corps at Lichtenfelds,
3rd corps at Bamberg,
4th corps at Amberg,
5th corps at Schweinfurt,
6th corps at Nüremberg,
7th corps, Guards, and cavalry at Wurzburg,

numbering about 200,000 men.

The Prussian field army was under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, and was organised in divisions as follows:—

1st division under Prince of Orange,
2nd division under Wartensleben,
3rd division under Schmettau,
} under Möllendorf.

4th division under Künheim,
5th division under Von Armin, } under Kalkreuth.
Saxons under Prince Hohenlohe,
Westphalians under General Ruchel,
Reserve under Eugene of Würtemberg,
numbering about 120,000 men.

The Prussians were posted between Magdeburg and Wittenberg, with advanced guard under the Duke of Weimar on the river Saale.

The Saxons between Torgau and Dresden, with advanced guard at Hof.

The Westphalians at Gotha.

Reserve in rear of Magdeburg.

On the right towards Hesse was a corps of observation.

The Russians could not be in line for several weeks.

October 8th. The French moved as follows:—

4th and 6th corps towards Hof.

1st and 3rd corps towards Saalburg.

5th and 7th corps towards Saalfield.

Cavalry covering the front and flanks.

Guards following in the centre.

The Prussian plan of operations was to concentrate at Meiningen, and march on Wurzburg, so as to cut the French off from the Rhine.

The French continued to advance, and the Prussians concentrated on the left bank of the river Saale about Weimar.

October 11th. The French 4th Corps reached Gera.

6th corps reached Auma.

1st and 3rd corps marched on Gera.

5th corps marched on Auma.

7th corps moved down the left bank of the river Saale.

Guards moved towards Auma.

During these movements the 1st and 5th corps came upon the Saxons, marching across their front. They attacked and defeated them, and thus the march of the Saxons was considerably delayed, but they reached Jena that evening. The Prussians were at Weimar.

Napoleon had lost the touch of his enemy. Murat was reconnoitring towards Leipsic.

October 12th. The French 1st corps moved to Zeitz, and the 3rd corps to Naumberg.

The 5th corps crossed the river Saale, and together with the 7th corps, moved down the left bank towards Jena.

October 13th. These last corps came on the Saxons, and Lannes sent word to Napoleon that he was in the presence of a considerable force of the enemy. Napoleon, thinking the whole Prussian army was before him, at once ordered the 4th corps and Guards to Jena, the 6th corps to Roda, and sent orders for the 1st and 3rd corps to concentrate at Naumberg, seize the bridge over the river there, and also secure the passage at Dornburg. The cavalry were ordered to march on Jena.

The Prussian generals being alarmed at the French advance, orders were given for a countermarch on Magdeburg. To secure this march the Saxons were to hold Jena and the passage over the river Saale there, whilst the Prussians marched on Kösen; but on this day the French 5th and 7th corps were in possession of the heights on the left bank of the river, overlooking Jena; the Saxons, therefore, were only able to occupy the ridge opposite to them.

Battle of Jena.—(See Plate 13.)

The undulations of the ground prevented Napoleon from seeing his adversaries' troops well, but he still thought the entire Prussian force was concentrated in front of him to give him battle. During the night, therefore, he placed in position on these heights, 7th corps on the left, 5th corps in the centre, 4th corps on the right, and Guards in rear of the centre. The 6th corps were ordered to march on Jena, with the cavalry. Napoleon also sent orders to Davoust (3rd corps) to march up the left bank of the Saale at daylight, so as to come down on the enemy's flank. The 1st corps was also to accompany him, "if Bernadotte had not already started for Dornburg."

On this night the Prussian army arrived at Auerstadt, and bivouacked on the heights.

October 14th. At 6 o'clock in the morning Napoleon gave orders for the 5th corps to advance to the attack of the heights in front of them. These heights were held by the Saxon outposts; the morning was foggy, and the French were upon them before they could give the alarm, and although they showed some resistance they had to fall back, leaving 20 guns behind them.

Prince Hohenlohe does not seem to have known the number of the French troops that were in his immediate front, and was quite unprepared to give battle. It was not until 9 o'clock when the fog cleared and he saw the French army in line, that he prepared for action. He drew up his army, 40,000 strong, with his centre at the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, and his flanks thrown back, and he sent to Ruchel, who was near Weimar, with the Westphalians, 20,000 strong, to come to his assistance.

The French 6th corps and cavalry had arrived, the former re-inforced the centre of the line, and the latter were formed up near the Guards.

The 6th corps was the first to advance to the attack, which they did somewhat too rapidly, and coming into action without support, were charged by the enemy's cavalry, and lost 13 guns; but the French cavalry came forward to extricate Ney, and the 5th corps also coming to his support, a further advance was made, and the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen carried. The French 7th corps now advancing against the Saxon right, took the village of Isserstadt; and the 4th corps on the other flank drove back the Saxon left. Hohenlohe, being hard pressed at every point by overwhelming numbers, was compelled to retreat; but he was doing so in good order, when Napoleon, thinking the decisive moment had arrived, ordered the whole of his cavalry, 15,000 strong, under Murat, to the front.

This charge broke the Saxons, and they retired in disorder towards Weimar.

The Westphalians arrived at Romstedt, and took up a position to cover the retreat of the Saxons; they stood opposed to the French attacks for an hour, but Ruchel was wounded, and they then retired in disorder.

The French continued to advance until they reached Weimar, making many prisoners, and taking most of the enemy's artillery and stores.

NOTES.—Napoleon had every reason to suppose that the entire Prussian army was assembled in front of him at Jena. It was scarcely to be expected that it would be separated when the French were approaching so rapidly, moreover, the fact of Prince Hohenlohe remaining in his position confirmed Napoleon in his opinion.

There was not much skill displayed in this battle, where 40,000 Saxons were attacked by 90,000 French.

BATTLE OF AUERSTADT.—(See Plate 13.)

Davoust, at Naumburg, received Napoleon's order at 6 a.m. on the 14th; Bernadotte's corps was still there, but, as the order said that "The Emperor hoped Bernadotte was already in the position assigned to him at Dornburg," this Marshal considered it to be his duty to proceed there by the right bank of the river Saale. Davoust therefore marched his 3rd Corps, about 30,000 strong, on Apolda, by itself. At 8 o'clock Davoust's van-guard reached the top of the heights of Kösen, and came upon the Prussian van-guard of the main army, which was on the march for Magdeburg. The mist prevented the opponents from seeing each other's strength. Davoust supported his advanced guard by his leading division, which established itself on the plateau, with its left on the village of Hassennaussen.

The Duke of Brunswick was desirous of halting the advanced troops of the Prussian army, and closing up, until the fog lifted and the enemy's strength could be seen, but the King, who was with the army, thinking the French force inconsiderable, ordered the march to be continued, and sent Schmettau with the 3rd division to drive them back over the Kösen Heights, accompanied by the cavalry under Blucher.

The Prussians were unable to turn the French out of the village of Hassenhaussen, and the Duke of Brunswick and Schmettau, whilst leading the infantry to the assault were killed. It was not possible to re-inforce either side very rapidly, as they

each had defiles in their rear to pass, before they could reach the plateau where the engagement was taking place. The first to arrive was the Prussian 2nd division, which formed up on the right of the 3rd division, and endeavoured to get in rear of the village; at the same time an attempt was made to turn the French right, but this was effectually prevented by the arrival of another French division on the right flank, and, shortly afterwards, Wartensleben's advance was checked by Davoust's 3rd division forming up on the left of the village.

The Prussian 1st division came up in support, and many vigorous attacks were made on the French, both with infantry and cavalry, but they were all repulsed.

On the French left, Prince William of Prussia was wounded whilst leading on his cavalry with a vain endeavour to break the French squares, and thus deprived of their leader they retired. The Prussian right flank by this became exposed, and the King, seeing the danger, put himself at the head of the troops in this part of the field, and charged the French left flank, but the French stood firm and the Prussians had to retire.

Davoust, seeing that now the decisive moment had arrived, ordered his line to advance; the Prussians retired before him, and he succeeded in gaining the crest of the plateau, from whence his artillery came into action with good effect.

The Prussian defeat was nearly complete, but one more effort was made to save the day.

The 4th and 5th divisions under Kalkreuth, arrived on the field, and they, together with all the cavalry that could be reformed, under Blucher, endeavoured to drive back the French, but without avail.

They now took post on some high ground, and were in their turn attacked by the French, and driven down the defile of Auerstadt, with a loss of 20 guns. The Prussian guards and Blucher's cavalry covered the retreat of the defeated troops, who retired towards Weimar.

The king, quite ignorant of what had happened to Hohenlohe, thought to fall back upon his force. On approaching Apolda at sunset the retreating Prussians observed French


Romstedt
Vierzehn Heiligen
Isserstadt
to Weimar
River Saale
N
JENA
mile 1 0 1 2 3 4
to Magdeburg
Kösen
Lassenhaasen
to Apolda
R. Saale
AUERSTADT
for Scale and Npoint see above

troops bivouacked on the heights. These were Bernadotte's 1st corps, which had crossed the river at Dornburg, and advanced in this direction. Some fugitives from Jena also came up; these two causes produced a panic, and the Prussian battalions broke up and dispersed in all directions.

The Prussian army which Davoust's corps defeated was 66,000 strong; they lost in killed and wounded 10,000 men.

The French corps was about 30,000, and they lost in killed and wounded 7,500.

NOTES.—Davoust's prompt seizure of the village of Hassenhausen enable him to maintain his position on the plateau until his other two divisions could come into line.

The leading division threw themselves into the village, occupying the garden walls and hedges, also a small wood in their immediate front.

Had the Duke of Brunswick's advice been taken, and the Prussian army brought into line before commencing the attack on the French, the chances are that the Prussians would have been victorious. As it was, each Prussian division, as it came up, only advanced to be defeated in its turn, and before the two rear divisions could come into action, the three leading ones were completely routed. As a matter of fact, the French were not at any time greatly outnumbered. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Prussian divisions did not probably amount to more than 35,000 men. For a short interval the first French division that arrived at the village was exposed to the attack of two Prussian divisions and Blucher's cavalry; it suffered accordingly, losing half its numbers, but the other two French divisions coming up on the right and left soon gave relief.

This seems to be a good illustration of the error of commencing an attack without necessity before all the troops are brought into line.

Many of the routed Prussians made for Erfurt, and others for Magdeburg.

On that night Napoleon issued orders for the pursuit.

1st corps was to move on Magdeburg by Halle.

3rd corps was to move to Naumburg.

4th corps was to move to Buttelstadt, where a number of fugitives had assembled.

6th corps and cavalry were to move to Erfurt.

5th, 7th, and Guards were to move to Weimar.

The 1st corps came on the Prussian reserves, under Prince Eugene of Würtemburg, at Halle, attacked them, and after a severe engagement compelled them to evacuate the town.

The 4th corps, driving the fugitives before them, reached Nordhausen; here they came on the remains of the Prussian 4th and 5th divisions, which retired towards Magdeburg after a short resistance.

Erfurt surrendered to Murat, who then directed the cavalry northward in further pursuit.

Whilst the Prussians were being thus pressed along the roads by which they were retreating, the other corps were allowed to rest until the 17th, when they were moved forward as follows:—

3rd corps by Leipsic on Wittenberg.

5th and 7th corps on Dessau.

6th corps on Magdeburg, and Guards following in rear.

October 21st. 1st, 4th, and 6th corps were at Magdeburg.

3rd, 5th, and 7th corps and Guards having passed the river Elbe were marching on Berlin.

Napoleon ordered the gates of Magdeburg to be left open, and endeavoured by means of his cavalry to drive the Prussians into the fortress, hoping thus to make them all prisoners, but Hohenlohe collected many of the men, and on this day marched for the river Oder, with a rear guard under Blucher.

Napoleon, on learning this, sent the cavalry and 5th corps in pursuit.

October 25th. The 3rd corps reached Berlin, and passing through, continued its march towards the river Oder.

October 28th. Hohenlohe's force reached Prentzlow, where after a short resistance he surrendered to Murat and the French 5th corps.

October 29th. Stettin capitulated to the 5th corps, and Custrin to the 3rd corps.

November 7th. Blucher, having been driven on to the Danish frontier at Lübeck by the 1st and 4th corps and cavalry, surrendered.

The 7th corps and Guards held Berlin.

NOTES.—Both the French and the Prussian commanders assumed the offensive with the same object, namely, to cut one another's line of communications. The French were nearer to their object than their adversaries,

moreover they advanced boldly, whilst the Prussians hesitated, when they moved they did so undecidedly, and eventually had to turn back.

We see Napoleon advancing in his usual formation two wings and a strong centre, so that he could turn to reinforce either side, whereas the Prussians first took up a defensive position, then the left made a flank march across their enemy's front to join the Prussian right, and finally the army countermarched.

Neither commander seems to have been able to gain very accurate information of his opponent's movements or intentions, but Napoleon had his troops so well in hand that under any circumstances he could have placed them in a superior position to his adversary.

It is difficult to understand why the Prussians, knowing what an opponent they had to encounter, did not remain on the defensive until their Russian allies could come to their assistance.

AGAINST THE RUSSIANS.

Napoleon now prepared to meet the Russians, who were advancing to the assistance of their allies.

The Russian army consisted of

1st corps under the command of Benningsen.
2nd „ „ Buxhowden.
3rd „ „ Essen.

General Kamenski was the Commander-in-Chief. There was also a Prussian corps under L'Estocq, intact and available for action.

The total force was about 100,000 men.

The Prussians occupied the line of the river Vistula, between Dantsic and Graudenz.

November 1st. The leading Russian corps had crossed the river Niemen, and was marching on the river Vistula.

The French corps moved as follows :—

Cavalry and 3rd corps to Posen.

7th corps to Custrin.

5th corps to Stargard.

Prince Jerome, with the German auxiliaries, was in Silisia.

1st, 4th and 6th corps and Guards were at Berlin.

8th corps, under Mortier, was in Hanover, to secure the French left flank against the Swedes.

November 12th. The Russian head-quarters were at Pultusk, they held the bridges over the river Vistula; and the Prussian corps was concentrated at Thorn. In this position the Russians waited for their army to close up.

November 16th. The French 3rd corps was moved to Warsaw, and the 5th and 7th corps to Bromberg and Thorn.

December 2nd to 11th:

The French 3rd corps crossed the Vistula and occupied Jablona.

The French 5th corps occupied Warsaw.

" " 7th corps was on the left bank of the river Vistula, opposite Mödlin.

" " 6th corps took and occupied Thorn.

" " 1st, 4th corps, and Guards were moved to Posen.

Thus the French gained the passage of the Vistula.

The Russians fell back behind the river Narew.

December 18th. Napoleon arrived at Warsaw.

December 20th to 23rd:

French 1st and 6th corps occupied Thorn.

" 4th corps crossed the river Vistula at Plock.

" 3rd corps crossed the rivers Narew and Ukra, occupied Mödlin, and a bridge was thrown over the Vistula by which—

" 7th corps crossed to Mödlin.

5th corps and Guards occupied Warsaw.

The cavalry were on the outer flanks, Bessières commanded on the left, and Murat on the right. There was severe fighting at many of these points of passage, but the Russians at each place had to fall back, and retired on Soldau, Golymin, and Pultusk.

Napoleon's design was to separate the Prussian corps from the Russians, and drive them north with his left wing, to get in rear of the Russians with his 5th corps, and cut them off from the main road leading from Pultusk to Russia; and with his other corps to advance against their front.

The weather, however, was so severe, and the roads so bad, that the French troops could not march with their usual celerity.

December 26th. The French 6th corps moved on Soldau.

1st corps on Biezun.

4th corps on Plonsk.

3rd and 7th corps on Golymin.

5th corps on Pultusk.

Guards remained at Warsaw.

The French 5th corps came upon the Russian 1st corps in a formidable position at Pultusk, 60,000 strong, with 120 guns. Lannes (whose corps was augmented by another division)

had about 35,000 men; he attacked the Russians vigorously on both flanks; they fought till after dark, when a severe storm obliged them to break off the engagement. Both forces then retired from the field of battle, the Russians across the river Narew, and the French to Warsaw. The French losses were 6,000, and the Russians 5,000.

On the same day the French 3rd and 7th corps came on the Russian 2nd corps at Golymin. The Russians here made an obstinate stand, they were vigorously attacked by the French, but they held their ground till night fall, when they retired to Ostrolenka.

The 1st and 6th corps came upon the Prussians at Soldau, defeated them, and drove them northwards, but not being pursued, they afterwards succeeded in rejoining the Russians.

December 28th. Napoleon advanced with his Guards to Golymin, but finding the roads impassable for further operations, he ordered a halt, placed his troops in cantonments between the rivers Narew and Ukra, and returned with his Guards to Warsaw. The Russians also went into cantonments on the left bank of the river Narew above Ostrolenka.

The French corps were stationed as follows :—

1st corps at Osterode.
6th corps at Mlawa.
4th corps at Golymin.
3rd corps at Pultusk.
5th corps at Sierock.
7th corps at Plonsk.
Guards at Warsaw.
8th corps blockading Stralsund.
9th corps in Silesia.

10th corps, composed of French, Poles, and Germans, under Lefebvre, was besieging Dantsic.

In January, 1807, the Russian commander-in-chief was superseded, and Benningsen was given the command. Benningsen decided on an offensive movement against the French left, and with this object in view, on the 15th January he concentrated his troops at Biala. Leaving a reserve under Essen on the

river Narew to mask his advance, he moved with 75,000 men and 500 guns to his right.

17th January. He was at Rhein.

22nd January. He reached Bischofstein.

27th January. He arrived at Mohrungen, where he halted.

Several engagements had taken place between the Russian advanced guard and the advanced posts of the French 1st and 6th corps, the French on all occasions falling back.

January 23rd. Napoleon was informed of the Russian advance, but not being certain what Benningsen's intentions were, he did not move his troops till the 27th January, when he ordered them to positions as follows :—

1st corps and part of the 10th corps to fall back towards Thorn.

6th corps by Hohenstein,
4th corps by Willenberg,
3rd corps by Ortelsburg,
7th corps by Niedenburg,
} to Allenstein.

Guards to follow in the centre.

5th corps was to remain on the river Narew to observe Essen. The cavalry covered the front.

February 2nd. The French corps were in position as follows :—6th, 4th, and 7th corps at Allenstein. 3rd corps detached somewhat to the right, and the Guards in rear of the centre.

The Russians moved to Jonkowo.

February 3rd. Napoleon ordered the 3rd corps to intercept the Russian left, the 6th corps to advance against their right, the 1st corps to move in rear of their right flank, and the other corps to advance later.

The Russians, this day, retreated on Eylau.

Battle of Eylau.—(See Plate 14.)

February 7th. After fighting several rear guard actions, the Russians arrived at Eylau, where Benningsen turned to make a stand.

He drew up his troops on the east side of the town.

The right, commanded by Touchkoff, had the village of Schloditten in its centre.

The centre, under Sacken, was in front of the village of Kutschitten.

The left, under Ostermann, had the village of Serpalten on its outer flank.

The reserve, under Doctoroff, was in rear.

The cavalry, under Platoff, was in rear of the centre and of both flanks.

The artillery consisted of 460 guns.

The total strength was about 65,000 men.

The Prussian corps, consisting of about 10,000 men, was at Hussehnen, about two miles to the N.W.

The ground was covered with snow, and the ice on the streams and lakes was sufficiently thick to bear all arms.

There is a gentle slope from the Russian position towards the village of Eylau, which stands on a knoll.

The French engaged the Russian rear guard, and without much difficulty gained possession of the village.

Napoleon brought into line this evening the 4th and 7th corps, with the Guards in rear, and sent orders to the commanders of the 6th and 3rd corps, who were on his right and left flanks detached, to join him at once to take part in the expected battle on the morrow.

On arrival these commanders were ordered to attack the Russian flanks, but Ney was not to do so until the left had been well turned, as Napoleon wished to drive the Russians towards the north, from their line of retreat to Russia.

At daylight on the morning of the 8th, Napoleon ordered an attack to be commenced on the Russian right and centre, in order to conceal the object he had in view.

The 7th corps was directed to carry out this attack, whilst a division only of the 4th corps was employed to insure connection with the 3rd corps, which was coming up on the French right.

Napoleon himself watched the attack from Eylau; his Guards were behind the village.

The 7th corps, in advancing, found themselves opposed by 200 Russian guns, and in order to avoid the shot they inclined to their left towards Schloditten to get cover from some houses which were on their left front.

About this time the snow began to fall, and the opponents could not see each other, still the firing continued, and the 7th corps suffered considerably. Whilst in this position the Russian right advanced against them, and came down unexpectedly on their left flank; at the same time they were charged on their other flank by cossacks from the reserve. Thus assailed they broke and fled towards Eylau; only 1,500 men, however, reached that village, all the others, including Augereau, being either killed, wounded, or made prisoners.

The Russians now advanced their right and centre, and a division, following the fugitives of the 7th corps, entered Eylau; they came close to Napoleon, whereupon he ordered up some of his Guards, who defeated them and drove them back.

In order to gain time for the French troops to reform, and Davoust to come into line, Napoleon ordered a charge to be made by all the cavalry, including that of the Guard, which was to be supported in rear by the 4th corps.

The snow prevented the Russians from seeing the French cavalry until they were close upon them; their infantry, however, formed themselves into rallying squares and held their ground.

Benningsen now ordered up his entire reserve to oppose the French advance; the leading division was charged by Murat's cavalry—it broke and fled pursued by the French, but Platoff launched the cossacks of the Don against the pursuing French cuirassiers, and they, in their turn, were thereby scattered. The French left was now completely defeated; the Guards held Eylau, and the 4th corps were rallying on their right, when, at about noon, the French 3rd corps arrived; its leading division attacked, and took Serpalten, and pushing on also occupied Klein Sausgarten, driving the Russians in front of them.

The French 4th corps again moved forward to connect and protect the left flank of the 3rd corps in their advance. The French continued to gain ground on their right, and captured the village of Anklappen.

Davoust now made dispositions for the attack of Kutschitten: Benningsen brought up his reserves, and formed his left wing into a new line at right angles to his right wing, and, at the same time, moved his extreme right to support his centre; by this means the further advance of the French was checked.

The village of Kutschitten was, however, attacked and taken by the French.

At this critical moment the Prussians, under L'Estocq, appeared on the Russian extreme right; orders were sent to them to move on Kutschitten.

The Prussians had been delayed in their march to the field of battle by constant engagements with the French 6th corps, who were closely following them. L'Estocq had, therefore, to leave 2000 men in the village of Althof, in his rear, to check Ney.

It was about one hour to sunset when the Prussians formed up for attack. They advanced vigorously, and carried all before them, driving the French out of the villages of Kutschitten and Anklappen through the wood and back to Sausgarten.

It was now dark, and the fighting here ceased. Just after this the French 6th corps arrived at Althof, which village they attacked and carried. Driving the Prussians in front of them they reached Schloditten and Schmoditten. This latter village is on the road to Königsberg, and was on the line of the Russian retreat. Benningsen, therefore, ordered it to be stormed. It was about 10 o'clock when the Russians advanced against it; by midnight they had driven the French out, and they commenced their retreat by Mühlhaussen on Königsberg.

It is difficult to ascertain the losses in this battle, as no official information on the subject has ever been given, but it is believed that the Russians lost upwards of 20,000 men, and the French 30,000.

NOTES.—Napoleon, according to his usual custom, commenced the attack; it is to be supposed that he expected Davoust to come into line before noon, otherwise he would not have begun so early. As it was, three French corps—indeed two, it may be said, for the Guards were not engaged, had to sustain, for several hours, the counter assault of the entire Russian army. Napoleon thought, by attacking his adversary's right, to induce Benningsen to move his reserves to that flank, and thereby render Davoust's turning movement more easy.

There was a time when the French were in a very critical position, the possession of Eylau, and the fact of the Guards being there, alone saved them.

It is a question whether Ney's corps would not have been more valuable on the field of battle than engaging and detaining the Prussians. However, their arrival, during the night, together with the expectation of the French 1st corps coming up on the following day, determined Benningsen to retire, and thus Napoleon was left the master of a field that he can scarcely be said to have won.

The weather was very bad, the roads almost impassable, and the French were so crippled by the battle that they were unable to advance. Napoleon sent Murat with the cavalry in pursuit; they found the Russians in possession at Königsberg, and, after an engagement with the cossacks and allied cavalry, in which the French were defeated, losing 700 men, they returned to Eylau.

February 17th. Overtures for peace having failed, Napoleon decided on a retreat, and took up positions as follows :—

1st corps on the left between Braunsberg and Spanden.

4th corps centre between Liebstadt and Mohrungen.

3rd corps on the right at Allenstein.

6th corps in advance at Guttstadt.

Guards in rear of centre at Osterode.

7th corps was broken up.

10th corps at Thorn, and blockading Dantsic.

The 5th corps, which was now under the command of Savary, Lannes being on the sick list, had an engagement with the Russians on the 15th and 16th February, at Ostrolenka. Essen was endeavouring to interrupt the communications between the main French army and Warsaw. The French were successful, and drove the Russians back.

On the retreat of the French, Benningsen advanced.

On the 25th February the Russian head-quarters were estab-

lished at Landsberg, and, afterwards, moved to Bartenstein, with the main body of the army about Heilsberg.

Each army had much difficulty in getting supplies, and were content to remain inactive, watching each other until the weather should become more favourable for further operations.

Early in March the French head-quarters were moved to Finkenstein.

May 26th. Dantsic capitulated to Lefebvre. This town formed an admirable depot for the French.

An armistice was made with Sweeden, and the 8th corps joined the main army.

In June Napoleon intended to advance against the Russians, get in between them and Königsberg, so as to drive them back on the river Niemen, but, whilst he was making preparations, Benningsen advanced against the French.

The Russian commander's plan of operations was to make a feint of forcing the passage of the river Passarge at Spanden and Lomitten, whilst he attacked the 6th corps at Guttstadt, and there endeavour to penetrate the centre of the French line.

June 5th. The Russian advance commenced; the bridge heads were attacked, and in the evening the Russians here retired.

At Spanden Bernadotte was wounded, and Victor took command of the 1st corps.

The French 6th corps was attacked, and Ney retired, crossing the river Passarge at Deppen.

The 5th and 8th corps were ordered up to support Ney, and Napoleon moved on Deppen with his Guards; he also ordered the 4th corps to cross the river Passarge, and threaten the Russian right flank.

June 8th. These movements of the French had the effect of making Benningsen retire to Heilsberg, where he took up a position behind entrenchments, which he had previously made around this town.

Napoleon followed him with the 4th, 5th, 6th corps, Guards, and cavalry, down the left bank of the river Alle; the 3rd and 8th corps being directed to turn the Russian right, and intercept

their communications with Königsberg, 1st corps being left on the river Passarge.

June 10th. The French attacked the entrenchments around Heilsberg; but, after a heavy loss, they were obliged to draw off.

June 11th. Napoleon pushed forward the 3rd and 8th corps, and ordered the 1st corps to advance to their support; Benningsen, finding his communications with Königsberg thus threatened, retired this night to Bartenstein, and having crossed the river Alle, he moved down the right bank towards Friedland.

June 12th. Napoleon, with the rest of his army, moved to Eylau.

June 13th. The French moved forward to Domnau with an advanced guard, composed of the 5th corps, which halted about three miles from Friedland, at Posthenen.

Battle of Friedland.—(See Plate 14.)

The Russians arrived at Friedland in the evening.

June 14th. Benningsen determined to cross the river Alle, and fall upon the 5th corps at Posthenen, with superior force, before the rest of the French army could come up. At 4 o'clock, a.m., the Russians began to cross the river by four bridges, three of them made with pontoons. A Russian division advanced against the French, but it was held in check, and Benningsen had to re-inforce it. Shortly after the firing commenced the French 8th corps arrived, and came into line on the left of the 5th corps, extending to Heinrichsdorf.

Benningsen was therefore obliged to bring more troops across the river to oppose this extended line, and eventually 55,000 Russians were on the left bank.

The French corps retired to some high ground between the two villages, which was skirted with woods, and here awaited re-inforcements.

Benningsen, thinking that he would have to deal only with these two French corps, formed his troops for an attack.

The right was commanded by Gortchakoff and the left by

Bagration; their line extended from the wood of Domnau on the right, to the wood of Sortlack on the left; the Guards were in reserve in rear of the centre. The wings were separated by a mill-stream with deep banks. One division was left on the right bank of the river. Benningsen took some time to arrange his troops, and whilst he was thus employed the French advanced thirty squadrons to attack the Russian right; but this endeavour was repulsed. Mortier now sent a column of 3,000 men against the centre of the Russian right wing, but this came under a terrible artillery fire, and was routed.

Benningsen now advanced his left wing to attack the French right, but the Russians were unable to deprive the French of their position.

Napoleon was at Domnau; when he heard the firing, he ordered all the corps to close up, and himself went to Heinrichsdorf. He arrived there about one o'clock, and as his corps came up, he posted them as follows:—

6th corps on the right from the wood of Sortlack to Posthenen.

5th corps and 8th corps remained in their positions.

1st corps formed in rear of the 6th corps, and the Guards behind the centre and left.

Cavalry under Grouchy and Nansouty, in rear of both flanks and the centre.

Murat was with the 3rd corps towards Königsberg.

The French troops, as they came up to their positions, were concealed by the woods, and Benningsen was not sure of the numbers he had opposed to him, but he was aware that the French had received considerable re-inforcements, and so abandoned his idea of acting on the offensive, his only thought now was how to recross the river.

He detached 6000 men to secure the bridge at Wehlau, over the river Pregel, and hoped to be able to act on the defensive until it was dark, when he could withdraw his force secretly.

By 4 o'clock all the French troops, 80,000 strong, were in line, and Napoleon, giving them an hour's rest, commenced operations at 5 o'clock.

He ordered an advance in echelon of corps from the right.

The signal for the attack was a discharge of artillery in the French centre. The 6th corps moved forward from the woods, accordingly, on Friedland, driving in the Russian's advanced troops before them. The French 1st corps now took the place of the 6th corps, and its artillery opened fire from the heights.

The 6th corps drove back the Russian left and nearly reached the town, when they were charged, in flank, by the Russian guards; this obliged them to retire, but the 1st corps, which was advancing in support, charged the Russian guards in flank, and they, in their turn, were driven back to the edge of Friedland.

This enabled the French 6th corps to rally, and both corps now advanced to the assault of the town.

The French entered the streets, the houses were set on fire, also the bridges over the river.

The Russian right wing held its ground, but when the left wing retired the left flank of the right wing became exposed, and some battalions of the French 5th corps, passing down the mill-stream banks, took the Russians in flank; the French, however, were quickly driven back by the Russian cavalry.

Benningsen, seeing his left wing defeated, his bridges destroyed, and Friedland in flames, would have been obliged to capitulate, had he not discovered a ford immediately in his rear. He withdrew his artillery from action and passed them over the river under cover of his infantry, which stood firm against the most determined attacks of the French infantry and cavalry. Most of the guns got across the river and took up position on the right bank, but the combatants were so close to each other that the guns could not open fire.

Two Russian divisions charged into Friedland, not knowing the bridges were destroyed; so vigorous was their assault, that they drove back the French troops of the 1st and 6th corps; but, on finding they were unable to pass the river there, they fell back to the ford.

Many Russians were drowned in their hurry to cross the river, but none surrendered themselves as prisoners to the French. A part of the Russian right moved by the left bank


Althorf
Schmeditten
Schledatten
Katschitten
Anklappen
7th
EYLAU
G
Kl. Sausgarten
Serpalten
mile
0
1
2
from Konigsberg
Wood of Domnau
to Allenburg
Heinrichsdorf
R. Alle
8
6
5
FRIEDLAND
to Allenburg
from Domnau
Posthenen
1
mile
0
1
2
3
4
Wood of Sortlack

of the river Alle to Allensburg; Benningsen during the night, or early on the following morning, joined them there with the remainder of the army, and on the next day they reached Wehlau.

The French had about 80,000 men engaged, and lost 8,000; the Russians had about 55,000 men, and lost 17,000, but only seventeen guns.

The French did not pursue, and forty squadrons on the French right never even mounted their horses, because, as their commander said, "He had no orders."

The Prussians, and the remainder of the Russian army detached with them to cover Königsberg, on hearing of the battle of Friedland, retired to Wehlau, and Königsberg capitulated.

June 18th. The united Russian army reached Tilsit, on the river Niemen. The French followed the Russians slowly. On this day the Russian Emperor sent proposals for an armistice, which Napoleon gladly accepted, and eventually the terms of peace were arranged at an interview of the two Emperors on the "Raft of Tilsit."

NOTES.—Benningsen failed to get his troops across the river fast enough to accomplish his object, namely, that of defeating Lannes before he could obtain assistance, and once having committed himself to the passage of the river with so considerable a part of his force, he was obliged to take up a position and act on the defensive. Although he knew that the French had received very large re-inforcements, he did not expect to be attacked that evening, and hoped to be able to recross the river during the night.

Napoleon, on reconnoitring the Russian position, at once saw that Friedland was the vulnerable point, and that if he could possess himself of that the retreat of the Russian army would be cut off. He therefore advanced against it with two corps, one in support of the other. The other corps advancing in echelon were ready to protect a reverse and follow up a success. Had not Benningsen discovered the ford in rear of his right wing, he must have surrendered with his entire force.

It is difficult to understand why Napoleon did not order his cavalry to attack the Russians, who were retreating by the left bank of the river Alle; it may be he was otherwise engaged at the time and did not observe them. If Murat had been present he would probably have watched for such an opportunity, and asked permission to pursue.

Throughout this campaign Napoleon, in advancing, adopted his usual formations—a corps on each flank, and his main body in the centre ready to

move to the assistance of either flank. Having made up his mind on a certain operation, he carried it out with decision; whereas we find the Russian general making indecisive advances and retreats, half-hearted offensive movements, and then falling back to the defensive: finally he placed himself with his back to a large river, with the whole French army in front of him.

Napoleon feared the hostilities of the Austrians on the one flank and the English and Swedes on the other: had these operated on his lines of communication, which were 1,000 miles in length, he must have been ruined. On this account he was so anxious to make peace.

THE WAGRAM CAMPAIGN.

In 1808-9 Napoleon was engaged in a war in the Spanish Peninsula.

The Austrians thought this was a good time to recommence hostilities against the French.

The French troops available for operations in Germany were:

2nd corps	under	Lannes.
3rd „	„	Davoust.
4th „	„	Massena.
7th „	„	Lefebvre.
8th „	„	Oudinot (Fusiliers).
Bavarians	„	Deroy, and Wrede.
Wurtembergers	„	Vandamme.

Part of the Guards.

Cavalry under Bessières.

In all about 170,000 strong.

The corps however were much scattered in March when war was threatened.

Napoleon ordered them to concentrate in the Valley of the Danube about Donauwörth, on the river Lech. Berthier was sent to superintend these arrangements.

April 10th. The Austrians under the Archduke Charles, consisting of corps as follows, crossed the river Inn about Braunau.

1st corps	under	Lichenstein.
2nd „	„	Kienmayer.
3rd „	„	Hohenzollern.
4th „	„	Rosenberg.
5th „	„	Archduke Louis.
6th „	„	Hiller.

In all about 150,000 men.

The 6th corps was advanced to Moosburg.

Another Austrian force under Bellegarde, consisting of a corps under Klenau and another corps under Kollowrath, in all about 50,000 men, was to advance by Amberg and operate on the left bank of the Danube.

Berthier had placed the French corps in position as follows:

Bavarians and 7th corps on the Isar.

2nd and 3rd corps at Ratisbon.

4th corps at Ulm.

The other corps much scattered about Bavaria.

April 16th. The Austrians advanced to the river Isar, and the French corps fell back before them.

The Archduke Charles now thought to cross the river Danube above Ratisbon and cut off the 2nd and 3rd corps from the rest of the French army, and at the same time to join Bellegarde.

April 17th. Napoleon arrived at Donauwörth, probably just in time to save the French army from destruction. He ordered the 2nd and 3rd corps to march on Abensberg, the other corps to concentrate about Pfaffenhofen and endeavour to communicate with the corps approaching them by Abensberg.

The Austrians on this day were marching as follows:—

4th corps from Dingolfing towards Ratisbon.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps, from Landshut towards Kelheim.

5th corps from Landshut by Neustadt towards the Danube.

6th corps from Moosburg by Mainburg towards the Danube.

Napoleon's plan was now to draw back his left, and push forward his right, so as to cut off the Austrian 6th corps, get behind Archduke Charles, and intercept his line of communications.

April 19th. Leaving a small force at Ratisbon, Davoust marched on Abensberg, his extreme outer column encountered the advanced troops of Archduke Charles; this had the effect of delaying the march of the Austrian centre, which halted about Eckmuhl.

April 20th. The Austrian 6th corps, from Mainburg, was marching on Pfaffenhofen to connect with the 5th corps. On this day these corps were surprised; attacked by the French; defeated, and driven back to the river Isar.

April 21st. Davoust, with the 3rd corps, was ordered to

engage the attention of the Archduke Charles, the French 4th corps was directed on Moosberg, and the others on Landshut, in pursuit of the Austrian 5th and 6th corps.

These Austrian corps were utterly routed, and made for the river Inn.

The Austrian 1st and 2nd corps were moved up the Danube towards Abach. Bellegrade arrived at Ratisbon, took possession of the town, and secured the bridge; the Austrian 3rd and 4th corps were drawn up at Eckmuhl with their rear to Ratisbon.

Battle of Eckmuhl.—(See Plate 15).

April 22nd. Napoleon marched from Landshut with the 2nd, 4th corps, Wurtembergers, 8th corps and Guards, on Eckmuhl; 7th corps and Bavarians were sent to re-inforce the 3rd corps. On arriving about Eckmuhl he reconnoitred the Austrian position, and ordered the 2nd corps, which was on the French right, to advance to the attack of the Austrian left, and the Wurtembergers to attack the village of Eckmuhl; the 4th corps, 8th corps, and Guards, being kept in reserve.

The Austrian left was turned, but the Wurtembergers were unable to carry Eckmuhl.

By the retreat of the Austrian left the centre became exposed, and Lannes sent a division to attack them here; this compelled them to retire, and the Wurtembergers were thus enabled to occupy the village.

Whilst this attack was going on Davoust came up on the French left. The 7th corps and Bavarians attacked the Austrian right flank at Unter Laichling, whilst the 3rd corps occupied the woods there, with a view of preventing the Austrian 1st and 2nd corps rendering assistance to the 3rd and 4th corps.

The Austrians at Eckmuhl, being thus out-numbered, were unable to hold their ground, and retired towards Ratisbon. Napoleon ordered his cavalry to charge them, and a general advance to be made. The Austrian cavalry came forward and covered the retreat of their infantry; by this means the 3rd and

4th corps were enabled to take up a position on the left of the 1st and 2nd corps, which had changed their front to the left on their right. The sun had now set, hostilities closed, and the two armies bivouacked facing each other.

The Archduke Charles made a pontoon bridge over the Danube above Ratisbon, and during the night, keeping up his watch-fires, he passed his army across the river.

At daybreak the Austrian rear guards only were on the right bank of the river in the bridge heads. Napoleon attacked these, but they made good their retreat, and, after burning the bridges, entered Ratisbon.

April 23rd. In the course of the day the 2nd corps succeeded in taking Ratisbon,* but by this time the Austrians were well on their march for Cham. In these engagements the Austrians lost about 30,000 men, including 7,000 prisoners, and 100 guns. The French lost about 20,000.

NOTES.—Napoleon arrived just in time to concentrate his troops.

Davoust's march was somewhat hazardous, being a flank march across an enemy's front. He might have been directed to march up the left bank of the Danube to Ingolstadt and to cross the river there; but Napoleon, calculating on the slow movements of the Austrians, ventured to bring him by the nearest road to join his left flank. It is to be observed that Napoleon had accurate information of the Austrian movements, whilst the Archduke Charles must have been in ignorance of the position of the French. The Archduke advanced from the river Isar in Napoleon's formation of two flanks and a strong centre, but, not knowing where his enemy was, he found himself with his left wing cut off and defeated before he could come to its assistance.

The Austrian retreat across the Danube, after the battle of Eckmuhl, is said to have been a masterly movement.

Napoleon considered that his manœuvres on this occasion were superior to any he ever executed.

During these operations in the valley of the Danube, Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy, had been engaged with 45,000 men in the Italian plains against 48,000 Austrians under Archduke John.

Although the Austrians here gained an advantage, Archduke John, on hearing of Napoleon's success on the Danube, was obliged to fall back upon Vienna.

* At the attack on Ratisbon Napoleon was wounded in the foot.

April 24th. Napoleon ordered—

3rd corps to follow up the Archduke Charles, leaving a garrison at Ratisbon.

2nd and 4th corps, Wurtembergers, 8th corps, Guards, and cavalry, to march down the right bank of the Danube towards Vienna.

7th corps and Bavarians to occupy Munich and operate in the Tyrol.

He also sent despatches to Eugene to press on from the Italian plains towards Vienna, and to Bernadotte to enter Bohemia with a Saxon corps he had been organising at Dresden, and make for Ratisbon.

April 26th. Napoleon arrived at Landshut, where he found the entire corps of Guards, which had just arrived from Spain, 20,000 strong.

The French advanced to the river Inn, 4th corps on the left, next to the Danube, 2nd corps on the right, cavalry in front and on the flanks, Wurtembergers, 8th corps, and Guards, in rear.

May 1st. The French arrived at the river Inn, and the Austrian 5th and 6th corps fell back to the river Traun; the 6th corps took up a position at Ebersberg, to defend the bridge at Mauthausen over the Danube; the Archduke Charles had arrived at Budweis, and was making for this bridge.

May 3rd. Massena, with the French 4th corps, attacked and carried Ebersberg, and gained possession of the bridge.

The Austrian 5th and 6th corps crossed the Danube, and marched on Vienna by the left bank.

The French pushed on along the right bank, and leaving detachments to secure the passage of the river Danube at Linz, Krems, and other points, arrived in front of Vienna without further opposition on 10th May.

May 11th. Vienna capitulated, and the French entered the town on the 13th.

The French troops were now put in position as follows:—

4th corps towards the Simmering.

2nd corps, 8th corps, and Guards occupied Vienna.

3rd corps between Ebersberg and St. Polton.

Wurtembergers at Linz.

Saxons, about 30,000, at Passau.

7th corps and Bavarians in the Tyrol, desperately engaged with the Tyrolese.

The Austrians, both under the Archdukes Charles and John, had been unable to reach Vienna before the French; those from Italy had retired to Hungary: and those under the Archduke Charles were in position a few miles north of the capital.

The army from Italy under Eugene, following up the Archduke John, occupied Trieste, moved north, and connected with the 4th corps.

Napoleon determined to make an attempt to cross the Danube, and operate against the Archduke Charles. He ordered the 4th corps, 3rd corps, and Wurtenbergers to concentrate at Vienna, and selected Ebersdorf, which is below Vienna, opposite the island of Lobau, as the point of passage. This island was occupied by the Austrians.

May 19th. At 10 o'clock at night a part of the 4th corps was passed over the river in boats; by surprise, they overcame the Austrians, and took possession of the island. Next day a bridge was made, and the 4th corps established itself on Lobau.

During these operations the Archduke Charles was making attempts to cross the Danube at Linz and Krems, but these places were defended by the Saxons, and he was unsuccessful.

On discovering the passage of the French at Ebersdorf, the Archduke Charles concentrated his troops behind the Bisamberg, opposite the island of Lobau, concealed from the French. His design was to attack the French army during their passage of the river, and destroy their bridge by means of fire-boats floated down the stream.

Battle of Aspern or Essling.—(See Plate 15.)

May 20th. The passage of the French troops across the river was continued, and on the morning of the 21st the 4th

and 2nd corps and cavalry, 40,000 strong, were on the left bank.

The 4th corps occupied the village of Aspern, and
2nd „ „ „ Essling.

On reconnoitering Napoleon came to the conclusion that the entire Austrian army was in front of him, so he sent orders for the Guards, 8th corps and 3rd corps, to march at once to Ebersdorf.

The Archduke, in the afternoon, thinking the time had come to attack, ordered the advance to be made as follows:—

6th corps, next to the river on Aspern.

Bellegarde, on the same village.

3rd Corps, by Breitenlee; also on Aspern.

4th corps, by Raschdorf on Essling.

2nd corps, by Enzersdorf on Essling.

The remainder, with the cavalry, were to support the centre, and advance between Raschdorf and Breitenlee; in all about 80,000 strong.

At 2 o'clock the attack on Aspern commenced, and was continued with the utmost vigour until 11 o'clock at night, when the village was carried by the Austrians, the French being thrust out by overwhelming numbers.

In the centre the French infantry were very weak, and, to check the Austrian attacks here, Napoleon ordered a charge to be made with all the cavalry; although the French cuirassiers did much execution, they were defeated and had to retire.

The French right at Essling was not attacked till 5 o'clock, the Austrian columns having further to march to reach this than the other flank.

Although many assaults were made by the Austrians, they were unable to turn the French out of this village, and it remained in Lannes's hands all night; its possession prevented the Austrians in the centre from advancing, as when they did so they were taken in flank.

May 22nd. During the night Napoleon used every endeavour to get more troops across the Danube. By daylight the 8th corps and Guards were on the eft bank, but the 3rd corps was still on the right bank.

Before sunrise the Austrians again assailed Essling, and at the same time Massena with the French 4th corps attacked Aspern. Both assaults succeeded, the French lost Essling on their right, and regained Aspern on their left. Seeing the great importance of holding these two villages on the flanks of his position, Napoleon reinforced the 2nd corps, and Essling was retaken. The Austrians now made great efforts to re-possess themselves of Aspern, and after several hours of severe fighting they regained it.

The position of the antagonists was now much the same as it had been on the previous evening, but Napoleon observed that the centre of the Austrian line had been weakened to reinforce the flanks for these desperate attacks on the villages—he accordingly formed all his available troops up to advance against the centre, supported by the Guards, and cavalry in rear. The Austrian line was penetrated between the 3rd and 4th corps and thrown back on either side in confusion, the French cavalry charged, and some of them reached Breitenlee, where the Austrian reserves were stationed; here they were repulsed and driven back by the Austrian cavalry.

The Archduke Charles seeing the danger caused by this attack, placed himself at the head of the reserves, and led them on to the attack of the French columns: this had the effect of checking their advance. The Austrians that had been thus driven back now rallied, and the French, attacked in front by the Austrian reserves, and on each flank by the 3rd and 4th corps, had to retire. In this retreat an opening was left in the French line, into which some battalions of the Austrian 3rd corps were advanced; they were quickly reinforced from the Austrian reserves, and so succeeded in separating the French centre.

It was now reported to Napoleon that his bridges over the Danube had been broken by fire-boats floated down the stream, and communication was cut off from the right bank. Only a part of the French 3rd corps had crossed.

Thus deprived of further reinforcements, and pressed hard in front and on both flanks, he was compelled to order a retreat on to the island of Lobau.

When the Austrians observed these indications of retirement on the part of the French, they reassaulted Essling, and drove the French through the village.

Napoleon, considering the retention of Essling essential to protect his retreat, ordered his Old Guard to arrest the advance of the Austrians here, which they did at the point of the bayonet, driving their adversaries back.

The French held their ground against repeated further attacks (in one of which Lannes was mortally wounded), and they made good their retreat to the island.

The Austrians kept up a fire from their batteries till midnight, by which time the French rear-guard had passed into the entrenchments which protected the bridge.

The Austrian losses were upwards of 20,000 killed and wounded; the French probably lost over 30,000.

Napoleon, leaving Massena in command on the island of Lobau, proceeded to the right bank of the river to superintend the reconstruction of the bridge and the supply and reorganisation of his army.

NOTES.—There can be no doubt that Napoleon's attempt to pass a large river like the Danube with only one bridge, and with an enemy known to be somewhere close at hand in great strength, was, to say the least of it, an exceedingly hazardous operation, and in a military point of view cannot be justified.

On the other hand, the Archduke Charles's movements were admirably conceived and executed: he kept his force concealed in a good position until the proper moment arrived to strike the blow, thus he succeeded in completely deceiving Napoleon. Had he exposed his force any sooner, Napoleon would not have continued the passage of his troops; but, on the afternoon of the 21st, when Napoleon discovered the Austrian army was in front of him, he had too many troops across the river to think of retreating. Before this no doubt he considered that he would have been able to have advanced into the open country, and there engaged the Archduke Charles; he had no idea that the entire Austrian army was so close to him, but only, as Lannes said, "a paltry 10,000, or so."

On the morning of the 22nd there were 70,000 French troops on the left bank of the river; there was no room between Aspern and Essling to manœuvre them; they were never able to deploy, and were in dense columns during the whole day, with the Austrian guns drawn up in a semi-circle firing into their masses.

It is generally acknowledged that this battle was, both strategically and tactically, a very grave mistake of Napoleon's.

The Austrians were too crippled by their two days' fighting to be able to renew the attack. The Archduke Charles therefore drew off his troops to reorganise and recruit. He expected the army from Italy under Archduke John to join him any day, which would bring up his numbers again to nearly equal that of the French.

Napoleon ordered a corps of the Italian army under Macdonald to Vienna, and the rest of the army under Eugene to continue to press the Archduke John, with a view of preventing his junction with Archduke Charles.

The 7th corps and Bavarians (from the Tyrol), the Wurtembergers and Saxons, were ordered to hold the posts on the south of the river Danube, so as to keep open and protect the line of communications.

Marmont, who was with a corps in Dalmatia, received directions to march for Vienna.

The island of Lobau was fortified, three strong bridges were constructed to connect it with the right bank of the river, and a strong boom was made above the bridges to protect them. A force of marines and sailors were brought from Brest to superintend and defend these bridges.

The Austrians also entrenched themselves between Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, with a view of preventing the French from again issuing from the island.

Napoleon, seeing this, caused several small bridges to be prepared that could be hastily put together and thrown across the stream round the island on the south-east side, so that he could turn the Austrian works at Enzersdorf.

June 14th. Eugene fought a battle with the Archduke John at Raab, defeated him, and succeeded in capturing an entrenched camp there. This enabled Napoleon to bring Eugene's corps to Lobau.

The Saxons under Bernadotte, the Wurtembergers under Vandamme, and the Bavarians under Wrede, were ordered to close up, and reached Lobau on the 2nd July.

July 3rd. Marmont's corps joined the French army, and on the following day Eugene arrived.


RATISBON
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1 0 1 2 3 4 Miles
Unter Laichling
ECKMUHL
Brettenlee
Raschdorf
Bellegarde
ASPERN
ESSLING
Enzersdorf
ISLAND OF LOBAU
Ebersdorf
1 ½ 0 1 Mile

Napoleon now had about 180,000 men and 700 guns on the island of Lobau, with which to operate against the Archduke Charles.

The Austrian army had also received considerable reinforcements, and was now about 140,000 strong, with 700 guns.

3rd corps, Hohenzollern } were at Wagram, in position on
4th „ Rosenberg } some heights behind the stream
5th „ Bellegarde } Russbach.
2nd „ Kollowrath, was on the Bisamberg.
1st „ Klenau, was in the forts at Essling.

The cavalry under Lichtenstein was at Breitenlee. The other corps were watching the banks of the Danube. An order was sent to Archduke John to use every endeavour to bring his force to Wagram as quickly as possible.

July 2nd. Napoleon made preparations, as if he intended to pass from the island of Lobau, by the old bridge between Aspern and Essling; this had the effect of causing the Archduke Charles to reinforce the forts.

During the night of the 4th and 5th July a heavy fire was kept up from the French batteries on the island towards Aspern, Essling, Enzersdorf, and the six bridges which had been secretly prepared were thrown across from the south-east side.

The Austrians, thinking the French were preparing to pass from the bridge-heads between Aspern and Essling, kept up an incessant fire in that direction.

Battle of Wagram.—(See Plate 16.)

In the morning, by 6 o'clock, 150,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, and 600 guns of the French army, had crossed from Lobau to the main land, and were in formation to the east of Enzersdorf. Thus the Austrian entrenchments were completely turned.

The Archduke Charles ordered his troops to retire from these forts: the 1st corps moved towards the Bisamberg, and the remainder to Wagram.

The French were drawn up as follows:—

3rd corps, Davoust, on the right,
8th „ Oudinot,
Saxons Bernadotte, } in the centre,
4th corps, Massena, on the left,
} 1st line.

Marmont's corps, in rear of the right,
Guards, Bavarians & cavalry, in rear of the centre,
Macdonald and Eugene's corps in rear of the left,
} 2nd line.

Cavalry, under Montbrun, were on the right flank.

The French advanced slowly, opening out as they did so, and the army of Italy came up into the 1st line, between the 4th corps and Saxons.

The Austrian advanced troops fell back before the French.

Napoleon arrived at Raschdorf, and ordered his batteries to open on the Austrian position between Wagram and Neusiedel. The 8th corps attacked the village of Baumersdorf, whilst Eugene and Macdonald advanced against Wagram. The latter corps forded the Russbach and gained the heights, driving back the Austrians, but the French artillery could not get across the stream. The French infantry were suffering much from the fire of the Austrian guns; both Eugene and Macdonald, however, maintained themselves on the heights for a considerable time, and the Saxons were coming up to their support. The Archduke Charles, seeing that the French were here gaining ground, put himself at the head of some battalions in the 2nd line, and led them in person against Eugene and Macdonald's corps. At the same time the Austrian 3rd corps (whose advanced troops were successfully resisting the attack of Oudinot's corps) took the French under Macdonald in flank; they were routed and driven down hill. It was now dark, and these retreating troops, coming on the advancing Saxons, caused much confusion; but the Austrians did not follow up their advantage. The troops were drawn off on each side, and fighting ceased for the night.

During the night both commanders made preparations for the renewal of the combat at daylight, each determined to assume the offensive.

Napoleon's plan was to fall with all his force on the three Austrian corps on the heights above Wagram, and drive them off the field, before either the corps on the Bisamberg or the Archduke John, who was at Presburg, could join them.

The French 4th corps, having detached a division to Aspern, was at Aderklaa, the Saxons, Eugene and Macdonald's corps, in front of Wagram, but to the right of it, Oudinot's 8th corps opposite Baumersdorf, Davoust's 3rd corps opposite Neusiedel.

The Guards, Bavarians, Marmont's corps, and the reserve cavalry, formed a line in rear about Raschdorf.

This was the position of the French at daylight.

The Archduke Charles decided to attack the French on their left flank with his corps from the Bisamberg, and to move his left corps forward to connect with the Archduke John, whom he calculated would arrive on the field at 1 o'clock. Thus he hoped to hold his own on the heights above Wagram, and at the same time cut the French off from their bridges.

The Austrian 6th corps had arrived and strengthened the force on the Bisamberg.

At daylight the Austrian 4th corps advanced and occupied Glinzendorf; the corps from the Bisamberg were also rapidly advancing.

Napoleon, thinking the Archduke John had arrived during the night, became alarmed for his right flank; he moved his Guards to Glinzendorf, and, taking the Austrian 4th corps in flank, compelled it to retire behind the Russbach. In the mean time the Austrian 1st, 2nd, and 6th corps, had arrived at Süssenbrunn-Leopoldau; the Saxons had attacked Wagram, been driven back in confusion on the French 4th corps, and the Austrians, following the Saxons, had reached Aderklaa.

Napoleon ordered Davoust to attack Neusiedel with the 3rd corps, and himself, with his Guards, proceeded towards Aderklaa. On arriving here he ordered the cuirassiers of the guard to charge the advancing Austrians, and, under cover of this, he rallied the 4th corps and Saxons. The Austrian advance here was checked, and Napoleon ordered the 4th corps to "wheel into mass on the left" and move on Aspern.

By 10 o'clock the Austrian 1st, 2nd, and 6th corps, under Kollowrath, had passed Breitenlee, and were advancing steadily on Aspern, driving the division of the 4th corps, which was there, before them.

The French 3rd corps had crossed the Russbach and turned the Austrian left on the Wagram plateau, which obliged Rosenberg to show a front to his left with the 4th corps.

The French stormed the heights, drove the Austrian 4th corps back, and captured Neusiedel. Oudinot, seeing this success, pushed forward the 8th corps, and drove the Austrian 3rd corps out of Baumersdorf back on to the plateau.

The left of these two Austrian corps was completely thrown back, and they showed a front almost at right angles to the Russbach.

The Austrian 5th corps had been moved down into the plain at Aderklaa, and there stood opposed to the Saxons and the army of Italy.

Messages now reached Napoleon of the success gained by the Austrian corps under Kollowrath, in capturing French artillery, &c.; he ordered the reserve cavalry to charge these Austrian corps on the left flank, and Massena, who had marched back to Aspern, to attack them in front. At the same time he directed Eugene's corps, the Saxons, and Marmont's corps, to attack Wagram. He also formed up Macdonald's corps, with eight battalions deployed in line, one behind the other, and seven and six battalions in close column on either flank,* supported by the Bavarians in rear of each flank, to advance against Süssenbrunn, and with his Guards he followed.

The Archduke Charles, seeing these preparations made to force what was now his centre, brought up his reserves to resist the attack. Macdonald advanced upon Süssenbrunn, leaving Aderklaa on his right. He suffered severely; the Austrians fell back on each of his flanks, but they were themselves taken in flank in so doing by the Bavarians, who were assisted by the young Guard and the Cuirassiers: the latter, however, met

* See Home's "Modern Tactics," pp. 55-56.


Brisamberg
Stammersdorf
Gerasdorf
WAGRAM
Aderklaa
Baumersdorf
Neusiedel
R. Russbach
Sassenbrunn
Saxons
Prussians
Macdonald
Leopoldau
Raschdorf
Glanzendorf
Bratenlee
Bavarians
Marmont
Lobersdorf
VIENNA
Aspern
Essling
Enzersdorf
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

with such a severe fire, that after losing 1,200 men in a few minutes, they had to retire before they had charged home. Both this French advance and that on Wagram were so successful, that the Archduke Charles, seeing his right cut off from his centre, his left defeated, and no appearance of the Archduke John, ordered a retreat. The Austrians retired by alternate bodies (either of regiments or brigades) in admirable order towards the Bisamberg.

The French were unable to do more than push the Austrians back to the heights above Stammersdorf; they made no prisoners and took no guns.

It was now between 3 and 4 o'clock, and just as the French had ceased their attack on the Austrian grand army, the Archduke John appeared at Loibersdorf, but seeing how the day had gone, he retraced his steps, without coming into action.

Each side is said to have lost about 25,000 men, killed and wounded.

July 7th. The Archduke Charles retreated towards Bohemia, and the Archduke John towards Hungary.

The French 3rd, 4th, and 8th corps, Marmont and the Guards, followed the Archduke Charles.

Eugene's corps, the Saxons and Wurtembergers, moved towards Presburg to observe the Archduke John. Macdonald's and the other corps remained in Vienna. At Znaym the Archduke Charles took up a position which was attacked by the French, but during the engagement he made overtures for an armistice, which was accepted by Napoleon, and signed on the 18th. Peace was afterwards signed at Vienna on the 14th October.

NOTES.—The Archduke Charles was no doubt surprised by Napoleon's passage of the river; he thought the French might try to cross above Vienna, as they had previously done unsuccessfully some two months before; it was on this account probably that he kept the force he did at the Bisamberg.

The Archduke John, it has been always considered, might have easily arrived in time to take part in the battle, had he used any exertion to do so. If he had appeared on Napoleon's right flank at about one o'clock, the most critical time, the French would probably have been defeated.

In this battle we see Napoleon disregarding the Austrian advance on his

left rear, and using all his strength to defeat the left and centre of his adversary before the Archduke John came up.

When penetrating the Austrian centre, on this occasion he took care to support his advanced column on either flank, thus he prevented their being so severely treated on the flanks as the advance column had been at Aspern.

Napoleon had brought all his troops into action except two regiments of the Old Guard, and had not this advance of Macdonald's been the means of causing the Archduke Charles to order a retreat, the French would have been in a bad way.

THE INVASION OF RUSSIA.

In 1812 Napoleon determined to make war against Russia, his excuse was that at Tilsit she had sworn eternal alliance with France and war with England. Whereas she had now violated her oaths, and refused to give any explanation till the French had repassed the Rhine.

June 23rd. The French corps were assembled on the banks of the frontier river Niemen.

1st	corps	under the command of	Davoust.
2nd	„	„	Oudinot.
3rd	„	„	Ney.
4th	„	„	Eugene.
5th	„	„	Poniatowski (Poles).
6th	„	„	St. Cyr (Louis Gouvion).
7th	„	„	Reynier.
8th	„	„	Vandamme.
9th	„	„	Victor.
10th	„	„	Macdonald.

Imperial Guard with Napoleon.

And a force of Austrians under Schwartzenberg.

The cavalry under the command of Murat, was as follows:—

1st	corps	under the command of	Nansouty.
2nd	„	„	Montbrun.
3rd	„	„	Grouchy.
4th	„	„	Latour-Maubourg.

In all about 500,000 infantry, 100,000 cavalry, and 1,372 guns.

The Russians assembled to oppose this invasion were divided into three armies—

1st army, under Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 100,000 infantry, and 30,000 cavalry.

2nd army, under Prince Bagration, consisting of 50,000 infantry, and 12,000 cavalry.

3rd army, under Tormasoff, consisting of 40,000 infantry, and 14,000 cavalry.

June 24th. At one a.m. the French 2nd corps crossed the river, and took possession of Kovno; the cavalry followed and went to the front; and on the following day the 1st and 3rd corps and the Imperial Guard crossed the river at the same place.

The 4th and 5th corps, under Eugene, crossed at Pilony; and the 8th corps at Grodno, with Jerome in command. The 10th corps crossed at Tilsit, with orders to move on the left flank of the main army.

The Austrians and 7th corps, under Schwartzenberg, passed the river Bug at Bresesc Litovsky to operate on the right flank.

The 6th corps supported the 2nd corps, but did not cross the river till 1st July.

The 9th corps remained on the river Vistula in reserve.

Napoleon's object was to march on Moscow.

The 1st Russian army was assembled to the north of Wilna, the 2nd was opposite Bresesc, and the 3rd was marching from Turkey.

On the advance of the French the Russians retired.

June 28th. Napoleon was at Wilna, where he remained seventeen days. Jerome advanced against the 2nd Russian army, and the 1st corps was pushed forward to operate on its flank. Bagration had to retire to Bobrinsk, on the river Beresina. Jerome did not pursue him with sufficient rapidity, for which he was deprived of his command, and it was given to Davoust.

Napoleon's object was to prevent the 2nd Russian army from joining the 1st, which was now at Drissa in an entrenched camp.

July 12th. Davoust occupied Mohilow. Bagration attacked him; the Russians were repulsed and driven back to Nov-Bichow, but marched from thence on Mestislau.

July 14th. The Russian 1st army left the camp at Drissa and retired to Polotsk.

July 16th. Napoleon advanced to Glubokoe with a view of

turning the camp at Drissa, but finding it evacuated, he halted.

July 22nd. He continued his advance and marched on Vitepsk.

July 23rd. The 1st Russian army marched on Vitepsk to preserve its communications with Smolensko.

July 25th. Napoleon's advanced guard reached Ostrowno, but by that time the Russian army had all passed.

July 27th. The French came up to the Russians at Vitepsk and found them in position. Napoleon made preparations for an attack on the morrow, but during the night the Russians retired towards Smolensko.

August 3rd. The 1st and 2nd Russian armies formed a junction at Smolensko.

The Russians had detached Wittgenstein with 30,000 men towards their right flank, and the 3rd army was now coming up on their left; these wings encountered the 2nd corps on the French left, and the 7th corps on the French right. The Russians engaged these two French corps with success.

August 7th. The Russians advanced in three columns against the French.

August 13th. Napoleon moved to his right, crossed the river Dnieper by three bridges, with a view of turning the Russian left and making an endeavour to cut them off from Smolensko.

August 16th. The Russian commander, Barclay de Tolly, having become aware of his danger, retired again to Smolensko, and arrived just in time to save it from falling into the hands of the French. Napoleon brought up his corps with a view of attacking the Russians here, but Barclay de Tolly, contrary to the opinion of Bagration, decided on a retreat; accordingly the Russians during the night withdrew and retired towards Moscow.

August 17th. The French attacked the rear-guard at Smolensko, but the Russians held the town against all assaults, and at 7 o'clock Napoleon ordered his troops to withdraw from the engagement.

During the night the Russians retired, evacuating the town.

Napoleon had ordered the 9th corps to the front, and it joined him here. This corps of reserve was replaced by another, 52,000 strong, under Augereau. The Austrians attacked the Russian 3rd army, and compelled it to retire. The 2nd and 6th corps were attacked by Wittgenstein at Polotsk, but the Russians were repulsed, and had to withdraw.

Napoleon thus feeling that his communications were more secure determined to continue his advance.

The Russian public became impatient at this continuous retreat, and demanded a change of commanders. The Emperor Alexander, although himself satisfied with Barclay de Tolly, yielded to the public agitation, and appointed Kutusoff to the supreme command; he was nearly 70 years of age.

The French followed the Russians, marching with their cavalry in front, under Murat.

1st corps leading; 5th corps on the right; 4th corps on the left; Guards on the highway following the 1st corps; 3rd corps in rear.

The 8th and 9th corps were on the lines of communication.

The 7th, and Austrians, were on the right flank, and the 2nd and 6th corps on the left flank at Polotsk.

It was incumbent on Kutusoff to give battle to Napoleon before reaching Moscow, and he fixed on a position behind the village of Borodino to make a stand. The right rested on the unfordable river Moskwa, the centre behind Borodino, and the left on the village of Semenowskoie; a small stream, Kolotza, ran in front of the right, and the left was covered by broken ground; the position was strengthened by field works. Napoleon, feeling that a collision was now imminent, halted his army for three days, to prepare themselves for the approaching battle.

September 5th. The French army came in sight of the Russians, the advance guard halted, and Napoleon, surveying the position, immediately ordered an attack to be made on an advanced redoubt.

The 5th corps assaulted it—it was captured, but with great loss.

BATTLE OF BORODINO.—(See Plate 17.)

September 6th. Both armies observed each other, and prepared for the coming contest.

The Russians were drawn up in their position as follows:—

On the right of the main road to Moscow were Ostermann and Bagawouth's divisions.

Doctoroff's division extended from thence to the Great Redoubt, Raeffskoi's division prolonged the line to the village of Semenowskoie, Borosdin's division occupied some Redans to the left, and Touchkoff was placed at the village of Ulitza to guard the old road leading round the Russian left flank; the Imperial Guards were in reserve in rear of the centre, and the cavalry in line in rear of the infantry.

The entire force consisted of about 132,000 men with 640 guns.

The French were about 133,000 with 590 guns. Davoust proposed to Napoleon to move during the night with 40,000 men to the Russian left, and whilst the attack was being made on their front to fall on their flank unexpectedly, but Napoleon considered that it was too hazardous an undertaking to detach such a considerable number of men from his force. He ordered the attack to be made on the Russian left flank by an advance in echelon from his right.

5th corps was to advance along the old road against Ulitza.

1st corps against Semenowskoie.

3rd „ „ the Great Redoubt.

4th „ „ Borodino.

Guards in reserve, cavalry in rear of both flanks and centre.

September 7th. At 6 o'clock a.m. the battle commenced; the artillery opened fire and the French columns advanced from their right.

The 1st corps after severe fighting took one of the Redans on the Russian left, but it was re-captured again. Kutusoff seeing that the French attack was being made on his left flank, moved Bagawouth from the right to support his left. The 3rd corps now came into action, and advanced against the redoubts and

other works in its front; they took some of them, but at this time Bagawouth's division was passing from the Russian right to left, and it was directed to retake these works, which they did, driving the French back to the plain. On the French right the 5th corps took the village of Ulitza, but could make no further advance against Touchkoff's division on the heights beyond.

The 4th corps carried Borodino, and crossing the stream Kolotza, formed up to attack the great Russian Redoubt. The 1st and 3rd corps still remained unable to gain the heights of Semenowskoie, and after four hours' fighting, Ney sent to Napolean asking to be re-inforced. Napoleon ordered the Young Guards and the reserve cavalry to support these corps, and directed 400 guns on the redoubts.

The French then made another advance, Bagration ordered his men to leave their entrenchments, and move forward to meet the attack.

In this position they remained opposed to each other for an hour, at last the Russians gave way, a division of the French 1st corps having got round their flank. The Russians retired and took up a position in rear, abandoning the heights of Semenowskoie, which were at once occupied by the French.

The French tried to press the Russians back further, and Nansouty charged their left flank, but the Russian Guards being sent forward from the reserve, repelled the attack, and prevented the French from gaining any more ground.

The 4th corps advanced against the Great Russian Redoubt, and carried it. Kutusoff directed the Russian Guards to retake this work, which they did, driving the French out, and in their retreat they were charged by the Russian cavalry.

Napoleon was now urged to support the 4th corps with his Guards, but this he refused to do.

The Cossacks, under Platoff, and the cavalry of the Russian Guard, made a desperate attack on the left flank of the 4th corps. Napoleon, to relieve them, sent forward the cavalry of the Guard, who succeeded in causing the Russians to retire. 200 guns were now directed against the Great Redoubt, and the 4th corps was again reformed to attack it. Whilst the 4th

Plate 17.


BORODINO.
R. Kolotza
R. Moskwa.
Bagawerth.
Ostermann.
Great Redoubt
Semenowskoi
Ulitza
To Moscow
Old road to Moscow
N
1 0 1 2 3 Miles.

corps advanced against the redoubt the French cavalry charging and defeating the Russian cavalry opposed to them, got in the rear of the work, and it was taken.

Kutusoff reformed Ostermann's division and the Guards, and made a desperate effort to re-take the entrenchments they had lost, but it was in vain; after struggling for two hours the Russians retired under cover of their artillery to the ridge immediately in rear of their original position. In the evening the 5th corps carried the heights above Ulitza, Touchkoff's division retiring behind their main army. The artillery continued to fire till night, but no further attacks were attempted by either side.

The French fell back to the position they occupied before the battle, and the Russians strengthened themselves in their new position.

The Russians lost 15,000 killed and 30,000 wounded, and had 2,000 prisoners taken.

(Prince Bagration and Touchkoff were amongst the killed).

The French lost 12,000 killed and 38,000 wounded.

(General Montbrun was killed).

NOTES.—An attack in echelon was a favourite manœuvre of Napoleon's, it has the advantages of supporting a success or of covering a reverse.

In this attack it would seem to have been of importance to strike a decisive blow on the Russian left flank before it could be re-inforced by moving troops from the right; Napoleon has, therefore, been blamed for not sending the Young Guard to re-inforce Ney before he did; but being so far from his base, he hesitated to employ his reserves before he was sure that his adversary had engaged his. He positively refused to use the Old Guards (20,000 strong), and it has been said that if they had been cut up at Borodino, none of the French army would have ever recrossed the river Niemen.

The enormous army collected on the river Niemen made it most difficult to keep them regularly supplied. Being unable to get food from the commissariat the troops took to pillage, and then lost their discipline; this, probably, was the cause of the difficulties Napoleon had in advancing; he entirely failed in his endeavour to keep the Russian armies separated: he remained seventeen days at Wilna, without moving, and again six days at Glubokoe: these delays allowed time for the Russians to unite.

September 8th. The day after the battle, the Russians retreated towards Moscow.

September 9th. The French followed, and engaged the

Russian rear guard at Mojaisk without any advantage; the Russians held the town till all their troops and guns had passed, and then retired.

September 14th. The Russians abandoned Moscow, and retired to Kolomna.

September 15th. The French occupied the city, but found it deserted; the entire inhabitants had fled.

The Russians moved to Kalouga.

September 24th. Napoleon attempted to negotiate with the Czar; the correspondence lasted till the 9th October, when a distinct refusal was returned to all proposals for peace.

The French had an outpost under Murat at Winkowo.

October 18th. The Russians attacked this outpost and drove it back.

RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM MOSCOW.

October 19th. Napoleon concentrated his troops and marched on Kalouga; he left Moscow with 130,000 men and 600 guns.

Kutusoff, on hearing of Napoleon's march, moved to Malo-Jaroslawitz, with 80,000 men and 30,000 Cossacks.

October 23rd. The French vanguard reached Malo-Jaroslawitz.

October 24th. The Russian division, under Doctoroff, got possession of the town.

The French 4th corps engaged the Russians, and succeeded in turning them out of the town, but in the evening Kutusoff arrived, and occupied the heights on the south side, thus stopping the road to Kalouga.

October 25th. Napoleon reconnoitred the Russian position, but considered it too formidable to attack.

October 26th. The French moved by Borowsk and Mojaisk on Smolensko.

The Russians retreated to Kalouga.

October 27th. The French reached Vereva.

Kutusoff moved on Wiazma, and caused the Cossacks to harass the French rear guard.

October 28th. The French army gained the Smolensko road.

November 2nd. The French advance guard came upon the Russian's advance guard at Wiazma, engaged and drove them clear of the road.

November 4th and 5th. The retreat of the French continued, the 3rd corps (Ney) forming the rear guard.

November 6th. The winter began, and thousands perished of cold and starvation. The French army, much reduced and greatly disorganized, reached Dorogobouge. The 1st corps and Guards proceeded on the road to Smolensko; the 4th corps

moved north to assist the 2nd corps; and the 3rd corps formed the rear guard. The 5th and 8th corps had almost entirely disappeared.

November 13th. The French army reached Smolensko.

The 4th Corps, unable to make its way north, rejoined the army here on this day, having lost all its guns and most of its men.

The Russians marched by Jelnia to Tchelkanowo.

The French army, with the exception of the Imperial Guard, was completely disorganised. The 6th corps was forced back from the Dwina by Wittgenstein, and was only saved from destruction by the 9th corps, which moved towards them and formed a junction at Smoliantzy, where on the 4th November an engagement was fought, the French being compelled to retire.

November 14th. Napoleon continued his retreat towards Krasnoi, with 5,100 cavalry under Latour-Maubourg, the Guards and the remains of the corps reorganised, in all about 42,000 men, with 250 guns.

Kutusoff, on this day, arrived in the neighbourhood of Krasnoi with 50,000 men.

The French marched as follows:—Guards with Napoleon leading, 4th and 1st corps in the centre, and the 3rd corps forming the rear-guard.

On this day the French Guards arrived in front of Krasnoi.

Battle of Krasnoi.—(See Plate 18.)

November 15th. The Russians opened an artillery fire on the French Guards, and a Russian division was placed in position across the road leading to Krasnoi. During the night Napoleon with his Young Guards, attacked the Russians and cleared the road.

November 16th. The Emperor passed the Russians in the midst of his Old Guards without being attacked. The French 4th corps which followed, however, met with an obstinate resistance, and Eugene only succeeded in joining the Emperor

by passing round the northern flank of the Russians, but with a loss of about 5,000 men and 18 guns.

November 17th. Napoleon, with a view of assisting the 1st corps under Davoust to pass the road, attacked the Russians; part of the 1st corps succeeded in reaching Krasnoi, but the rest were cut off and made prisoners.

Napoleon continued his retreat on Orcha, leaving the 3rd corps behind.

November 18th. The 3rd corps under Ney, unconscious of what had happened in front, advanced against the Russians under cover of a thick fog, when it was suddenly assailed by artillery fire. Ney attempted to storm the Russian position, but after losing upwards of 5,000 men, he retired along the road to Smolensko for about three miles, he then turned northward, crossed the river Dnieper on the ice, and after suffering many losses from the Cossacks and privations, he brought the remnant of his corps, about 1,500 men to Orcha, where he joined the Emperor November 20th.

The French losses in thus forcing the road at Krasnoi were 10,000 killed and wounded, and 26,000 prisoners. The Grand Army was now reduced to 10,000 combatants.

The Russians did not lose more than 2,000 men.

NOTES.—Kutusoff has been much blamed for not attacking the French Guards when they passed along the road on the 16th November—actually through the Russian lines. It was thought that he might have easily surrounded them and taken Napoleon prisoner, but such was his dread of this "Corps elite" that he dared not venture to leave his position to do so. It has also been thought that he ought to have occupied a position on the road to Orcha, and so hemmed in Napoleon, but he was afraid to separate his forces in front of such an opponent.

The courageous manner in which Ney extricated himself from his forlorn position is the admiration of every military student.

Never before was Napoleon in such a plight—his losses were terrible, indeed it can scarcely be said that he did much more than save himself, his Generals, and his Guards.

Kutusoff, by his engagement with Ney, had allowed the main body of the French army to get well in advance of him, so, leaving the Russian flank armies under Wittgenstein and

Tchichagoff to complete their destruction, he moved, by easy marches, to Kopys.

The Russian army, from Turkey, under Tchichagoff, captured Minsk on the 16th November, where there were large French magazines.

November 23rd. Tchichagoff's advanced guard passed the Beresina at Borissow, but was met by the French 2nd corps, defeated, and driven back across the river. The 2nd and 9th corps now joined Napoleon, which made his force 40,000 men, and 250 guns.

The Russians, under Tchichagoff, were about 33,000 men, with 150 guns.

PASSAGE OF THE RIVER BERESINA.—(See Plate 18.)

Napoleon advanced towards the Beresina with the 2nd corps in front, the remains of the Grand Army in the centre, and the 9th corps in rear. He moved on Brill, and made preparations as if to pass the river there, but, on the night of November 25th, he threw two bridges over the stream at Studienka.

November 26th. Napoleon passed over a sufficient force to drive the Russians opposite to him away, and secured the completion of the bridges.

During these operations Tchichagoff was closely watching the river below Borissow, and Wittgenstein was endeavouring to march on Studienka, but finding the roads impracticable, he had to change the direction of his march to Borissow, where the two Russian armies joined.

November 27th. The French army proceeded to cross the river, the 9th corps being extended along the left bank to cover the passage.

November 28th. The Russians, having arranged to attack the French, advanced—

Tchichagoff along the right bank, and Wittgenstein by the left.

The 2nd, 3rd corps and Guards, which had crossed the river successfully resisted the attack on the right bank; and during

N
KRASNOI
G.
Y.G.
to Smolensko
1
1 0 1 2 Miles.
Stadienka
G
Wittgenstein
Orcha
1
G
to Lemberg
R. Beresina
3
G
2nd
Tchichagoff
to Minsk
N
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

the action the Guards and 1st corps defiled in the direction of Zembin.

The 9th corps kept the advanced guard of Wittgenstein in check, but when the main body came up the Russians established their batteries in a semicircle and opened fire on the bridges. One bridge was broken, and thousands perished by drowning as well as by shot.

November 29th. The remainder of the rear guard of the 9th corps, in the early morning, passed the river and set fire to the bridge.

December 5th. The French army, now only 7,000 strong, reached Smorgoni, and Napoleon having handed the command over to Murat, with orders to fall back behind the river Niemen, set off for Paris.

NOTES.—This was a most masterly passage of a river in the presence of an enemy.

The circumstances of the position in which the French army was situated, rendered it very disastrous; the sacrifice of life was appalling, but it was a successful military manœuvre. The great loss was chiefly in consequence of the severity of the weather.

December 9th. What was left of the Grand Army reached Wilna, and continued its retreat, being constantly attacked by the Russians.

December 12th. It reached Kovno, where the rear guard, under Ney, was destroyed.

The remains of the army were ordered to rally at Dantzig and Thorn.

December 29th. The French 10th corps, under Macdonald, with the Prussian contingent, retired on Tilsit, and from thence continued their retreat to the river Pregel.

January 1st, 1813. The Prussians hearing of the defeat of the Grand Army, joined the Russians.

The Austrian corps, under Schwartzenberg, concluded an armistice with the Russians (on the 21st December, 1812); they left the French 7th corps under Reynier, and retired to the Bug, so as to gain the Austrian territory.

Macdonald retreated behind the river Vistula, and held

Dantzic, whilst Reynier occupied Warsaw. Murat withdrew the remains of the other corps to Posen.

NOTES.—The very magnitude of this expedition rendered it unlikely to succeed. Enormous stores were collected at the base, but it was found impossible to get them up 500 miles through such a country as Russia. Under the circumstances Napoleon was, undoubtedly, rash in advancing on Moscow after the battle of Borodino, and more rash in remaining there so long. He thought every day he would have been able to make terms of peace from Moscow, but he ought not to have risked his army in such a position.

After Borodino Napoleon might have moved to his right (South) into a country from which he could have drawn supplies.

Kutusoff's movements into this country, and his position at Malo-Jaroslawitz, which drove Napoleon back on to the line by which he had advanced, and which was now destitute of supplies, was most masterly; likewise his flank, or parallel march to the French on Krasnoi.

There can be no doubt that the failure of this expedition ruined Napoleon.

The French army in this campaign lost 538,313 men.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RIVER ELBE.

The French Generals hoped to maintain the line of the Vistula, but on the 15th January Wittgenstein crossed the river near Elbing, and marched on Berlin, Platoff blockaded Dantzic, and Tchichagoff crossed the river, and marched through East Prussia, whilst another column moved on Warsaw.

Murat, at this crisis, resigned the command of the French, and went to Italy. Eugene assumed it, and concentrated his forces at Posen. Towards the end of February he fell back to the river Oder, leaving small garrisons in the fortresses.

The Russians continued their advance, and early in March, they crossed the river Oder at Zellin and Glogau. Eugene evacuated Berlin, and fell back to the river Elbe, holding Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, Dresden, and the entrenched camp at Pirna.

Kutusoff died, and Wittgenstein was appointed to command the Russians.

March 1st. The King of Prussia signed an offensive alliance with the Czar.

March 4th. The Russians entered Berlin.

The Allies were placed as follows:—

Russians,	36,000	between Berlin and Magdeburg,	under Wittgenstein.
„	33,000	watching the Elbe between Dresden and Magdeburg,	under Wittgenstein.
„	20,000	blockading Dantzic and Thorn,	under Barclay de Tolly.
Prussians,	9,000	near Magdeburg,	under York.
„	10,000	at Berlin,	„ Bulow.
„	25,000	in Silesia,	„ Blucher.
In all about	133,000	including about 30,000 good cavalry.	

The French had 15,000 on the lower Elbe under Vandamme, Head-Quarters at Bremen, and occupying Hamburg.
50,000 about Magdeburg.
20,000 „ Dresden.
In all about 85,000.

On all sides great efforts were being made to re-inforce both armies.

March 18th. The Russians took Hamburg, and the French fell back to Magdeburg.

Towards the end of the month Wittgenstein moved towards Magdeburg, and Blucher on Dresden.

The French blew up the bridge at Dresden and retired on Leipsic.

The Prussians entered Dresden, and the Saxons joined the Allies.

April 4th. Eugene advanced from Magdeburg to Mockern with a view of making the Allies concentrate. Wittgenstein attacked and drove the French back. Eugene, leaving a garrison in Magdeburg, withdrew behind the upper Saale.

April 16th. Napoleon arrived at Mayence.

April 24th. After seeing his reinforcements pass the Rhine, he left Mayence for Erfurt.

The French thus re-inforced were organised as follows:—

4th corps	under Bertrand	about	Saalfeld.
12th „	Oudinot	„	Coburg.
3rd „	Ney	„	Weimar.
Guards	under Mortier	„	Erfurt.
6th corps	under Marmont	„	Gotha.
11th „	Macdonald,	under	towards
2nd „	Victor,	Eugene,	Dessau.
5th „	Lauriston,		
13th „	Davoust in Hanover.		

1st cavalry corps under Latour Maubourg.
2nd „ „ „ Sebastiani.

In all about 200,000 men, with 350 guns; but the cavalry were of a very indifferent character.

Wittgenstein crossed the river Elbe, and concentrated his troops at Leipsic, with his right at Halle.

The Prussian and Russian Guards (with the Czar and King) and Blucher's corps were at Dresden.

April 28th. Napoleon advanced from Erfurt to Naumburg, with the 3rd, 4th, and 6th corps and Guards, with a view of joining Eugene, who moved to Merseburg, and a junction was effected on the 30th April.

May 1st. The Prussian army concentrated at Röthe, and the Russians at Zwenkau.

The French moved forward towards Leipsic.

May 2nd. The French 5th and 11th corps moved on Liepsic from Merseburg; the Guards along the road from Lützen towards Leipsic; and the 6th, 4th, and 12th corps on the right. All the corps in echelon from the left; the 3rd corps marched on Pegau to cover the right flank.

The allies determined to attack the French on their right flank, and endeavour to cut Napoleon off from his line Weissenfels-Erfurt.

Battle of Lutzen.—(See Plate 19.)

May 2nd. The Prussians, under Blucher, crossed the river Elster, near Pegau, early in the morning, followed by the Russians under Wittgenstein, and the reserve composed of a Russian corps under Winzingerode, and the Guards.

At 1 o'clock p.m., the Allies somewhat suddenly appeared on the French right; Napoleon (who was near Lützen) was thus taken by surprise, with his army scattered, on the march for Leipsic, over nearly 30 miles of country.

The Allies opened fire on the villages of Gross and Klein Görschen and Rahna, which were occupied by French infantry of the 3rd corps. These villages were attacked and carried by the Prussians. The French 3rd corps thus attacked fell back, the 4th and 6th corps were ordered to come up on the right, and the 11th corps on the left, whilst the Guards were to form the reserve.

The 3rd Corps was led forward by Ney, and recovered the villages they had lost.

The Prussian reserves however came up, and drove the French back again; several regiments of conscripts disbanded and fled. Wittgenstein now brought up all his force, and pushed the French back beyond Kaia. This village, which was the key of the French position, was set on fire.

The whole French line retired 500 yards, and abandoned also the village of Starsiedel.

It was now 6 p.m. Napoleon galloped to his right flank, rallied the flying conscripts, and led the 3rd corps forward again to the attack of Kaia, which they carried.

The French 4th, 6th, and 11th corps were now coming into line, and the Guards formed up in rear of Kaia.

Wittgenstein ordered the Russians to attack Eissdorf, with a view of turning the left of the French 3rd corps before the 11th corps had formed; this attack succeeded, and the French again had to evacuate Kaia.

Napoleon seeing the decisive moment had arrived, brought forward 16 battalions of the Young Guard; Kaia was regained, and the Allies forced back to Klein Görschen. The Guards continued their advance, pressing the Allies back, and the 11th corps having come into line, fell on their right flank.

It now became dark, the artillery continued to fire, and several charges were made by the Allied cavalry. The French having no cavalry were unable to oppose them; the French infantry bivouacked in squares, and during the night were again charged by the Allied cavalry.

When the morning came, it was found that the Allies had retired.

The French had 18,000 killed and wounded, and the Allies lost 15,000 killed and wounded.

NOTES.—Napoleon, from want of good cavalry, did not know that the Allies were within striking distance of his right flank; he was surprised on the line of march; with his troops very much scattered, it seems a wonder that he was not completely routed.

The 3rd corps, which was composed largely of conscripts, must have fought very well: they alone lost 12,000 killed and wounded, and 500 officers.

The echelon formation of Napoleon's march rendered it convenient for the corps to wheel to the flank and come to the assistance of the 3rd corps.

The Allies retired through Dresden to Bautzen; the Prussians by Nossen, followed by the French 5th, 6th, and 11th corps, and Guards; the Russians, by Freyberg, followed by the 4th and 12th corps; the French 2nd and 3rd corps moved on Torgau.

May 11th. The French 5th, 6th, and 11th corps crossed the river Elbe and entered Dresden.

May 12th. The King of Saxony placed himself and all his troops at the disposal of Napoleon.

May 13th. The French 2nd and 3rd corps, under Ney, entered Torgau.

The Saxon troops, 14,000 strong, were formed into a corps, numbered 7, and placed under the command of Reynier.

The Allies reached Bautzen, they were reinforced, and now had 90,000 men in an entrenched position there.

May 17th. Ney was ordered to join Napoleon.

May 19th. He was attacked on the march by Russians under Barclay de Tolly, and routed, together with a part of the 4th corps, which Napoleon had detached to connect with him. The French 5th corps, however, came to Ney's assistance, and his junction with Napoleon was secured.

Battle of Bautzen.—(See Plate 19.)

May 20th. The Allied army occupied the position to the east of Bautzen, as follows:—

10,000 Prussians, under Berg and York, from Jenkwitz to Baschütz.

18,000 Prussians and cavalry, under Blucher, from Kreckwitz to Plieskowitz.

14,000 Russians, under Barclay de Tolly, at Klix and Gleina.

10,000 Russians, under Milaradowich, at Bautzen,
5,000 Prussians, under Kleist, at Burk,
} As advanced posts.

16,000 Russian Guards.
8,000 Cuirassiers.
} In reserve in rear of the centre.

Total 81,000 men.

Napoleon determined to attack the Allies in front, whilst Ney, with four corps, was to turn their right flank.

2nd, 3rd, 5th and 7th corps were placed under the command of Ney, and were to move on Klix and cross the river Spree, there.

4th, 6th, 11th and 12th corps were placed under the immediate command of Soult; the 12th and 11th corps were to assault Bautzen, and the 6th and 4th corps were to advance on the left of the 11th corps.

The Guards in rear of the centre were to form the reserve. In all they numbered about 150,000.

At 11 o'clock the French artillery came into position on the left bank of the river Spree, and opened fire, under cover of which bridges were put together; when they were completed, Bautzen was evacuated by the Allies and occupied by the French 11th corps.

Milaradowich on withdrawing from Bautzen took up a position on the left flank, between Pielitz and Jenkwitz.

By 5 o'clock the river was passed at all points, and the French were moving towards the Allies' position.

The French 12th corps attacked the left flank, whilst the 11th, 6th and 4th corps advanced against the heights of Burk. The Allies on the left held their ground, but the Prussians, under Kleist, at Burk, were compelled to retire to the entrenched position.

Ney crossed the river at Klix and drove back Barclay de Tolly.

It now became dark, and hostilities ceased for the night.

The French bivouacked in squares.

Napoleon, after giving orders to Oudinot to renew the attack on the Allies' left at day-break with the French 12th corps, went for the night to Bautzen.

May 21st. At 5 a.m., the 12th corps advanced against Milaradowich's Russians, but they were repulsed, and driven back beyond Binnewitz. Napoleon, on seeing this, sent the 11th corps to their support, which succeeded in checking the further advance of the Russians.

At daylight Ney advanced the 3rd and 5th corps against

Barclay de Tolly, who was posted on the heights above Gleina; at the same time he directed the 2nd and 7th corps on Baruth, to which place Kleist had been sent with the remainder of his division, now reduced to 3,000 men.

The French 2nd and 7th corps drove back Kleist, and appeared on Barclay de Tolly's flank, which obliged him to leave his position.

At eleven o'clock Ney became possessed of the villages of Preititz and Souham. Napoleon, hearing him in action at these villages, ordered Soult to make a general advance against the front of the Allies. Blucher made a desperate effort, and re-took Souham and Preititz. At one o'clock p.m., however, Ney again attacked the villages, and, at the same time, Napoleon pressed the Allies in front, supporting the attack with his Guards. The French re-took Preititz, and Ney extended his line to the left.

The Allies' right was thus completely turned, and orders were given for Blucher and Barclay de Tolly to retire, and the forts to be evacuated.

The Russians retreated by Hochkirk, and the Prussians by Weissenberg, in good order.

The entire French army advanced against the Allies, and the French cavalry endeavoured to break their formations, but the Russian cavalry were too powerful, and prevented that of the French from gaining any advantage. The night came on and Napoleon halted, occupying Klein Purschwitz and Würschen.

The Allies lost 15,000 killed and wounded, and the French lost 25,000.

NOTES.—The French in this battle far outnumbered the Allies; it was not therefore difficult to turn their flank. Napoleon could spare 60,000 men for his flank movement, and still have as many men in front of the Allies as they had.

When the Allies' flank was so completely turned by Ney, there was nothing for them to do but retire; this they did in complete formation, covered by their cavalry, which was so much superior to the French, that Napoleon found himself unable to make any impression on the retreating columns.

May 23rd. The French advanced to Görlitz, and the Allies

continued their retreat on Waldau and Liegnitz; they were making for an entrenched camp at Schweidnitz.

May 26th. The French 5th corps came upon the Russian rear guard near Haynau, and were defeated.

May 27th. The Allies continued their retreat; there were now only 35,000 Russians and 25,000 Prussians.

After the battle of Bautzen the French 12th corps was detached towards Magdeburg to operate against a Prussian force under Bulow at Berlin. Oudinot attacked Bulow at Luckau on the 4th June, but was repulsed, which laid open the road to Leipsic; the Prussians here advanced, and came on the French in position, when news arrived of an armistice. The French took Hamburg.

On the 4th June Napoleon signed an armistice for six weeks at Pleswitz.

Denmark, Saxony, and Bavaria were in alliance with France, whilst Austria and Sweden joined the Allies. When hostilities were resumed the French forces had been augmented to the utmost; they were reorganised, and posted as follows:—

Watching Berlin in front of Torgau:

12th corps under Oudinot,
4th „ „ Bertrand,
7th „ „ Reynier,
} with Oudinot in chief command.

In Silesia, about Löwenberg and Liegnitz:

11th corps under Macdonald,
5th „ „ Lauriston,
3rd „ „ Ney,
6th „ „ Marmont,
} with Macdonald in chief command.

Watching Bohemia:

14th corps, under St. Cyr, at Pirna.
1st „ „ Vandamme, at Stolpen.
8th „ „ Poniatowski,
2nd „ „ Victor,
} at Zittau.

Guards, under Mortier, about Dresden.

Cavalry under Murat.
1st corps, under Latour Maubourg, at Görlitz.
2nd „ „ Sebastiani, at Liegnitz.
3rd „ „ Arrighi, at Leipsic.
4th „ „ Kellerman, at Zittau.
In all about 300,000 men.

The detached corps were the 13th, under Davoust, at Hamburg, and the 15th, under Augereau, at Würtzburg, numbering about 40,000 men; and Prince Eugene, in Italy, with 50,000 men.

The Allies were organised as follows:—

In Bohemia, under Prince Schwartzenberg;	
Austrians	130,000
Russians, under Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein	60,000
Prussians, under Kleist	50,000
Total.....	240,000
In Silesia, under Blucher:	
Russians under Langeron, St. Priest, and Sacken...	50,000
Prussians, under York	45,000
Total.....	95,000
At Berlin, under Bernadotte:	
Swedes	25,000
Russians, under Woronzow and Winzingerode	28,000
Prussians, under Bulow	40,000
Total.....	93,000

In all about 430,000 men.

The detached corps were as follows:—

At Dantzic, corps under Tauenzein	30,000
At Hamburg „ „ Walmoden	12,000

The Russian reserve under Benningsen, about 50,000, at Kalisch.

An Austrian corps under Prince Reuss, 25,000, watching the Bavarians, and another corps in Italy under Hiller, of 50,000 men.

On the 14th August hostilities recommenced.

The Allies' plan of operations was as follows:—

Bernadotte was to cover Berlin and attack Hamburg; Blucher was to engage the French in front; and Schwartzenberg was to operate against Napoleon's line of communications by Dresden.

Napoleon, expecting the Allies to advance from Silesia, proceeded to Görlitz with his Guards.

August 18th. Blucher was at Goldberg, the French falling back in front of him; Napoleon, with the Guards, arrived at Lauban.

August 19th. The French force under Macdonald, reinforced by the Guards, advanced against Blucher, who retired.

During this time the Allied grand army were crossing the mountains in four columns from Bohemia into Saxony.

August 22nd. Wittgenstein carried Pirna, and the French 14th corps was driven back to Dresden.

August 25th. The Allied grand army reached the heights above Dresden on the left bank of the river Elbe, but Schwartzenberg hesitated to attack at once, as one of his corps had not come up. Napoleon heard of the advance of the Allies from Bohemia on the 23rd; he immediately retraced his steps through Görlitz with the Guards and 6th corps, leaving Macdonald to oppose Blucher with the 11th, 5th, and 3rd corps.

August 24th. Napoleon reached Bautzen.

August 25th. He marched on Dresden with the 1st and 4th cavalry corps, 2nd and 6th corps, and Guards; the 1st corps was sent to Gieshübel to intercept the enemy's retreat, by occupying the defiles; the 8th corps was ordered to remain at Zittau.

Battle of Dresden.—(See Plate 20.)

August 26th. Napoleon arrived at Dresden at 9 a.m., and made dispositions for the defence of the town. The Prussians attacked the Grosse Garten, and gained possession of it.

On arriving at the town the Young Guards were to move part by the Pirna and Ziegel gates, and the remainder by the Dippold and Falken gates. The Old Guards were to remain in the town, and the cavalry were to cross to the left bank of the Weisseritz stream, and form up on the French right.

At 4 p.m. Schwartzenberg ordered an attack to be made upon the town. All the batteries on the heights opened fire, and the Allies advanced in six columns; Wittgenstein commanded the three columns on the right. The Prussians advanced in the centre, and the Austrians on the left. The Austrians carried the Great Redoubt in front of Moczinski Garten, and the Russians, on the extreme right, captured the Redoubts near Hopfgarten. The French, however, retook Moczinski Redoubt, but the work was so enfiladed by the Austrian guns, that they could not remain in it.

At 6.30 p.m the French Guards and cavalry arrived. They issued from the respective gates of the town as appointed, against the assailants, who, being quite unprepared for such a counter-attack, were forced back at all points, and withdrew to the heights.

During the night the French 2nd and 6th corps arrived, and the entire force bivouacked outside the town, between Pirna gate and Friedrichstadt, about 120,000 men.

The Allies lost about 6,000 men in the assault of the town, but still had about 160,000 in position on the heights.

Napoleon determined to attack them on the following morning. The 2nd corps, with the cavalry, were posted on the right, under Murat; the 6th and 14th corps in the centre, with the Old Guards in reserve, and the Young Guards on the left.

August 27th. At about 6 o'clock a.m. the artillery, on both sides, opened fire. There was a gap in the Austrian line, which was left to be filled by a corps which had not yet come up. The morning was misty and wet. The French 2nd corps advanced against Löbda, and the cavalry, unperceived, got to the Austrian rear through the gap. As the French infantry attacked the Austrians in front they were charged by the cavalry in rear, on which they broke and fled; 10,000 prisoners,

and many guns, were taken. When Napoleon heard that Murat's attack had been successful, he gave orders for his left to advance; they attacked the villages of Seidnitz and Gross Dobritz. After an obstinate resistance the Russians were compelled to retire to their main body at Reick.

Schwartzenberg, learning that the French 1st corps was in his rear at Pirna, ordered a retreat.

Barclay de Tolly and the Prussians under Kleist were to move on Peterswalde; the Austrians in two columns on Altenberg and Marienberg; Wittgenstein was to form the rear-guard; and Ostermann, with the Russian guards and cuirassiers, was to oppose the French 1st corps. During the night the Allies retired.

August 28th. The French 2nd corps and cavalry under Murat pursued the Austrian columns retiring on Marienberg, the 6th and 14th corps those that were moving on Altenberg, and the Guards under Mortier marched on Pirna. Napoleon did not press the columns moving by this road, but returned himself to Dresden with his Old Guards, leaving the Young Guards at Pirna.

The Allies, including prisoners, lost 25,000 men, and the French had about 12,000 killed and wounded.

NOTES.—If the Allies had attacked the town vigorously on their first arrival, they would doubtless have carried it, as St. Cyr could not have held such an extent of line with his single corps. Napoleon returned with assistance just in time to save a severe disaster.

This was the only battle that Napoleon attacked the enemy on both flanks at the same time, but his position here was unusual. His centre rested on a fortress, and his numbers nearly equalled his opponent's. The mist and rain in the early morning greatly contributed to Murat's success on the right flank, and the non-arrival of the Austrian corps which was intended to defend a part of the position on the Allies' left flank, was also a fortunate occurrence for the French.

The attack made by the French left on the two villages was little more than an attack on advanced posts, but in this, Marshal Ney, who commanded the Young Guard here, exposed his left flank; the Russian generals were intreated by Moreau and Jomini, who were with the Allies, to take advantage of this by making a counter-attack, but they could not be induced to undertake such an enterprise. In the centre the engagement consisted only of an artillery duel.

Dresden was Napoleon's main position on the river Elbe, and the loss of it would have greatly endangered his line of communications; he had also collected immense stores here.

August 29th. Vandamme attacked the Russian Guards, which, under Ostermann, were posted on the Töplitz road, near Culm, but the French were defeated, and had to draw off.

August 30th. Vandamme took up a position in front of Culm, and the Russians, receiving reinforcements, advanced to the attack under Barclay; the Prussians also got in rear of the French, and the 1st corps was almost destroyed, the cavalry and fugitives only reached Pirna.

NOTES.—It has been thought that Napoleon should have supported Vandamme with the Guards. His idea was to march at once on Berlin after the battle of Dresden, and he returned to the town to organize an expedition thence; but it certainly was unreasonable to expect Vandamme with his one corps to oppose such a force as the Allies could bring against him.

When Napoleon handed over the army of Silesia to Macdonald, he gave him instructions to concentrate, and follow up Blucher, but if he found the enemy in superior numbers, he was to retire behind the river Queis, hold Görlitz, and if hard pressed there, to retire on Dresden.

August 26th. Macdonald, with the 11th, 5th, and 3rd corps (the latter being commanded by Souham, and a part placed under Sebastiani, Ney having gone with Napoleon to Dresden in command of the Young Guards), numbering 80,000 men, advanced in five columns, spread out between Schönau and Leignitz.

The 5th corps was on the right, the 11th corps in the centre, and the 3rd corps on the left.

Blucher having heard of Napoleon's departure, concentrated his troops on their right, and moved forward against the French left.

Whilst the two left columns were partly across the river Katzback, Blucher fell upon them, and drove them back.

August 27th. The French retreated to Goldberg.

August 28th. They were forced back to Buntzlau, on the river Bober.

In this battle and retreat, the French lost 18,000 prisoners,* 103 guns, and 7,000 killed and wounded.

The allies lost about 4,000 men.

* The heavy rains had broken down most of the bridges over the rivers, and some divisions of the French, being unable to cross, were surrounded.

August 21st. Oudinot, obedient to Napoleon's orders, advanced towards Berlin with the 12th, 4th, and 7th corps.

August 23rd. The 4th corps moved on Blankenfeld, 7th corps on Gross Beeren, and the 12th corps on Ahrensdorf, each column being about six miles apart, and separated by woods.

The 4th corps came on the enemy and attacked, but failed; the 7th corps was defeated before supports could reach it; the 12th Corps moved on Gross Beeren, but arrived in the evening only in time to cover the retreat of the 7th corps.

The French had to retire to Wittenberg; they lost 4,000 prisoners, and about the same number of killed and wounded.

The Allies lost about 2,000 killed and wounded.

Bernadotte advanced, but he did not reach Rabenstein till September 4th.

NOTE.—Oudinot was much blamed for the dispersion of his corps, in the immediate presence of the enemy; also for retreating on Wittenberg instead of Torgau, thus uncovering his communications with Dresden, and exposing Macdonald's rear.

Napoleon sent Ney to command the 4th, 7th, and 12th corps, relieving Oudinot.

The pursuit of the Allies towards Bohemia was stopped. What remained of the 1st corps was placed under the command of Count Lobau (Vandamme being a prisoner) and sent back to Peterswalde; the 14th corps was posted near Altenberg, the 2nd corps near Freyberg, and the 6th corps was sent to Hoyerswerda to protect Macdonald's left flank and rear. Napoleon, with the Guards and 8th corps, marched to re-inforce Macdonald. Blucher fell back before Napoleon, and the French reached Görlitz on September 5th. Being unable to bring Blucher to action, Napoleon returned with his Guards to Dresden.

Napoleon ordered Ney to regain the position of the high road from Torgau to Berlin.

September 5th. He commenced the movement by marching on Juterback and Dahme.

Plate 20


R. Elbe
DRESDEN
Friedrich Stadt
Moczinski
Headquarters
Zwinger Gate
Pirna Gate
Falkens Gate
Dippoldis Gate
Grosse Garten
Lobda
R. Weisseritz
Austrians
2
6
14
G
VG
Seidnitz
Gross Dobrid
to Pirna
to Freyberg
½ Reich
Russians
Prussians
N
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles.

September 6th. Bernadotte attacked him on his flank at Dennewitz, and defeated him. The 12th corps was driven back on Schweinitz, but Ney, with the 4th and 7th corps, managed to reach Dahme.

September 8th. These corps arrived at Togau, having lost about 6,000 killed and wounded, 43 guns, and 7,000 prisoners. The allies lost about 6,000 killed and wounded.

Schwartzenberg, hearing that Napoleon was operating against Blucher, again advanced towards Dresden.

September 5th. Wittgenstein reached Nollendorf, and the next day moved to Gieshübel.

September 7th. The vanguard of the Bohemian allied army appeared in front of Dresden.

Napoleon ordered Macdonald to retire to Bautzen, and the 8th corps to join him there. The 6th corps was ordered to march on Dresden.

September 8th. Napoleon advanced with the troops at Dresden against Wittgenstein, who was on the heights above that town, upon which he withdrew to Nollendorf. The French 14th corps occupied Peterswalde, watching the allies in the plain below them.

September 17th. Napoleon made a reconnaissance in force into the plain from Peterswalde, but was attacked by superior numbers, and had to retire with considerable loss.

September 18th. He returned to Dresden, and marched with his Guards to reinforce Macdonald, who during his absence had been retiring before Blucher. Being unable to attack the enemy advantageously, he ordered Macdonald to retire to Weissig.

September 24th. Wittenberg was beseiged by the allies. The French 12th corps was broken up, and what remained of it was distributed between the 4th and 7th corps.

October 1st. Benningsen arrived at Töplitz with 50,000 men, which raised the army of Bohemia to—

Russians and Prussians.....	80,000
Austrians	70,000
	150,000 men.

The allies' plan was to move on Leipsic with the Bohemian army, and divert the attention of the French from the movement by uniting the armies of Blucher and Bernadotte, who were either to protect Berlin, or follow up the advance of the Bohemian army should it be successful.

October 2nd. Blucher reached Jessen, and during the night crossed the river Elbe.

October 3rd. He attacked the French 4th corps, who were in position at Wartenburg, drove them back, and advanced to Düben. At the same time Bernadotte crossed the river Elbe at Ackow and Roslau, and connected with Blucher.

Ney, with the 4th and 7th corps, retreated to Leipsic. During these operations the Bohemian army was advancing by Sebastiansberg and Chemmitz.

October 4th. The head-quarters of the Bohemian army were at Marienberg.

Napoleon ordered the 15th corps (Augereau) to march for Leipsic.

October 7th. He placed the 2nd, 5th, and 8th corps under Murat, with orders to move towards Freyberg to endeavour to stop the advance of the Bohemian army, or, if unable to do so, to fall back on Leipsic.

With his Guards, the 11th, 3rd, and 6th corps, he marched against Blucher; whilst the 1st and 14th corps were left to defend Dresden.

October 10th. Napoleon arrived at Düben; Blucher and Bernadotte concentrated at Zörbig.

October 11th. Blucher and Bernadotte moved to Halle. Napoleon moved to Wittenberg and Dessau, each expecting the other to retire so as to regain their communications. Thus the seige of Wittenberg was raised.

October 12th. Bernadotte moved to Köthen.

The French 15th corps reached Leipsic, and Murat's army was gradually falling back on that town in front of the Bohemian army.

Napoleon this day heard that the Bavarians had joined the allies.

Concentration of the French at Leipsic.

(See Plate 21).

Napoleon ordered the 11th, 3rd, and 6th corps to march on Leipsic, and himself went there with the Guards.

October 15th. He arrived at Leipsic, and on the same day Murat reached the neighbourhood of the town with the allies in his immediate front. The French corps at Leipsic were arranged as follows:

4th corps at Lindenau, to protect the entrances across the marshes; the allies having already gained the Erfurth Road.

8th corps, above Mark-Kleeberg and at Connewitz.

15th corps, 2nd corps } On the heights above Wachau.

5th corps, above Liebertwolkwitz.

11th corps, 3rd corps } On their arrival were to come into line about Holzhausen.

The cavalry were placed, Kellerman in rear of the 2nd corps, and Sebastiani on the left flank of the 5th corps. Napoleon and the Guards were near Probstheyda.

In all about 110,000 men.

The 6th and 7th corps and cavalry, under Arrighi, were posted near Möckern to oppose the advance of Blucher and Bernadotte; this force consisted of 48,000 men.

The total, therefore, that Napoleon had under his command at Leipsic was about 160,000 men, with 720 guns.

The Bohemian army under Schwartzenberg was posted as follows:—

Austrians, under Giulay, opposite the French right, on the left bank of the river Elster.

Prussians	under Kleist	In front of Wachau.
Austrians	„ Meerfeldt	
„	„ Prince Hesse Homburg	
Russians	„ Wittgenstein	
Austrians	„ Klenau	At Gross Pössnau.
Prussians	„ Ziethen	

The Cossacks under Platoff covered the right flank.

The Russian and Prussian Guards and Cuirassiers were in reserve at Magdeborn.

This army consisted of about 143,000 men and 620 guns.

The army of Blucher and a part of Bernadotte's, consisting of 56,000 men, with 356 guns, were at Schkeuditz.

Battle of Leipsic. (See Plate 21.)

October 16th, at 9 a.m., the allies opened fire. The Bohemian army advanced to the attack. Kleist captured Mark-Kleeberg, but the centre failed to carry any of the other positions held by the French. Klenau was also unable to take Liebertwolkwitz. At 11 o'clock Macdonald brought the 11th corps into line on the French left, and took Klenau's Austrians in flank, which obliged them to retire.

Napoleon now determined to make an attack on the allied centre. The Young Guards, under Oudinot and Mortier, were brought up close behind Wachau, the 15th corps were sent to support the 8th corps, and the Old Guards were moved forward to Dolitz. The Young Guards and the 2nd corps, preceded by 60 guns belonging to the Guards, advanced to the attack. They steadily gained ground.

At 1 o'clock the French were checked in their advance near Gossa by the arrival of the Austrian reserves. The allies still held on to Mark-Kleeberg, and at 3 o'clock, having been reinforced, made an attack from thence on the flank of the Young Guards and 2nd corps at Gossa; this obliged the French to retire again to their original position. At 5 o'clock Napoleon reformed the cavalry and the 2nd and 5th corps for another attack on Gossa. This village was taken, but they were unable to advance beyond it. Such was the position of the troops when darkness prevented further movements. Whilst this fighting was going on, on the right bank of the river Elster, Giulay was engaged in attacking the French 4th corps at Lindenau. The Austrians carried the village, but it was retaken by the French, and at nightfall was in their hands.

Blucher's force at daybreak advanced in two columns, one by

Radefeld on Breitenfeld, and the other by Möckern. Ney's force, consisting of the 6th and 7th corps, were drawn up in position from Breitenfeld to Möckern, but he had sent two divisions to Wachau to reinforce Napoleon there, which reduced his strength to 28,000 men. After severe fighting all day, Möckern having been taken and re-taken five times, the 6th corps was driven back, and at sunset Ney had to retire behind the river Partha.

In this day's fighting each side lost about 15,000 men killed and wounded.

October 17th. The allies waited for their reinforcements to come into line; 50,000 additional troops joined the Bohemian army in the course of the day. Bernadotte also arrived with 40,000 men at Breitenfeld.

During the night Napoleon threw back his line. The 8th and 15th corps were drawn back to Connewitz, the 2nd corps to Probstheyda, the 11th corps to Holzhausen, the 5th corps to Stötteritz, and the Guards to the Thonberg; the 4th corps remained at Lindenau, the 7th corps was posted at Paunsdorf, the 3rd corps and the 6th corps extended to Neutzsch.

Napoleon also ordered a part of the 4th corps to proceed to Weissenfels, on the road to Mayence.

The French army therefore occupied a semi-circle round Leipsic, with each flank resting on a river.

Schwartzenberg's dispositions for attacking on the following day were as follows:—

Austrians under Klenau } under the orders of Benningsen
Prussians under Ziethen } were to advance on Holzhausen.

Prussians under Kleist
Russians under Wittgenstein } under Barclay de Tolly were
With the Guards in reserve } to advance on Wachau.

Austrians under Meerfeldt
Austrians under Colloredo . } under Prince of Hesse-
With reserves under Lichtenstein } Homburg were to advance on Dolitz.

Bernadotte was to cross the Partha at Taucha, whilst Blucher was to remain on the right bank of the river to prevent the French from debouching on that side of the town.

October 18th, 9 a.m. The allies' columns commenced to advance from the south and east, the French outposts falling back in front of them. The allies' left first came into action. They carried Dolitz and Lossnig, and menaced Connewitz. Napoleon ordered two divisions of the Young Guards, under Oudinot, to support the 8th and 15th corps, and moved the Old Guards, under Mortier, to the suburbs of Leipsic, in rear.

Schwartzenberg brought Giulay's corps across the river to support the Prince of Hesse Homburg, but the allies were unable to carry the village of Connewitz.

The Prussians and Russians under Barclay de Tolly carried Probstheyda after very severe fighting. Napoleon, on seeing this, led forward the two other divisions of the Young Guards, and succeeded in recovering the village; the 2nd corps was rallied behind them and supported by the 5th corps, returned to the village, which they succeeded in holding against renewed attacks.

On the allies' right the Prussians, under Ziethen, at about 11 o'clock, moved against Holzhausen; the French dragoons, under Sebastiani, attacked these columns in flank, but the cavalry of the allies repulsed the French, and during this engagement Platoff, with his Cossacks, got round the left flank of the 11th corps, and threatened to take them in rear, whereupon Macdonald fell back to Stötteritz.

The Cossacks, by this movement, were able to open communications with Bernadotte.

Schwartzenberg, finding his endeavours to force the French position on the south hopeless, determined to use all his power against the French left. Eight hundred guns were brought into action on some rising ground about Holzhausen; the 2nd and 5th corps made several efforts to dislodge these guns, but without effect, and the allies' batteries maintained their ground till nightfall.

At 10 a.m. Blucher and Bernadotte moved forward. Bernadotte crossed the river Partha at Taucha and Mockau, and the French fell back to Schönfeld, Sellershausen, and Stuntz. The 7th corps, however, still remained at Paunsdorf, but on the

Plate 21


Blucher
from Halle
Schkeuditz
R Elster
Radefeld
Breitenfeld
Modern
Lindenau
LEIPSIC
R Partha
Mockau
Neutzsch
Schonfeld
Paunsdorf
Sellerhausen
Stuntz
Tauchaw
Stetteritz
Holzhausen
Thomberg
Probstheyda
Gennewitz
Dosdings
Dolitz
Liebertwolkewitz
Wachau
Mark Kleeberg
Gr Dosnau
Gossa
Gruttay
to Erfurt
& Weissenfels
Magdeberg
N
1 ½ 0 1 2 Miles

approach of the Russians several Saxon divisions went over to the allies, which so reduced the corps that Reynier was forced to fall back on Sellershausen.

The allies pressed back the 7th, 3rd, and 6th corps. Napoleon despatched a division of the Young Guards to assist Ney, and a desperate fight occurred for the possession of Schönfeld; the Russians penetrated the village five times, but were driven back. At length, at six o'clock they carried the village, and it remained in their occupation.

The allies also succeeded, after severe fighting, in carrying the villages of Stuntz and Sellershausen, the French falling back nearly to Leipsic.

Napoleon seeing that the position around Leipsic was now untenable, ordered preparations for a retreat. The 4th corps was sent to clear the road to Weissenfels, along which the baggage moved.

Blucher, observing this, directed one of his corps on Halle.

October 19th. During the night the 2nd and 15th corps, and all the cavalry, crossed the Elster at Lindenau, at which place was the only bridge over the river.

At day-break the allies finding the French were in retreat, pressed forward at all points on Leipsic.

The defence of the suburbs was obstinate and the French held their enemy in check, whilst their troops defiled across the Lindenau bridge, but the allies gradually gained ground.

The bridge had been mined and a corporal was left in charge to blow up the arch as soon as the French had passed. Seeing the allied troops approaching, and hearing cheers from all sides, the corporal thought the time had come for him to carry out his orders, so he blew up the arch; but the French 8th, 5th, 7th, and part of the 11th corps were still in Leipsic, and being unable to pass the river were made prisoners.

Poniatowski was drowned in endeavouring to swim across the river. Macdonald was the only commander of these corps who escaped.

The French in all lost 60,000 men (including prisoners), and

250 guns. The allies lost about 45,000 men killed and wounded.

NOTES.—The position of the French with their backs to a river which could only be crossed by a single bridge seems to be faulty. Why Napoleon did not cause more bridges to be constructed in case of his being obliged to retreat has been the wonder of all military students.

There is nothing very remarkable about this battle; the allies were not well placed, but their superiority of numbers enabled them to drive back the French at all points.

When Napoleon advanced his centre he was taken in flank, the 8th corps being unable to turn the allies out of Mark-Kleeberg; this obliged him to retire.

It seems to be always rather a hazardous proceeding to make a counter attack from the centre on this account.

RETREAT OF THE FRENCH TO THE RHINE.

October 19th. Napoleon with his Guards arrived at Markrannstädt. The allies did not pursue.

October 20th. The allies were ordered to move as follows:

Bernadotte and Benningsen on Hamburg.

Klenau on Dresden.

Blucher to follow up the French towards Mayence.

Giulay on Pegau.

The others rested at Leipsic.

Napoleon arrived at Weissenfels.

October 21st. Giulay at Kösen engaged the French rear guard, and Napoleon reached Eckartsberge.

October 23rd. The French reached Erfurth, and the allies moved on Wiemar.

Bernadotte was ordered to move on Cassel.

Napoleon remained two days at Erfurth re-organizing and re-supplying his army.

He had with him the 2nd corps under Victor, 3rd corps under Ney, the 4th corps under Bertrand, the 6th corps under Marmont, the 11th corps (made up again) under Macdonald, the 15th corps under Augereau and the Guards.

October 26th. With about 90,000 men he moved to Gotha. Blucher followed him and several times engaged the rear guard. The rest of the allies moved on the French flank through the Thuringian forest.

The Bavarians had now joined the allies, and sent three divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry under Wrede, to augment a force of Austrians under the Prince of Reuss, which was marching on Frankfort to intercept Napoleon's retreat; they numbered in all about 56,000 men with 116 guns.

October 29th. They took post in front of Hanau, across the road to Frankfort and Mayence.

October 30th. The French advanced, and drove the allies from their position, thus clearing the road to the Rhine.

October 31st. The French reached Frankfort, and on the 1st and 2nd November they passed the Rhine at Mayence.

Napoleon, after remaining six days there, went to Paris.

November 4th. The allies entered Frankfort.

The French 4th corps was left at Hockheim, to defend the Mayence Bridge Head.

November 5th. This corps was attacked by the allies and driven back to the "Tête de pont."

The French took up positions on the left bank of the Rhine, from Cologne to Strassburg, and the allies on the right bank, from Kehl to Coblentz.

The French 13th corps was shut up in Hamburg, which was blockaded by Benningsen.

At the end of the year the 1st and 14th corps, under St. Cyr, at Dresden, surrendered to Klenau.

NOTES.—Napoleon's only chance of maintaining himself in Germany was to hold on to the river Elbe. At the commencement of hostilities he thought that if he gained possession of Berlin the allies would make terms of peace, but when the Austrians joined them his right flank was in danger of being turned; he was, therefore, obliged to fight the Battle of Dresden.

The two forces under Macdonald and Oudinot were intended to act as detaining forces, and ought not to have advanced to the attack, but stood on the defensive until such time as Napoleon, who was on the interior lines, came to reinforce them. It was the defeat of these two forces that ruined Napoleon's plan of the campaign. When he retired to Leipsic, he still hoped to defeat the allies, and so left strong forces on his flanks at Dresden and Hamburg, also large magazines at Torgau.

Being defeated at Leipsic, he was compelled to retire to the Rhine.

THE INVASION OF FRANCE BY THE ALLIES.

Negotiations for peace having failed, the allies made preparations to invade France.

The Grand Army, under Schwartzenberg, consisted of—

Austrians, 1st corps, under Colloredo.
„ 2nd „ „ Lichtenstein.
„ 3rd „ „ Giulay.
Guards, „ Hesse Homburg.

Wurtembergers, 4th corps, under the Prince Royal.

Bavarians, 5th corps, under Wrede.

Russians, 6th corps, under Wittgenstein.

German Confederates, under Prince Philippe of Hesse Homburg and Count Hockberg.

In all about 120,000 men, with 468 guns.

There was also a reserve of about 50,000 Prussians and Russians under Barclay de Tolly.

This army was to cross the Rhine at Basle, and move on Belfort and Langres.

The second army, under Blucher, consisted of—

Prussian 1st corps under York.
„ 2nd „ „ Kleist.
Russian 8th „ „ Langeron.
„ 11th „ „ Sacken.
German Confederation 4th corps under Prince Hesse Cassel.
„ „ 5th „ „ Duke of Saxe Coburg.

In all about 90,000 men, with 478 guns.

This army was to cross the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence, and advance amongst the French fortresses.

The 3rd army under Bernadotte consisted of—

Russian corps under Winzingerode.
Prussian „ „ Bulow.

German Confederation corps under Saxe Weimar and the Duke of Brunswick.

Swedish Auxiliaries.

In all about 120,000 men.

This army was posted on the Lower Rhine, about Cologne, and was to advance through Belgium.

Napoleon had to resist this invasion about 120,000 men, which he posted as follows :—

2nd corps under Victor, between Basle and Strasbourg,
6th „ „ Marmont „ Strasbourg and Mayence,
11th „ „ Macdonald, from thence to the north,
3rd „ „ Ney, in the Vosges Mountains,
15th „ „ Augereau, at Lyons,

and the Guards under Mortier, on the river Yonne.

December 20th. Schwartzenberg crossed the Rhine in six columns, and marched into the Jura Mountains.

December 31st. Blucher passed the Rhine in three columns. The French fell back before these advancing columns, the 2nd and 6th corps on the Vosges Mountains, and the 11th corps on Laon.

January 16th. The allies occupied Langres, thus the Vosges Mountains were turned. Blucher here connected with the Grand Army. The French retired from the mountains towards Chalons.

January 24th. Napoleon arrived at Chalons.

January 25th. The French 2nd, 3rd, and 6th corps were at Vitry; the 11th corps moved on Chalons.

January 27th. Napoleon, with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th corps, moved to St. Dizier; the Guards were at Troyes. His object was to fall on Blucher unexpectedly, and separate him from the Grand Army.

January 28th. The French passed through the forest of Der.

January 29th. They reached Brienne, where they found the enemy in position; here was Blucher with Sacken's corps. A messenger from Napoleon to Mortier at Troyes, with orders to move forward the Guards in co-operation with this advance,

had been captured, and gave the allies notice of Napoleon's intended movements. The French attacked Brienne, and carried it at night, after severe fighting.

January 30th. The allies' Grand Army was ordered to concentrate at Trannes, except the Bavarians and Russians under Wittgenstein, who were ordered to Vassy and St. Dizier to cover the right and open up communications with the rest of Blucher's army.

January 31st. Both forces remained inactive. The allies took up a position in front of Trannes—Wurtembergers on the right, Russians of Blucher's army in the centre, and Austrians under Giulay on the left; the whole under the command of Blucher, in all about 100,000 men.

Napoleon took up a position with his right at Dienville, centre at La Rothière and La Giberie, and his left thrown back towards Morvilliers; finding himself outnumbered (being only 42,000), he determined to retreat.

Battle of La Rothière.—(See Plate 22.)

February 1st. Schwartzenberg, perceiving that Napoleon was not moving to the attack, gave Blucher orders to advance against the French position.

The French 6th corps was on the left, the 2nd corps on the right under Gérard, the 3rd corps and Guards (which had come up from Troyes) were in reserve.

The Bavarians had been ordered to move from Vassy to attack the French left.

The allies did not commence their attack until noon; they delayed, partly in hopes that Napoleon would attack them, and partly to give the Bavarians time to come up.

It was 3 p.m. before the battle really began. Giulay's Austrians attacked Dienville, the Russians La Rothière, and the Wurtembergers La Giberie; the Bavarians also came into line, and advanced against Morvilliers.

The ground was very heavy, snow was falling, and the allies had to double-horse their guns. The French cavalry tried to

take advantage of this, but the gunners reserved their fire till the French were within 600 yards, and then opened with such rapidity and with such effect, that the cavalry were defeated. The Wurtembergers drove the French from the wood at La Giberie, carried the village, and attacked Chaumesnil; the Russians also took the village of La Rothière; the Austrians, however, were unable to take Dienville.

Napoleon, bringing forward part of his Guards, retook La Giberie, but the Wurtembergers reformed, and again advanced to the attack of the village. They were supported by the Bavarians, who attacked on the French left flank. In this assault the village was regained by the allies, and some French guns were taken. The Bavarians also captured Chaumesnil and Morvilliers.

It was now six o'clock, and Napoleon reformed his troops in the centre for an attack on La Rothière. Blucher, seeing this concentration in the French centre, placed himself at the head of his reserves, and advanced to meet the attack. The French succeeded in retaking the village, but the Czar, bringing forward his Guards, after a desperate conflict, drove them back.

The Austrians also succeeded in carrying Dienville. Napoleon having lost all his posts, retired, covered by the Guards, on Brienne, having the river Aube on his right flank, and the forest of Ajou on his left.

February 2nd. At 4 a.m. the French retired by Lesmont to Troyes.

The losses were, French 6,000 men and 73 guns; the allies about 4,000.

NOTES.—Owing probably to the interception of a despatch the allies became acquainted with Napoleon's movements; and so his advance from Brienne against Blucher failed, for they had concentrated double the number of men to oppose him. The position he took up at La Rothière was certainly a bad one, forming a salient at La Giberie; and knowing this, and being so much outnumbered, he determined to retire. It is said that he delayed his retreat because the bridge at Lesmont required to be repaired, and so he was compelled to fight. The allies certainly ought to have attacked the French sooner, and not waited for the Bavarians. The main attack should have been directed on the salient.

At a council of war at Brienne, it was decided that the allies should again separate, the difficulties of getting provisions being assigned as the cause.

The Grand Army was to move on Troyes, and advance down the valley of the Seine, by Montereau, on Paris; and the 2nd army was to march on Chalons, and advance by the valley of the Marne.

February 5th. Blucher reached Chalons, and the French 11th corps retired to Épernay.

February 6th. Napoleon, on hearing of the separation of the allied armies, retired to Nogent.

February 7th. Schwartzenberg occupied Troyes.

At Nogent the French received reinforcements from the Pyrenees, and another corps was formed under Oudinot, namely the 12th corps.

February 8th. Blucher marched on Paris.

February 9th. Napoleon determined to fall on Blucher's left flank. He left the 2nd corps at Nogent and the 12th corps at Bray to detain the Grand Army in their passage of the river Seine, and with the remainder of his army—namely, the 3rd and 6th corps and Guards, about 45,000 strong—he marched to Sézanne.

February 10th. Blucher was marching with his columns somewhat dispersed, thinking that Napoleon was fully engaged with the Grand Army, when the French 6th corps came upon a Russian column at Champaubert, which they defeated, making many prisoners and capturing twelve guns. Sacken's corps was in advance, beyond Montmirail, York's corps near Château Thierry, and Blucher at Etoges.

On hearing of Napoleon's approach, Blucher ordered Sacken and York to retire on him by Montmirail.

The 11th French corps had been retiring in front of the allies down the valley of the Marne, and were at Meaux.

February 11th. Sacken found Montmirail occupied by the French, and was obliged to halt, take up a position, and wait for York.

Napoleon, leaving the 6th corps to watch Blucher, moved

with the 3rd corps and Guards against Sacken, sending orders to Macdonald to co-operate with the 11th corps.

The French advanced to the attack of Sacken at about 10 a.m. York was marching towards him, but sent word that he could not arrive before 3 p.m. After a desperate encounter, the French drove Sacken from his position, and intercepted his retreat towards York.

February 12th. Napoleon continued the pursuit of Sacken's corps, and also attacked York's corps, which was now retiring. Both of these allied corps crossed the river Marne, about Château Thierry, breaking down the bridges.

Blucher collecting the remainder of his army together, about 20,000, advanced against the French 6th corps, which retired in front of him, towards Napoleon.

February 13th. Napoleon advanced against Blucher.

February 14th. He reached Vauchamp's just as his 6th corps was retiring from it. Blucher, on perceiving that the French were reinforced took up a position of defence, but finding himself considerably outnumbered, he retired in squares across the open country to Champaubert, being constantly charged by the French cavalry. At night the allies reached Etoges, and on the 15th succeeded in regaining Chalons. Here Blucher's army was reformed, but he had lost 20,000 men.

February 15th. Napoleon returned to Montmirail to turn his attention to the advance of the Grand Army. He left the 6th corps at Etoges, and a force under Mortier at Château Thierry, and with the 3rd and 11th corps and Guards he marched for the river Seine.

Schwartzenberg was advancing on Paris: Wrede and Wittgenstein, by Nogent, and the rest of the army by Sens on Fontainebleau.

February 13th. Wrede forced the passage of the river Seine at Bray, and Wittgenstein at Pont-Sur-Seine; these corps moved on Provins, whilst the rest of the army marched on Montereau and Moret; the French 2nd and 12th corps fell back in front of this advance.

February 16th. The allies were at Nangis and Montereau.

Napoleon joined the 2nd and 12th corps at Guignes: he now had with him 60,000 men.

February 17th. He advanced against Wrede and Wittgenstein's corps, and drove them back over the river Seine, at Nogent and Bray. The French 2nd corps was sent to Montereau to secure the bridge there.

February 18th. The bridge at Montereau was found to be in possession of the allies; the 2nd corps became engaged early in the morning, but were unable to take the heights above the town. At 2 p.m. Napoleon arrived with his Guards, and before night the allies were driven across the bridge, without being able to destroy it, and out of the town; their pursuit, however, was checked by the destruction of the bridge over the river Yonne.

The Grand Army was now ordered to concentrate at Troyes, and Schwartzenberg directed Blucher to move to his left to rejoin him.

Victor was deprived of the 2nd corps by Napoleon because he had not taken the bridge at Montereau on the 17th, and the command was given to Gerard. The French 15th corps at Lyons was ordered to move by Mâcon towards the left flank of the Grand Army.

During these operations Bernadotte was advancing on Laon from Cologne, and on the 9th February his advanced guard reached Avesnes; they pushed on and captured Soissons, but were recalled by Blucher and ordered to march on Rheims.

February 18th. Winzingerode was at Rheims, and Blucher with Sacken, York and Langeron at Chalons.

February 20th. Napoleon advanced up the river Seine to Nogent.

February 21st. Blucher, in obedience to his orders, was moving towards the Grand Army, and was at Méry.

February 22nd. The allies concentrated at Troyes. Napoleon took up a position in front of them.

February 23rd. The allies retreated without giving battle, and the French occupied Troyes.

NOTES.—In these manœuvres Napoleon displayed as brilliant strategy as has ever been recorded in history. He occupied a position on interior lines, and took full advantage of it; with less than half the force of his adversary, he always managed to be in greater numbers at the point of attack; to do this he must have had perfect information of the position of his enemy's columns, and at the same time been able to screen his own movements. The separation of the armies exposed the allies to the defeats that they sustained, and Blucher's dispersion also facilitated Napoleon's victories.

February 25th. At a conference held by the allies it was decided that Blucher should be reinforced by the corps of Winzingerode and Bulow, and again operate in the valley of the Marne.

Blucher crossed the river Aube and marched for the river Marne.

February 26th. Driving the French 6th corps in front of him to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, he reached the river. Winzingerode and Bulow's corps were also approaching the valley from the north.

February 27th. The French 6th corps retired to Meaux followed by Sacken.

Napoleon hearing of these movements left Troyes and marched on Arcis and Sezanne, leaving the 2nd, 11th, and 12th corps to oppose the Grand Army.

February 28th. Schwartzenberg, on finding Napoleon had marched north, ordered Wrede and Wittgenstein to advance to Bar, where they engaged the French 2nd and 12th corps during the entire day, and at nightfall the French, with a loss of 3,000, had to retire.

The French 11th corps was at Vendeuvre.

In this engagement Wittgenstein was wounded, and the command of his corps was given to Raeffskoi.

March 1st. The French 2nd, 11th, and 12th corps concentrated at Troyes. Napoleon reached Arcis with the 3rd corps and Guards.

March 3rd. The Grand Army attacked the French at Troyes, and caused them to retire.

March 5th. They took up positions at Nogent, Bray and Montereau.

Plate 22


Brienne
Forest
of
Ajou
Merrilliers
to Vassy
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Charmeaux
2
LA ROTHIERE
Rhennille
La Giberie
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The Head Quarters of the Grand Army moved to Troyes, and advanced corps were posted at Sens and Port-sur-Yonne.

Napoleon, on reaching the river Marne, found that Blucher had crossed to the right bank and destroyed all the bridges.

March 2nd and 3rd. He repaired the bridges at La Ferté, crossed the river, and, taking the 6th corps from Meaux with him, followed up Blucher.

Blucher moved on Soissons to unite with Bulow and Winzingerode. The French garrison of Soissons being menaced by these two corps, one on each side of the river Aisne, capitulated, and thus opened the passage of the river to Blucher.

Blucher's force was now 90,000 strong, and the French with Napoleon only 55,000.

March 5th. Napoleon, leaving the 6th corps and Mortier in front of Soissons, which was now occupied by a garrison of the allies, marched with the 3rd corps and Guards to Bery-au-Bac.

March 6th. Blucher's army was in position as follows :—

Bulow's corps at Laon.

Sacken's and part of Winzingerode's corps, under Woronzoff, at Craonne.

Kleist's and Langeron's corps, and the remainder of Winzingerode's corps, to the north-east of that town.

York's corps was between Soissons and Laon.

Napoleon crossed the river Aisne, and marched on Craonne. He ordered the 6th corps and Mortier's division to attack Soissons. The attack on Soissons failed.

Battle of Craonne.—(See Plate 23.)

March 7th. Napoleon advanced against the heights of Craonne.

Woronzoff was drawn up across the neck of the plateau between Ailles and Paissy; Sacken's corps was some distance in rear.

Napoleon directed Ney, with the 3rd corps, to move round the Russian left flank, and ascend the slopes from the Lette

Valley. Nansouty, with the cavalry, was to climb the slopes from Ouche, whilst Napoleon, with the Guards, led by Victor, was to attack in front from Craonne. The Russians were about 27,000 and the French 40,000.

The slopes to be mounted were very steep, but on the north and east sides they were wooded.

At 9 a.m. the French commenced the attack. Blucher at this time was present, but leaving Sacken in command he went off in search of Kleist's corps and the cavalry, with a view of bringing them down on the French right flank and rear.

The French guns were dragged up the slopes, and the artillery on both sides became hotly engaged. Ney carried the village of Ailles, and succeeded in establishing himself on the plateau.

Napoleon now ordered the Guards to advance. They captured a Russian battery, but it was quickly retaken.

At 1 p.m. the Russian ammunition fell short, and Sacken, seeing nothing of Blucher, ordered Woronzoff to retire.

It was 2 p.m., however, before this order was carried out. Woronzoff then formed his troops into squares, and retired alternately with his artillery in the intervals.

They were closely followed by the French, and charged on the right flank by the cavalry. On reaching the second neck the Russian guns, sixty-four in number, were placed in two lines, the second line on rising ground, so that they could fire over the first. On each of the flanks were perpendicular rocks, which could not be scaled. Woronzoff's infantry were drawn up in a line with the first guns.

The French made an attempt to force this position, but after twenty minutes' hard and unsuccessful fighting they were withdrawn out of fire.

In the evening the Russians retired on Laon.

In this engagement the Russians lost 5,000 killed and wounded, and the French 8,000.

NOTES.—This was one of the most severely-contested battles on record. The French lost one-fifth of their force, and the Russians not far short of it. The steadiness of the Russians was particularly remarkable. Their retreat from

the first position was owing to the failure of ammunition, the second position was impregnable. The arrangement of guns in two tiers was unique.

If Blucher could have succeeded in getting Kleist's and Langeron's corps up in time, so as to attack the French in rear during the action, Napoleon would have been defeated.

March 8th. Blucher collected all his troops at Laon, about 140,000 men and 260 guns.

Napoleon ordered the 6th corps and Mortier's division to cross the river Aisne at Bery-au-Bac, and move direct on Laon, whilst he, with the rest of his troops marched for Chavignon. The French force amounted to 52,000 men.

The allies took up a position as follows :—

Winzingerode's corps in two lines in front of Aven.

Bulow's corps in the town of Laon, with advanced posts at Semilly and Ardon.

Kleist's corps, } from Laon to Chambry, with an advanced
York's „ } post at Athies.

Sacken's and Langeron's corps in reserve.

Blucher had occupied the defile at Etouville, but Ney, who commanded the French advanced guard, turned the defile, so that this advanced party of the allies was called in.

Battle of Laon.—(See Plate 23.)

March 9th. The French were posted as follows :—

6th corps on the Rheims road approaching Athies.

3rd corps in front of Ardon and Semilly.

Guards in rear of 3rd corps.

Napoleon was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the 6th corps to make an attack on the allies.

The morning was foggy, and the 3rd corps was sent forward to feel for the enemy. They succeeded in taking Semilly and Ardon; but at 11 o'clock the mist cleared away, and Blucher, seeing the position of the French, assumed the offensive. He sent Winzingerode's infantry against Semilly and Bulow's against Ardon.

The French 3rd corps was driven back in disorder, and only

saved by the Guards in their rear, who arrested the pursuit, driving the allies back to their position.

At 4 p.m. the 6th corps arrived in front of the allies, and Napoleon again advanced against Ardon, which village the Guards carried, and then pushed on to the Abbey of St. Vincent. The 6th corps attacked Athies and set it on fire.

Blucher seeing that Napoleon's design was to turn his left flank and thus drive him off his communications, moved his reserves to that flank, Sacken, to support Kleist, and Langeron, York.

At night-fall the firing ceased, and the French bivouacked on the ground they had gained. Shortly after dark Blucher advanced his entire left wing against the French 6th corps, surprised it, and drove it back in great confusion along the Rheims road.

March 10th. At four a.m. Napoleon learnt the fate of his right wing, but fearing to retreat in front of such a superior force, he ordered the 3rd corps and Guards to advance against the enemy. Blucher, seeing this boldness on the part of Napoleon, ordered his left wing to stop the pursuit of the 6th corps, and return to their position; thus the 6th corps was relieved and rallied at Fismes.

During the entire day Napoleon kept the allies engaged, and at four p.m., sending his equipage, &c., to the rear, he drew off his troops, and at night-fall retired by the Soissons road. In these engagements the allies lost about 4,000 men killed and wounded, and the French 6,000.

NOTES.—It would seem that the French were in a dangerous position thus separated. A corps intended to make a flank attack, may, with advantage, be brought from a distance unexpectedly, whilst the other part of the army is engaging the enemy in front, but to bivouac in the immediate presence of the enemy in such a position is certainly injudicious.

It required the courage and confidence of a great commander to remain in his position and engage with such superior numbers in front of him, after his right wing had been thus defeated during the previous night; by so doing, however, he saved the 6th corps from annihilation, and not only gave them an opportunity to rally, but also enabled the rest of the French army to retire in good order.

On the night of the 10th Napoleon halted at Chavignon.





For Scale and N point see above

March 11th. The 3rd corps and Guards reached Soissons, which had been retaken by the French, and the 6th corps moved to Bery-au-Bac. The allies remained at Laon, being short of supplies.

March 12th. Napoleon learnt that a Russian corps under St. Priest had reached Rheims to join Blucher; he left a garrison at Soissons and Bery-au-Bac, and marched on Rheims.

March 13th. He arrived at Rheims, attacked St. Priest's corps, took the town and many prisoners. He remained there several days, and received reinforcements from the neighbouring garrisons.

During these operations Schwartzenberg had advanced towards Paris, pressing back the 2nd, 11th and 12th corps.

March 17th. Napoleon left the division under Mortier at Rheims, sent the 6th corps to Bery-au-Bac, the 3rd corps to Chalons, and moved himself, with the Guards, to Epernay.

March 18th. Schwartzenberg reached Provins. Napoleon moved to Fère Champenoise.

Schwartzenberg, hearing of Napoleon's movements, began to retreat.

March 19th. Napoleon moved to Plancy and gained the passage of the river, the 3rd corps was ordered to march on Arcis, and the 2nd, 11th and 12th corps, were ordered to join him at Plancy.

The allies, 90,000, concentrated at Troyes.

March 20th. Napoleon, with 60,000 men, marched up the right bank of the Aube to Arcis, and crossed the river. Schwartzenberg moved on Arcis from Troyes and attacked Napoleon, who was formed up in a semicircle around the town. The French maintained their position during the day, and firing was continued till 10 p.m.

March 21st. At daybreak both armies were in the same position, but they remained inactive. Napoleon threw another bridge over the river, and at 1 p.m. commenced to retreat. It was not till 3 p.m. that Schwartzenberg attacked. The French made an orderly passage of the river, covered by the 11th corps, and at night-fall their rear guard crossed and blew up the bridges.

March 22nd. Napoleon moved on Vitry, and sent orders to the 6th corps and Mortier's division to join him.

His plan was now to move towards the Rhine, collect all the troops in the various fortresses, and operate against the allies' communications, in hopes that by this means he might draw them from Paris.

March 23rd. He moved to St. Dizier, and from thence towards Chaumont.

Blucher had moved to Rheims, and from thence to Epernay; he had intercepted the 6th corps and Mortier's division, and driven them back towards Paris; they were therefore unable to obey Napoleon's order.

Schwartzenberg's advanced parties had communicated with Blucher's.

March 24th. It was decided by the allies to march on Paris, sending Winzingerode with 8,000 cavalry only to observe Napoleon.

March 25th. Both armies of the allies were marching onParis. At Fère-Champenoise the French made a stand, but were defeated with a loss of 4,000 killed and wounded, and 7,000 prisoners.

March 26th. The allies continued their advance on Paris, what remained of the 6th corps and Mortier's division falling back before them.

Napoleon, discovering that he had nothing but cavalry pursuing him, and hearing of the march of the allies on Paris, turned again towards his capital.

March 28th. He marched on Paris by Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau. The allies reached Meaux. Marmont and Mortier retired by Nangis and Melun, and thence on Paris.

March 30th. The allies arrived in front of Paris, which was immediately attacked. It was defended with great courage from the heights of Montmartre, Chaumont, and Romainville; but after an obstinate resistance, which lasted all day, the French were compelled to retire into the town, being forced back by overwhelming numbers, and Paris capitulated. In the assault of Paris the allies lost 10,000 killed and wounded, and the French 4,500.

Napoleon, on arriving at Fontainebleau, heard that Paris was taken, and on the 11th of April he abdicated.

NOTES.—The second part of this campaign, although conducted by Napoleon on the same method, did not attain the same success as the first part.

His actions against Blucher were fruitless, as he was unable to engage him with superior numbers; also when he turned against the Grand Army, he found himself so out-numbered that he could not hope to gain any advantage in a battle. The allied generals had learnt to keep their forces concentrated.

The positions of the various rivers in this theatre of operations are in themselves a strategical study, at times affording a protection to either side, and at others an impediment to an advance.

Napoleon had a large number of men in the frontier fortresses, also in Germany, and his object in moving away from Paris towards the Rhine after the battle of Arcis was to augment his army with these men; he also hoped that by operating against the allies' lines of communication he might draw them from Paris.

BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT IN 1801.

In 1801 it was determined by the British to send an expedition to expel the French from Egypt. 17,000 men, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, were to land from the Mediterranean, and 8,000, under Sir David Baird, were to embark at Bombay, and land from the Red Sea.

The French forces in Egypt at this time amounted to 27,000, and were under the command of General Menou.

March 2nd. Sir Ralph Abercromby's force arrived at Aboukir Bay in 200 vessels.

It was organized in three divisions under Generals Moore, Ludlow, and Cradock.

March 8th. At 2 a.m. the 1st division, about 5,500 strong, prepared to land in 150 boats.

The French, 2,000 strong, with 12 guns, were in position on the heights to dispute the landing; their left rested on the Castle of Aboukir, and the guns were placed on their right flank. At nine o'clock the boats made for the shore, and although several were sunk they continued in line, and in this formation reached the beach, all the troops jumped ashore, and the 42nd Royal Highlanders, 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and 40th (South Lancashire) regiment formed up, stormed the heights, and carried them; the Guards followed in support, and the 54th (Dorset) regiment and 1st Royal Scots protected their exposed flank against a counter attack made by the French. At ten o'clock the heights were in possession of the British, the French retired, leaving eight guns.

The British lost 500 killed and wounded, and the French 300.

The remainder of the British troops were then disembarked.

March 12th. Sir Ralph Abercromby moved towards Alexandria.

The French general, on hearing of this landing, gave orders for his troops to concentrate at Alexandria.

March 13th. The British continued their advance. This day they came upon a French force of about 6,000 men, who, after an engagement, retreated.

Sir Ralph Abercromby now took up a position on some sand-hills in front of Alexandria; his right, somewhat advanced, occupied an old Roman ruin, and rested on the sea, whilst his left was on the lake of Maadieh; he showed a front of about one mile, and had gun-boats both on the sea and on the lake. The position was entrenched and occupied by about 12,000 men and 36 guns. Here Abercromby determined to await attack.

The French took up a position opposite the British in front of Alexandria on some higher sand-hills, with their left resting on the sea, and their right on a canal, which, however, was dry. At this time there were very few French in front of the British, and had Abercromby attacked, he would probably easily have taken Alexandria.

March 19th. Menou arrived with all the available troops he could collect, which brought his force here up to 11,000 men and 46 guns.

Battle of Alexandria.—(See Plate 24.)

March 21st. The French advanced to attack the British early in the morning, under cover of a mist. They had a corps mounted on dromedaries, and these, moving round to the left of the British line, commenced the attack, and succeeded in capturing some guns. At the same time a French division, under Lanusse, attacked the Roman ruins, but they were repulsed by the 58th (Northamptonshire) regiment and the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Lanusse's division rallied on another French division under Rampon, which was in support, and an attack was again made on the British right. Menou supported this attack by a cavalry charge against the centre of the British line. To meet this attack, Abercromby moved forward the 42nd Royal Highlanders and the 28th (Gloucestershire) regiment from the second


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line. The Highlanders were taken in flank by the French cavalry, and being surprised broke, but formed themselves into rallying squares; the 28th (Gloucestershire) regiment was attacked in front, and at the same time in rear, by a French regiment which had got round them under cover of the mist; the rear rank was turned about, and firing volleys in both directions they drove off their enemy.

This French column which had thus penetrated the British line was now attacked in flank and rear by the Reserves, it was driven into the Roman ruins, and the one-third that remained of them were made prisoners.

The French cavalry also suffered severely, losing half their numbers; they penetrated the British line, wheeled about and cut their way back.

The attacks on the British right and centre having failed, Menou retired again to his position in front of Alexandria.

The British in this battle lost 1,500 killed and wounded, and the French about 2,000.

In the cavalry charge Sir Ralph Abercromby was mortally wounded, and died on the 29th March.

After this battle the British remained inactive on their sand-hills, and the French remained opposite to them in observation.

In the beginning of May General Hutchinson arrived to take command, bringing with him 3,000 men as a reinforcement.

Hutchinson cut a channel from the sea to the canal, and by letting the water in, isolated Alexandria. Leaving a force here to observe the French, he marched on Cairo.

Menou sent 4,000 men under La Grange towards Cairo to observe the British movements. General Hutchinson engaged La Grange at Ramanieh, and the French general fell back on Cairo.

May 20th. Hutchinson, assisted by some Turkish troops, which were led by Majors Hope and Holloway, invested Cairo.

May 21st. The French, 13,000 strong, capitulated, and were sent down the river Nile in boats. It was not until after this capitulation that the force under Sir David Baird arrived;

having been detained by adverse winds, they did not reach Egypt until the beginning of July. They were disembarked at Kossier, and marched across the desert 140 miles to Keneh, on the Nile, in nine days; here they embarked in boats on the river, and in nine days more reached Cairo, arriving there on the 10th of August.

Hutchinson now moved on Alexandria with all his available force of 16,000 and invested the town. After resisting some attacks made by the British, Menou capitulated, having with him about 10,500 men.

NOTES.—This was the first time the British troops had been brought in contact with the veterans of France. None of these soldiers had been in action before. The way they behaved, their courage and steadiness on this occasion, leads one to believe that good drill and discipline is the best training for war, and that the actual experience in fighting is not so necessary.

The slowness of the British movements is remarkable; had a little more expedition been exercised, Sir Ralph Abercromby might have easily seized Alexandria before Menou arrived, but it is to be observed that Sir Ralph had a much smaller force of cavalry than the French, and probably he was somewhat doubtful as to whether his untried soldiers would be able to contest with the veterans of France.

After Sir Ralph Abercromby's death it is probable that the English generals thought it desirable to wait for the arrival of the Indian contingent before making further movements, but it cannot be said they shewed much enterprise.

THE PENINSULAR WAR.

England was the only country that Napoleon had not and could not subdue in the field, and she had destroyed his fleet. To ruin England's trade, therefore, he had demanded of all nations that they should have no commercial dealings with her. Spain and Portugal had not obeyed these injunctions, and Napoleon made this an excuse for marching his troops into the Peninsular.

In order to assist the Spaniards and Portuguese in their hopeless struggle against the French, England sent out an expedition.

1st August, 1808. About 13,000 men, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, landed at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal, unopposed, with a view of marching on Lisbon, to secure this town and its harbour as a base.

The French troops in Portugal at this time were about 15,000, under Junot.

By the 8th August the landing was completed, and all was ready for an advance.

15th August. The British reached Caldas, and at Obidos first came on the French. A division under Laborde had taken up a position at Roliça, to detain the British until Junot could concentrate his corps.

17th August. The British advanced to the attack, and after maintaining his position until his flanks were nearly turned, Laborde retired in good order.

The French retreated inland, but as Wellesley expected reinforcements by sea, he did not pursue, and keeping to the coast, he marched on Vimeira, which place he reached on the 19th August.

20th August. Two more brigades were landed, which made the British force about 16,000 infantry, but they had only 18 guns and 180 cavalry.

Junot had concentrated his troops at Torres Vedras: 14,000 infantry, 28 guns, and 1,300 cavalry.

Both Wellesley and Junot determined to advance on the night of the 20th: the former to turn Junot's left by way of Mafra, and the latter to attack the British at Vimeira.

With the reinforcement a senior officer to Sir Arthur Wellesley had arrived, Sir Harry Burrard; and although he did not land, he objected to any forward movement until further reinforcements, which were expected, should arrive.

Battle of Vimeira.—(See Plate 25.)

August 21st. The British force was organized as follows, and on the appearance of the French on the opposite ridges, took up their positions:—

1st brigade, under Hill, on the right, with some Portuguese.

2nd	„	„	Anstruther,	On the hill in front of Vimeira and in the village.
3rd	„	„	Fane,	
4th	„	„	Ackland,	On the heights to the left of the village,
5th	„	„	Bowes,	
6th	„	„	Nightingale,	
7th	„	„	Ferguson,	

and a mixed force of British and Portuguese to the left rear.

The French advanced in three divisions.

1st under Laborde, on the right.

2nd „ Brennier, on the left.

3rd „ Kellerman, in the rear in reserve.

Cavalry under Margaron, with the reserve.

The British troops kept as much as possible out of sight, and those on the left could not be seen by Junot. The French commander determined to turn the British left, and ordered the 2nd division to advance against the heights to the north of Vimeira, the 1st division to attack the village and the hill in front of it, and the reserve to follow the 1st division. The French advance commenced about 8 o'clock, the 1st division coming into action first; the 2nd division found the bottom of

the ravine, immediately opposite to Toledo, impracticable, and had to move more to the right.

Junot seeing this, sent a portion of the reserve to assist Brennier in his attack on the British flank. The right column of the French 1st division ascended the hill in front of Vimeira, at an angle to the British line, the 50th Queen's Own (West Kent Regiment) opened fire on it, obliquely in front and flank, and then charging drove it down the hill. Another column storming the hill opposite Anstruther's brigade met with a similar fate, and a 3rd column was charged and driven back by the 43rd (Oxford Light Infantry).

The French retired in disorder up the valley towards Lourinha, and were pursued by Colonel Taylor's cavalry, but the French cavalry charged the British and annihilated them.

The French 2nd division had not come into action, but Ferguson's brigade, the 7th, made a counter attack on that part of it which had been sent from the reserve, defeated it, and drove it up the valley. The road to Torres Vedras was thus left open to the British. The French retreated eastward, under cover of that portion of the reserve which had not been engaged, and their cavalry.

Sir Arthur Wellesley made preparations to follow up Junot with part of his force, and with the remainder to seize the defiles at Torres Vedras, by which he would have secured Lisbon, but Sir Harry Burrard, thinking this a too hazardous operation, decided to wait for further reinforcements.

The French lost 2,000 killed and wounded, and 13 guns, and the British about 800.

Early in the morning of the 22nd Sir Hew Dalrymple, a senior general to Sir Harry Burrard, landed and took command; he decided on an advance, which was made on the 23rd, but it was now too late, the French were found in position at Torres Vedras. Junot, however, knowing that Lisbon was hostile to him, proposed a suspension of arms with a view to evacuate Portugal; to this the British generals agreed, and terms were afterwards settled by the convention of Cintra.

NOTES.—The strength of the French army in Portugal does not appear to have been very well known to the English Generals, it was this that prevented Sir Harry Burrard from consenting to the forward movements proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley; there is little doubt that had this advance been carried out it would have been successful; Junot would have arrived at Vimeira only to find the British army gone towards Lisbon by Mafra, and therefore nearer that town than himself; also the defiles at Torres Vedras would probably have been stopped, and thus his own retreat to Lisbon intercepted.

Even after the battle the same object might have been attained had Sir Arthur's recommendations been accepted.

Junot exposed his own line of communications by attacking the British left flank; had he first taken the central hill, then attacked the British right, and been successful, he would have preserved his own communications and driven the British off their harbour.

The British army marched to Lisbon and occupied the town. A force, under Sir John Moore, landed there, which increased the strength to about 32,000 men. Sir Arthur Wellesey, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hew Dalrymple were ordered to England, and the command devolved upon Sir John Moore.

In October the British Government sent 10,000 men, under Sir David Baird, to the Peninsular; they were to disembark at Corunna, and Sir John Moore was directed to co-operate with this force in assisting the Spaniards.

Sir John Moore ordered Baird to join him at Salamanca.

October 26th. Moore marched from Lisbon with about 20,000 men. About the same time the Spanish army, concentrating, advanced on Madrid, drove the French out of the capital, and moved towards the river Ebro.

Napoleon being informed of these movements about the beginning of November, entered Spain with 250,000 men.

Sir John Moore hearing that the roads north of the river Tagus were impassable for artillery, sent his guns with the cavalry, under Sir John Hope, round by Elvas, Badajoz, Talavera, and Madrid.

The infantry marched by Coimbra and Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca.

November 9th. Baird's force marched from Corunna.

November 28th. Moore's infantry was at Salamanca; Baird was at Astorga, and Hope near Madrid crossing the mountains.

Napoleon having defeated the Spaniards and driven them in all directions was at Aranda, with an advanced corps 30,000 strong at Valladolid.

December 2nd. He reached Madrid.

Hope was marching to join Moore.

December 11th. Moore, having been joined by his artillery and cavalry, advanced to Toro, arriving on the 13th. Here he intercepted French despatches and learnt that Napoleon was at Madrid, that a French corps was marching on Lisbon by Talavera, and that another French corps, under Soult, was on the river Carrion. This despatch ordered Soult to move upon Benevente.

Moore determined to attack Soult and retreat on Corunna in case of need; he therefore sent orders for his transports to go thence from Lisbon, and Baird to join him at Mayorga.

December 20th. Moore and Baird's forces joined, and on the 23rd advanced to attack Soult.

Napoleon became aware of the position of the British, and ordered Soult to march on Astorga; the corps at Talavera to move on Salamanca; whilst he, with 50,000 men and 150 guns, marched for the river Duero.

Moore hearing of Napoleon's advance against him, at once ordered a retreat.

December 26th. The British army crossed the river Esla, and reached Benevente, with Soult following them.

Napoleon was at Tordesillas.

The British continued their retreat towards Corunna, and, by destroying the bridge over the river Esla, gained two days on the French.

January 1st, 1809. Napoleon arrived at Astorga. Here he received despatches informing him of the preparations that were being made in Austria for an advance up the valley of the Danube and in Italy.

He ordered the two corps of Soult and Ney, about 60,000 strong, to continue the pursuit of the British, and returned with the rest of his troops to France.

January 6th. Moore halted at Lugo, and took up a position

to give his troops time to rally, and to correct some disorders which had taken place in this hasty retreat; but Soult did not attack him.

January 7th to 28th. Moore continued his retreat, and reached Corunna on the 12th, but the transports had not arrived; the British were therefore obliged to make preparations for defending themselves against the closely pursuing French; they took up a position with their backs to the sea, and waited for their ships to embark.

The French took up their position in front of the British, but made no attack.

January 15th. The transports arrived, and Moore immediately embarked all the sick and wounded and 52 guns, leaving only 12 guns with the troops. His force was drawn up about a mile from Corunna as follows:—

1, Hope's division on the left; 2, Baird's division next, behind Elvina; 3, Fraser's division echeloned to the right rear; and 4, Paget's division in reserve at the village of Airis; in all about 14,000 men.

The French corps under Soult, which was on the heights immediately opposite, about a mile distant, consisted of three divisions.

1st, under Laborde, on the right; 2nd, under Merle, in the centre; and 3rd, under Mermet, on the left; with cavalry on the left flank: in all about 20,000 men. Ney's corps had not come up.

Battle of Corunna.—(See Plate 25.)

January 16th. Moore thought from the inactivity of the French for the past two days, that Soult did not intend to attack him; he therefore arranged for the withdrawal of his troops into the town that night. However, about noon the French made preparations for an attack, and at 2 p.m. they drove in the British advanced posts, and took Elvina. The French extended beyond Baird's division, and threatened to turn the right flank; the 4th King's Own (Lancaster

Regiment) was on the right, and being thrown back, met the French attack, and repulsed it.

Sir John Moore coming up to this flank, ordered the 50th Queen's Own (West Kent) Regiment and the 42nd (Royal Highlanders) to charge the retreating French, which they did, and thereby recovered Elvina. During this contest both Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird were wounded.

Soult now ordered the French 1st division to attack the British left, and at the same time sent the 3rd division behind the hills round the right flank of Baird's division. The attack on Hope's division was easily repulsed, and the French were driven back through Palavio Abaxo.

To meet the advance of the French 3rd division, Paget moved up the reserve, and after a severe encounter the French here were also compelled to retire.

Fraser's division was too far in rear to render any assistance.

There was no cavalry to follow up the defeated French columns, which were therefore able to withdraw to their former position unopposed.

At dark the British, now under the orders of General Hope, withdrew to the town, and embarked.

The British lost 1,000 killed and wounded in this action, and the French about 2,000. Sir John Moore died of his wounds.

NOTES.—Sir John Moore's force was not sufficiently strong to hold the position in front of Elvina and Palavio Abaxo, which commanded the one on which he had to place his troops; this he was obliged to leave for the French, and their artillery from the nearest hill played on the British right and centre during the engagement.

The 3rd British division, under Fraser, was placed so as to prevent the possibility of the British being cut off from their ships; Sir John Moore evidently expected the French to make a more decided turning movement in this direction, and it is difficult to understand why Soult did not do so. If, as it was to have been expected, Soult had engaged the British front with one division, and passed the two others round Baird's right flank, the British 3rd division would then have been well placed to fall on the French flank; as it was, the British 4th division (the reserve) was able to defeat the French 3rd division before the British 3rd division came up.

The British army advanced from two bases, namely, Lisbon and Corunna, which under the circumstances was a great advantage, as it enabled Moore to change his base to Corunna when he was cut off from Lisbon.

The separation of Moore's infantry from his cavalry and artillery was very hazardous, and can scarcely be justified; the columns on this occasion had a very narrow escape of annihilation. The information of both commanders, as to the position and numbers of their opponents, seems to have been exceedingly defective. Had Napoleon known a little sooner of the position of the British, he would have certainly captured both of Moore's columns before they had united.

Moore's advance to attack Soult on the Carrion river was a well conceived and bold movement, its object being to draw Napoleon away from Portugal. The French march from Madrid to Astorga was an extraordinary one; 50,000 men marched 200 miles in ten days over a very difficult country, and a mountainous pass covered with snow in bad weather. The advance of the Austrians on the river Danube, and the flooding of the river Esla, were fortunate circumstances for the British.

Napoleon left about 100,000 men in the Peninsular, nominally under the command of his brother Joseph.

1st corps under Marshal Soult was in Galicia.

2nd „ „ General Lapisse was at Salamanca.

3rd „ „ Marshal Victor was about Talavera.

Reserve corps under Joseph was at Madrid.

These Generals, however, would not take orders from Joseph, and acted independently, in many cases reporting direct to Napoleon; from this cause they had not made much progress in the subjugation of the Peninsular, when Sir Arthur Wellesley landed at Lisbon, on the 22nd April, 1809.

The British force in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, including German auxiliaries, was about 25,000. The Portuguese army, under General Beresford, was at Thomar, and the Spanish army, under General Cuesta, was in Andalusia.

In the beginning of May Soult's corps was at Oporto, it was about 20,000; the French 2nd and 3rd corps united and moved to Merida, they were about 30,000 strong, and were under the command of Victor.

Sir Arthur decided, in the first instance, to advance against Soult. Leaving a force at Abrantes to observe Victor and cover Lisbon, and sending instructions to the Spaniards to follow up the French 2nd and 3rd corps, in case they should advance, he concentrated about 20,000 men at Coimbra on the 5th May, and moved 6,000 Portuguese under Beresford to Visen.

ATLANTIC OCEAN
2.D.
Toledo
1.D.
VIMEIRA
To Mafra
To Torres Vedras
CORUNNA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Airis
Elvina
Palavie Abaxo
2 Miles

May 7th. Sir Arthur moved forward to the river Duero; the Portuguese on Lamego, and the rest of his force towards Oporto.

May 11th. The French posts fell back on the advance of the British, and Soult concentrated his corps about Oporto, on the right bank of the Duero, he broke up his bridges and secured all the boats on the river, by bringing them to his side.

May 12th. The British arrived at the Duero, and took up a position behind the Serra Rock, opposite Oporto, whilst Beresford, with his Portuguese, crossed the river, so as to intercept the French retreat towards Salamanca.

Soult expected that the British would send ships to the mouth of the river, and thus pass their troops over, but Sir Arthnr managed to get some barges from the enemy's side, and in them he passed over 3 Battalions, the 3rd Buffs (East Kent), the 48th (Northamptonshire), and the 66th (Berkshire), unperceived by the French, and occupied a seminary immediately opposite to the Serra Rock, on which he placed his artillery. In this position Sir Arthur managed to maintain himself, whilst a German brigade and the 14th Dragoons, under General Murray, were sent up the river to cross at a Ford and come down on the French flank. A division, under Sherbrooke, was also passed over the river to the town of Oporto, which was evacuated by the French. These columns coming down on the French flanks caused them to retire. Soult was completely surprised, and drew off towards Amarante.

Beresford, with the Portuguese, reached Chaves, and Wellesley passed the rest of his force over the river and occupied Oporto.

May 13th. Murray was sent to follow up Soult, who, finding himself thus headed by Beresford and pursued by Murray, abandoned his artillery and baggage and struck across the mountains to Guimarens.

May 14th. Sir Arthur advanced on Braga, which he reached on the 15th, the French retiring before him.

May 16th. Soult reached Salamonde by mountain paths, and pressing on by Ponte Nova to Montalegre succeeded in escaping from the British.

Sir Arthur now heard of Victor's advance, so he gave up the pursuit of Soult and marched on Abrantes.

On the approach of the British, Victor fell back to Talavera.

By the end of June the French were in position as follows:—

2nd & 3rd corps under Victor near Talavera, 25,000 strong.

Reserve, Joseph covering Madrid with 50,000 men.

1st corps under Soult at Zamora,
4th „ Ney at Astorga,
5th „ Mortier at Valladolid,
} about 50,000 strong.

The British army, about 21,000 strong, was at Abrantes. Beresford, with Portuguese and Spaniards, about 20,000, was at Ciudad Rodrigo. Cuesta, with the Spanish army, about 40,000 strong, was at Mirabete; and Venegas, with some 25,000 more Spaniards, was at Carolina.

Sir Arthur was not aware that Soult had been reinforced, and thought Beresford would be able to detain him whilst he, uniting with the Spanish army, advanced against Victor.

July 20th. The British and Spanish army, under Cuesta, united at Oropesa; Venegas was ordered to advance towards Toledo in co-operation and threaten Madrid from the South.

July 23rd. Sir Arthur was anxious to attack Victor, but Cuesta would not consent to do so that day, and on the following morning the French had fallen back behind the river Alberche, and were reinforced by troops under Joseph from Madrid.

July 24th. The allies followed the French slowly. The Spanish authorities had promised to provision the British army in this advance, but already the supplies were beginning to fail.

July 25th. Joseph, at the head of 55,000 men, determined to attack the allies. The Spanish van-guard quickly fell back in front of the advancing French.

Battle of Talavera.—(See Plate 26.)

July 26th.—The French appeared in the neighbourhood of Talavera, and the allies took up a position to the north of the town.

The Spanish army, 34,000 strong with 70 guns, was on the right, with that flank resting on Talavera, and its left on a conical hill. The British continued the line, 20,000 strong with 30 guns—

1st division in two lines under Campbell.
2nd „ in one line „ Sherbrooke.
3rd „ under McKenzie in rear of Sherbrooke's.
German Legion and Guards.
4th division under Hill on the extreme left, partly thrown back, resting on high ground.

The cavalry was in rear of the centre.

The position extended about two miles, with a rivulet running along the front. Olive groves were opposite the right and open high ground in front of the left flank.

July 27th. Victor's advanced guard came upon a British outpost at 3 p.m. suddenly, which, being surprised, was routed, and Sir Arthur, who was with them, escaped with difficulty; the 45th (Sherwood Foresters) and a battalion of the 60th (King's Rifles), however, covered their retreat, but the appearance of the French cavalry in front of the Spaniards caused them to break and fly several miles to the rear.

Victor, continuing his advance, attacked the left of the British position, but his leading columns were driven back by the 29th (Worcestershire) regiment. Darkness put an end to further action.

During the night most of the Spaniards returned.

The French army, consisting of—

2nd corps under Victor, about 22,000 strong.
3rd „ „ Sebastiani, „ 21,000 „
Guards and Reserve „ 13,000 „

Total 56,000

with 80 guns, bivouacked on the heights in front of the British.

July 28th. At eight o'clock in the morning the attack on the allies was renewed. It was determined to again attempt to turn the British left flank. A division of Victor's corps, commanded by Ruffin, supported by another under Villatte,

advanced against Hill's division; after half-an-hour's desperate fighting (during which Hill was wounded) the French had to retire.

Sir Arthur supported his left by placing all his cavalry into the valley on that flank, and at the same time moved a Spanish division on to the Sierra de Montalban.

During the heat of the day, by common consent, the fighting was suspended; in this interval the lines were re-arranged, the ammunition was replenished, and the wounded were sent to the rear.

At one o'clock the French again made preparations for attack. The 3rd corps advanced against the British right, but were repulsed by Campbell's division; at the same time two divisions (Ruffin's and Villatte's), of Victor's 2nd corps moved up the valley by the foot of the Sierra de Montalban. Sir Arthur ordered the cavalry to charge them, but owing to the difficulties of ground only a part, under Ponsonby, reached the French columns; and they being attacked by Polish Lancers, who were in rear of the French infantry, were routed.

The French guns were placed on the heights opposite the British front, and did much execution to Sherbrooke's division, the German Legion, and the Guards; under cover of this fire, Lapisse's division of Victor's 2nd corps stormed that part of the British heights which were defended by the German Legion and the Guards, but without success; the French were routed and followed by the Guards across the rivulet and up the opposite height; the Guards, however, on coming under the fire of the French guns, were thrown into disorder, gave way and retired in confusion; the German Legion, seeing this, also turned, and thus the British centre was exposed. Sir Arthur, in anticipation of this, had moved forward the 48th (Northamptonshire) Regiment. This regiment breaking into column, allowed the Guards and Germans to pass through them, and then, wheeling into line, fired a volley into the flank of the pursuing French column which compelled it to halt. The Guards and Germans were rallied and again came into the fighting line. Cotton's brigade of light cavalry were brought up, and threatened the

flank of this French division, which accordingly retired. The French now drew off and retreated across the river Alberche, but the British were so reduced by the fatigues of the day and by the want of supplies, that Sir Arthur did not pursue. The British lost about 6,000, killed and wounded, and the French about 9,000.

NOTES.—The right of the allies' position was difficult to attack, but from the experience of the 27th it is probable that, had the French attempted it, they would have been successful; undoubtedly the left was the key of the position, and had they succeeded in carrying the heights there, they would have won the battle.

All counter attacks on the part of the defenders of a position should be made by troops formed in rear for that purpose, and generally should be sent out from the flanks. It is always dangerous for the troops in the defenders' front line to follow for any distance the attackers when repulsed, as they themselves become exposed on both flanks; they leave a gap in the position, and if routed they endanger the safety of the entire line. In this case the steadiness of the 48th alone saved the penetration of the British centre. No advance should be made by the defenders of a position, unless ordered by the general commanding.

July 29th. General Craufurd arrived in the British camp with the 43rd and 52nd (Oxfordshire Light Infantry) and the Rifle Brigade, having marched 62 miles in 26 hours, 17 men only having fallen out.

August 2nd. Sir Arthur, whilst meditating an advance on Madrid, heard that Soult had reached Placencia; he therefore moved down the valley of the Tagus to meet him, leaving the Spanish army at Talavera.

August 3rd. Sir Arthur became aware that Soult was in great force, 50,000, and that he had reached Naval Moral. Sir Arthur also heard that Joseph was again advancing.

August 4th. The British crossed the river Tagus, at Arzobispo, and moved on Jaracejo; the Spaniards also retreated in the same direction. The bridges over the Tagus were destroyed. The French did not follow.

August 19th. Sir Arthur being unable to co-operate with the Spaniards, and the necessary supplies for his army that were promised by them having failed, he withdrew the British to Portugal, retiring through Merida and Badajoz; from thence

he marched north to Ciudad Rodrigo, and at the same time commenced the construction of the lines of Torres Vedras.

NOTES.—Sir Arthur thought, in this campaign, to give the Spanish such assistance as would enable them to recover their capital. Soult being on his flank, it was necessary to dispose of him before advancing on Madrid; hence his expedition to the river Duero, which he considered sufficiently successful to justify his advance by the valley of the Tagus. Napoleon, foreseeing the designs of Sir Arthur, reinforced Soult by Ney and Mortier's corps, and then ordered these three corps, under Soult, to fall on the British line of communications when the advance was made; but Ney was jealous of being placed under Soult, and Joseph, not realizing the position of affairs, had ordered Mortier to move towards Madrid. Happily, by this want of combination, Soult's march was considerably delayed. The Spaniards entrusted with the defence of the mountain passes by which Soult had to advance to reach the British line of communication, abandoned them without firing a shot, and Sir Arthur had no idea of the force that was on his flank. Venegas advanced timidly, and in no way threatened Madrid from the South; he scarcely succeeded in gaining any attention from Joseph.

Had Cuesta consented to join the British in the attack on Victor at Talavera before Joseph came up, this corps would probably have been defeated, and the allies would have pushed on to Madrid; but Soult's force would then have been on the British line of communication.

Joseph has been much blamed for attacking the allies before Soult had reached the valley of the Tagus.

In this campaign both forces suffered from divided command, and the allies particularly from a want of knowledge of the strength and position of their adversary.

After the battle of Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington.

The war with Austria having been brought to a successful termination, Napoleon was enabled to reinforce the troops in Spain. The Spanish army was dispersed, and in June, 1810, the country was occupied by the French as follows:—

1st corps, under Victor.	}	60,000 in all were in Andalusia, under the command of Soult.
5th „ „ Mortier.		
3rd „ „ Sebastiani.		
6th corps, under Ney.	}	86,000 strong, under the command of Massena; 6th and 8th corps were at Salamanca, and the 2nd corps at Alcantara.
2nd „ „ Reynier.		
8th „ „ Junot.		
Cavalry „ Montbrun.		

24,000 men were at Madrid, under Joseph.

The British army, about 25,000 strong, was in the valley of the Mondego, with head-quarters at Celorico, and the Light division, under General Craufurd, between the rivers Coa and Agueda, towards Ciudad Rodrigo.

A mixed force of British and Portuguese of about 13,000 men, under Hill, was at Abrantes and Portalegre.

The Portuguese army, about 30,000 strong, was at Thomar; and some irregular Portuguese corps, under Beresford, were north of the river Duero.

Napoleon directed Massena to invade Portugal from Salamanca, and Soult to advance by Badajoz and Elvas on Lisbon.

June 1st. Massena advanced from Salamanca on Ciudad Rodrigo; this fortress was occupied by Spaniards; it was invested and batteries opened against it on the 25th. Wellington advanced his army to the banks of the river Agueda; but finding the French too strong to attack, he was unable to relieve the siege of the fortress, which fell on the 10th July.

Massena, having secured Ciudad Rodrigo, continued his advance, Wellington falling back before him.

July 24th. In passing the river Coa, the British rear-guard, under General Craufurd, became engaged with the French advanced guard under Ney.

August 15th. The French invested Almeida.

„ 28th. They gained possession of the fortress.

Wellington withdrew to the left bank of the river Mondego.

Massena ordered Reynier's 2nd corps to join him in the valley of the Mondego. As this corps marched to its right, across the mountains, so Hill moved to his left, and on the 21st September, the French army was concentrated at Visen, and the allies on the river Alva, Hill and the Portuguese having joined Wellington.

Massena commenced a forward movement towards Coimbra.

Battle of Busaco.—(See Plate 26.)

Wellington, determined to oppose his advance, moved into position on the Sierra Busaco.

The approaches to Coimbra from Visen by the right bank of the river Mondego are by two roads, which lead over the Busaco ridge; by occupying this ridge, therefore, Wellington stopped the roads.

The right of the British rested on heights above the river, and extended along the ridge for about eight miles; on the left there were impassable ravines.

Hill's division was on the right, next came Leith's, Picton's division, and Pack's Portuguese; then Craufurd's Light division, and on the extreme left were Portuguese under Cole; more Portuguese were in rear of the Light division, under Coleman and Campbell, and Spencer's division was in reserve by a convent.

In all about 60,000 strong.

The only advance that could be made against the allies was by the two roads, which were about three miles apart.

Massena accordingly directed Ney's 6th corps to attack by the north road, and Reynier's 2nd corps by the other, whilst Junot's 8th corps was held in reserve.

September 27th. At daybreak the French advanced, driving in the British outposts; in half an hour their 2nd corps was close to the summit, and a column gained the ridge between Picton's and Leith's divisions. Wellington on seeing this moved two guns, so as to open with grape on their flank, and at the same time directed the 88th, "Connaught Rangers," and half a battalion of the 45th, "Sherwood Foresters," to charge them; this had the effect of driving the French down the hill.

Another French column succeeded in establishing itself on the ridge, to the left of Picton's division: it was hidden from his view by a cloud. Leith, however, perceived it forming, and immediately sent a brigade to oppose it. The 38th (South Staffordshire) regiment was directed to turn its right flank, and the 9th (Norfolk) regiment advanced against its front,

whilst the 1st (Royal Scots) were held in reserve. A ravine stopped the 38th in their advance, but the 9th charged home and drove them down the hill: on this occasion, however, they refrained from pursuit.

Hill's division now came to the support of Leith and Picton, and the French 2nd corps was compelled to retire. On the British left Craufurd had formed the 43rd and 52nd (Oxford Light Infantry) in line, concealed in a hollow on either side of the road; the Portuguese, which were on the ridge behind the Light division, were the only troops that could be seen by Ney. The French 6th corps were allowed to approach by the road opposed only by artillery and skirmishers' fire, with two divisions leading, and one in reserve, to within a few yards of the summit. Craufurd was standing on a rock, and when he saw the advantageous moment had arrived, he ordered the 43rd and 52nd to charge; the leading column of the French attack was hurled back on the others, and the British, opening a fire on them at close range, compelled them to retire.

On the extreme right of the French attack a division gained a wood, but the ridge here was too steep for them to storm, and Ney, considering further attempts useless, drew off. About 2 p.m. the fighting stopped throughout the line.

Not more than 40,000 men were actually employed in the attack.

The French losses were about 4,500 killed and wounded, and that of the allies about 1,300.

NOTES.—There was little opportunity for the French to display any tactical skill in this battle. The position was such that they could only attack along the roads. General Craufurd's disposition of his troops was most skilful, and the charge of the 43rd and 52nd has become celebrated in the annals of the British army. It is to be observed, that in this engagement none of the regiments, when they had routed the French columns, left their position to pursue, a lesson that had been learned at Talavera.

After this experience, Massena considered Busaco to be impregnable, and intended to retire; but a peasant told him of a path by which he could turn the allies' left flank.

September 28th. Under cover of skirmishing, which was

intended to make Wellington think that a renewal of the attack was to be attempted, Massena moved his troops to the right, and gained a road beyond the mountains leading to Coimbra. Wellington was therefore obliged to fall back on that town.

October 1st. The French advanced guard appeared in front of Coimbra, and Wellington retired by Pombal and Leirya to the lines of Torres Vedras.

October 10th. Massena arrived in front of the lines, which caused him to halt.

The allies were considerably reinforced, and by the end of October there were 130,000 men available to man the forts, which were built in three lines on the ground in front of Lisbon, between the river Tagus and the sea, which is about 29 miles across.

Massena hesitated to attack these formidable lines, and sent to Napoleon, who was at Paris, for reinforcements and instructions.

November 14th. Massena having exhausted all the supplies that the country around could produce, was compelled to commence a retreat.

Wellington, issuing from his lines, followed him.

A force of two divisions was sent across the river Tagus under Hill, and moved up the left bank.

Massena halted at Santarem, and took up a position on the Rio Major; Wellington halted in front of him.

Massena tried to cross the river Tagus, but Hill commanded all the passages, and effectually prevented him. Napoleon refused to send any more troops to Massena, considering there were enough in Spain to contest with the allies, but he ordered Soult to leave Victor's 1st corps to blockade Cadiz, and with the 3rd and 5th corps to march on Badajoz.

January 26th, 1811. Soult blockaded Badajoz.

March 2nd. British reinforcement reached Lisbon.

Sir Thomas Graham, who commanded at Cadiz, made an attempt to raise the siege. He embarked 5,000 British troops at Cadiz, and sailed with them for Tarifa, where he was joined by 10,000 Spaniards under La Pena. This force marched

down on the French lines, and although the Spanish general gave Sir Thomas Graham no support, the British troops succeeded in defeating Victor's 1st corps at the battle of Barossa on March 5th.

On the same day Massena recommenced his retreat, being unable to maintain himself in his position any longer for want of supplies. He retired in two columns; one consisting of the 8th corps and cavalry, with the 6th corps under Ney as rear guard, by Leirya on Coimbra, and the other consisting of Reynier's 2nd corps by Thomar and Espinhal on Murcella.

Wellington, detaching a force towards Badajoz, followed.

March 10. Badajoz fell to Soult, but, hearing of the defeat of Victor's 1st corps, he marched for Cadiz, leaving a garrison in Badajoz. On this day Wellington came on the French rear guard under Ney at Pombal.

March 12th. Ney took up a position at Redinha, and showed such a bold front that Wellington deployed his entire force for attack, thinking the whole of Massena's army was in front of him; but on the advance of the British, Ney skilfully withdrew his corps towards Condeixa.

Massena, finding Coimbra occupied by Portuguese troops and the bridges over the river Mondego destroyed, moved to the east towards Guarda.

March 14th. Ney made a stand at Miranda, and the two columns joined.

March 15th. Ney showed a front again at Foz d'Aronce, whilst Massena's army passed the river Alva.

Wellington here heard of the fall of Badajoz, and detached Beresford towards that fortress to observe Soult.

The allies had to halt for two days for their supplies to come up.

March 21st. Massena reached Celorico and Guarda, where he was joined by a division consisting of about 9,000 men; thus reinforced, he determined to remain in Portugal; to this Ney made objections, and became so insubordinate that Massena deprived him of his command, and gave it to Loison.

March 29th. Wellington attacked Massena at Guarda, and being somewhat surprised, he fell back to Sabugal.

April 1st. Wellington followed up the French, attacked them again at Sabugal, and Massena's flank being turned he retired by Ciudad Rodrigo on Salamanca.

April 9th. Wellington ordered Almeida to be invested, and leaving the command of the allies here to General Spencer, he set off to join Beresford.

April 22nd. The allies invested Badajoz.

Napoleon ordered Massena to advance to the relief of Almeida. Wellington, hearing of this movement, hastened to rejoin the army in the north.

May 2nd. Massena crossed the Portuguese frontier, and Wellington took up a position to oppose him at the village of Fuentes d'Onoro.

May 3rd to 5th. Massena attacked the allies' position, but without success, and had to fall back upon Salamanca.

May 10th. Almeida fell into Wellington's hands, the French garrison, at night, having evacuated the fortress and succeeded in cutting their way through the British lines. Thus ended the French invasion of Portugal by Massena.

NOTES.—It was doubtful, at the commencement of this campaign, from which direction the French would advance. Wellington had therefore to keep his troops considerably extended, and in such positions as they could easily reinforce one another. When the advance of the French did take place, Wellington retired before them until all the available troops under his command had joined him, and then, taking up a position across his adversary's line of advance, offered him battle.

He had made arrangements with the Portuguese to stop the path leading round the Busaco ridge, and had his orders been obeyed Massena, after his repulse at Busaco, would have had to retire.

In the lines of Torres Vedras the allies were easily supplied by sea, whereas the French were obliged to subsist on what provisions the country around could produce. A month sufficed to compel Massena to retire to fresh ground, and in three months he had completely exhausted the supplies within reach of Santarem.

If Massena could have forced the passage of the river Tagus, he would have marched by the left bank, along which there was a good road to Madrid, and joined Soult and Joseph, but the roads on the right bank up the valley of the Tagus were so bad, that the allies on the left bank could have outmarched the French, and have fallen on their flank, or taken up a position to cut off their retreat; it was for this reason that Massena chose the northern road. During Massena's retreat, Ney's masterly disposition of the rear guard, which caused Wellington several times to deploy for attack, and thus delayed

the pursuit, is considered to be one of the most perfect examples of the duty of a commander of a rear guard on record.

Sir Thomas Graham's expedition from Cadiz had the effect of drawing Soult southward, and thus prevented him from rendering any assistance to Massena in his retreat.

When Massena received reinforcements at Guarda, he was anxious to move towards Soult and Joseph, with a hope that he might, united with them, advance again down the valley of the Tagus; this was the reason of his movement to Sabugal, but Wellington pressing him hard, and giving him no time to reorganise, compelled him to retire on Salamanca.

No doubt one of the chief causes of failure in the French invasion of Portugal was that the jealousies which existed between the different marshals prevented them from acting in combination, but it is an old saying: "The country is such that if you invade the Peninsula with a small army you will be beaten, and if you invade it with a large one you will be starved." In a mountainous country, with indifferent roads, such as Spain was then, it is impossible to supply a large army for long, where the lines of communication are of any length.

Soult now returned to raise the siege of Badajoz, and Beresford, hearing of his approach, determined to move towards him, take up a position behind the river Albuera, and oppose his advance.

Battle of Albuera.—(See Plate 27.)

May 15th. Beresford occupied the village of Albuera with the German contingent, under Alten, and behind some rising ground in rear of the village he placed the British 2nd division, under Stewart, with some Portuguese troops, under Hamilton and Collins, on the left flank.

The British 4th division, under Cole, and the Spaniards had been left in front of Badajoz.

At about 3 p.m. the allied cavalry came into Albuera with the information that the French were in the immediate front and advancing, whereupon Beresford ordered up the remainder of his force from Badajoz.

The Spaniards, under Blake, arrived during the night, and took post on the right of the 2nd division; but they did not reach as far as a commanding hill on the right flank, which was left unoccupied.

May 16th. At about 9 a.m. two brigades of the 4th division

arrived, and were placed in rear of the 2nd division. The allied cavalry, under Lumley, was drawn up in rear of the centre.

The allies consisted of 30,000 infantry (but of this arm only about 7,000 were British), 2,000 cavalry and 38 guns.

On the evening of the 15th Soult arrived in front of Albuera with the 5th corps, under Gerard, and two brigades under Godinot and Werle, in all about 19,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry under Latour Maubourg, and 40 guns. On reconnoitring the allies' position, he decided on attacking the right flank by the hill which was still unoccupied. During the night he moved the 5th corps through the woods, and posted them opposite the allies' right, with the cavalry and most of the artillery. Werle's brigade was held in reserve in rear of the 5th corps, whilst Godinot's brigade was left in the woods in front of the village of Albuera.

May 16th. At 9 o'clock Godinot, emerging from the woods, advanced to the attack of the village of Albuera, and Werle's brigade was sent forward as if to support him, but Beresford saw that Werle did not follow up closely, and inclined to his left, thereby the allies' commander judged correctly that this was only a feint, and that he must expect the main attack to be made on his right. He therefore sent orders to Blake to change front half right and occupy the hill on the right of the allied position; to the Portuguese under Hamilton to send one brigade to the village of Albuera to support Alten's Germans, and with the others to form a reserve; to the 2nd division to support the Spaniards; and to the 4th division and cavalry to move to the right flank.

It was some time before Blake could be persuaded to change front with the Spaniards, and it required the personal attendance of Beresford to induce him to attempt it.

Whilst this manœuvre was being carried out, the French 5th corps appeared on the top of the hill, with the cavalry on their left flank, and Werle's brigade had countermarched and formed in rear.

The French guns came into action on the Spaniards whilst

they were changing front, and the French infantry also opened fire upon them, this caused the utmost confusion and the Spaniards retired in great disorder.

The British 2nd division was moving up to the support of the Spaniards, Colborne's brigade was somewhat in advance of the others, and being shaken by the retiring Spaniards and suffering much from the French fire, they could not deploy, they lost two-thirds of their strength, the 31st (East Surrey) regiment alone being able to show a front, the remainder of the brigade who were not slain, were taken prisoners by the French cavalry.

The 31st regiment, however, retained their position, and Houghton's brigade formed on them.

Ammunition was beginning to fail, and Beresford was making preparations to retreat; he had actually ordered Alten to withdraw from the village, and the Portuguese to form up to cover the retreat, when the 4th division came up on the right of Houghton's brigade and the 3rd brigade of the 2nd division on the left flank. Thus reinforced, the British line moved forward, gained the hill, and drove the French 5th corps back on its reserves.

During this advance Lumley's cavalry were engaged by the French cavalry, and therefore unable to charge the retiring French infantry.

Beresford, unexpectedly finding himself victorious on this hill, sent orders to Alten to retake the village Albuera, and supported him with the Portuguese.

At about 3 o'clock the French drew off, and retired behind the river.

Beresford had suffered too much to pursue.

The French lost 8,000 men, killed and wounded; and the allies about 7,000, out of which the British alone lost 5,200.

Soult remained in position until the 18th, and then returned to Llerena to await reinforcements.

NOTES.—Beresford took up a position in the first place to cover the Badajoz road, by which the French were advancing; when the Spaniards came up he deployed them to his right.,

Soult formed to attack the allies in oblique order of battle; after he gained the hill on the allied flank, he paused to rearrange his troops before advancing (it is stated that he thought the battle was won). This was the cause of his failure. A severe storm of wind and rain came on immediately after the French commenced their attack, which prevented the commanders from seeing each other's movements.

The Spaniards were very badly disciplined and drilled, and the attempt to change front in the immediate presence of the enemy with such troops was fatal.

The battle was won by the allies, but at a fearful expenditure of British soldiers.

Wellington, on hearing of the battle of Albuera, returned to Badajoz. The town was reinvested, and a force under Hill was sent to observe Soult. Beresford was sent to Lisbon to arrange some matters connected with the Portuguese army.

Napoleon recalled Massena, and sent Marmont to command the army at Salamanca.

Wellington left General Spencer in command of the allies at Ciudad Rodrigo, with orders to follow Marmont should he move towards Soult.

June 6th. An assault was made on Badajoz, but it failed.

June 9th. Another attempt was made to storm the place, but it also was unsuccessful. Marmont now commenced a movement to his left to join Soult.

June 11th. Wellington raised the siege of Badajoz and retired to Elvas, where he was joined by Spencer.

June 19th. The united armies of Marmont and Soult entered Badajoz.

The French were now upwards of 60,000 strong, with 90 guns; whereas the allies had only 46,000 men (of which not more than 28,000 were British soldiers) and 64 guns; Wellington took up a defensive position, but Marmont after reconnoitring feared to attack him.

June 27th. The two French armies finding it difficult to obtain supplies, separated. Soult retired towards Seville, and Marmont to the valley of the Tagus. Wellington, leaving Hill on the Estremadura with 10,000 men, marched towards Ciudad Rodrigo.

August 8th. He reached the banks of the river Coa; here

he received reinforcements, and made every exertion to bring up a siege train to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. The French were also reinforced by a force under the command of Dorsenne, which included the Young Guards; these troops were called the Army of the North.

Having heard of the dangers that were awaiting the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, both Marmont and Dorsenne advanced to its relief: in all about 60,000 men.

September 23rd. The French army, with a large convoy of provisions, arrived in front of Ciudad Rodrigo; the allies were in position about three miles from the town, somewhat extended.

September 25th. The French advanced, and the allies retired before them. The supplies were thrown into the fortress.

September 28th. The French armies being short of provisions again retired, Dorsenne to Salamanca, and Marmont to the valley of the Tagus.

The allies then advanced, and reinvested Ciudad Rodrigo, but finding his troops unhealthy, and being short of provisions, Wellington in November withdrew behind the river Coa, and spread out his army.

NOTES.—Throughout these operations the allies were greatly outnumbered, but by the skill of Wellington they succeeded in maintaining their position on the Portuguese frontier. The French were unable to concentrate for any length of time, on account of their inability to supply their troops; their rear was constantly harassed by the irregular Spanish corps, who carried on a guerilla warfare in their native mountains.

Although Wellington was unsuccessful in his attempts to take either Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, the two frontier fortresses, which were the objects of his operations, still he kept the French out of Portugal.

In December, 1811, Napoleon decided to invade Russia, and for this purpose he withdrew a considerable number of his troops from the Peninsular. He gave up the invasion of Portugal, but he kept a force in Spain, partly to maintain his brother on the throne, and partly to occupy the attention of the British Government, and thus prevent the possibility of their operating in the north of Europe on his lines of communication during his advance into Russia.

The French force left in Spain consisted of—

1st army, under Dorsenne, about 48,000, around Valladolid.

2nd „ „ Marmont, „ 55,000, in the valley of the Tagus.

3rd „ „ Soult, „ 55,000, in Andalusia.

4th „ „ Joseph, „ 19,000, at Madrid.

The allies consisted of about 50,000 men under Wellington on the river Coa, and about 10,000 under Hill in Alentejo.

The frontier fortresses, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, were garrisoned by the French, and Almeida and Elvas were occupied by the allies.

The allies were more concentrated than the French, being only about 100 miles apart, and were well supplied from the coast; the rivers Duero, Mondego, and Tagus being used in the conveyance of stores to the front; whereas the French extended over 500 miles, and were dependent on the country in which they were for supplies. Wellington thought this a favourable opportunity to assault the frontier fortresses, which it was necessary that he should take before he could invade Spain.

Hill was ordered to move forward into Estremadura, to attract the French in that direction; and Wellington, on the 9th January, 1812, crossed the river Agueda, and laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo.

January 13th. Marmont arrived at Valladolid, having been ordered to proceed thither by Nopoleon; he did not hear of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo until the 15th, and then immediately ordered a concentration of his troops to be made at Salamanca.

January 19th. Ciudad Rodrigo was assaulted and carried by storm (in this assault General Craufurd was killed). The fortress was repaired, reprovisioned, garrisoned by a division, and Wellington had retired to his former position on the river Coa before the French could come up.

Wellington now made secret preparations for besieging Badajoz.

March 9th. Leaving only some cavalry opposite Ciudad Rodrigo, he moved to his right, crossed the Tagus at Vilha-Velha, and on March 16th he was on the river Guadiana.

March 17. He invested Badajoz; Hill, with 30,000 men,

being moved forward to Merida, to cover the siege. Soult concentrated and moved forward towards Hill, whilst Marmont marched towards Ciudad Rodrigo.

April 7th. Badajoz was carried by assault, but with a loss of 5,000 men killed and wounded.

On this day, Soult, with 25,000 men, was approaching Hill, but hearing of the fall of the fortress, he retired again to Seville. Marmont had invested Ciudad Rodrigo, and had entered Portugal with 35,000 men. Wellington, leaving 10,000 men to cover Badajoz, marched again north to oppose him.

Marmont on the approach of Wellington fell back behind the Duero, and the allies assumed their old position on the banks of the river Coa.

Wellington now meditated an advance into Spain against Marmont, but previous to moving forward he sent Hill to Almaraz to surprise a French post there, and destroy a military bridge, thus considerably impeding the possible junction of Soult and Marmont.

May 16th. This expedition was skilfully carried out, and Hill returned in safety to Badajoz.

Hill's corps was made up to 20,000 men, to enable him to hold his own against Soult.

June 13th. Wellington crossed the river Agueda, and marched on Salamanca. The French had made forts at Salamanca, and Wellington, passing the river Tormes above and below them, invested them.

June 26th. The forts fell, and Marmont retired behind the river Duero.

July 8th. Marmont was in position with his right at Toro, his centre at Tordesillas, and his left at Simancas on the river Pisuerga.

There was a bridge over this river at Tordesillas, and at one or two places there were fords; there was also a bridge at Simancas; these passages were all protected by field works.

Wellington took up a position opposite the French, with his right at Rueda, centre on the river Trabancos, and his left on the river Guarena. He hesitated to attack the French in their

position, which he considered to be strong, and waited with the expectation that Marmont would have to retire from want of supplies.

July 15th. Marmont assumed the offensive; he closed his troops on his right, and crossed the river Duero with part of his army.

July 16th. Wellington closed his left and centre, and brought his right to the river Trabancos.

July 17th. Marmont brought back that part of his army which he had passed over the river, and by a forced march gained Pollos and Tordesillas; he crossed unopposed, and advanced to Nava del Rey.

Wellington brought his right back to the river Guarena.

July 18th. The allies concentrated on the river Guarena.

July 19th. Marmont attempted to cross this river, but was unable to effect the passage. His object was to cross the river Tormes and cut Wellington off from the Ciudad Rodrigo road.

There were fords over the river Tormes at Santa Marta, Aldea-Lengua, Huerta, and Alba; the ford at Alba was commanded by a fort garrisoned by Spanish, and Wellington, being nearer to Huerta, thought he could reach that before the French.

July 20th. Marmont, having during the night concentrated on his left flank, passed the river Guarena beyond the allies' right unopposed, and marched for the fords at Huerta and Alba.

Wellington seeing the French movement, placed his troops in motion, and endeavoured to gain Huerta before the French, but as he saw this was hopeless, the French troops outmarching the allies, he directed his columns to some high ground above the ford at Aldea-Lengua.

July 21st. Marmont crossed the river Tormes by the fords of Huerta and Alba; the Spanish garrison having abandoned the fort at the latter place, it was occupied by the French.

Wellington crossed the river Tormes at Santa Marta and Aldea-Lengua.

That evening the French biavoucked in the woods about Calvariza-Ariba, and the allies behind Arapiles.

Joseph was fast approaching Marmont, and Wellington contemplated a retreat into Portugal.

Battle of Salamanca. (See Plate 27).

The divisions of the allied army with Wellington were commanded as follows:—

1st division by Campbell;	3rd division by Packenham;
4th „ „ Cole;	5th „ „ Leith;
6th „ „ Clinton;	7th „ „ Hope;

Light division by Alten; Portuguese divisions by Bradford and Pack; and a Spanish division by Don Carlos d'Espana. The British cavalry was under Sir Stapleton Cotton (LeMarchant commanding the heavy cavalry brigade, and Anson the light); the Portuguese cavalry was under D'Urban—in all about 46,000 men.

The French army consisted of about 44,000 men.

July 22nd. At daybreak Marmont, seeing that one of the hills called Arapiles, in his immediate front, was unoccupied, seized it, and endeavoured to take the other, but in this he was unsuccessful.

Wellington placed the Guards in the village of Arapiles, and the 4th division behind them; the 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions he placed in Mass, behind the hill of Arapiles, out of sight, and from the top of it he watched the French movements. They were coming out of the wood, and advancing towards Calvariza-Ariba, and the other Arapiles hill.

He therefore brought up the 1st and light divisions on his left, and ordered the 3rd division and D'Urban's cavalry to take post in a wood near Aldea-Tejada to cover the main road to Ciudad Rodrigo; the Portuguese and the Spanish divisions and the British cavalry connected the 3rd and 4th divisions. The ground was such that the allied troops were generally concealed from the French.

The commissariat and baggage had been ordered to the rear,

and Marmont, seeing the dust of the trains on the road, thought that the allies were in full retreat.

At about noon he ordered up the two divisions of Foy and Ferey to support his troops between the Arapiles and N^a S^a de la Pena, and directed Thomière's division, with 50 guns and the light cavalry, to move to their left and threaten the Rodrigo road. There was a considerable part of the French force still in the wood.

Marmont thought that Wellington, on seeing Thomière's movement, would retire, and he designed at that moment to fall upon the allies with six divisions of infantry and Boyer's dragoons, which were now in line about Calvariza-Ariba.

Wellington, observing this flank movement of Thomière's, ordered the 5th division to form up on the right of the 4th, and Bradford's Portuguese on the right of the 5th, whilst the British cavalry were sent to the right of the Portuguese. The 6th and 7th divisions were formed in a second line, with the Spanish division on the right. The 1st and light divisions, and Pack's Portuguese, were formed up in mass in rear as a reserve.

Marmont, from the Arapiles, observed the massing of the allies on their right, and, becoming somewhat anxious for the safety of Thomière's, he despatched the divisions of Clausel and Bonnet to his assistance. Clausel's division, however, could not overtake Thomière's, and Bonnet's was delayed by engaging at the village of Arapiles, consequently there was a gap between each of the divisions.

Wellington now ordered the 3rd division, with D'Urban's cavalry, to form up across Thomière's line of march, and advance. When the 3rd division became engaged, the 5th and 4th divisions were to advance in echelon from the right, and Pack's Portuguese were to attack the French Arapiles, so as to protect the left flank of the 4th division.

At 5 o'clock the 3rd division came suddenly upon Thomière's, who, expecting to see the allies in full retreat along the Rodrigo road, was surprised; the division, thus attacked in front and flank, was routed and thrown back on Clausel's, which was also thereby thrown into confusion. On seeing the position in which

these two divisions were placed, Marmont left the Arapiles and went to them; he was, however, almost immediately severely wounded, and Thomière was killed.

The 5th and 4th divisions continued to advance; bringing forward their right, they pressed back the French in front of them, whilst Pack's Portuguese attacked the Arapiles, and the 1st and light divisions, moving up on the allied left, engaged the French divisions of Foy and Ferey.

The command of the French army now devolved on Clausel; he withdrew Ferey's division from the heights of Calvariza and placed it behind his centre. Two divisions of infantry, Sarrut's and Brennier's, from the forest, now came into line with Ferey's division. Clausel also collected here all his cavalry, and with them he rallied the remnants of Thomière's and his own divisions.

The French Arapiles was still held by a division under Maucune, Foy's division being on his right.

Pack's attack on the Arapiles failed, and the French, following them down the hill, menaced the flank of the 4th division; the 40th (South Lancashire) regiment wheeled back to meet this attack, but Clausel, seeing the advantage here gained, advanced the divisions which he had formed in rear. This compelled the British 4th and 5th divisions to retire. Wellington ordered the 6th division to charge the advancing French: this caused them to halt, and the 3rd division coming up on their flank, compelled them to retire.

Clausel, seeing that the battle was hopelessly lost, ordered a retreat on the fords, under cover of Maucune's and Foy's divisions.

The allied 3rd, 5th, and 6th divisions on the right, with the 4th (which had rallied), 1st, and light divisions on the left, and the 7th division, Portuguese and Spaniards, in reserve, followed the French closely for three miles, when darkness prevented further action; the French withdrew into the woods.

Wellington, being unaware that the Spaniards had abandoned the fort at Alba, supposed the French, being unable to cross there, would make for the ford at Huerta; he therefore

pushed forward the light division in that direction to harass them in their passage; but they had retreated on the Alba ford, and the light division, although they moved forward rapidly, came on no enemy.

The allies lost in this battle about 5,200 men killed and wounded; the French are supposed to have lost about 7,000 killed and wounded, and upwards of 7,000 prisoners.

NOTES.—When Marmont moved Thomière's division to his left, he was under the impression that the allies were already in retreat, and that he had opposed to him on the Arapiles an inconsiderable force; he saw his mistake too late to rectify it.

Wellington had the advantage of being on the interior line, and when the flank manœuvre was commenced, he was able to concentrate his force in a convenient position to attack and defeat a part of his enemy before the other part could come to its assistance.

The tactics displayed by him in this battle are a combination of those adopted by Frederick at Rossbach and Napoleon at Austerlitz.

July 23rd. During the night of the battle, Clausel with his entire army passed the river Tormes at Alba. Wellington moved forward at daylight, but it was not till noon that the allies came on the French rear guard. The French cavalry gave way, and their infantry formed into three squares; they were charged by the allied cavalry, and for the first time in Napoleon's Wars, the French squares were broken by cavalry alone. Although the French rear guard was thus defeated, the army pushed on with such rapidity that the allies could not overtake it. On the night of the 24th the French were forty miles from the battle-field. They continued their retreat through Valladolid to Burgos.

July 30th. Wellington reached Valladolid; leaving here the 6th division and the light cavalry brigade to observe the French army of the north, he moved on Madrid. Joseph, who was approaching Salamanca to render assistance to Marmont, on hearing of the result of the battle, moved on Segovia, but on the advance of Wellington from Valladolid, he retired through Madrid to Toledo, and sent orders to Soult to evacuate Andalusia and join him.

August 12th. Wellington with the allies entered Madrid.


N
4 D
2 D
Portuguese
to Badajoz
Spaniards
ALBUERA
Godinot
Wood
3rd Corps
2 Miles
SALAMANCA
R. Tormes
St Marta
to Ciudad Rodrigo
St Ide la Pena
Fort
Calvarizo Arriba
1 D
Parks
Portuguese
Aldea Tejada
Spaniards
Arapiles
Arapiles
Magazine
Pinares
Fort
for Scale and N point see above

August 26th. Soult raised the siege of Cadiz, evacuated Andalusia, and moved towards Joseph.

Hill thus released from covering Badajoz, marched on Madrid.

September 1st. Clausel had reorganised his army and had been considerably reinforced, Wellington therefore determined to march against him; he left Hill and two divisions at Madrid, and with the others moved on Valladolid. British reinforcements were now ordered to land at Corunna, and march across Galicia to join the allied army.

Clausel retired before Wellington past Burgos to Briviesca, and Wellington laid siege to Burgos. Five times was the assault of this fortress attempted, but each time it failed. The siege had lasted thirty days, when on the 21st October Wellington, finding Soult and Joseph advancing on his right flank and Clausel in his front, was obliged to raise the siege and retire by Valladolid to Salamanca. Here he was joined by Hill, who had abandoned Madrid on the approach of the French.

Wellington being hard pressed by the French, was obliged to continue his retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, which place he reached on the 18th November, and went into cantonments on the rivers Coa and Agueda.

NOTES.—In these operations, both commanders manœuvred against one another to gain a strategical advantage; Wellington to throw Marmont off his line of communications with Burgos, and Marmont to cut Wellington off from Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont's feint at Toro was intended to draw the allies in that direction, whilst he turned their right flank. Wellington was not so easily deceived, but Marmont did actually succeed in turning the right flank of the allies by the superior marching powers of his army.

Marmont's base was at no time in danger, as Joseph was marching on Blasco-Sancho, and thus, if he had been cut off from Burgos, he could have retreated on Madrid. Having gained the fords over the river Tormes at Huerta and Alba, he was actually nearer the Ciudad Rodrigo road than Wellington, and thereby had obtained a strategical advantage over his adversary. He had compelled the allies to throw back their right flank and show a front parallel to their line of retreat, whereas the French had their line secure up to the day of the battle.. Marmont had displayed the utmost ability, and had out-manœuvred and out-marched the allies, but that one false tactical movement was fatal to him, and in forty minutes all the advantages he had hitherto gained were lost. Such is war, the most brilliant strategy may be completely nullified by a tactical error.

Although Wellington at the end of this campaign found himself back in Portugal, he had succeeded in occupying Madrid, freeing Andalusia, and raising the siege of Cadiz, besides inflicting a severe defeat on his adversary. The French in the Peninsular were still in overwhelming numbers, but as Napoleon was now engaged in his Russian enterprise, it was not to be expected that they would receive any further reinforcements.

During the winter of 1812–13 Wellington made every preparation for another advance in the spring.

Fresh Portuguese battalions were raised, the Spanish army was reorganised, and reinforcements were received from England. On the approach of spring the allied army was in position, as follows:—

In cantonments about the river Coa, 44,000 British and 30,000 Portuguese; in Galicia and Asturias 40,000 Spaniards, under Castanos.

The French, about 60,000, under Joseph, were considerably extended from Toledo to Salamanca.

In case of an advance of the allies the French had been ordered by Napoleon to concentrate at Valladolid, and defend the line of the river Duero.

Wellington's plan for this campaign was to move his left wing across the river Duero, within the Portuguese frontier, and march up the right bank, join with the Spanish army in Galicia, and fall upon the French right flank, whilst he with the centre and right advanced by Salamanca against the French front.

May 22nd. The allies were concentrated and head-quarters established at Ciudad Rodrigo.

May 23rd. Graham, with 40,000 men, crossed the river Duero, above Lamego, moved towards Braganza, joined the Spanish army in Galicia and marched on the river Esla. At the same time the Duke del Parque's army, which was in Andalusia, advanced as if to threaten Madrid.

When Graham had sufficiently advanced, Wellington, with the centre, and Hill in command of the right, moved forward on Salamanca.

At this time the French had not more than 35,000 men concentrated at Valladolid; they took up their position behind

the river Duero to resist Wellington's advance, as they had done before; but when Graham, crossing the river Esla, came down on their flank at Zamora, they retired, abandoning their works.

June 3rd. The allies united at Toro; the French retired to Burgos.

June 7th and 8th. The allies, 90,000 strong, crossed the river Carrion. The French blew up the Castle of Burgos, and continued their retreat; they took up a position behind the river Ebro; Wellington decided to turn their right.

June 14th. Graham crossed the river Ebro at Rocamunde.

June 15th. Wellington, with the centre, crossed at the same place, and Hill at Puente Arenas.

British vessels assembled on the north coast, and a depôt was established at Santander, which was made a new base of operations.

French fall back, and take up a position at Vitoria. (See Plate 28.)

Joseph, concentrating his army, fell back to Vitoria, and there took up a position facing the allies, but parallel to his own line of retreat on Bayonne.

June 20th. The allies arrived opposite the French, who were drawn up as follows:—

Reille's corps on the extreme right, about Gamarra Mayor, to guard the Bilbao road.

The proper right extended from Margarita village to the main road; the centre was in front of the village of Ariniz; and the left on rough ground behind the village of Subijana de Alava. They were in two lines, the front one under Gazan, and the rear one under D'Erlon; the reserve was at Gomecha; there was also a brigade, under Maransin, on the extreme left on the Puebla ridge. The river Zadorra was in their immediate front; there were four bridges over it which were not destroyed, namely, at Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclares; but the French artillery on the heights commanded them. Their strength was about 60,000 men and 150 guns.

There were many thousands of carriages on the road about Vitoria containing supplies, treasure, and works of fine art taken from the Spanish towns.

Wellington, observing the French position, decided to attack on the morrow.

Sir T. Graham, with 20,000 men, was to move by the Bilbao road, and force the passage of the river Zadorra at Gamarra Mayor.

Hill, with 20,000 men (2nd British division, Morillo's Spaniards, and Portuguese under Sylviera), was to cross the river below the Puebla defile, attack the heights, and bring his left round so as to secure the bridge at Nanclares.

Wellington was to move, with 30,000 men (3rd, 4th, 7th, and light divisions), against the four bridges opposite the French position.

Battle of Vitoria.—(See Plate 28.)

June 21st. At daybreak it was raining and thick weather. Hill succeeded in crossing the river; at about 10 o'clock he gained the heights of Puebla, secured the defile, and brought his left round towards Nanclares.

Wellington directed the 4th division on Nanclares and the light division on Villodas. Some French artillery had been pushed forward into the loop of the river by Villodas, but, being taken in flank by the light division, were compelled to retire.

The weather now cleared, and Hill's position could be seen; but the 3rd and 7th divisions were still in rear, and had some very difficult ground to cross. Wellington, therefore, after connecting the right of the 4th division with Hill, waited for the divisions in rear before making any further advance.

About 1 o'clock the 3rd and 7th divisions came into line about Mendoza. Hill then attacked and carried the village of Subijana; about the same time Graham attacked Reille's corps, on the Bilbao road. The king finding both his flanks attacked moved his reserves to Vitoria, and ordered Gazan to retire by

successive divisions; but at this moment the French became severely engaged with the light division and the 3rd division, who having forced their way across the river were moving on the heights; being thus assailed by the British the French were unable to retreat. The 7th division also crossed the river and engaged the French right.

When Hill attacked the heights of Puebla so vigorously Gazan moved a division, under the command of Villatte, from his centre in front of Ariniz to his left flank. Wellington observing this withdrawal of troops from the French centre, directed the 3rd division on this point; they gained the ridge, and the French thus penetrated, retired to the second range of heights, but still held on to the village of Ariniz. The village of Margarita was carried by the 52nd (Oxfordshire) Light Infantry, and Hermandad by the 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers.

After severe fighting the 3rd division carried Ariniz; by the capture of this village, the French left, which was engaged with Hill, was outflanked, and they fell back in disorder on Vitoria.

The French right, seeing their left defeated, also retired towards Vitoria, leaving many guns and stores to be taken by the British, and at 6 o'clock took up a position about a mile from the town, between the villages of Ali and Armentia.

Reille still held Graham in check.

The 4th division attacked and turned the French left at Armentia, upon which they abandoned the heights and retreated in a confused mass along the road to Pampeluna, the Bayonne road being blocked with carriages. Reille continued to dispute the possession of the bridge at Gamarra Mayor until the British had actually reached Vitoria: he had repulsed several vigorous assaults. It was not until the British from Vitoria threatened his rear that he retired; rallying his troops at Betonio, he not only succeeded it making good his retreat, but also formed a rear guard to the fugitive army.

The French lost 6,000 men killed and wounded, 143 guns, and all their train, equipage and treasure; the allies lost about 5,000 killed and wounded.

NOTES.—No doubt the weather favoured Hill in his turning movement; he completed the passage of the river, and gained the Puebla defile without much opposition; he was able to throw his left forward, so as to cover the bridge at Nanclares, and thus enable the 4th Division to pass. Gazan did not do wisely to weaken his centre to reinforce his left; this threatened flank should have been strengthened by troops from the reserve.

It is generally acknowledged that in this battle the king handled a brave and experienced army shamefully. At the first, on being fired at on each of his flanks, he immediately ordered a retreat, and actually marched his reserves to the rear. The position he took up parallel to his line of retreat was also most unskilful. Nothing could have been finer, however, than the manner in which Reille, with his detaining force, kept Graham in check throughout the day.

After the battle of Vitoria, the greater part of the French army under Joseph retreated by Pampeluna; and leaving a garrison there, they crossed the Pyrenees into France. A force, under Graham, was sent against General Foy, who was approaching Vitoria from Bilbao; they came in contact at Tolosa, but after making a short stand the French retired to Irun, on the river Bidassoa, leaving a garrison at St. Sebastian. Three British divisions were also sent to Tudela to intercept a French force under Clausel, which was approaching by Logrono; but this general, by abandoning his artillery, managed to escape into France.

The allies now occupied the principal passes over the mountains, as far as Roncesvalles.

A corps, under Suchet, still occupied Catalonia; but with this exception, the French had been driven out of Spain. Wellington determined to follow them into France.

On the 25th July St. Sebastian was assaulted, but without success.

After the battle of Vitoria the Emperor suspended Joseph, and gave Marshal Soult the command of the French army; he arrived about the middle of July, and collecting 80,000 men, he moved on St. Jean Pied de Port. He attacked the two passes of Roncesvalles and Maya, driving back the allies towards Pampeluna.

July 27th. Wellington arrived from St. Sebastian, and took up a position covering the two roads leading from these passes.


Graham
from Bilbao
to Bayonne
Ganarte's Mayor
R. Zadorra
Betoño
Mendoza
Tres Puentes
Margarita
Hermandad
5 Alt
VITORIA
to Pamplona
1 D
Villodas
Armentia
Gomecha
Trinis
4 D
Nanclares
Salvijana
2 D
Puebla
1
½
0
1
2 Miles

Plate 28

Soult attacked on the 27th and 28th, but being unable to carry the position, he fell back across the mountains and moved to his right towards St. Sebastian; here he made another attempt to cross the Pyrenees on the 31st, but failed, and retired to a position behind the river Bidassoa.

August 31st. St. Sebastian was stormed and captured, except the Castle. Soult on this day made another advance across the Bidassoa, but was driven back.

Sept. 9th. The Castle of St. Sebastian capitulated.

October 7th. Wellington, after manœuvring in front of Soult, crossed the Bidassoa, and outflanked the French, who fell back behind the river Nivelle.

October 31st. Pampeluna capitulated, and Wellington, having thus cleared the way, made preparatious for an advance into France.

NOTES.—Wellington, at the commencement of this campaign, divided his army by an impassable river, and it was not done without danger. He was anxious to lend a hand to the Spanish army in Galicia, and at the same time turn the French right; his venture was justified by success.

In moving to his left towards the coast, he was enabled to establish a new base at Santander, by which he gained a strategical advantage, and facilitated the supply of his troops.

Joseph's incapacity as a commander was remarkable in this campaign.

Wellington had only one siege train, so he could not besiege St. Sebastian and Pampeluna at the same time, although it was necessary to gain possession of both places before he could advance into France. He elected to commence operations on St. Sebastian, which being on the sea, when captured, would give him a new port, and consequently another convenient base.

Soult took up a position and entrenched it, with his right on the sea and his left on the mountains, about ten miles in length; the river Nivelle passed in rear of the right and centre of the lines, and then separated the left from the centre, but the river was well bridged in case a retreat should become necessary.

D'Erlon's corps extended from the left to the bridge of Amotz.

Clausel's corps from that bridge to Ascain; Reille's corps from Ascain to the sea.

Foy's corps was at the bridge of Cambo, either to make a

counter attack or reinforce the French left. In all about 80,000 men.

Soult was constantly urging Suchet in Catalonia to co-operate with him, and march against the allies' right flank and rear, but to no avail; Suchet would not stir.

Battle of Nivelle.—(See Plate 29).

Wellington, finding Suchet inactive, determined to make an attack on Soult's entrenched position. He decided to attack down the river to San Pé.

Hill, with the 2nd division under Stewart, 6th division under Clinton, Murillo's Spaniards and two Portuguese brigades, was to attack the French left.

Beresford, with the 3rd division on the right under Colville, 7th division in the centre under Le Cor, 4th division on the left under Cole, and Giron's Spaniards, was to advance against Clausel's corps, attacking the forts St. Barbe and Grenada. The Light division under Alten, and Longa's Spaniards were to move on Ascain after attacking the advanced redoubt on the heights of La Petite Rhune. Hope, with the 5th division, 1st division, and Freyre's Spaniards, was to engage the French right. The allies were about 90,000 strong with 94 guns. On the night of November 9th they assembled at their various posts on the Rhune mountain unperceived by the French, ready for an attack at daylight.

November 10th. On the signal for them to advance being given, the Light division carried the forts on La Petite Rhune, and the French retired on Ascain, leaving a battalion prisoners. At the same time the 4th and 7th divisions attacked the forts St. Barbe and Grenada, which they carried, driving the French through the village of Sarre. It was now 8 o'clock, the ships at sea were firing on the extreme right of the French position, whilst Hope was engaged with them on the low ground. The Light division and Beresford's corps, having cleared the slopes of the Rhune mountains, were waiting for Hill's corps, which had difficult ground to move over. Hill

passed Murillo's Spaniards over to the right bank of the river Nivelle, and with the rest of his corps he marched on the bridge of Amotz; it was 11 o'clock before he came under fire of the forts.

The 3rd division advanced on Hill's left, and the 7th and 4th followed in echelon.

The forts were carried and the bridge was seized by the 3rd division, the French falling back on San Pé; the 4th and 7th divisions were brought up into line on the left of the 3rd division, the French here also falling back before them.

The communication between D'Erlon and Clausel was thus cut.

The 4th and 7th divisions were now directed on Clausel's corps, and the 3rd division attacked the left flank of it, which, being separated from D'Erlon, was exposed.

The Light division fought its way up to the left of the 4th division.

After severe fighting, the French abandoned all their entrenchments, except a single redoubt opposite to the Light division, and retired by the different bridges over the river Nivelle.

This fort was a formidable work, but was of no value to the French after all the others had been abandoned. The colonel of the 52nd (Oxfordshire) Light infantry, who was in front of the fort, therefore avoided it; but a staff officer, without any authority from General Alten, rode up and gave the order for the regiment to attack it. They did so, and lost thereby, uselessly, 200 men.

The allies continued to advance, and pressed back the French centre along the Bayonne road.

Hope's corps engaged Reille's, keeping it fully occupied throughout the day. The allies carried the advanced posts, and drove the French back to their main line of entrenchments. Thus Reille was unable to send any support to Clausel. When the allies reached San Pé, Reille retired in good order to the heights on the Bayonne road, destroying his bridges.

Night came on, and the allies bivouacked on the ground they had won, with the French in front of them.

November 11th. Hope forded the Nivelle, and came into line on the left; the artillery, however, could not be brought across the river until the bridges were repaired. Soult had therefore time to rally his men and take up a fresh position.

November 12th. Under cover of a fog the French retired; the left behind the river Nive, and the right in position in front of Bayonne.

The French lost 4,300 men killed and wounded, besides 1,400 prisoners and 52 guns.

The allies lost 2,700 killed and wounded.

NOTES.—The French were disheartened by their late defeats, and the generals themselves acknowledged that their men fought badly at the defence of these works. Many of the forts were incomplete, and they covered a great extent of country.

These circumstances must be the cause of their so easily abandoning such a strong position.

Wellington, on reconnoitring these entrenchments, at once saw that the vulnerable point was where the river ran at right angles to the position, for by obtaining possesion of the bridge at Amotz, he would separate the French left from the centre, and thus penetrate the line.

Hope's corps was detailed to engage the French right so as to hold it fast whilst the attack on the French centre and left was made: this was ably done, and Reille was prevented from sending any assistance to Clausel.

It is to be observed that a river running at right angles to a position and through the centre of it is a serious defect, for however well it may be bridged, if the assailant succeeds in obtaining possession of either side of the bridge heads, the troops on each side of the river are completely separated.

ENGAGEMENTS IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.—(See Plate 30).

The allies now went into cantonments, the weather being unfavourable for further operations. Each army strengthened itself by field works.

The left of the allies was on the sea at Bidart, running through Arcangues to the river Nive; the right was thrown back along the left bank.

The French troops were concentrated around Bayonne, with outposts along the right bank of the river, opposite the allies.

Wellington had 9,000 cavalry, and finding his position somewhat cramped, and a difficulty in providing forage, he determined to force the Nive, drive back the French, and bring his right forward to the river Adour.


Plate 30
Rhein
Neuville
Kehl
Hanau
Strasbourg
Offenburg
Gambsheim
Drusenheim
Rastatt
Haguenau
Wissembourg
Landau
Germersheim
Speyer
Worms
Mannheim
Heidelberg
Darmstadt
Frankfort
Aschaffenburg
Wurtzburg
Nuremberg
Ulm
Augsburg
Munich
Ingolstadt
Ratisbon
Passau
Linz
Vienna
Presburg
Buda
Pesth
Comorn
Raab
Gratz
Carlstadt
Fiume
Trieste
Venice
Verona
Mantua
Milan
Turin
Coni
Nice
Genoa
Leghorn
Florence
Rome
Naples
Ancona
Bologna
Modena
Parma
Piacenza
Alessandria
Novi
Tortona
Pavia
Lodi
Cremona
Brescia
Bergamo
Lecco
Como
Chiavenna
Coire
Zurich
Schaffhausen
Constance
Basle
Berne
Lucerne
Geneva
Lausanne
Sion
Martigny
Aosta
Ivrea
Chambery
Grenoble
Lyons
Dijon
Besançon
Belfort
Colmar
Metz
Nancy
Luxemburg
Treves
Coblentz
Cologne
Aix la Chapelle
Liege
Namur
Brussels
Ghent
Antwerp
Bruges
Ostend
Dunkirk
Calais
Boulogne
Abbeville
Amiens
Arras
Lille
Valenciennes
Mons
Tournay
Ypres
Dixmude
Nieuport
Furnes
Dover
Canterbury
Rochester
Chatham
Sheerness
London
Gravesend
Tilbury
Maidstone
Ashford
Hythe
Romney
Rye
Winchelsea
Hastings
Battle
Lewes
Brighton
Arundel
Chichester
Portsmouth
Southampton
Winchester
Salisbury
Andover
Basingstoke
Reading
Windsor
Staines
Kingston
Guildford
Dorking
Epsom
Croydon
Sevenoaks
Tunbridge
Tunbridge Wells
Uckfield
Lewes
Newhaven
Seaford
Eastbourne
Pevensey
Hailsham
Heathfield
Mayfield
Crowborough
Forest Row
East Grinstead
Horsham
Petworth
Midhurst
Haslemere
Godalming
Farnham
Alton
Petersfield
Havant
Fareham
Gosport
Cowes
Newport
Ryde
Sandown
Shanklin
Ventnor
Freshwater
Yarmouth
Lymington
Ringwood
Fordingbridge
Romsey
Eastleigh
Hedge End
Bishop's Waltham
Wickham
Titchfield
Alresford
New Alresford
Odiham
Hook
Basingstoke
Whitchurch
Overton
Kingsclere
Newbury
Hungerford
Marlborough
Devizes
Trowbridge
Bradford
Frome
Shepton Mallet
Wells
Glastonbury
Bridgwater
Taunton
Wellington
Tiverton
Exeter
Crediton
Okehampton
Launceston
Bodmin
Truro
Falmouth
Helston
Penzance
St Ives
Redruth
Camborne
Hayle
St Just
Penryn
Falmouth
Plymouth
Dartmouth
Totnes
Kingsbridge
Salcombe
Ivybridge
Modbury
Plympton
Tavistock
Yelverton
Princetown
Dartmoor
Moretonhampstead
Chagford
Bovey Tracey
Newton Abbot
Teignmouth
Dawlish
Exmouth
Sidmouth
Honiton
Axminster
Lyme Regis
Bridport
Dorchester
Weymouth
Portland
Swanage
Wareham
Poole
Christchurch
Lymington
Ringwood
Fordingbridge
Salisbury
Amesbury
Warminster
Westbury

Soult had three divisions at Bayonne under Reille, in an entrenched camp, extending to the lower Adour, with an outpost at Anglet; three divisions under Clausel in his centre on the left bank of the Nive, and four divisions under D'Erlon on the right bank, extended to Cambo. There was also a French division under General Paris at Lahoussoa, at the foot of the mountains, which was in communication with the French left.

December 9th. Wellington gave instructions for Hope and Alten to drive in the French outposts in front of Bayonne, whilst Beresford, crossing the Nive at Ustaritz on pontoons, and Hill at Cambo and Larressore, by fords, attacked the French on the right bank of the river.

Murillo's Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu to observe General Paris.

At daylight Beresford's troops crossed without much opposition, having arranged their pontoon bridge during the night. Hill forced his passage about Cambo in three columns, and Murillo passed over the river at Itzassu.

The French everywhere fell back in front of the allies, and took up a position behind Villefranque.

The roads were so bad that, beyond an attack made on Villefranque by some of the 6th division, who drove the French outpost out of the village at about three o'clock, there was no fighting; in fact, the allies could not be brought up into line.

On the left Hope advanced, driving back the French, and at about one o'clock, with his left resting on the lower Adour, he took the entrenched camp in front of Bayonne.

Alten was at Bassussary, and in connection with Hope.

December 10th. The allies were thus separated by the river, and Soult resolved to fall upon those on the left bank, with as large a force as he could assemble there. During the night he passed D'Erlon's four divisions over the river, and placed them behind Clausel's corps.

Wellington was with Hill and Beresford, making preparations to assault the French.

Hope had withdrawn to Barrouilhet, and Alten was still at Bassussary.

Soult's first design was to attack Bassussary with all his force, but for some reason he changed his plan, and at daybreak Reille, followed by two of D'Erlon's divisions, marched against Hope, and Clausel advanced against Bassussary, followed by the remainder of D'Erlon's corps. The picquets of the Light division were attacked and driven in. Alten retired to Arcangues, and occupied the village. Clausel made an attempt to take the village, but without success; the action continued all day, but it was not very severe.

The Light division was separated from Hope's by a valley, and being now menaced by Clausel, had lost their connection.

Reille drove in the allies' outposts at Anglet, and assailed the position of Barrouilhet, but the ground was unfavourable for the French; they could only march by the main road, all the bye roads being so deep with mud, and it was midday before they were ready to attack.

The fight which ensued was generally confused, the ground being such that any directions from generals were impossible.

The 9th (Norfolk) regiment, on the left of the allied line, distinguished itself. A French regiment had, unperceived, managed to get round its flank, and was forming up, when the colonel in command, leaving fifty men to answer the French skirmishers' fire, formed his regiment up on their left, and charging the French regiment, put it to flight.

Reille's divisions were repulsed, but Villatte, who commanded the reserve, brought it up, and menaced the allies' right flank; one of D'Erlon's divisions also occupied the ground between Hope and the Light division.

It was now two o'clock, and Soult, collecting all his force together, was making preparation for another assault, when he observed a force of the allies coming down on his left flank, which caused him to hesitate and detach a division of D'Erlon's corps to meet them.

Wellington having discovered at daylight that the heights in front of him had been evacuated, and hearing firing on the other side of the river, had ordered Beresford's corps and the

6th division to recross, throwing over another pontoon bridge at Villefranque, so as to shorten the distance.

These were the troops seen by Soult.

Wellington placed the 7th division at St. Barbe, and moved up the others to support Hope and Alten. These dispositions caused Soult to suspend his order for attack.

December 11th. The morning broke with a thick fog. Wellington, anxious to know what the enemy were doing, caused a reconnaissance to be made by the 9th (Norfolk) regiment, when the fog suddenly cleared, and they found themselves unsupported opposed to a large force; they retired in good order, followed by the French, but the allies were somewhat surprised and driven out of Barrouilhet; however, being rallied by Hope, they re-took the village.

December 12th. In the morning the outposts became engaged, but after an hour or two of desultory fighting, the French withdrew, and as Wellington thought, to attack Hill.

Hill took up a position with his left in front of the Chateau of Villefranque: his centre near the hamlet of St. Pierre, and his right at Vieux Monguerre.

Soult, leaving three divisions in the entrenched camp on the left bank of the river, moved to the right bank with seven divisions to attack Hill.

During the night the river came down in a flood, and the bridges were carried away.

Hill had 14,000 men in position, and 14 guns.

December 13th. There was a heavy mist at daybreak, under cover of which Soult formed his troops for the assault of Hill's position. Three divisions of D'Erlon's corps were in front; a division was echeloned to the rear on each flank, and two divisions were held in reserve.

The roads were narrow and difficult to move along.

At half-past eight o'clock the allies' picquets in the centre were pushed back, and the position was attacked on both flanks and in the centre by the three leading French divisions. In the centre the British line gave way. Hill, however, seeing this, brought forward a brigade from the reserve, and himself rallied

the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 3rd Buffs, who were retiring somewhat rapidly, and caused them to advance and regain their ground. The 92nd (Gordon) Highlanders, who were behind the hamlet of St. Pierre, being thus again supported, charged the advancing French, who on their approach retreated; the 71st also drove back the French in their front, and thus the allies' centre recovered their position.

The French division opposite the British right was pressing on very hard, and had actually got round the flank. The French division attacking the allies' left had been repulsed.

In this crisis, the bridge of boats having been restored, the 6th division, which had been marching since daybreak, passed the river and appeared at St. Pierre; it was soon followed by the 3rd and 4th divisions, and two brigades of the 7th division; with these troops came Wellington.

Soult now made another attack on the centre, but he was easily repulsed, and likewise the division menacing the allies' right was driven back.

The French now commenced a retreat, and at two p.m. Wellington ordered a general advance, and drove them back to Bayonne and across the Adour, keeping up the fighting until it was dark.

In these operations the total French loss was about 6,000 killed and wounded, and the allies lost about 5,000.

NOTES.—This is a good example of the great advantage of occupying a position on interior lines.

Soult at Bayonne could concentrate and move his force against either wing of the allies before they could be reinforced, having a shorter distance to pass over.

On the 10th December Soult brought 60,000 men against Hope's corps, and the Light division, which did not number more than 30,000, and even this force was separated. It has been thought that if Soult had fallen with all his weight on either, he must have been successful.

On the 13th he brought about 35,000 men to attack Hill, who had not more than 14,000 in position at St. Pierre.

Thus the allies on either side of the river had to resist the attack of a superior French force for many hours before they could be reinforced. The ground certainly is more favourable for defence than attack—especially at that time of year,—but the real cause of failure was that the French had so many young conscripts in their ranks.

Plate 30

BAYONNE
R Adour
Anglet
Bassussary
St Pierre
Ville franche
R Nive
2 Miles

Soult left three divisions in front of Bayonne on the right bank of the river Nive, sent two divisions to reinforce Reille, and passed one division over the Adour, extending it up the right bank of the river to the confluence of the Gave de Pau, so as to protect the navigation, on which his supplies now depended. His magazines were at Dax on the river Adour and Peyrehorade on the river Gave de Pau.

Wellington caused the French so much annoyance on the river, and intercepted so often the supplies coming down the Adour, that Soult, leaving four divisions at Bayonne, moved with the rest of his army to Peyrehorade, from whence he could draw his supplies easier, and at the same time menace the allies' right flank. The weather being unfit for further operations, the two armies remained inactive until February, 1814.

Wellington's plan now was to throw a bridge over the Adour below Bayonne and invest the town, so as to enable him to move against Soult.

February 14th. He moved forward his right to engage the attention of Soult, driving the French across the rivers Bidouze and Gave de Mauleon.

February 22nd. Soult retired to the right bank of the river Gave de Pau, with his head quarters at Orthes.

February 23rd and 24th. After much difficulty the bridge was thrown across the Adour, below the town.

February 26th. Bayonne was invested by Hope's corps, consisting of about 28,000 men.

Wellington now moved forward all his available force against Soult.

February 25th. He pressed the French rear guard into Orthes. The 4th and 7th divisions, under Beresford, were at Peyrehorade, the 3rd, 6th, and Light divisions under Picton, and Hill's corps, (being the 2nd division, and Portuguese), were in front of the town. The 3rd division was moved to Berenx. Soult ordered all his troops to concentrate at Orthes.

February 26th. Beresford, finding the French in front of him had retired, crossed the Gave de Pau, and threw forward his left, so as to gain the Dax road.

Wellington ordered Beresford to move to Baights, and take up a position there for the night.

During the night a bridge was made at Berenx under the cover of Beresford's corps.

Soult did not hear of Beresford's passage of the river until his advanced troops reached Baights, through some miscarriage of dispatches.

He now threw back his right, and took up a position with his left on Orthes and his right above St. Boes, on a ridge of hills partly wooded; the main road from Dax to Orthes ran along his rear.

Reille commanded on the right, D'Erlon in the centre, and Clausel on the left; in all there were about 40,000 men (including 3,000 cavalry) and 40 guns.

February 27th. At daybreak Wellington moved Picton's corps across the river at Berenx, leaving Hill's corps opposite Orthes.

The allied force in front of the French consisted of about 37,000 (4,000 of which were cavalry), and 48 guns.

Battle of Orthes.—(See Plate 31.)

At nine o'clock Wellington commenced his attack on Soult's position.

The 4th division was directed to assail the French right at St. Boes, whilst the 3rd and 6th divisions advanced against the centre; the remainder were kept in reserve about the Roman camp.

The 3rd and 6th divisions, owing to difficulties of ground, could make no progress.

The 4th division was unable to gain any advantage against the French right, and having fought for three hours they gave way.

Wellington, seeing that the French right could not be turned, directed the 3rd and 6th divisions against the French left, and ordered the (52nd) Oxfordshire Light infantry to advance from the Roman camp towards the French position, and attack the

Plate 31


to Dax
R. Luy de Bearn
Sault de Navailles
St Boes
Roman Camp
Barcus
St Baights
Sallospisse
N
R. Gave de Pau
ORTHES
Miles 1 ½ 0 1 2 3
Hill
Souars
to Pau

flank of the French, who were driving the 4th division back from St. Boes. The 52nd advanced through a marsh, unperceived; they gained the enemy's heights, and got in rear of them.

Wellington, observing this advantage, thrust the 7th division into the opening thus made.

The 3rd and 6th divisions were also successful against the French left, and established themselves on the position.

The 3rd and 7th divisions were connected, and the heights thus gained.

When the attack on the French left was commenced, Wellington had sent orders to Hill to cross the river below Orthes, so as to turn the town, and cut off the French retreat by Pau.

Hill crossed by a ford at Souars, drove back the French, and established himself on some heights, which menaced Soult's only remaining line of retreat by Salespice.

Soult, seeing Hill thus posted, gave orders for a general retreat, which he effected in tolerable good order, covered by his reserves.

Hill advanced to cut him off, which caused some confusion amongst the French ranks, but most of them succeeded in getting across the muddy stream of Luy de Bearn, by the bridge at Sault de Nevoilles, which they destroyed after passing.

The pursuit by the rest of the allies was not as vigorous as usual, owing to a wound Wellington had received in the thigh.

The French crossed the Luy de Bearn, with a loss of six guns and about 4,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The allies lost 2,300.

NOTES.—Soult had decided to fall with all his force on the head of the first column of the allies that crossed the river, but Beresford's crossing was unknown to him, and when he found Beresford established at Baights, he feared to weaken his force about Orthes, lest Hill should cross above the town, and intercept his retreat.

The river here prevented Soult from discovering the strength and movements of the allies.

February 28th. Soult arrived at St. Sever, and to some extent reformed his troops.

March 3rd. He moved towards Tarbes, and took up a position covering the high road from Pau to Toulouse.

Wellington remained on the river Adour, with head-quarters at Aire.

March 8th. Beresford was sent to Bordeaux; he entered the town on the 12th, and was well received by the people.

He left the 7th division there under Lord Dalhousie, and rejoined the army with the 4th division.

NOTE:—Whilst Beresford was detached, each commander imagining the other stronger than himself, remained in observation. Wellington thought that Soult had been reinforced, and Soult did not know that Beresford had been sent to Bordeaux.

March 13th. Soult heard of Beresford's march to Bordeaux, and sending off all his sick and baggage to Toulouse, he moved forward offensively towards the allies.

Wellington took up a position in front of the road from Aire to Pau. Soult halted behind the river Gross Lees.

This advance of Soult's was probably an endeavour to make Wellington recall his troops from Bordeaux.

March 16th. The allies prepared to attack Soult, but he (having heard of the submission of Bordeaux) retired to Vic Bigorre

March 19th. He took up a position behind Tarbes.

March 20th. The allies attacked the French, turned their position, and Soult retired to Toulouse, at which place he arrived on the 24th. The allies followed, but having heavy baggage, pontoon train, &c., they did not reach Toulouse until the 27th.

Soult posted his army around Toulouse, and prepared it for defence.

Wellington observed that the south side was most open to attack, and determined to cross the river Garonne above the town.

He massed his centre and left opposite St. Cyprien, and directed Hill to march up the river, and cross it. An attempt was made about six miles from Toulouse, but the pontoons were too short, and it had to be abandoned.

March 31st. A passage was however effected at Pensaguel. Soult sent cavalry to observe Hill's column, together with four divisions under Clausel.

Being unable to get his guns across the river and finding the ground on the right bank very rough and difficult to move over with rapidity, Hill recrossed and rejoined the allied army.

There was so much water in the river that Wellington could not attempt any further operations until April 3rd. On that night he threw a bridge across at Grenade, 15 miles below the town.

The 3rd, 4th and 6th divisions and three brigades of cavalry were passed over under Beresford. The Light division and Spaniards were to have followed but the bridge became damaged.

During this time Soult was strengthening himself about the town.

April 8th. The bridge was again made passable, the water having subsided, and the Spaniards and Portuguese crossed.

Beresford moved up the river Ers to within five miles of Toulouse.

April 9th. A bridge was made over the river Garonne at Seilh, but was not practicable till late in the day.

Soult occupied his positions as follows:—

Reille with two divisions defended St. Cyprien.

Daricau's division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the river to Mount Rave.

Harispe's division was on Mount Rave with its right at St. Sypière.

The remaining divisions were in column in rear.

Wellington decided to attack on the 10th April.

Hill was to menace St. Cyprien.

The 3rd and Light divisions were to advance against the canal and make a feint.

The Spaniards and Portuguese under Freyre were to attack the hill Pujade, and when the 4th and 6th divisions, who were to attack Mount Rave, were in position, they were to advance with them.

Battle of Toulouse.—(See Plate 32.)

April 10th. At 2 a.m. the Light division crossed the river. At 6 a.m. the allies advanced to the attack. The 3rd division, under Picton, and the Light division under Alten, drove back the French advanced troops into the works covering the canal. The Spaniards attacked and took Pujade. The 4th and 6th divisions got into difficult and marshy ground, and were delayed.

Freyre became impatient, and assailed the forts above him on Mount Rave with his Spaniards before Beresford had got into position; they were repulsed, and many jumping into a hollow road 25 feet deep, were shot down by the French.

Picton, also contrary to his instructions, attacked vigorously the bridge of Jumeau, and his division was driven back with a loss of 400 men.

Hill attacked the works at St. Cyprien, but was unsuccessful. All now depended on Beresford, who was advancing slowly under the French fire to his assigned point of attack.

The French having repulsed their enemy from St. Cyprien to Pujade, Soult was enabled to withdraw troops from the former place, and reinforce his right on Mount Rave to meet Beresford.

Seeing the difficulties under which Beresford was advancing, Soult ordered the troops on his right at St. Sypière to leave their positson and attack, at the same time he directed a regiment of cavalry to move forward along the Lavaur road.

The 4th and 6th divisions repulsed this attack, and following the French to the high ground, drove them down the slopes on the other side.

Soult having thus lost his position, threw back his right, so as to cover the bridge Demoiselles.

The French still held on to the forts Augustine and Colombier on the mount.

At half-past two o'clock, Beresford attacked these forts with the 42nd Royal Highlanders, 79th Cameronian Highlanders, supported by the 11th (Devonshire) regiment, and 91st (Suther-


Miles 1 0 1 2
N
R. Ers
S&P
F.D
4 & 6
Canal
3
Pajade
Mount Rave
Augustine
Colombier
to Lavaur
R. Ers
Jumeau B.
R. Garonne
TOULOUSE
St Cyprien
St Sypere
F. Demoiselle
Canal

land and Argyle) Highlanders; they managed to take them, but at a sacrifice of ⅓ths of their strength.

The Spaniards were now again sent to attack the forts above Pujade, but were again repulsed; the Light division was brought up to their support.

It was now 5 o'clock, and Soult, seeing that Beresford was in possession of the greater part of Mount Rave, and that the Light division was coming up to reinforce the Spaniards, withdrew his troops behind the canal, and this ended the battle.

The French lost 5 generals, and 3,000 killed and wounded, and the allies 4 generals, and 4,600 killed and wounded.

Soult sent a messenger to Suchet to tell him of the result of the battle, and suggested that they should join forces on the upper Garonne.

April 11th. The French remained on the defensive, but the allies did not attack them; they had to renew their supplies of ammunition, and make preparations for crossing the canal.

The allied cavalry, however, was sent up the canal to menace the French retreat.

Soult, fearing that he might be shut up in Toulouse, left two generals and 1,000 wounded men in the town, and marched on the night of the 11th. He destroyed the bridges over the canal and upper Ers, and on the 12th reached Ville Franche, which is 22 miles from Toulouse.

Wellington entered Toulouse, and Hill was sent after Soult. On that afternoon two officers arrived from Paris to say that Napoleon had abdicated. Messages were sent to Soult, but he would not believe them, until on the 17th April he received official intimation, when hostilities ceased.

NOTES.—Wellington had a most difficult operation to perform, namely, to pass a broad river in the immediate presence of an enemy of nearly equal strength to his own (the allies were about 50,000 and the French 40,000).

Doubtless one of the reasons why he attempted to pass the river above the town was that he might get in between Soult and Suchet.

The allies were in great danger from the 4th to the 8th April, with half their force across the Garonne, and their bridge broken by the swollen river. It would seem that Soult lost a great opportunity by not attacking Beresford during these four days.

We have here another fatal instance of troops in position leaving it to attack an enemy advancing to attack them. Any counter attack made on an enemy advancing to attack a position should be made by other troops than those placed in the defence of the position, as if the defending troops advance to the attack and are repulsed, they are nearly always sure to retire beyond their position, and it is thus gained by the closely pursuing attackers.

THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

March 20th, 1815. Napoleon, having escaped from captivity, entered Paris, and as the Great Powers refused to negotiate with him in any way, he prepared for war.

The only troops that were in any state of readiness to oppose the French were a force of British, Hanoverians, and Belgians, quickly assembled in Belgium, under Wellington, and a force of Prussians under Blucher, who were hastily brought forward to the French frontier.

Napoleon thought that by defeating these two armies, he might get possession of Belgium, and so gain the line of the river Rhine, which he could hold against his enemies, and thus obtain terms.

The French army that he organized from his veterans was as follows:—

1st corps under D'Erlon, at Lille,
2nd „ „ Reille, at Valenciennes,
3rd „ „ Vandamme, at Mezières,
4th „ „ Gérard, at Metz,
6th „ „ Lobau, at Laon,
Guards under Drouot, at Paris,
Cavalry under Grouchy, between Laon and Avesnes,

in all about 128,000 men, including 20,000 cavalry and 344 guns.

Marshal Soult was chief of the staff.

The allies were formed and posted as follows, under Wellington:—

1st corps under the Prince of Orange at Braine le Compte.	1st British division under Cooke. 3rd „ „ „ Alten. 2nd Dutch-Belgian „ Perponcher. 3rd „ „ Chassé.

2nd corps under Hill at Ath.
- 2nd British division under Clinton.
- 4th „ „ „ Colville.
- 1st Dutch-Belgian „ Stedman.
- The Dutch-Indian Brigade.

3rd corps reserve, under Wellington, at Brussels.
- 5th British division, under Picton.
- 6th „ „ „ Cole.
- Hanoverians, Brunswickers, & Nassau troops, under the Duke of Brunswick.

The cavalry under Lord Uxbridge at Enghien, in all about 106,000 men and 196 guns.

The Prussians under Blucher were:—

1st corps under Ziethen, at Charleroi,
2nd „ „ Pirch, at Namur,
3rd „ „ Thielemann, at Ciney,
4th „ „ Bulow, at Liege,

in all about 117,000 men, and 300 guns. Gneisenau was chief of the staff.

Wellington drew most of his supplies from the sea, Ostend being his port, whereas Blucher drew his supplies from Germany, by Cologne.

Napoleon determined to march on Charleroi, and endeavour to separate the two armies of the allies, driving each back on its base.

June 7th. The French troops began to move.

4th corps, on Philippeville.

Guards and 6th corps on Beaumont.

1st corps, on Valenciennes.

2nd and 3rd corps, on Maubeuge.

Demonstrations being made towards Ostend and Ghent, to deceive Wellington.

June 12th. Napoleon left Paris.

June 14th. He arrived at Beaumont, and his army was in position as follows:—

1st and 2nd corps, on the river Sambre, in front of Beaumont.

4th corps, at Philippeville.

3rd, 6th corps, and Guards, at Beaumont.

Cavalry in front and rear of Beaumont.

The Prussian outposts of the 1st corps, reported this concentration, in consequence of which Blucher moved:

4th corps to Hannut.

2nd „ „ Sombref.

3rd „ „ Namur.

1st corps fell back, engaged with the French advanced guard.

June 15th. Napoleon advanced to Charleroi from Beaumont, the 4th corps moving to Châtelet. Ney arrived at head quarters, and was given command of the 1st and 2nd corps. At 6 p.m. the French reached Lambusart, and the Prussians retired to Fleurus.

On the French left, the 1st and 2nd corps marching on the Brussels road, reached Frasne.

Wellington ordered his 1st corps to move on Nivelles, and the second corps on Enghien.

Battle of Ligny.—(See Plate 33.)

June 16th. The Prussian 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps, concentrated at Ligny, and took up a position there.

1st corps defended Ligny and St. Amand.

2nd corps was formed in a second line between Bry and Sombref.

3rd corps was formed on the left, extending towards Tongrinne.

Their strength was about 80,000 men and 224 guns.

The 4th corps was on the march to join the army, but had not yet come up. Blucher, however, was anxious to make a stand here in order to maintain his communications with Wellington, with whom he had an interview on this morning, and who had agreed to move a force to make a flank attack on the French at 4 o'clock.

Napoleon had about 64,000 men and 218 guns in line opposite the Prussians. He gave orders to Ney to occupy Quatre Bras, drive the English back, and then leaving the 2nd

corps there, to move the 1st corps to the right, and come up on the Prussian right flank. As soon as Ney came into action, he intended to attack Blucher's position.

The 3rd corps was to advance against the Prussian right, and the 4th corps was to attack Ligny, whilst the cavalry were to engage the attention of the Prussian left, and to protect the French right flank.

The Guards were placed at Fleurus, and the 6th corps was coming up on their right.

Napoleon, whilst waiting for his 1st corps to appear, at 3 p.m., heard a severe engagement going on at Quatre Bras, which was about 3½ miles off, so despairing of assistance from Ney, and anxious to attack the Prussians before their 4th corps came up, he ordered his 3rd corps to advance.

St. Amand was carried, upon which Blucher reinforced his right, and retook the village, but it was again retaken by the French.

The French 4th corps now advanced against Ligny, and that village was taken and retaken three times.

At 6 p.m. Blucher further reinforced his right, and again retook St. Amand.

Napoleon sent to Ney for assistance, and his aide-de-camp, as he passed the 1st corps, which was then in reserve to the 2nd corps, informed D'Erlon of Napoleon's message, whereupon he moved his corps to the right so as to come up on the Prussian right, where it appeared about 7 p.m. It had no sooner arrived in sight, however, than D'Erlon received an order from Ney to return forthwith, so that the 1st corps took no part in this battle.

The Prussian reserves were now nearly all engaged; seeing this, Napoleon, at half-past seven o'clock, brought up his Guards to attack on the right of Ligny; by this time the French 6th corps had also come into line.

The Guards crossed the stream at Ligny after a short but sharp action, whereupon the Prussians commenced to retire.

The French lost 6,900 killed and wounded, and the Prussians 15,000, besides 8,000 deserters, as well as 21 guns.

The night was very dark, and pursuit was impossible; the Prussian 3rd corps held Sombref and Point du Jour till the following morning, thus covering the retreat on Wavre.

NOTES.—Napoleon was waiting before he attacked the Prussians for his 1st corps to appear on his left, which would indicate that the British had been driven back, and were being held in check by Ney.

On the other side, Blucher was anxiously looking for his 4th corps, and for the assistance of the British on his right flank.

Blucher expended his reserves in reinforcing St. Amand and Ligny, when attacked by the French 3rd and 4th corps; but, after all the Prussians were engaged, Napoleon had the Guards and 6th corps still in hand; by thrusting these into the Prussian centre at the decisive moment he won the battle. The side which had the last reserves unengaged gained the day.

The position taken up by Blucher was said by Wellington to have been faulty, insomuch that the front line was below the slopes, and could not be reinforced without much exposing the men who were reinforcing; moreover, the 3rd corps was placed in such a position as to be almost useless.

BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.—(See Plate 33.)

At the same time that Napoleon was engaged with the Prussians at Ligny, Ney with the 2nd corps, 17,000 men and 38 guns, advanced against Quatre Bras, which was occupied by the 2nd Dutch-Belgian division, consisting of 7,000 men and 16 guns. Ney's advance commenced at 2 p.m., and it was three o'clock before the allies were reinforced by the 5th British division (Picton) from Brussels. The Duke of Wellington now arrived from his interview with Blucher, and the Duke of Brunswick's corps from Brussels also came into line. The allies now had on the field 20,000 men and 28 guns.

The French at the commencement of the action gained Gemioncourt and the wood of Bossu; they also held Piermont on their right; they were stopped here in their advance by the arrival of Picton's division, which took up a position by the stream. The Duke of Brunswick's corps came up on the British right, and extended the line to the wood of Bossu.

The French made an endeavour to cross the stream. They were driven back by the British, but succeeded in forcing the line opposite the Brunswickers, which somewhat endangered

the right of Picton's division. At 5 p.m. the third British division arrived from Nivelles, and regained the ground on Picton's right.

It was at this time that Ney, seeing the allies were considerably reinforced, sent for the 1st corps to come to his immediate assistance.

At half-past 6 the British 1st division arrived from Nivelles, and were sent into the wood of Bossu, which they cleared, driving back the French.

Ney, finding himself outnumbered, and despairing of assistance from the 1st corps, withdrew his troops to Frasne.

The allies lost 4,700 killed and wounded, and the French 4,400.

Both forces bivouacked on the ground.

NOTE.—By this engagement Wellington was prevented from assisting Blucher at Ligny. Had the 1st corps been available, Ney would probably have gained Quatre Bras, but it would not have been a very important result, as he could scarcely have ventured an advance on Brussels without Napoleon.

June 17th. The Prussian 1st and 2nd corps marched on Wavre by Tilly and Gentinnes, the 3rd corps to Gembloux, where it met the 4th corps, and then moved on Wavre by Walhain.

During the night of the 16th and 17th Wellington was unaware of what had happened to the Prussians at Ligny, the messenger which had been sent to him having been captured by the French; but in the morning, seeing Ney still in position, he knew the French had not been defeated. Shortly after daylight he received a despatch from Blucher, saying he would retreat to Wavre, and assist Wellington, if he would accept battle in front of Brussels.

Wellington immediately ordered a retreat and concentration in front of Waterloo.

Napoleon ordered Grouchy, with the 3rd and 4th corps, in all about 30,000 men, with 96 guns, to follow up the Prussians by the Gembloux road, in which direction he thought they had retreated, to make for the Rhine; and with the 6th corps and Guards he determined to join Ney, and move on Brussels.


to Brussels
Sombref
Point du Jour
to Namur
1st Corps
2nd
Bry
3rd
Tongruine
1st
LIGNY
St Amand
4th
2nd
3rd
Fleurus
6th
Mile 1
0
1
2
to Nivelles
to Brussels
QUATRE BRAS
Wood of Bossu
3rd
5th
to Namur
Gemioncourt
Piermont
to Charleroi
For Scale and N point see above

He did not, however, start on his march till 1 p.m., and the British troops were then well on the road; so, with the exception of a cavalry encounter at Genappe, there was no engagement. In the evening the force under Wellington took up its position in front of Waterloo, and Napoleon halted opposite to them at La Belle Alliance, about one mile off.

It was not till late on this night that Grouchy found out the true direction of the Prussian retreat.

June 18th. At daybreak the Prussian 4th corps moved on St. Lambert, the 1st corps on Ohain, the 2nd corps followed the 4th corps, and the 3rd corps was ordered to remain on the river Dyle, to cover the march.

Battle of Waterloo.—(See Plate 34.)

Wellington occupied the position in front of Waterloo as follows:—

On the extreme right, at Braine le Leud.	3rd Dutch-Belgian Brigade.
Between that and the Nivelles Road.	Part of the 4th and 2nd divisions.
From the Nivelles Road to the Charleroi Road.	1st and 3rd divisions with the German Legion, some of the Guards were in the advanced post of Hougomont, and a part of the German Legion at La Haye Sainte.
From the Charleroi Road *to the left.*	5th division, 2nd Dutch-Belgians and Hanoverians, with some Belgian and Nassau troops in the advanced post of Papelotte.

The extent of ground occupied from right to left was about two miles.

The cavalry formed the 2nd line, and a part of the 6th division were in reserve at Mount St. Jean.

The troops were all concealed behind the slopes.

The right was placed under Lord Hill, and the left under the Prince of Orange.

There were about 68,000 men in position, with 156 guns.

The rest of the army, about 18,000 men, were detached to Hal, to preserve the communications with the sea.

The French were drawn up opposite the allies as follows:—

On the right from Frischermont, to La Belle Alliance.	1st corps.
From La Belle Alliance to the Nivelles road.	2nd corps.

About 300 yards in rear of the 1st line, to the left of the Charleroi road, were 2 divisions of the 6th corps (the other division being with Grouchy).

The cavalry were in rear of the flanks and centre.

The Guards were about 300 yards in rear of the 6th corps, in 4 columns, two on each side of the Charleroi road.

The strength of the French was about 72,000 men, with 246 guns.

The night was wet, and it was not until past 9 a.m. that the weather cleared.

At 10 a.m. Napoleon rode round his troops.

Information was brought to him that there were some Prussian troops at Wavre, and he dispatched a message to Grouchy to march on that place.

His plan of attack was to take Hougomont, which flanked the allies, first, and then advance against the allies' left and centre, so as to drive Wellington off the Brussels road, and get between him and the Prussians.

At 11.30 a.m. the attack on Hougomont by the 2nd corps commenced.

In the centre of the two armies there was an intermediate ridge, and on this Napoleon now massed 80 guns.

The struggle for Hougomont continued for two hours.

Napoleon had hoped that by making this vigorous assault on the allies' right, Wellington would have weakened his centre and left to reinforce this flank, but the British Guards were able to retain possession of their posts without requiring any assistance.

1.30 p.m. Some troops appeared on the heights towards Lambert; these were the Prussian 4th corps. Napoleon sent some cavalry to detain them, and ordered the 1st corps to advance to the attack. Papelotte was taken, but the German legion at La Haye Sainte withstood the assault.

The 2nd Dutch-Belgians now gave way, and the French were only prevented from penetrating the ridge by the 5th division, at the head of which Sir Thomas Picton was killed.

The heavy cavalry under Ponsonby charged these advancing French columns, and put them to rout, but following the infantry too far, they were in their turn charged by the French cavalry, and driven back with the loss of their leader. Whilst this attack was being made, Ney to support the left of the 1st corps, had brought forward a strong column of cuirassiers, and advanced them against the centre of the allied position; they were charged by the Life Guards (Blues) and 1st Royal Dragoon Guards, and were driven back with great loss.

2 p.m. Napoleon, seeing the steady advance of the Prussians, moved the 6th corps, 10,000 strong, to the right, to occupy the ground from Frischermont to the Lasne stream, and at the same time ordered the Guards to take their place.

3 p.m. He ordered 40 squadrons of cavalry to attack the allied centre, and supported them with artillery fire, and 37 more squadrons.

The allied cavalry were completely outnumbered, but the infantry in squares withstood the shock, and the French were obliged to draw off.

About 5 p.m., whilst the cavalry attack was being made, part of the French 1st corps succeeded in capturing La Haye Sainte; meantime the Prussians were steadily advancing, the 4th corps on Planchenoit, and the 1st corps on its right to connect it with the allied left flank.

The French 6th corps was hard pressed, and Napoleon sent 4,000 of the Young Guards to its assistance.

7.30 p.m. He formed up the remainder of his Guards to attack the allied centre. There were 12 battalions, formed into three columns.

1st column of four battalions moved against the right centre of the allied position.

2nd column of six battalions to the east of Hougomont, and the third column was in reserve. The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery fire.

The 1st column reached the summit of the ridge at that part which was occupied by the British Guards, who, after delivering a volley at a few yards' distance, charged the French Guards, and drove them in confusion down the hill.

The 2nd column approached the summit opposite the 3rd division, and being taken in flank and charged in front by Adams's brigade, was also repulsed.

The allies then advanced, and the French throughout abandoned the field.

The French Guards held Planchenoit till about 8 p.m., and then all fled in confusion, pursued by the Prussians.

The British and Belgians lost about 15,000 men in killed and wounded, the Prussians 7,000, and the French, including prisoners, must have lost about 30,000.

Grouchy had marched from Gembloux at 7 a.m. upon Sart-a-Walhaim, and having ascertained for certain that the Prussians had retired on Wavre, he directed his own march thither; he arrived there at 4 p.m., and immediately engaged the Prussian 3rd corps.

It was not till 7 p.m. that Grouchy received the despatch sent from La Belle Alliance at 1 p.m., informing him of the Prussian advance on the French flank, and urging him to move to Napoleon's assistance; he then proceeded up the river Dyle, and crossed the stream at Limale; he succeeded in driving back the Prussians, but the engagement continued till midnight.

At daybreak Grouchy again attacked the Prussian 3rd corps, and drove them back towards Louvain.

At 11 a.m. he received the intelligence of Napoleon's defeat, and therefore retreated on Namur.

NOTES.—Napoleon's great desire in attacking Wellington at Waterloo was to defeat his left, and drive him off the Brussels road, back on to the sea, so as to separate him well from the Prussians. He had no idea that the

Plate 34.


WATERLOO
to Brussels
to Louvain
to Wavre
Mont St. Jean
G.D.B.
Braine le Leud
Papelotte
Frischermont
La Haie Sainte
Hougoumont
La Belle Alliance
Lasne Stream
Planchenoit
N
2
9
to Nivelles
to Charleroi
1 2 0 1 2 3 Miles

Prussians had marched on Wavre in such force; indeed, his firm belief was that they had retired towards Liege, their natural base, and that Grouchy was pursuing them; if such had been the case the delay in commencing the attack would have been of no consequence, and every hour of sunshine after the rain ceased made the ground more favourable for his cavalry and artillery to operate.

It was necessary before attacking the allies' left to carry Hougomont, which flanked the front. Napoleon also thought, by attacking this vigorously, he might cause Wellington to reinforce his right, and thus weaken his left and centre and also absorb his reserves, as Blucher had done at Ligny; but in this he was disappointed; when the Prussians appeared on his flank he made a desperate effort to break the allies' centre, the extreme left being rather too near the Prussians to attack.

The columns of Guards seem to have been in too deep a formation, for they were easily outflanked by the British lines.

Most critics think that Napoleon, when he saw the Prussians appearing on his flanks, should have broken off the engagement and retired, so as to rejoin with Grouchy.

June 19th. The Prussians continued to pursue the French, and when the infantry could march no longer, Blucher put drummers on horses, and sent them forward with the cavalry, so that any bodies of French infantry who might make a stand against the cavalry when they heard the infantry drums should resume their flight.

Soult rallied a small force at Laon.

The allies marched on Paris by the valley of the Oise.

Napoleon went to Paris, and, unable to appease the "Representatives," he abdicated on the 22nd June.

June 25th. Soult and Grouchy joined forces at Soissons. Grouchy was appointed to command by the Provisional Government at Paris, Soult therefore left the army.

June 28th-29th. Grouchy reached Paris, and the allies arrived in front of it.

July 7th. The French surrendered, and the allies made their triumphal entry into the capital.

NOTES.—Napoleon, in this campaign, formed his troops, as usual, with two wings and a main body. His plan was to separate his adversaries' forces, detain one whilst he was defeating the other, and when one was beaten, turn his weight on to the other. He concentrated his troops in the centre of the allied line, advanced into their midst, sent Ney, with the 1st and 2nd corps, to detain the allies at Quatre Bras, whilst with the 3rd and 4th corps, reinforced by the 6th corps and Guards, he attacked the Prussians at Ligny. Then,

having defeated the Prussians, he sent his right wing in pursuit, and with his main body reinforced his left wing, and engaged the allies at Waterloo.

His plan failed because his right wing did not detain the Prussians as he intended. Napoleon took for granted that after Ligny they would be compelled, from want of supplies, &c., to retire towards the Rhine, via Liege; and he seems to have neglected to reconnoitre, so as to ascertain the true direction of their retreat, which was a most unusual want of precaution for him.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, 1849.

Austria was in possession of Lombardy and Venetia, ceded to her by the treaties of 1815.

In 1848 an insurrection broke out in Venice and Milan, and Charles Albert, the King of Sardinia, marched with his army to assist the insurgents.

Field-Marshal Count Radetzky was in command of the Austrian forces in the north of Italy. Not feeling himself strong enough to meet the Sardinians, he retired into the Quadrilateral* to await reinforcements.

In May, 1848, he attempted to advance, but at Goito on the 27th he was repulsed, and had to retreat to his fortresses.

In July he advanced again, and at Custozza, on the 26th, he succeeded in defeating King Charles Albert, who had to retire in confusion upon Milan.

August 6th. Milan was evacuated by the Sardinians, they recrossed the river Ticino, which was the frontier; and on the 9th an armistice was concluded. Peace, however, could not be arranged, and on the 20th March, 1849, hostilities were again renewed.

The Sardinians numbered 85,000 and 150 guns.

The King not feeling any confidence in his own powers, and not putting any trust in his own generals, engaged the services of a Pole named Chrzanowsky as his adviser, much to the disgust of the entire army.

They were formed in 7 divisions:

1st division	under	Durando	was	at Vespolate and Vigevano.
2nd „	„	Bes	„	Cerano and Casalnuovo.
3rd „	„	Perrone	„	Romentino.

* The four fortresses Peschiera, Verona, Mantua, and Legnago are commonly known by the name of "the Quadrilateral."

4th division under Duke of Genoa was at Trecate.
5th „ „ Ramorino „ La Cava.
6th „ „ La Marmora was on the right bank of the Po observing Piacenza.

Reserve under Duke of Savoy, near Novara.

The Austrian army under the command of Radetzky (who had fought at Marengo as a colonel on the staff) was in position as follows:—

1st corps under Wratislaw
2nd „ „ D'Aspre
3rd „ „ Appel
4th „ „ Thurn
5th „ „ Wocker
} between Turbigo and Pavia.

6th „ „ Haynau blockading Venice (which was in the hands of the insurgents), and in securing the lines of communication.

In all there were about 90,000 men with 200 guns.

The Sardinians took the offensive, and their plan was to march on Milan.

The Austrian general also had determined to take the offensive, and his objective point was Turin.

To carry out their respective designs they both concentrated on their left flanks.

March 20th. The Austrians crossed the river Ticino at Pavia by 3 bridges, two of which were military.

The Sardinian 5th division, which had been left by the King at La Cava, was moved across the river Po to Casatisma by Ramorino, and so the Austrians passed the river unopposed.

N.B.—Ramorino stated that he had received information that the Austrians were moving along the right bank of the river Po on Alexandria; after the war he was tried by court-martial for thus acting; he was condemned and shot. Whether he acted from false information or treacherously, being jealous of Chrzanowsky, seems to be doubtful.

On the night of the 20th the Austrians were in position as follows:—

4th corps at La Cava, and occupying the bridge heads over the river Po to prevent the Sardinians from recrossing.

1st and 2nd corps at Zerbolo.
3rd „ Gropello.
5th „ Pavia.

The Sardinian 4th division crossed the river Ticino at San Martino, and its vanguard moved on Magenta, but as no Austrians were visible the advance was not continued. At 8 p.m. it was reported that the Austrians had crossed at Pavia and that Ramorino was absent from his post. Chrzanowsky decided to concentrate and take up a position facing S.E. about Mortara, the Sardinian 2nd division was moved to Vigevano and the 1st towards Mortara.

March 21st. The Sardinian reserve joined the 1st division and they took up a position in front of Mortara. La Marmora was sent to command. The 2nd division was joined by the 3rd and 4th divisions, and they took up a position in front of Vigevano.

The Austrians advanced on Mortara.

The first corps by Gambolo.

The 2nd, 3rd, and 5th corps by Garlasco.

And the 4th corps by St. Giorgio.

The 1st corps became engaged at Gambolo and had to retire. On this report reaching Radetzky, he pushed forward the 2nd corps, and at 5 o'clock they attacked the Sardinians, forced their centre, drove them back, and entered the town of Mortara, which was occupied by two battalions; during the night La Marmora attacked the town, but without success, and had to retreat on Novara and Robbio.

In these engagements the Sardinians lost 2,000 prisoners, 500 killed and wounded, and 5 guns. The Austrians lost 300 killed and wounded.

March 22nd. The Sardinian army concentrated at Novara unopposed.

The Austrian corps marched forward as follows:—

1st corps to Civalegna.

2nd, 3rd, and 5th corps towards Novara, by Vespolate.

4th corps to Robbio.

Battle of Novara.—(See plate 35.)

March 23rd.. Chrzanowsky took up a position, with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th divisions and the reserve, consisting of about 55,000 men, and 111 guns, on a plateau about 1½ miles in front of Novara.

The vanguard of the Austrian main body came upon the Sardinian outposts at about 9 a.m. and drove them in.

The 2nd corps arrived at eleven o'clock, and immediately attacked La Bicocca, a village in the centre of the Sardinian position, which they carried, but the Sardinian 3rd division, which was posted here, was reinforced by the 4th division, and recaptured the post. The Austrian 2nd corps was at present without support, but Chrzanowsky failed to take advantage of this rashness on the part of D'Aspre, in attacking the whole Sardinian army with his single corps, and allowed the Austrians to remain in front of him for two hours without making any counter-attack. D'Aspre, finding the Sardinians did not assume the offensive, again assaulted La Bicocca.

It was four o'clock before the Austrian 3rd corps arrived, and reinforced the 2nd, which had already been five hours engaged.

Radetzky now reached the field, and forbade any further advance or attack until the arrival of the other corps.

The Sardinians still remained exclusively on the defensive.

At five o'clock the Austrian 5th corps had closed up on the Mortara-Novara road, and the 4th corps was coming up on the left flank.

Radetzky now felt himself strong enough to make an attack.

The 2nd and 3rd corps, supported by part of the 5th corps, were advanced to the attack of La Bicocca, whilst the rest of the 5th corps were deployed to the left to keep the Sardinian 1st and 2nd divisions engaged. As the Austrians assaulted La Bicocca, Chrzanowsky ordered the divisions on his right to advance. These divisions drove back the Austrian single line here, but La Bicocca was carried.

The Duke of Genoa made a desperate effort to retake the village, but did not succeed.

Plate 35


to Vercelli
NOVARA
R. Agogna
Canal
Canal
to Trecate
R. Tordoppio
Bicocca
to Mortara
1 0 1 2 3 Miles

The Sardinian 3rd and 4th divisions were in full retreat on Novara, and the Austrians followed them.

The Austrian 4th corps came up and took the Sardinian 1st and 2nd divisions in flank, and compelled them to retreat also.

The Austrian cavalry pursued the Sardinians to the gate of Novara, and Radetzky bivouacked his troops on the field of battle.

The Sardinians lost 4,000 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, and 12 guns.

The Austrians lost about 3,000 killed and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners.

Charles Albert asked for an armistice, which was granted on the 24th March. He abdicated, and the Duke of Savoy was proclaimed king.

Peace was concluded, and Austria re-occupied the territory that was ceded to her in 1815.

NOTES.—Each army concentrated on its left flank for the same purpose, namely, of invading the enemy's territory; but there was this difference: the Sardinian line of communications ran towards the Austrian's, whereas the Austrian's ran away from the Sardinians' advance. Both armies changed front for action to their right flank; the Sardinians were defeated, and had to capitulate, the Austrians being on their line of communication. Had the Austrians been defeated they would probably have been able to make good their retreat on their base.

The position taken up by Chrzanowsky in front of Novara is considered to have been good. The Austrian commander of the 2nd corps (D'Aspre) was indeed rash to have attacked the Sardinians at La Bicocca, the key of the position, single-handed, more especially as he must have known that the corps following was five hours behind him. It seems unaccountable that the Sardinians should have allowed him to remain in front of them for such a time without making some effort to dislodge him. It was not until all the Austrian corps had arrived on the field, and preparations had been made for the assault of La Bicocca by Radetzky with the main body of his force, that Chrzanowsky thought of making a counter attack.

Then it was too late, and it would have been better, had his 1st and 2nd divisions remained in position until the attack on La Bicocca had taken place and been decided.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, 1859.

Austria still occupied Venetia and Lombardy, as arranged by treaty in 1815; and Sardinia's constant ambition was to form a united Italy under Victor Emmanuel, their king. With this object in view they had taken part in the Crimean war, and thereby become the allies of England and France.

They now saw an opportunity of obtaining the assistance of France to make war upon Austria.

War was declared on the 29th April, 1859.

The Austrian army consisted of about 99,000 men and 264 guns, under the command of Gyulai, and was divided into corps as follows:—

1st corps was under Count Gallas.
2nd „ „ Liechtenstein.
3rd „ „ Schwarzenberg.
5th „ „ Stadion.
7th „ „ Zobel.
8th „ „ Benedek.

The Sardinian army, under the King Victor Emmanuel, was formed into five divisions, and numbered in all about 62,000 men, with 90 guns.

The French, under the command of the Emperor Napoleon III., consisted of—

Guards, under Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely.
1st corps under Baraguay d'Hilliers.
2nd „ „ MacMahon.
3rd „ „ Canrobert.
4th „ „ Niel.
5th „ „ Prince Napoleon.

Their strength was about 125,000 men, with 312 guns.

The French were not in Italy when war was declared, so at first the Austrians had the advantage in point of numbers.

The Austrian army, therefore, took the offensive, and crossed the river Ticino on the 30th April.

May 2nd. They were on the river Sesia, with their right about Vercelli, and their left thrown back along the river Po.

May 3rd. The Sardinians concentrated between Casale and Novi.

The French were advancing, but they were several marches in rear. On May 2nd the 3rd corps reached Turin; the 4th corps was coming over Mount Cenis; and the 1st, 2nd, and 5th corps and Guards disembarked at Genoa.

The plan of the Austrians was to engage the Sardinians before the French could come up, and orders were sent from Vienna to this effect, but on May 4th the Austrians had not moved. On that day the 8th corps crossed the river Po, supported by the 2nd corps, and advanced to Voghera and Tortona, meeting with no opposition. Here Benedek destroyed the railway bridges, and retired.

May 7th. The Austrians concentrated about Vercelli (having given up the Sardinians without even discovering their position), and moved on Turin. The 8th corps was left at Lomello to observe the river Po.

A brigade of the 7th corps detached to Casale had a skirmish with the Sardinians.

A brigade was also sent to Piacenza under Urban.

May 8th. The Austrians continued their advance on Turin without opposition.

May 9th. It was reported that the French were moving from Turin, *via* Alessandria, on Piacenza, which caused the Austrians to countermarch, move on Lomello, and again observed the passages of the river Sesia.

May 12th. Napoleon arrived at Genoa.

May 14th. He was at Alessandria with all his troops at hand.

Thus the Austrians wasted their time and lost their opportunity of attacking the Sardinians before the French arrived.

May 18th. The Austrians abandoned Vercelli, destroying the railway bridge, and threw back their right to Palestro.

May 20th. Gyulai ordered a reconnaissance in force to be made to discover the enemy's position. About 18,000 men crossed the river, and came on the French at Montebello. They were about 8,500 men, under Forey. An engagement here took place, and the Austrians, after losing 1,300 men, retired without gaining any information as to the position of the allies.

The French in this action lost about 700 men.

May 23rd. The French moved forward to Casteggio, and their rear closed up.

The Sardinians occupied the line of the river Sesia, and a force crossed at Vercelli.

The French plan was to move to the left, and turn the Austrian right flank.

May 28th. A feint was made by the French of throwing a bridge over the river Po, so as to deceive Gyulai, whilst the rear corps moved up towards Vercelli.

May 30th. The Sardinians, under the King, supported by the French 3rd corps, having crossed the river Sesia at Vercelli, moved on Palestro, and driving back the Austrians, established themselves there.

May 31st. Advanced guards were pushed on to Robbio and Mortara, and the French concentrated at Vercelli.

June 1st. The French 2nd, 4th corps, and Guards, having crossed the river, took up a position at Novara. The 1st corps was at Vercelli, and the 5th corps on the lines of communication. The Austrians concentrated 100,000 men at Mortara.

June 2nd. The Austrians moved on A Grasso (this was a forced march made in twenty-four hours): The French 1st corps closed up, Turbigo was seized, and the river Ticino bridged.

June 3rd. The Austrians were allowed to move without interference, and the French 3rd corps and Sardinians were brought to Novara, the force there being moved towards the river Ticino; San Martino was also occupied by the French, it having been evacuated by the Austrians, who retired on Magenta.

Mac Mahon, with the 2nd corps and part of the Guards,

crossed the river Ticino and the canal at Turbigo, driving back the Austrians there.

June 4th. The Austrians were in position as follows:—

1st, 2nd, 7th corps and cavalry at Magenta.

3rd corps at A Grasso.

5th and 8th corps somewhat south, and another corps, the 9th, had reached Pavia, and was coming up.

Reports of the Austrians' occupation of Magenta reached the Emperor Napoleon.

MacMahon, with the 2nd corps and part of the Guards, was ordered to march down on the Austrians' right flank.

The Sardinians were to follow MacMahon as a support, and the rest of the Guards, the 3rd and 4th corps were to attack at Boffalora and Ponte di Magenta when MacMahon became engaged.

Count Clam, who commanded the Austrians at Magenta, had taken up a position behind the canal and in front of the town.

Battle of Magenta.—(See Plate 36.)

About 2 p.m. MacMahon came into action, whereupon the Guards advanced over the bridge at Boffalora and took the village on the heights. Ponte di Magenta was also occupied by them. MacMahon was checked by the Austrians advancing between his two divisions, and he was obliged to withdraw his right division to unite it to his left. The French 3rd corps also had difficulty in coming up on account of the roads; the Guards at Boffalora and Ponte di Magenta, therefore, had to remain for some hours unsupported, and the Austrians succeeded in retaking Ponte di Magenta.

The Austrian 3rd corps now advanced from A Grasso against the French right flank, on both sides of the canal.

About 6 p.m. the French 3rd corps and a part of the 4th arrived at the scene of action. About the same time, MacMahon, having reformed his corps, commenced the attack on Magenta. The Austrians endeavoured to separate his divisions by attacking his centre again; but this time he was here supported by the Guards. He threw forward his flanks, and after a desperate


Canal
Marcalle
Buffalora
MAGENTA
Ponte di Magenta
Rebecco
R Ticino
N
Miles

fight which lasted till 8 p.m., the Austrians retired and gave up the village.

During this action the Austrian 5th corps came up to reinforce the 2nd and 7th corps, and at about the same time the Austrian 3rd corps were again driven out of Ponte di Magenta, and being defeated, they drew off to Robecco.

June 5th. The Austrians retired, covered by an attack on Magenta by their 5th corps.

The French and Sardinians lost about 4,500 men killed and wounded, and the Austrians nearly 10,000.

NOTES.—It seems difficult to understand why the Austrians' original plan of attacking the Sardinian army before the French arrived to support it was not attempted, unless it was that defective organisation hampered their movements. The plan adopted by the French in moving to their left flank and thus leaving their communications open to their enemy, has been condemned by many critics, but it gained the object for which it was intended—namely, in causing the Austrians to retire.

The Austrians' flank march on Magenta seems to have been well conceived, but badly carried out. MacMahon's flank attack is said to have been a surprise. The battle was lost by the Austrians from want of proper support. MacMahon does not appear to have been in communication with the Emperor. When his guns first opened, the Emperor thought it was time to make the front attack, but MacMahon was not really ready to advance. Finding his centre threatened he withdrew to reform on his left. It would have seemed more natural to have closed on his right, but no doubt he had good reasons for adopting the former course.

By thus coming hurriedly into action he deceived the Emperor, and had no telegraph to inform him of what had taken place. This might have proved very disastrous to the French, and probably would have done so with a more enterprising enemy. We have here an example of the great use of field telegraphy.

The Austrians retreated without being pursued by the French, abandoning Pavia, Milan, and Piacenza.

June 7th. The allies occupied Milan.

June 8th. A small action occurred at Melegnano, after which the Austrians retired without any further engagement.

June 21st. They crossed the River Mincio, and took up positions within the Quadrilateral to re-organise.

June 23rd. The allies having advanced slowly were in position as follows:—

The Sardinians on the left at Lonato.

The French 1st corps, Guards, and 2nd corps about Castiglione.

The French 4th and 3rd corps about Medola.

The Austrians, having reformed their troops into two armies, recrossed the River Mincio, and took up positions as follows:—

2nd Army. 8th corps at Pozzolengo, 5th and 7th corps from Madonna d. Scoperta to S. Cassiano, having Solferino in the centre, 1st corps in reserve about Carviana.

1st Army. 3rd and 9th corps prolonged the line to the left as far as the Medola road, 11th corps in reserve, 2nd corps was sent from Mantua to turn the French right flank.

Battle of Solferino.—(See Plate 37).

June 24th. The French advanced to the attack as follows:—Sardinians on the left, to turn the Austrian right flank, French 1st corps on Solferino, 2nd corps in the centre, 4th corps on the right, Guards in support in rear of the 2nd corps, and the 3rd corps echeloned to the right rear, the cavalry were in rear of the 4th corps.

The French 1st corps to attack Solferino (which is the highest point on these hills, and on which is a chateau, a cemetery, and a tower), moved somewhat to the left, so as to get round the height, and thus left a gap between them and the 2nd corps, to fill up this the Guards were brought forward into the front line, and thus took part in the attack on the hill.

There was also a space between the 2nd and 4th corps, for Niel had moved on Guidizzolo, to attack the Austrians posted there, this interval was filled up by the cavalry.

The height at Solferino was carried, and MacMahon advanced against Cassiano; the 4th corps reinforced by the 3rd corps on its right also advanced on the position. The Austrians were defeated throughout the line, and they again retired, unpursued, into the Quadrilateral.

The Austrians had about 160,000 men engaged, and lost 13,000 killed and wounded. The allies had about 135,000 men in the field, and lost about 14,400 killed and wounded.

July 1st. The allies advanced, crossed the river Mincio, and invested Peschiera.


8
Pozzolengo
Madonna
di Scoperta
Castiglione
9
1
5
SOLFERINO
2
7
S. Cassiano
Cavriana
4
3
3
N
Medole
9
11
Guidizzolo
1 2 0 1 2 3 Miles

July 3rd. The 5th corps joined the French army. At the same time the French fleet had arrived in the Adriatic, and were ready to attack Venice.

Under these circumstances the Austrians sued for peace, which was arranged and signed at Villafranca.

NOTES.—The Sardinian turning movement was kept in check by the Austrian 8th corps, and did not assist much in the result of the battle. The key of the position was Solferino, and when this was taken the battle was lost to the Austrians.

The allies opened out when advancing to the attack, the reserve had to be employed in filling up the gaps thus left, and became engaged in the first assaults.

The space between the 2nd and 4th corps was only occupied by cavalry; it would appear that the Austrians might have driven them back without difficulty, and made counter attacks on the flanks of the 2nd and 4th corps with considerable effect, the French having no troops in reserve to bring against them. This would have relieved the attack on Solferino.

The new French rifle guns in this battle did great execution.

THE PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN WAR, 1866.

The real object of the war was to decide who should have the supremacy in the German Confederation.

The Confederation had existed since 1815, and Austria had always assumed the lead, the Emperor considering himself as Emperor over the Confederation.

For many years Prussia had shown a decided reluctance to be considered in any way subordinate to Austria, and since the present King had been on the Prussian Throne, with Bismark as Chancellor, affairs of state between the two countries had become very strained.

June 14th. The German Diet met to discuss the question of disarming, &c.—really supremacy. With Austria were Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg, Hesse Cassel, Hesse Darmstadt, and other minor states.

With Prussia were Baden, Luxembourg, Saxe Weimar, Saxe Coburg, and some others.

The Diet broke up and virtually internal war was proclaimed among its members.

The strength of the Austrian army was about 380,000, with upwards of 1,000 guns.

Bavaria	had	58,000	and 96	guns.
Saxony	„	23,000	„ 70	„
Hanover	„	22,000	„ 50	„
Wurtemberg	„	18,000	„ 44	„
Hesse Cassel	„	10,000	„ 22	„
Hesse Darmstadt	„	8,500	„ 24	„

The Prussians had 8 army corps, consisting of about 31,000 men in each, and the Guards corps which had 36,000 men The total strength, therefore, was about 284,000 men with 864 guns.

The States which sided with Prussia furnished about 28,600 men.

Italy now saw a chance of extending her territory by gaining Venetia, and accordingly made an alliance with Prussia. Her army consisted of about 240,000 men and 480 guns.

On the 14th June, the armies were in position as follows:—

Prussians: 1st army, under Prince Frederick Charles.

2nd army corps *	At Heyerswerda and Gorlitz.
3rd „	
4th „	
Cavalry corps, 15 regiments	

2nd army under the Crown Prince.

Guards' corps	In Silesia.
1st army corps	
5th „	
6th „	
Cavalry corps, 7 regiments	

3rd Army under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld.

7th army corps (14th division only)	On the River Elbe.
8th „	
Cavalry corps, 3 regiments	

Reserve Landwehr, under General Mülbe, at Berlin.

The other division of the 7th corps, under General von Manteuffel, was sent to operate against Hanover. Other troops of various States, under General von Falkenstein, were posted about Wetzlar and Minden.

The Austrian troops, in Austria, were placed under the command of Field Marshal von Benedek, and were organised in seven corps.

1st corps, under Count Clam Gallas, at Prague.
2nd „ „ Count Thun Hohenstadt, at Olmütz.
3rd „ „ Archduke Ernst, at Brünn.
4th „ „ Count Festetics, at Teschen.

* Each army corps consisted of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a military train. Each infantry division consisted of two brigades, each brigade of two regiments, each regiment of three battalions, each battalion had 1,000 men, divided into four companies. Each division had also a regiment of cavalry attached to it, and four batteries of artillery. A cavalry division consisted of two brigades, each brigade of two regiments, and each regiment of four squadrons (140 men per squadron). Each brigade had one battery of horse artillery attached to it.

6th corps, under Baron Ramming, at Olmütz.
8th „ „ Archduke Leopold, at Brünn.
10th „ „ Count Gablenz, at Böhmisch Trübau.

The army of the south was under the command of Archduke Albrecht, and consisted of 5th, 7th, and 9th corps, two of which were in Venetia, and one was held in reserve.

The Italians had four army corps.

1st corps, under the command of Giovanni Durando, at Lodi.
2nd „ „ „ Cuchiari, at Cremona.
3rd „ „ „ Della Rocca, at Piacenza.
4th „ „ „ Cialdini, at Bologna.

The Saxon army was at Dresden and Pirna; the Hanovarian army was unprepared at Hanover; the Bavarian army, under Prince Charles, was between Bamberg and Wurzburg, and the troops of the other States, who sided with Austria (with which were those of Baden, who were compelled to join unwillingly) in all about 58,000 and 114 guns, were at Frankfort under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse.

June 15th. The Hanoverians moved to Gottingen, and on the two following days Falkenstein entered Hanover.

June 18th. Manteuffel reached Hanover.

June 19th. General Beyer, with 17,000 Prussians, entered Cassel, the troops of that State having joined the army at Frankfort.

June 15th. The Prussian 1st and 3rd armies entered Saxony, and reached Dresden on the 18th unopposed. The Saxon army retired into Bohemia.

The Prussian outposts were pushed forward, and by the 20th June the Prussians were in full possession of Saxony, except the fortress of Königstein.

The 1st and 3rd armies were moved towards Bohemia, and the reserved corps was brought up to Dresden from Berlin.

Field-Marshal von Benedek had intended to invade Prussia through Saxony, but the Prussian movements had been too quick for him to carry out his design. The Austrian army was at Brünn and Olmütz, and could not be concentrated in time to defend the line of the Iron Mountains. Benedek decided there-

fore to hold the Prussian 2nd army in check at the mountain passes from Silesia, and with the rest of his force fall upon the 1st and 3rd armies as they issued from Saxony.

With this object in view, the Austrian 1st corps and Saxons, under Count Clam Gallas, were posted on the left bank of the river Iser, about Münchengratz; the 4th and 8th corps at Josephstadt; the 10th and 6th corps towards the Silesian frontier; the 3rd corps at Pardubitz; and the 2nd corps at Böhmisch Trübau.

The Prussian plan was to march the 1st army by Zittau and Gorlitz, over the mountains to Reichenberg, and the 3rd army by Neustadt to Gabel, pass the river Iser, and unite with the 1st army about Gitschin. The 2nd army from Landshut and Glatz, was to pass over the mountains at Trautenau and Nachod, gain the right bank of the river Elbe, and thus get into connection with the other two armies. The 2nd army, having the most difficult task to perform, was made the strongest, and was to pass the mountains four days later than the 1st and 3rd armies, in order that these might occupy the attention of the Austrians, and thus relieve the 2nd army during its passage. Moreover, in order to cause the Austrian commander uncertainty, the Crown Prince was directed to manœuvre two of his corps southwards, and make a reconnaissance towards Olmütz. Finally, General Mülbe, with the reserve, was to move forward and occupy the passes in the Iron Mountains.

June 22nd. The 1st army reached Zittau, and on 23rd and 24th Reichenberg, the 3rd army, on these days arrived at Gabel. Count Clam Gallas concentrated his troops at Münchengratz, with an advanced brigade at Liebenau.

June 26th. The Prussian advanced guard engaged this Austrian brigade, and drove it back to the village of Podol, on the river Iser, where it took up a position to defend the bridge. The Prussians pushed on at eight o'clock in the evening, and, fighting desperately all night, gained the bridge at 4 a.m., 27th. The Austrians retiring towards Münchengratz.*

* At this action was first observed the great superiority of the breech-loader over the muzzle-loader: the Austrians lost five to the Prussian one.

The Prussians also occupied Turnau unopposed, the Austrians having burnt the bridge and retired.

June 28th. Prince Frederick Charles crossed the river and moved down the left bank against the Austrians, who were in position at Münchengratz, whilst the third army marched on the bridge at that town. After a slight resistance the Austrians retired and took up a position at Gitschin.

June 29th. Prince Frederick Charles advanced by three roads from the river to Gitschin, and attacked the Austrians along their entire line; he took the position, and they retired by Horitz on Königgratz.

June 30th. He sent cavalry to his left flank and communicated with patrols from the Crown Prince's army at Arnau and Königinhof.

The Crown Prince's movements in Silesia were as follows:—

1st corps marched on Trautenau, the 5th corps on Nachod, and the Guards were kept in the centre at Braunau, somewhat to the rear to reinforce either corps.

The 6th corps, after making demonstrations to the south towards Olmütz, countermarched to Reinerz, so as to support the 5th corps. The army was to wheel to the left on Nachod, so that the right should join Prince Frederick Charles.

June 26th. The Austrian 10th corps was at Pilnikau, 4th corps at Königinhof, 6th corps at Skalitz, the 8th and 2nd corps were at Josephstadt, and the 3rd corps at Böhmisch Trübau.

June 27th. The Prussian first corps found the enemy in position at Trautenau. They attacked, but the Austrians were reinforced from Pilnikau, and the Prussians had to retreat.

The Prussian Guards were then brought forward to Eypel.

June 28th. They crossed the river Aupa at daylight with a view of attacking the Austrian 10th corps, which moved to Burgersdorf; the Austrian 4th corps was advancing from Königinhof to join it. A division of the Prussian Guards under General Alvensleben, however, attacked the 10th corps at Burgersdorf before the Austrian 4th corps had arrived, and at a great sacrifice of life carried the position. Two battalions of the guards detached to the right towards Trautenau, kept in

check an Austrian brigade which had been sent to attack the Prussian flank during the engagement. The 2nd division of the guards came to their assistance, and the Austrians were driven back. They retired on Königinhof, covered by a brigade of their 4th corps at Soor.

The Prussian 1st corps now occupied Trautenau.

June 29th. The Prussian Guards advanced to Königinhof, and the Austrians retired; the Prussian 1st corps was brought forward to Pilnikau, and on the following day was advanced to Arnau.

June 30th. The Austrian 2nd corps now moved up towards Königinhof to assist the 4th and 10th, but it was too late, the Prussian Guards were already in possession of that place.

The Prussian 5th corps had only one road by which to march, and extended, with its baggage, over twenty miles, the troops alone occupied half that distance.

The Austrian 6th and 8th corps were directed to oppose the advance of this column.

June 27th. The Prussians arrived at Nachod and found the pass in possession of the Austrian 6th corps, they attacked and cleared it. Several brilliant cavalry charges took place here, in which the Prussians were successful. The Austrians retired on Skalitz.

June 28th. General Steinmetz, with the Prussian 5th corps and a brigade of the 6th corps, advanced on Skalitz, found the Austrians in position there, attacked them and drove them back.

June 29th. The Prussian 5th corps joined the Guards at Königinhof, driving the Austrians back towards Josephstadt.

June 30th. The 6th corps closed up and took up their position on the left of the 5th corps at Gradlitz, the Prussian 1st corps then moved forward.

NOTES.—Benedek had a great strategical advantage over the Prussians. He could have held one force in check, prevented its passing over the mountains, whilst he brought an overwhelming force to bear on the other. This was his plan, but he was unable to execute it.

He determined to hold the Crown Prince in check, and attack Prince Frederick Charles. He would probably have done better if he had endeavoured to detain Prince Frederick Charles and attack the Crown Prince, as, had he tried his plan and been unsuccessful, he would have had the Crown Prince on his flank and line of communication.

The passing of the Prussians over these mountains was a somewhat hazardous manœuvre, but Benedek seems to have lost all his opportunities of successfully opposing them. It is said that the commissariat arrangements were so bad, that the Saxons and the 1st corps, under Clam Gallas, had not had anything to eat for twenty-four hours before Podol and Münchengratz. Perhaps this is why Benedek did not send any more corps to assist at Gitschin.

The Austrian corps which were sent to detain the Crown Prince did not occupy the tops of the passes, but only the entrances into Bohemia; they also appear to have neglected to oppose the advance of the Guards at Eypel.

June 30th. Benedek ordered a concentration at Königgratz, which was not completed until July 2nd.

July 1st. Prince Frederick Charles advanced the 7th and 8th corps to Smidar, the 4th corps to Horitz, the 3rd corps to Miletin, and held the 2nd corps in reserve in rear of the 3rd and 4th corps.

July 2nd. The Prussians halted, and the King, with Field-Marshal von Moltke, arrived at Gitschin.

THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRATZ.—(See Plate 38).

July 3rd. Benedek took up a position in front of Königgratz. The Saxons and 8th corps were on the left, the flank rested on the wood and castle of Hradek, with an advanced guard at Nechanitz, and cavalry at Prim.

In the centre were the 10th corps at Langenhof, the 3rd corps at Cistowes, and the 4th corps at Maslowed. On the right the 2nd corps was at Sendrasitz, with a division of cavalry.

The reserve consisted of the 1st corps near Rosnitz, the 6th corps south of Rosberitz, and the cavalry in rear of these two corps.

During the night Prince Frederick Charles advanced from Horitz to Milowitz, thinking the Austrians were about to withdraw across the river Elbe. He sent a report to this effect to the King, and suggested that he should advance against them at daylight. He also sent word to the Crown Prince of his

proposal, and desired him to advance against the Austrian's right flank, whilst he attacked their front.

The King sent his approval, and ordered the Crown Prince to comply.

July 4th. Soon after daybreak the 1st and 3rd Prussian armies advanced, and discovered the Austrians in position.

The artillery opened fire at 7.30 o'clock, and at 7.45 o'clock the King arrived on the field.

At 10 o'clock the 4th and 2nd corps were ordered to attack Benatek, Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Mokrovous. The two latter villages were set on fire by the Prussian artillery.

By 11 o'clock Sadowa and Dohalitz were taken, and a severe struggle was going on in the wood above Benatek.

The fighting continued all down the line without either side having much the advantage. At 1 o'clock Prince Frederick Charles sent the 3rd corps to reinforce the 4th in the wood, but the Prussians could gain no ground.

The 3rd army was employed in attacking the Austrian left flank. They drove back the Saxon outpost at Nechanitz, but could make no further advance. A division was sent to turn the Saxon left, but they fought obstinately and the Prussians were unable to attain their object.

The whole of the 1st and 3rd armies were thus engaged, and could make no advance against the Austrian position.

At 3 o'clock, the King became somewhat uneasy, anxiously looking for the arrival of the Crown Prince.

The Crown Prince had sent to Prince Frederick Charles to say he would attack the Austrians at 2 p.m., and he really was engaged at this hour, but he could neither be seen nor heard on account of wind, rain, and thick mist.

The 6th corps marched down the river Elbe to the Trottina river, supported by the 5th corps. The Guards marched on Horenowes, and the 1st corps to the right of the Guards echeloned to the rear. They arrived at these positions about noon. At 1 o'clock, Horenowes and Racitz were taken, just about the time that the 3rd corps was sent into the wood. The Prussian Guards advanced to the attack of Maslowed, which




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Sart Walhain
Quatre Bras
Tilly
Sombref
Erasne
Genbloux
LIEGE
Ligny
Lambusart
Fleurus
NAMUR
Charleroi
Marchiennes
R. Sambre
Valenciennes
Maubeuge
Ciney
Beaumont
Philippeville
Avesnes
Mizieres
Sedan
Mouzon
Laon
Rethel
Beaumont
Montmedy
R. Meuse
Chavignon
Craonne
Vouziers
R. Oise
R. Aisne
Soissons
Bery-au-Bac
St Hilaire
Rheims
Verdun
Lemmes
Chateau Thierry
R. Marne
Epernay
Thalons
Trancourt
Meaux
St Mard
La Heycourt
Harmont
La Ferté sous Jouarre
Vauchamps
Etoges
Hautz
Montmirail
Champaubert
Vitry
Heitz-l'Eveque
PARIS
Fere Champenoise
St Dizier
Eclaron
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Sezanne
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Nangis
Plancy
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Lesmont
Brienne
Provins
Arcis
Melun
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Mary
Troyes
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
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Arcangues
Lambe
R. Nive
R. Bidouze
R. Gave de Pau
R. Gave d'Oleron
Pensaguel
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
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Cistowes
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R. Trotina
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Chlum
Rosberitz
Mokrowous
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KONIGGRATZ
Plate 38

they took, driving back the Austrian 4th corps and thus separating it from the 2nd corps at Sendrasitz. At 2.45 p.m the Prussian Guards pushed on and took Chlum, which is the highest point in the field.

Benedek now brought forward his reserves and endeavoured to re-take Chlum.

Soon after 3 p.m. the Prussian 7th corps took Problus, and Benedek was obliged to detach part of his reserves to reinforce this point.

The fighting for Chlum continued; the Austrians made three attacks but each time were repulsed.

The Prussian 1st corps now reached Benatek, and with its assistance the wood above the village was cleared and the batteries at Lipa taken. The 5th corps was also moved to its right to support this attack.

The whole of the 1st army now advanced with drums beating, and the Austrians retreated leaving most of their guns. They took up a fresh position near Rosnitz, under cover of several severe cavalry charges.* The firing continued till 9 o'clock. The Austrians managed to cross the river Elbe during the night.

The number of Austrians engaged was about 200,000, with 600 guns; and Prussians, 260,000, with 800 guns.

The Austrians lost about 32,000 killed and wounded, and 20,000 prisoners, with 174 guns; the Prussians lost about 12,000.

NOTES.—Benedek's idea was to get Prince Frederick Charles' force across the boggy stream of Bistritz, fully engage it, and counter attack him; he hoped still thus to defeat him before the Crown Prince could come up. He trusted to the bad roads and his 2nd corps on the river Trottina to detain the Prussian 2nd army whilst he was thus employed.

What strikes one about this battle is that the immediate cause of success seems to have happened more by chance than skill. The attack of the Prussian 3rd corps on the wood below Chlum obliged the Austrian 4th corps to send reinforcements from Maslowed, and thus weaken the defence of that village, which enabled the Prussian Guards to take it easily. At this time, Prince Frederick Charles did not even know that the Crown Prince was near. It is also said that on account of the fog, mist, or rain, the Austrians

* One of the most notable of these Austrian cavalry charges was led by an Englishman named Beales.

did not see the Crown Prince's army. These circumstances led to the capture of Chlum, which was the key of the position. In these manœuvres and in this battle the mobility of the Austrians was destroyed by too great concentration.

June 19th. The Hanoverians were at Gottingen, the Bavarians at Wurzburg and Bamberg, and the Federal corps at Frankfort.

The Prussians, under General Beyer, at Cassel, thus cut the Hanoverians off from the other armies.

General von Falkenstein was marching south from Hanover.

June 24th. The Hanoverians, moving very slowly, reached Langensalza in their endeavour to join the Bavarians.

The Prussians, from Cassel, occupied Eisenack, Gotha, and Weimar, but in small numbers.

The Bavarians made no effort to advance, and the King of Hanover, finding his march south thus intercepted, sent an offer to capitulate.

June 26th. The northern Prussian army, consisting of 42,000 men, arrived in their vicinity.

Battle of Langensalza.—(See Plate 39.)

June 27th. The Hanoverians were in position on the river Unstruth, the right at Thämsbruck, the centre at Merxleben, and the left at Nägelstedt, with outposts across the river.

General Flies, with about 12,000 Prussians, advancing from the direction of Gotha, arrived in front of Langensalza at about 9 o'clock, drove in the Hanoverian picquets, and took the town at about 10 o'clock. Encouraged by this success he determined to attack the position without waiting for the other Prussian columns. He ordered a small column to make a feint at Thämsbruck, two regiments to advance against Merxleben, and a strong column of Landwehr to attack and turn the left flank.

The artillery opened fire between 10 and 11 o'clock, the centre Prussian column advanced and took Merxleben, but the right column could not cross the river.

At about noon the Hanoverians made counter attacks, one in


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the centre retaking Merxleben, and another on the left driving back the Prussian right column.

The Prussians retired in disorder, and were pursued by the Hanoverian cavalry, which did considerable execution, capturing many prisoners and a Prussian battery. The pursuit lasted till 5 p.m. The Prussians lost about 15,000 men killed and wounded, and about 1,000 prisoners. The Hanoverians lost about 1,400 men.

June 28th. The Hanoverians, having no supplies or means of transport, could make no use of their victory.

June 29th. Flies had retired towards Gotha, but the Prussians, under Von Falkenstein, were closing in on all sides, so the King of Hanover capitulated.

NOTES.—This was the only battle the Hanoverians fought. The position taken up by them was a good one, except perhaps that the boggy river in their front made counter-attacking somewhat difficult. However, they succeeded in driving the Prussians off by this means. The Hanoverians, who were fine gallant troops, and led by courageous officers, seem to have somewhat astonished the Prussians. General Flies evidently despised them, and thought he could beat 20,000 of them, placed in position with his 12,000, but deservedly got beaten. He should have waited for the other columns to come up.

Had the King of Hanover marched his army at once to the south on the 25th June instead of halting at Langensalza, there is little doubt but that he would have succeeded in joining the Bavarians.

Von Falkenstein had now under his orders about 50,000 men, with 96 guns, wherewith to operate against the Bavarians and Federals.

The Federal corps, under Prince Alexander of Hesse, was not to be ready to take the field until the 9th July. It was then to unite with the Bavarians, and operate with them towards Berlin.

The Bavarians were urged by the authorities at Vienna to advance to the assistance of the Hanoverians, although the corps at Frankfort was not ready. Accordingly Prince Charles did march from his positions to the river Maine, and on June 29th reached Hilburghausen and Meiningen, but on hearing of the capitulation of the Hanoverians, he halted, and thought to move to his left on Giessen to join the Federal troops. Prince

Alexander was concentrating his troops about Friedberg, and Prince Charles (who was to assume command of the two forces, with General von der Tann as chief of the staff) sent him orders to march, with all the troops he could collect, on Fulda.

Falkenstein had set his troops in motion towards Fulda on July 2nd, with a view of preventing the Federal corps from joining the Bavarians.

July 4th. The Prussians came upon the Bavarians at Wiesenthal. Two brigades, under General Goeben, engaged them here, and drove them back. They retired towards Kissingen.

Prince Alexander, on hearing of this, also retired to Frankfort.

July 6th. The Prussians occupied Fulda.

July 8th. Falkenstein marched to attack Prince Charles, who took up positions behind the river Saale. The Prussian right wing, under Beyer, marched on Hammelburg, the centre, under Goeben, on Kissingen, and the left, under Manteuffel, on Waldaschach.

July 10th. At about 11 o'clock Beyer engaged the Bavarians at Hammelburg, and carried the bridge there; about the same time Goeben took the bridge at Kissingen, entered the town at about 3 p.m., and after some severe fighting, captured the heights above it. Manteuffel also took another bridge higher up the river. The Bavarians are said to have been surprised at all these posts on the river Saale: they had their reserves too far behind to bring them up in time to save the bridges.

July 11th. The Bavarians retired up the river Maine. Falkenstein moved towards Hanau, against the Federal Corps, sending Beyer's division to watch the Bavarians.

July 13th. A brigade of Prussians at Laufach were attacked by two brigades of Hessians: the latter were defeated.

July 14th. The Prussians continued their advance, and found Aschaffenburg in possession of the enemy; they attacked and drove the Federals through the town, capturing 2,000 prisoners and some stores.

July 16th. Falkenstein, with these two divisions, entered Frankfort. General Beyer, not having seen anything of the

Bavarians, received orders to march on Frankfort, at which place he arrived on July 17th.

During these operations Prince Alexander remained inactive on the left bank of the river, and afterwards moved south.

Falkenstein was now made Governor-General of Bohemia, and Manteuffel took the command.

July 18th. The Prussians occupied Wiesbaden; and on the 20th Darmstadt.

July 21st. They received reinforcements, which enabled Manteuffel to leave 5,000 men on the river Maine, and march south with 60,000.

A division under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, consisting of 23,000 men, was formed at Leipsic, and ordered to move into Bavaria by Hof, to act against the enemy's rear, whilst Manteuffel engaged them in front.

Manteuffel heard that the Bavarians were in position at Wurzburg, and that the Federal Corps was on the river Tauber; he therefore moved on Darmstadt, and then up the valley of the Maine.

July 23rd. The Prussians were at Moltenberg and Amorbach.

July 24th. They advanced to the Tauber, and drove the Federal troops from thence, taking possession of the passages over the river. The Federal corps fell back on Gerscheim, and the Bavarians moved forward and took up a position on their right at Helmstadt and Utingen.

July 25th. Manteuffel sent a division against the Federal corps, and another against the Bavarians, holding one in reserve at Wertheim. The Federal corps, after a short engagement, was pushed back on Wurzburg.

The Bavarians were more difficult to turn out of their position, and Manteuffel was obliged to bring up his reserve to defeat them.

July 26th. Prince Charles passed his troops over the river at Wurzburg.

July 28th. The Bavarians and Federal corps concentrated at Rottendorf, and Manteuffel advanced to attack them; but

Prince Charles sent a flag of truce to say that an armistice had been agreed upon.

The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin reached Hof on the 24th July; Baireuth on the 29th, and afterwards pushed on to Nüremberg.

NOTES.—Throughout these movements there seems to have been no concerted action between the Bavarians and the Federal corps. Even when they were formed up in position to fight a battle they did not touch, but acted independently. Under these circumstances, there is little to learn from their movements.

Manteuffel's march was most skilful, quick, and courageous. By his manœuvres he drove the enemy away from his territory, and with the Prussian division coming from Hof and Baireuth, he would probably have cut him off from his supplies had hostilities continued.

Benedek, after his defeat at Königgratz, directed his army to re-assemble at Olmütz, except the 10th corps, which had suffered so severely that it was sent by train to Vienna.

July 5th. The 1st and 3rd Prussian armies marched on Prelautsch, 2nd army on Pardubitz, and the Landwehr of the Guard moved on Prague, which they occupied on the 8th July.

The railways were repaired, and were now in working order from Prussia by Prague and Reichenberg.

July 6th. The Prussians halted, but their cavalry pushed forward to reconnoitre.

July 7th. The 2nd army moved towards Olmütz, the 1st army on Brünn, and the 3rd army on Iglau.

The Austrian army was being moved by rail to Vienna, at the rate of 10,000 men a day. When this became known, the Prussian 2nd army was directed towards Prerau, to cut the line between Olmütz and Vienna.

July 10th and 11th. The advanced guard of the Prussian 1st army engaged the Austrian cavalry.

July 12th. Prince Frederick Charles arrived at Brünn, and occupied the town without opposition, and there halted for two days.

The Prussian 3rd army reached Iglau on the 10th July, and moved forward on Znaym.

Benedek resigned command of the Austrian army, and Archduke Albrecht was appointed his successor. He decided to take up a defensive line on the river Danube from Krems to Presburg, with his centre at Florisdorf, a fortified post in front of Vienna.

July 14th. The Prussian 2nd army was approaching Prosnitz.

July 15th. The cavalry of the Prussian 1st army cut the line of railway at Lundenburg, so that no more Austrian troops could be sent by rail to Vienna. Benedek was left at Olmütz with the 1st, 2nd, and 8th corps; he accordingly started to march for the Danube, by the left bank of the river March, with one brigade on the right bank by Tobitschau and Kremser.

The Prussians came upon this brigade about Tobitschau, and drove it back across the river. Here there were several cavalry charges, and the Prussian 5th Cuirassiers captured 18 Austrian guns.

Benedek thus threatened on his right flank by the Crown Prince, crossed the mountains, and marched by Tyrnau to Presburg, which place he reached on the 21st July.

July 17th. The Crown Prince broke the line of railway, and cut the telegraph at Prerau, and then, leaving the 5th corps to watch Olmütz, marched on Brünn, arriving there on the 19th. The Prussian 1st and 3rd armies continued their advance, and on the 20th July the 3rd army reached Stockerau (from whence Vienna could be seen), and the 1st army Ganserndorf.

July 22nd. The 4th corps were ordered to make a dash for Presburg, but whilst engaged with the Austrians defending this post, a flag of truce came from the Austrian commander to say that an armistice had been agreed upon. This brought the action to a close.

The war in Italy presented many difficulties to the Italians; they had to invade Venetia, and turn the Austrians out of the Quadrilateral. The Austrians had a field army of 78,000 men with 176 guns, besides about 50,000 men in the fortresses.

The Italians numbered about 200,000. King Victor Emmanuel commanded in person. The King's plan was to cross the Austrian frontier, which was the river Mincio with 120,000 men, and engage Archduke Albrecht's field force somewhere between the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, whilst 80,000 men under Cialdini moved up the coast of the Adriatic, supported by the fleet to operate in rear of the fortresses, and if possible cut the Austrian lines of communication.

June 20th. The Italians under the King assembled near the river Mincio, and those under Cialdini, at Bologna.

June 22nd. The King crossed the river between Valeggio and Goito.

June 23rd. Leaving troops to mask the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, he moved forward and occupied some high ground near Custozza.

June 24th. The Austrians advancing from Verona attacked the Italians, and drove them back to the river; the fighting was very severe, both sides losing about 8,000 men killed and wounded, and several prisoners.

When Cialdini heard of the King's defeat he fell back on Modena.

July 1st. Archduke Albrecht after fortifying Valeggio and Custozza, crossed the Mincio to follow up his victory, but on the news of the disaster in Bohemia, he re-crossed the river, and in accordance with orders from Vienna, marched his army to the Danube.

July 7th. The Austrian field army having been withdrawn, Cialdini crossed the river Po, and pushed forward his advanced guards to Padua and Vicenza.

July 19th. The Austrian fleet defeated that of the Italians, at Lissa.

August 12th. An armistice was concluded which led to peace.

NOTES.—The Italian cavalry did not reconnoitre well, and no report was made of the Archduke's advance from Verona, consequently the King was surprised at Custozza. The Italians crossed the river in too large a front in the immediate presence of an enemy, and were not sufficiently concentrated on the 24th June to meet the Austrians.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870.

The French had been concentrating troops on the German frontier before the war was declared. Their idea was to assemble 150,000 men at Metz and 100,000 men at Strasbourg, keeping 50,000 men at the military camp at Chalons as a reserve, and invade Germany, with a view of separating the North German forces from the South.

On the 15th July war was declared, but a week passed without any forward movement being made by the French, and it soon became generally known that their organisation was so imperfect, that they were unable to advance.

The troops assembled by the French on the frontier were as follows :—

1st corps, under MacMahon, at Strasbourg.
2nd „ „ Frossard, at St. Avold.
3rd „ „ Bazaine, at Metz.
4th „ „ Ladmirault, at Thionville.
5th „ „ de Failly, at Bitsche.
6th „ „ Canrobert, at Chalons.
7th „ „ Douay, at Belfort.
Guard corps, under Bourbaki, at Nancy.

In all, about 200,000 men, with 1,000 guns.

The Emperor Napoleon III. commanded in person.

The German armies were rapidly concentrating, and it was necessary for the Emperor, although he had given up all idea of an invasion, to move his troops towards the frontier, and take up positions to oppose the enemy's advance. Accordingly, on the 31st July, the 2nd and 3rd corps were moved forward, and a division of the 2nd corps was posted to Forbach, six miles from Saarbruck, which place was reported to be already occupied by the Prussians in force.

The 1st corps and as much of the 7th corps as could be collected were ordered to march to Weissemburg.

At the commencement of the war, the Germans were divided into three armies as follows :—

I. Army under Steinmetz.

1st corps under Manteuffel.
7th „ „ Zastrow.
8th „ „ Goeben.

II. Army under Prince Frederick Charles.

Guards under Duke of Wurtemberg.
2nd corps „ Fransecky.
3rd „ „ Alvensleben II.
4th „ „ Alvensleben I.
9th „ „ Manstein.
10th „ „ Voigts Rhetz.
12th(Saxons)„ Prince Albert of Saxony.

III. Army under The Crown Prince.

5th corps under Kirchbach.
6th „ „ Tümpling.
11th „ „ Bose.
1st Bavarian corps under Von der Tann.
2nd „ „ „ Hartmann.
Wurtembergers „ Obernitz.
Baden „ „ Beyer.

In all, about 400,000 men, with 1,200 guns.*

The King commanded in person, and Von Moltke was chief of the staff.

The Germans were assembled at the fortresses of Coblentz, Mayence, and Manheim on the Rhine, so as to resist the expected passage of the river by the French.

By the end of July, their armies were in position and ready to take the field.

There being no signs of the French advancing, it was decided

* Each corps consisted of about 25,000 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and 84 guns (the Guards were stronger); each army had a reserve of cavalry and artillery.

that they should issue forth from their fortresses to invade France.

August 1st. The German 7th and 8th corps marched from Coblentz towards the river Saar, the 2nd army from Mayence advanced towards the French frontier, and the 3rd army from Manheim moved up the Rhine towards Weissemburg.

August 2nd. The Emperor of the French, thinking it necessary to do something, ordered an attack to be made on Saarbruck. This small town on the river Saar, just across the frontier, was then occupied by one battalion of Prussian fusiliers and three squadrons of Uhlans; against this force General Frossard was sent with his entire corps. The Emperor, accompanied by the Prince Imperial, came on the ground to witness the action.

The weakness of the Prussians was cleverly concealed. General Frossard was induced to deploy his whole force, and when the French advanced, the Prussians managed to effect their retreat in good order.

August 4th. The Crown Prince was directed to attack Weissemburg, with a view of severing the communications between Paris and Strasbourg. This town was occupied by General Able Douay's division, which belonged to the 1st corps, but being outnumbered, after some fighting, they had to retire. In the engagement General Douay was killed.

Battle of Wörth.—(See Plate 40.)

August 5th. Marshal MacMahon now became aware of the advance of the Prussians against him; he accordingly concentrated his troops at Wörth, on the main line of communication leading from Strasbourg to Metz, and determined to make a stand on the east side of the Vosges mountains. He brought on the field about 36,000 infantry, 102 guns, 30 mitrailleuses, and 3,500 cavalry.

The ground he selected for a position is on the right bank of the river Sauer; this river was 20 feet wide, and unfordable: there was a bridge at Wörth, two below about Gunstett, and several above; they were all left standing. The valley here

varies in breadth, from 500 to 1,000 yards, and the hills on either side are about 300 feet high, with steep slopes. The left of the position was at Neuweiler, and the right on the heights above Morsbronn, the entire front being about four and a half miles. In the centre are two small villages, Froschweiler and Elsaschausen, to the south of this last-named is a thick wood, called the Niederwald, it runs down nearly to the main road to Hagenau, which passes along the valley, and also to the rear of the position. There is an indifferent road connecting Neuweiler, Froschweiler, Elsaschausen, and Morsbronn, which passes through the wood. A good road, at right angles to the position, leading from Reichshofen, runs through Froschweiler, to the village of Wörth. This village is only seen from the French position near Elsaschausen. The heights at Neuweiler are wooded, they command those opposite, but towards the Niederwald and Morsbronn they fall to about the same level as the hills on the other side of the river. The Niederwald much obstructs the view. Gunstett and the ground around cannot be seen from Elsaschausen.

The heights on the left bank of the river, opposite to the French position, are all open.

MacMahon had four infantry divisions of his own corps and one belonging to the 7th corps sent from Belfort:—

1. General Ducrot's division occupied the ground from Neuweiler to Froschweiler.

2. General Raoult's division from Froschweiler to the Niederwald.

3. General Lartigue's division was in the wood, and extended to the heights above Morsbronn, that village being unoccupied. The other two divisions were in reserve.

4. General Pelle's behind General Raoult's, and

5. General Dumesnil's, at Eberback, behind the right flank. There was a light cavalry brigade behind Froschweiler, General Bonnemain's cavalry division in rear of the centre, and General Michel's brigade of Cuirassiers behind the right flank. The left of the position was unsuited for the action of this arm.

General de Failly at Bitsche was ordered by the Emperor to

march to MacMahon's assistance. He did not, however, arrive in time to take part in the battle.

The Crown Prince's army, with the exception of the 6th corps (which had concentrated in Silesia to watch the Austrians and had not yet come up), advanced in two lines; the 2nd Bavarian corps on the right, the 5th corps in the centre, and the 11th corps on the left, were the first line, the centre being rather more forward than the flanks; the 1st Bavarian corps, the Wurtembergers, and the Baden corps, formed the 2nd line. They were in all about 90,000 strong. On the night of the 5th August, the 5th corps bivouacked with its outposts in Gunstett, and opposite Wörth.

August 6th. At daybreak, a column from the Prussian 5th corps was sent forward to make a reconnaissance, which brought on a skirmish; this caused the 2nd Bavarians to come up on the right of the 5th corps, and the 11th corps on their left. At 8 o'clock a.m. the skirmishers on each side of the river became engaged along the entire front. The German generals, on hearing the fire, gave orders for their corps to deploy, and the divisional artillery was sent to the front.

The Crown Prince had not intended to attack MacMahon until the following day, and sent orders to stop the engagement. It had, however, become so general that it was impossible to do so, and the three corps engaged were ordered to continue the action.

MacMahon now ordered Dumesnil to send a brigade from his division to attack Gunstett. At about 10.30 a.m. they advanced; the village was occupied by troops of the Prussian 11th corps; the French attack was repulsed, their skirmishers being unable to cross the river.

At 11.30 a.m. the French made another attack with a larger force, and this time reached the enclosures of the village, but were again repulsed with great loss.

At noon the three German corps were all closed up ready to advance to the attack of the position. Eighty-four guns had been brought into action about Dieffenbach, and after they had well pounded Wörth, the village was assaulted and taken by troops of the 5th corps.

The 2nd Bavarians now advanced, crossed the river, and compelled General Ducrot's division to retire from the wood.

The French made two desperate attempts to retake the village of Wörth, but without success.

At half-past one o'clock the Crown Prince ordered a general attack to be made.

The 5th corps advanced from Wörth to attack the heights of Froschweiler, and the 11th corps, passing the river on flying bridges, attacked the Niederwald and the heights above Mossbronn, the Wurtemberg cavalry brigade being on the left to protect their flank.

The 5th corps were unable to effect their object, and suffered severely, but the 11th corps gained the wood and drove the French through it; they ascended the height and reached the village of Elsaschausen. The divisions of Lartigue and Dumesnil on the French right were thus separated from the centre, and finding themselves cut off they fled in disorder towards Hagenau.

The Prussian 11th corps now pivoting on the 5th corps, brought its left round. Whilst this movement was taking place, the two Cuirassier regiments of Michel's brigade made a desperate charge on the left flank of the 11th corps, in order that Lartigue's and Dumesnil's divisions might be rallied, but their noble attempt to redeem the battle was in vain, and they were almost annihilated.

MacMahon recognised the necessity of retaking Elsaschausen as the only means of maintaining his position; he therefore ordered General Pelle to advance to the attack, and in the meantime, in order to stop the Prussians, he directed General Bonnemain's Curassiers to charge between the wood and the village; this charge took place over hop gardens and most impracticable ground; it had accordingly little or no effect, and the greater part of the cavalry was destroyed.

The French counter attack on Elsaschausen utterly failed, and at the same time General Ducrot's division on the left was pushed back by the 2nd Bavarians.

At 3.30 p.m. the Prussian 5th corps, being thus well sup-


Neuweiler
Froschweiler
Reichshofen
Elsaschausen
Niederwalde
Eberbach
N
2nd B.
1st B.
WORTH
5th Corps
Dieffenbach
R. Sauer
B
Gunstett
11th Corps
Morsbronn
W
to Bagenau
1
2
3 Miles.

ported on both flanks, stormed the village of Froschweiler and took it, making several thousand prisoners.

The position was now gained, and MacMahon, seeing that further resistance was useless, at 4 p.m. ordered the retreat to be sounded. The French retired by Reichshofen, pursued by the German cavalry, to Niederbronn, where they received some relief. General de Failly's advanced troops had arrived there, and taken up a defensive position at the railway station, which stopped the German cavalry; the 2nd Bavarians, however, were brought forward and turned the French out of their post, but night came on and further pursuit was given up.

The German army lost nearly 8,000 killed and wounded; there is no authentic return of the losses of the French, but they were probably not much less than those of the Germans. 6,000 French prisoners were taken, as well as 39 guns and a quantity of baggage.

NOTES.—It was scarcely to be expected that 40,000 men would hold a position against the attack of 90,000, this great superiority in numbers was the primary cause of the German success.

The Niederwald was undoubtedly the weak point of the position, it ran down to within 500 yards of the river, when once reached by the assailants they became on equal terms with the defenders, and when the French were driven back, the Prussians were enabled to mass their forces there without opposition. The wood, as it were, lent an arm to the Prussians, by which they succeeded in penetrating the French centre.

The woods on the left of the French position although nothing like as thick as the Niederwald, still afforded sufficient protection to the Bavarians to enable them without very serious loss to drive back General Ducrot's division. These woods, however, ended on the plateau at the top of the hill, and this prevented for a time the Bavarians from advancing beyond them. General Ducrot by retiring about 400 yards to some suitable ground, kept the Bavarians in the woods till about 3 o'clock. An open space in a wood is a great assistance in checking the advance of an assailant, should he succeed in entering it, and driving the defenders back. The Niederwald reached to the rear of the position, and had no open space in it, and this it was that enabled the Prussians to gain ground here so easily. The slopes were too steep for the French fire from the heights to be effective, after the Prussians had reached the river; only one battery could see Wörth, which was the most important advanced post; when the Prussians had taken it, they were comparatively speaking unmolested there.

The front attack on Froschweiler, although made with a very superior force, failed; from 1.30 to 3.30 the 5th corps used every exertion to carry the village, but could not succeed, although it was only defended by one French brigade, it was not until both flanks were turned that the village was taken.

It would seem therefore that except under special circumstances, it is not advisable to make a direct attack with force on a strong position, a weak point or a flank should be first assailed, and should this attack succeed the strong parts of the position will have to be evacuated.

Hence, as a rule, it becomes advisable for the defending force to have reserves on each flank, because there it is to be expected the greatest endeavour of the assailants will be made; if the ground in front of the defender's line is favourable for their fire, a small number of them will keep in check a large number of assailants.

General Ducrot does not seem to have had any reserves wherewith to make a counter attack on the Bavarian's right flank. The Reserve division behind the French right under General Dumesnil was exhausted by its two counter attacks on Gunstett before the battle commenced; had these troops been in hand and fresh when the 11th Corps advanced against the heights above Morsbronn, they would probably have made a successful attack on the Prussian left flank.

None of the ground is really favourable for cavalry action. About Eberbach it is the most suitable. General Michel's cuirassiers devoted themselves with some object; had they succeeded in driving back the Prussian left, the French right wing might have rallied: as it was they probably gave their comrades some relief; but to send cavalry into hop gardens and vineyards against infantry, seems to be a useless sacrifice of brave men.

However confident a commander may be of holding a position, he should always prepare for a retreat in case of necessity. The roads leading to the rear should not only be well surveyed, but each brigade should know exactly which road it should take. A position should be chosen to cover the retreat, and fresh troops should be held in hand for this purpose.

After the retreat was sounded at 4 p.m., it has been generally stated that the confusion was very great. An Austrian officer, an eye witness, states that he saw unarmed cavalrymen, artillerymen mounted on horses whose traces had been cut, and masses of infantry without officers, different regiments all mixed up together, all without knapsacks, and many without arms, running away in the greatest confusion and disorder. The German cavalry pursued these through Reichshofen and up to Niederbronn, but here luckily for the French, a division of General de Failly's Corps had arrived and taken up a position; this at once stopped the German cavalry: the Bavarian infantry had to come forward to attack the French thus posted, and they did not succeed in turning them out of the Railway Station till it was dark, which in August would not be till after 8 o'clock. Thus, more by good chance than good management, it appears the French fugitives were relieved from pursuit.

The 1st and 2nd German armies had been steadily advancing, and on the 6th August the 1st army was about nine miles from the river Saar, the 7th corps was on the right, and the 8th corps on the left. The 3rd corps, belonging to the 2nd army, touched the left flank of the 8th corps, and thus kept up the connection between the two armies. The order was given for the 1st army

to halt until the 2nd army had come up into line—in fact, a wheel to the right was to be made, the right of the 1st army being the pivot. On the morning of this day the outposts of the 7th and 8th corps, which were on the river Saar, observed that during the night the French had abandoned their position on the heights on the opposite side of the river; they accordingly sent word back to their respective columns that the French were retreating.

This intelligence induced the corps' commanders to push forward at once.

The cavalry reconnoitrers seem to have framed their reports rather too hastily, the truth being that General Frossard, whose corps (the 2nd) occupied Saarbrucken, had merely retired his troops to a somewhat more favourable position for defence, on some heights in front of the village of Speichern.

At 11.30 o'clock the advanced guard of the 7th corps reached Saarbrucken, marched through the town, across the river and up to the high ground above, where they were soon made aware that the enemy had not retreated.

The advanced guard having thus become injudiciously engaged were reinforced from their column. On hearing the fire all behind pushed forward, even a division of the 3rd corps belonging to the other army came to the assistance, and the action became general. When Steinmetz arrived on the ground, which was not till 7 o'clock, the engagement was at its height, and it was then impossible to discontinue the attack.

At 9 o'clock the Prussians, after very severe fighting and much loss, were in full possession of the heights, the French having been driven back through Speichern; their retreat was covered by the whole of their artillery from a favourable position in rear of the village. Bazaine was with the 3rd corps on this day, only five or six miles in rear of the 2nd corps, and had been sent there for the express purpose of supporting Frossard. When Bazaine received intelligence of the Prussians having crossed the river Saar, he sent to Frossard offering him assistance, but it was declined as being considered unnecessary.

NOTES.—This action seems to be a good illustration of the danger of an advanced guard without necessity becoming seriously engaged, and the error of reinforcing it by driblets. The German Generals were blamed for bringing on this engagement, contrary to the orders received from Head Quarters. Had the French been a little more active, it might have resulted in serious consequences for the Prussians. If Frossard had advanced boldly at first, he would not have had much difficulty in beating the Prussian divisions as they arrived, and with the assistance of Bazaine he might have compelled the 1st German army to retreat.

Thus both flanks of the French were defeated and had to retire.

MacMahon's corps was in such disorder that it could not be rallied. They got on the railway at Saverne and made for Chalons. Frossard's corps fell back on Bazaine's and was not further molested.

The French 5th corps at Bitsche, finding a victorious enemy on each flank, was also obliged to retreat.

The French Emperor was now very undecided as to what orders he should give; his inclination was to concentrate all his troops at Chalons to cover Paris, but for political reasons he abandoned this plan and ordered the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th corps and Guards to assemble at Metz.

One brigade of the French 5th corps afterwards joined this army; the rest of the corps followed the 1st corps to Chalons.

The 7th corps returned to Belfort, but afterwards retired to Chalons.

Such was the position of the French troops on August 12th.

The Emperor, finding himself quite unfit to conduct the movements of his armies under such conditions, resigned the command. He appointed Bazaine to the command of the Metz army, and ordered MacMahon to organize a second army at Chalons. Bazaine, on assuming command, at once ordered a retreat on Verdun.

Meanwhile the German armies had been steadily advancing, the 2nd army had come into the general line, and all were now connected and showed a regular front.

The 1st army was directed towards Metz.

The 2nd army towards Pont à Mousson.

The 3rd army, except the Baden corps, which was sent to besiege Strasbourg, moved on Nancy.

August 13th. On the afternoon Bazaine issued orders to his army, which was encamped to the east of Metz on the right bank of the Moselle, to commence the retreat by passing the river on the following morning. Every man was to be provided with three days' rations, and the movement was to begin at 5 a.m.

The 6th corps was on the French right.

The 2nd and 3rd corps were in the centre.

The 4th corps was on the left.

The Guards were in rear of the line.

August 14th. The Guards were the first to cross the river, and the remainder were ordered to do so by alternate corps, commencing from the right. The manœuvre was conducted with tolerable regularity, and in the course of the morning all had passed over the river except the 3rd corps and a part of the 4th corps, which corps was in the act of crossing when the advanced guard of the 1st German army came in sight.

Major-General Von der Golz was in command of this advanced guard, and, knowing that the 2nd German army was just about to pass the river Moselle at Pont à Mousson, he came to the conclusion that the French were abandoning their position in consequence of their flank being thus turned, and that if he could manage to detain them on the right bank of the river a little longer, he would greatly assist the turning movement; on his own responsibility, therefore, without orders, he at once commenced an attack on the French 3rd corps with his single brigade, sending back messengers to all the corps and division commanders of his intentions.

Action of Colombey.—(See Plate 41.)

The position which the French occupied was on some high ground about two and a half miles to the east of Metz, just in front of the village of Borny. Each flank was well protected by two large forts, namely, St. Julien on the left and St. Queuleu on the right. The ground is all open in front of the position,

but on the right flank there are some woods. The main road from Saarbrucken runs through the centre, in front of the right there is a river which had three bridges over it; there are several villages in the valley, Ars Laquenexy, Colombey, Montoy, and Nouilly; there is another village on the height opposite the French left, namely, Noisseville.

General Golz formed up his brigade behind Marsilly, and from thence sent it forward to attack Colombey; a jager battalion was directed on Ars Laquenexy to protect the left flank, and the right flank was covered by three squadrons of Hussars.

At 3.30 o'clock the action commenced.

The artillery was brought forward and opened fire from the high ground opposite the French position, the infantry was extended ready to attack, but the very superior forces of the enemy rendered a further advance impossible.

The French now brought forward column after column to repulse this Prussian brigade, but they were unable to do so. It held its position for fully two hours before it was reinforced.

The French 3rd corps was under the command of General Decaen, since Bazaine had been appointed commander of the Metz army; finding himself unable to make head against the attack, he sent to the 4th corps for assistance. General L'Admirault, although he had nearly crossed the river, ordered his troops to countermarch and brought them back to General Decaen's aid; he sent a division to protect each flank of the 3rd corps.

At about 5 p.m. the leading troops of the 1st Prussian corps reached Montoy, and General Golz's line was by them extended to Noisseville. The corps artillery was sent forward, and fourteen batteries took up an advantageous position in a horse-shoe shape on the high ground between Montoy and Noisseville.

At 7 p.m. nearly all the 1st and 7th corps had arrived on the field; the line of attack was extended to Nouilly on the right and Mercy les Metz on the left. An advance was now made against the French right, partly through the woods. The French here had to fall back on Borny. The whole of the 7th corps then made a general advance, and the French position was


N
St. Julien
St. Quentin
METZ
Berny
2d Nouilly
4 Naisseville
7th
Montoy
3
Nidanbey
2d Marsilly
Ars Laquenexy
4
7th
Mercy les Metz
2 Miles

carried. Towards evening L'Admirault attempted a counter-attack from the French left on Nouilly and Noisseville, but he was compelled to retreat with heavy loss.

Darkness put an end to the engagement at about 8.30 p.m., and the Prussians bivouacked for the night under arms on the ground they had gained. The Germans lost 1200 and the French 4000 men. General Steinmetz does not seem to have approved of this attack, for at 11 p.m. he sent an order for the 7th corps to retire forthwith; they did not, however, move till day-break, their excuse being that they could not in the darkness remove their wounded. It was found in the morning that the French had withdrawn during the night into Metz. In this action General Decaen was killed, and General Le Bœuf was given command of the 3rd corps.

NOTES.—This is another instance of an advance guard making a serious attack on a far superior force in position, but under different circumstances to those at Saarbrucken; as events afterwards proved General Golz's daring attempt was perfectly successful. He not only detained the 3rd Corps on the right bank of the River Moselle for nearly eighteen hours, but the 4th Corps having actually made the passage of the river, recrossed; in consequence of his attack, the retreat of the entire French army was delayed, and as we shall see hereafter, completely intercepted by the 2nd German army.

There can be no doubt that if the French had decided between 4 and 6 o'clock p.m., on making a resolute attack by Colombey, they could have easily overcome this Prussian vanguard; but if they had done so, General Golz would have retired on to his advancing columns, probably followed by the French, who would have thus been equally delayed from carrying out their object, which was retreat on Verdun.

The 1st German army was here in no danger of being defeated, because they had the 2nd German army in advance on their left flank, which could by wheeling to the right have come up on the French flank.

In this attack we see here again the assailants overlapping the defender's line, advancing on his flank and compelling him by this means to evacuate his position.

On this occasion there was a French reserve available, namely a division of the 4th Corps, but they do not seem to have made any counter attack on the Prussian's attacking flank; possibly, finding themselves outnumbered, they considered the attempt useless. The French gained nothing in defending their position: had they continued their movement of crossing the River Moselle, they would have made good their retreat on Verdun; the 3rd Corps could have easily retired under the protection of a rear guard within Metz, the guns of the fortress and the forts would have kept General Golz at a distance.

Whilst this action was going on, the 2nd German army was marching in the following order, and with all speed, to cross the river Moselle.

The 10th corps on Pont à Mousson, its leading cavalry patrols crossed the river and searched the road leading from Metz to Verdun; the Guards on Dieulouard, the 4th corps on Marbache, and the 3rd corps was on the right of the 10th corps, to connect the 1st army with the 2nd.

The second line was composed of the 9th and 2nd corps behind the 3rd corps, and the 12th corps in the rear of the 10th.

The 3rd army was moving on Nancy.

August 15th. The second army crossed the river, and the 1st army took up a position to cover their passage; the 1st corps remained before Metz, and the 7th and 8th corps were placed in positions between the 1st corps and the river.

The 3rd corps crossed the river about Noveant, and that night reached Gorse.

The French movements were as follows:—The 2nd corps was directed to march on Mars-la-Tour, it was to be followed by the 6th corps and Guards; the 3rd and 4th corps were ordered to take the northernmost road by Doncourt; but in consequence of the combat at Colombey, the north road column was detained, and the south road column was ordered to wait until the other had come up.

August 15th. The march was resumed, but the columns did not make much progress; the French advanced cavalry came in contact with the enemy near Vionville, and the commander observing that artillery was also in front of him, and imagining that he saw infantry, retired on his column.

The French 2nd corps, on reaching Rezonville, took up a position south of the road, and the 6th corps on its arrival prolonged the line to the right to the north of the road; here they bivouacked for the night.

The Guards were at Gravelotte.

The 3rd corps on the north road only managed to reach St. Marcel during the night, and the 4th corps was some distance in the rear of it.

August 16th. General Alvensleben having received information from his cavalry patrols that the French army had thus halted for the night, determimed to advance at an early hour in the morning, and place his corps across the Verdun road, with a view of preventing the French from continuing their march on that place.

He started on this dangerous enterprise at 5 a.m., marching on Mars-la-Tours.

BATTLE OF MARS-LA-TOUR.—(See plate 42.)

The villages of Mars-la-Tour, Vionville, Rezonville and Tronville are all situated on a plateau above the river, the country around them is quite open, except some small patches of wood near Mars-la-Tour, and to the north of the road. On this plateau there are slight undulations of the ground which afford some protection to infantry. There is a deep valley running north from Mars-la-Tour, and about a mile up it there is another running east, about two miles up this last-named there are traces of an old Roman road by the side of the wood.

The Prussian patrols sent forward to this plateau reported that the French out-posts were at Tronville and Vionville, and that there was a great encampment with tents close behind these villages, by which Alvensleben became aware that they had not as yet resumed their march on Verdun.

He accordingly at 9 a.m. sent forward a cavalry division to drive in the outposts, ordered the artillery to come to the front, and deployed one of his infantry divisions to attack the French 2nd corps, which were now formed up in position between Vionville and Flavigny facing west, with their left towards the wood; the French 6th corps also deployed extending the line to St. Marcel.

At 10.30 a.m. the Prussian divisional artillery opened fire on the French 2nd corps with four batteries, which they had placed in position near Tronville; and the infantry division, passing up two small valleys, attacked and took Vionville and Flavigny.

At the commencement of this action, Alvensleben sent orders to his other division to push forward with all speed, and he also reported the state of affairs to the commander of the 10th corps which was advancing on St. Hilaire.

The corps artillery now came into action, and the other division of the 3rd corps prolonged the line as far as the wood, which the Prussians occupied after driving the French out of it. In this position they maintained themselves against repeated attacks of the French.

It was 11.30 o'clock before the leading troops of the 10th corps arrived; they came by Tronville and reinforced the left flank of the 3rd corps, which was much exposed.

Where the Prussian line was reinforced the French line gave way, and Bazaine, who was on this part of the field at the time, ordered a regiment of Cuirassiers and Lancers to charge; he placed himself at their head and led them, but although they advanced in perfect order and with good courage, they were unable to break the Prussian line and had to retreat, which they did in confusion, being followed by Prussian Hussars, who nearly succeeded in capturing the Marshal.

The French 2nd corps was now so much shattered and exhausted that they could hold the ground no longer, Bazaine, therefore, ordered up the Guards to relieve them.

Whilst this severe fighting was going on the French 6th corps remained in its original position unengaged,—waiting, it has been said, until the 3rd and 4th corps could come up to protect their right flank, before throwing it forward: these corps had now arrived, and the 6th corps commenced its change of front to the left.

To meet this change of front, which threatened to turn the Prussian left flank, the newly-arrived troops were sent into the woods to the north of the road between Vionville and Mars-la-Tour; here ensued a long and obstinate fight, which ended in the Prussians having to retire. More reinforcements of their 10th corps were now approaching, and in order to relieve the engaged infantry and give these reinforcements time to come to their assistance, the cavalry at hand were sent against the

French line. There were only six squadrons available, three of the 7th Cuirassiers and three of the 10th Uhlans, they advanced across the road, deployed into line under a heavy artillery fire, the Cuirassiers on the left leading, and Lancers on the right, somewhat in rear. They charged up to the guns, cut down the gunners, and passing the batteries charged the infantry lines, which they passed through with such speed that but few of the French had time to fire a second shot. The French cavalry now coming from behind the wood, by the Roman Road, attacked those of the Prussians who were still mounted, and completely routed them.

The loss of these squadrons was very heavy.

Each regiment had about eighteen officers and 450 men on going into action. Of the 7th Cuirassiers only seven officers and seventy men returned from the charge, and of the 10th Uhlans only six officers and eighty men.

The further advance of the 6th corps was checked by this charge.

At 2 p.m. the French 3rd corps came into line on their right, and at 3 p.m. the 4th corps prolonged the line to the valley, running north from Mars-la-Tour; but neither corps advanced with any determination, although there was really at that time nothing but the Prussian cavalry in front of the 4th corps. It was not until 4 p.m. that the whole of the Prussian 10th corps had arrived. They had marched twenty-seven miles, and were now called upon to advance to the attack of the French right. A brigade was formed for this purpose, with six regiments of cavalry on their flank; they crossed the road near Mars-la-Tour, and continued their advance over undulating ground without seeing anything of their enemy. The skirmishing line unexpectedly came into a deep ravine, and, on surmounting the heigh on the opposite side, found themselves in front of the Frenc line at only 150 paces distant. The French commenced ind pendent firing, and the Prussians lost 43 officers and 615 m at the first discharge; the French then assumed the offensi and drove the Prussians back behind Tronville. A Prus cavalry regiment charged the advancing French infantry, without much success they lost two-thirds of their force.

At 6 p.m. the six cavalry regiments on the Prussian left advanced by Mars-la-Tour, to make an attack on the French right. They were met by ten French cavalry regiments; they came into contact about Ville-sur-Yron. The French were driven back, and received so heavy a repulse that no further attempt was made by them to advance their right.

The Prussian 9th corps now came up on their right, and reinforced the exhausted 3rd corps. At 7 p.m. Prince Frederick Charles (who had arrived on the ground at 3.30 p.m., having ridden sixteen miles in an hour) ordered a general advance, but the Prussians could gain no ground. Both forces, thus placed, continued fighting till daylight failed.

The Prussians had about 80,000 men on the field, and lost nearly 17,000. The French had about the same number of men engaged, and lost nearly 23,000.

NOTES.—It is difficult to understand why the French 6th Corps stood for nearly three hours unengaged without changing front or sending any of its troops to take the attackers in flank; had this been done early in the day the Prussians must have been driven back on Gorse, and the Verdun road would then have been left clear.

The boldness of the German commander who thrust his single corps in front of the whole French army is a great contrast to the want of enterprise amongst the French generals.

The cavalry charges in this action seem to have attained their object; the ground throughout is particularly suited to this arm.

The French cavalry stopped the advance of the Prussians, which enabled Bazaine to relieve the 2nd corps by the Guards.

The six squadrons of Prussians checked the advance of the French 6th corps, and thus gave the reinforcements from the 10th corps time to come up.

There are times therefore during a battle when cavalry can still be used to great advantage, but by using it against formed artillery and infantry it is almost sacrificed: the losses are fearful. Still under certain circumstances such attacks are justifiable; this appears to have been the case when the six Prussian squadrons were launched against the French line by the Roman pad.

If the Prussian brigade formed to attack the French right through Mars-Tour had had scouts in front of its skirmishers, the French would have been discovered in position, the Prussians would not have been surprised, and therefore would probably not have suffered defeat and such severe loss.

The artillery took an unusually prominent part in this battle, and the study of its order of march, concentration, &c., is very interesting and instructive. (*Home's Modern Tactics.*)


Denevart
St Marcel
Ville-sur-Yron
Roman Road
Gravelotte
to Verdun
MARS-LA-TOUR
Rezonville
Tronville
Flavigny
N
Miles

During the night the French received orders to retire towards Metz, in order that they might be re-supplied.

The 2nd corps was to take up a position between Rozerieulles and Point du Jour, the 3rd corps was directed to form on the right of the 2nd about Chatel St. Germain, the 4th corps about Amanvillers, the 6th corps about St. Privat, and the Guards behind St. Quentin.

August 17th. The French occupying these defensive positions endeavoured to re-supply the various corps from the fortress of Metz. It was Bazaine's intention, as soon as his train was again complete, to march on Verdun by a more northern road; but although every exertion was made, the 17th past and the 18th August came, and the army was still insufficiently supplied to attempt to move. During the 17th August the French generals strengthened their various posts, anticipating an attack.

Battle of Gravelotte.—(See Plate 43.)

The entire position extended from St. Ruffine to Roncourt with a front of nearly eight miles; it was occupied by about 120,000 men. There is a deep ravine running behind it, which reaches nearly to St. Privat, along which is a fair road and railway from Metz, the latter, on reaching Amanvillers, turns to the west at right angles to the position; the slopes of this ravine are wooded, they are steep between Chatel St. Germain and Amanvillers, but beyond that they become slighter, and the valley ends at St. Privat. The plateau above this is quite open, and has a gentle slope to the westward, it varies in width from 350 to 2,500 yards; beyond this the ground falls, and there is a valley with steep slopes in which a stream called Mance flows; these slopes are wooded. The Verdun road running through Gravelotte passes over this valley by a bridge and then on reaching the plateau winds in a southerly direction to the rear of the position.

The ground in front of St. Privat and Roncourt is perfectly open, troops advancing could be seen for three miles.

The villages in the position were Roncourt, a small hamlet

St. Privat, a small village with a church and some good brick buildings, Amanvillers, a somewhat larger village, with a street running west, Rozerieulles and St. Ruffine, the former in the valley to the north of the high road, and the latter on a hill, overlooking the river Moselle.

These villages were placed in a state of defence, and shelter trenches, gun epaulments, and rifle pits were made throughout. The following advanced posts were also occupied:

St. Marie-aux-Chènes, one and three quarter miles in front of St. Privat; it is a small village, about the same size as St. Privat; the ground in between these two villages is perfectly open, without any cover for troops, but there are two small valleys running up to St. Marie-aux-Chènes.

Champenois is a farm-house about one mile to the left front of Amanvillers: it is situated at the head of a small valley running from Verneville, and commands some ground which is hid from the position by a knoll.

La Folie is only 350 yards from the position, it is a farm-house, with outbuildings all enclosed by a wall; it is situated at the head of a small valley which runs up into the centre of the position; this house was, therefore, a very important post.

Leipzig is a farm-house in a wood, about half a mile from the general line.

Moscow is another farm-house 700 yards in front of Chatel St. Germain.

St. Hubert's Inn is situated on the high road, just on the top of the hill, as the road rises from the Mance Valley; it is close to the wood; there were several buildings around the inn, barns, stables, and various sheds; there is also an orchard, and the premises were enclosed by a stone wall between five and six feet high.

Le Point du Jour is a small house about half a mile further the road towards Metz, but it may be said that this house is lost in the general line.

The village of Vaux is more than a mile in front of St. Ruf- below the plateau, surrounded by a wood, except on the

side looking towards the river, from which it is distant only some 600 or 700 yards.

All these advanced posts were placed in a state of defence. The various reasons for occupying them were obvious, they commanded ground that could not be seen from the position; but there was no cover by which the troops could retire from any of them, these garrisons must either hold out to the end of the day or surrender as prisoners.

The position was occupied as follows:—

6th corps, on the right from Roncourt to St. Privat, two divisions in the front line and one division in reserve; three battalions were posted in Marie-aux-Chênes, and four cavalry regiments were drawn up behind the right flank.

4th corps continued the line as far as Montigny la Grange, the village of Amanvillers being the centre, two divisions were in the front line and one division in reserve; the advanced post Champenois was occupied with a battalion. L'Admirault did not occupy the Bois de la Cusse, which was about 1,000 yards to his front.

3rd corps came next and extended to the high road at Point du Jour. All the divisions were in the front line, and the outposts of La Folie, Leipzig and Moscow, and the Bois de Geniveaux, were strongly occupied.

A triple row of single pits one above the other and commanding ground for the batteries, rendered the position of this corps so strong, that it was not considered necessary to have a reserve.

2nd corps was posted on the left, with its outer flank throw back to Rozerieulles, it occupied the advanced posts of St. H bert's Inn and the villages of St. Ruffine and Vaux; also t southern part of the Bois de Geniveaux.

The cavalry were placed in rear of the left flank.

The main reserve, consisting of the Imperial Guards, drawn up near Plappeville.

There were 350 guns in position in the front line a reserve of 120 guns on the heights of St. Quentin. Fro height there is an extensive view of the country aroun

here it was that Bazaine took up his position on the morning of the 18th August.

On the morning of the 17th August the King arrived at Mars-la-Tour and rode over the field of battle, reviewing the troops and congratulating them on their victory.

After reconnoitring, and thereby ascertaining for certain that the French had retreated, it was determined at a Council of War to follow them up the next day and attack them.

For this purpose all the available troops of the 2nd army were ordered to close up on the line Mars-la-Tour—Gravelotte.

The 3rd, 10th, and 9th corps were already on the ground; the 12th corps arrived about noon, and the Guards at about 3 p.m., having marched 19 miles in 10 hours.

The 2nd and 4th corps did not reach the line on that day.

The 7th and 8th corps of the 1st army were brought across the river Moselle and moved up towards Gravelotte, the 1st corps remaining on the right bank.

On that night the corps bivouacked as follows:—

12th corps somewhat to the west of Mars-la-Tour, the Guards on their right and the 10th corps in rear. 9th corps to the south of Rezonville, with the 3rd corps in rear of them. 8th corps between Rezonville and Gravelotte. 7th corps in the Bois de Vaux.

An advance in echelon from the left was ordered to be made on the following morning.

August 18th, at 5 a.m., the 12th corps advanced, the Guards next, then the 9th corps, and finally the 8th. The 10th and 3rd corps were in the second line.

By 10 a.m. the corps were all well in echelon, with the cavalry in front feeling for the enemy. The 12th corps had passed Conflans with their scouts considerably to the north. All there was no sign of the French.

The 9th corps were the first to come in contact, about Verne- from whence the French camp was distinctly seen on the ts at Amanvillers. The corps were therefore ordered to to the right.

artillery of the 9th corps came into action near Cham-

penois about mid-day. This commenced the battle. The French artillery replied, and their batteries opened as far as St. Privat, thus showing the extent of the ground they occupied. The first position taken up by this Prussian artillery was oblique to the French front, the left being thrown forward to suit the ground. It was not at that time thought that the French extended beyond Amanvillers. The batteries thus placed, however, received not only a return frontal fire but also a flanking fire, both from artillery, mitrailleuse, and rifles.*

When the roar of the artillery gave notice that an engagement had commenced, Von Steinmitz ordered the 8th corps to advance. The artillery of this corps, 50 guns, came into action on the heights about Gravelotte, whilst the infantry were sent into the Bois de Geniveaux, and, driving the French before them, they connected with the 9th corps.

The 7th corps occupied the Bois de Vaux, and its artillery came into action on heights south of Gravelotte.

The Prussian Guards, on hearing the firing, pressed forward towards Habonville and St. Ail: their artillery came into action on some open ground between these two villages about 2,500 yards from the French position.

At 2 p.m. the Germans had 246 guns in action.

For two hours the artillery on both sides continued constantly to fire at each other.

The French infantry made a desperate effort to compel th artillery of the 9th corps to withdraw, but they were drive back by two Hessian battalions, who following the French, ca tured the outpost of Champenois.

At 4 p.m. the French artillery fire slackened, and Prussian artillery of the guard advanced in echelon of batte from the right towards St. Privat, till their guns got wi rifle range.

During these two hours endeavours were made by the man infantry to gain ground.

The 8th corps after forcing the French through the B

* One Prussian horse artillery battery lost upwards of 100 horses.

Geniveaux, tried to advance beyond the wood; they made a dash at St. Hubert's Inn and Moscow, but were driven back.

The 7th corps made an attack on Le Point du Jour from the Bois de Vaux, but it failed; the French came up to the crest of the hill, and drove the Prussians back into the wood.

A Jäger battalion of the 9th corps tried to advance by the side of the railway embankment from the Bois de la Cusse, but the fire of the French was so murderous that they were obliged to return to their cover.

At 3.30 o'clock the 12th corps arrived in front of St. Marie-aux-Chênes; the leading battalions immediately formed for attack; the skirmishing line by a series of rushes got within about 200 yards of the village, the French then evacuated their defences without waiting for the last rush, some escaped and reached St. Privat, but most were taken prisoners.

The division of the 12th corps which had not been engaged in the capture of St. Marie-aux-Chênes, was now directed to march by Auboué so as to attack the French right flank at Roncourt.

The two army corps in reserve, namely, the 10th and 3rd corps, closed up, and the artillery of the latter corps came into action at Verneville. A desperate fight now occurred on the German right flank. Four battalions of the 8th corps made another attack on St. Hubert's Inn; they formed for attack in the valley of the river Mance, and although they had only a few yards to run across the open from the top of the slopes to the Inn, they had to make several attempts, during which they suffered great losses before they captured the post. It was defended by 700 Frenchmen, 300 of whom were placed hors de combat."

Although several other attempts to advance were made by the Germans all down the line, they were unable to capture any other post. As soon as their skirmishers left the woods, they were shot down by the French riflemen, who were either in the fortified posts or rifle pits.

General Canrobert, on finding that the Saxons had deployed troops round his right flank, determined to evacuate

Roncourt, and collect all his available men for the defence of St. Privat.

Whilst this movement was being executed the Duke of Wurtemberg ordered the Guards to advance to the attack of St. Privat.

The following is a description of the attack, written by the Duke himself:—

"About 5 o'clock in the afternoon it was considered that the enemy was sufficiently shaken to risk an assault across the open and gently ascending ground. The 4th brigade of the Guards was therefore moved forward from Habonville in the direction of St. Privat in line of columns, in two lines, with skirmishers thrown out in front; in a quarter of an hour later the 1st division of the Guard was ordered to advance from St. Marie-aux-Chènes, which place is distant 2,640 paces from the main French position; Habonville is about 3,960 paces, therefore the three brigades came about the same time within effective range of the enemy's fire; the front of the attack included little more than 2,000 paces, so that there were about 10 men to a pace. The effect of the enemy's fire at a distance of about 1,500 paces was so murderous that the advance had to be discontinued; 6,000 men fell in ten minutes."

The Guards, however, held the ground they had gained, and lying flat, continued firing, awaiting the advance of the Saxon on their left flank. The Saxons, however, did not reach Roncourt till 6.30 p.m.; the village had already been evacuated and they at once formed up for the attack on St. Privat.

At 6.45 they arrived at about the same distance from the village as the Prussian guards. The Duke of Wurtemberg then ordered a general advance. The skirmishing line in a series of rushes got within 400 yards of the village, but in doing they had absorbed their supports. The French artillery had now fired away all their ammunition, so they were ordered to limber up and retire; this enabled the Prussian artillery to advance closer to the village, into which they threw shells and set it on fire. The German infantry now rushed forward, Prussians and Saxons entering the village almost at the

time; they charged down the streets, and the French fled in disorder through the woods towards Metz.

St. Privat was thus taken, but with a fearful sacrifice of life.

Darkness set in and further pursuit was considered inexpedient, more especially as the edges of the woods were lined with French skirmishers.

The German 2nd corps (Pomeranians) were some distance from Gravelotte on the night before the battle, the nearest battalion being twenty-three and the farthest twenty-seven miles; but so anxious were they to arrive in time to take part in the glories of the day that they marched these distances in seventeen hours, arriving at Gravelotte at 7 o'clock p.m.

Soon after their arrival the King ordered them to advance to the attack of the Farm Moscow. Some of the infantry crossed the bridge and extended on either side of it, but on attempting to advance across the plateau the French opened such a destructive fire that the Pomeranians had to retire; most of them made for the bridge, and here they met the columns advancing, this caused a jam and much confusion, the French shot and shell reached the bridge, the sun had gone down, and want of light increased the difficulties.

Fransecky, the corps commander, was himself on the bridge; seeing a bugler near him, he ordered "cease fire" to be sounded, upon which not only did his own troops stop firing, but the French buglers took up the sound, and their fire ceased also.

Again the Pomeranians advanced to the attack, and the French opened a most murderous fire; again the bugles sounded "cease fire," and again both sides at the same moment ceased.

It was too dark now to attempt anything further, but it was thought that perhaps the French might endeavour to break through during the night; the German troops were therefore ordered to bivouack in line with fixed bayonets on the ground which they had fought.

About 10.30 p.m. the French opened once more a fire all along their line, but it only lasted for a few minutes, and then was still for the rest of the night.

The Germans had about 200,000 men engaged in this battle, and lost nearly 20,000. The French had 120,000 engaged, and lost nearly 12,000.

NOTES:—There were only two arms used in this battle, namely, artillery and infantry.

The French cavalry were mostly assembled in rear of their left flank, where the ground is not suited for the action of that arm. The ground about St. Privat is well adapted for cavalry enterprises, and had they all been massed in rear of the right flank, it has been generally thought that something might have been undertaken by them against the flank of the 12th (Saxon) corps.

The German cavalry was posted on their exposed flank, and employed in watching the roads to their rear, to protect their army against surprise,—in this somewhat dangerous manœuvre of advancing in echelon from the outer flank when in line parallel to their line of communications, then changing direction towards their base, and accepting battle facing to their rear. The great superiority in numbers, the fact that the 3rd army was on the exposed flank, and the knowledge that there was no other French army in the field within striking distance, would seem to justify the movement, although it has been thought that Bazaine might have seized upon this opportunity of operating against the German lines of communication, by passing his army to the right bank of the river Moselle through Metz, and marching on Strasbourg. (See Hamley.)

The artillery took a prominent part in this battle; for two hours they carried on the engagement almost entirely. The Prussians endeavoured by shelling the French position to prepare the way for their infantry to attack, and the French used all their power to silence the Prussian guns. The French had the greater number of guns in action, but they fell short of ammunition, and when the Prussian guards and 12th corps approached St. Privat, from this want they were unable to oppose them.

The position occupied by the French was no doubt an unusually good one about St. Privat it was nearly perfect, the ground to the front falli gradually and regularly like a "glacis," and the ground to the rear falli suddenly, thus affording to the defenders admirable cover, up to the v moment that their services were required on the summit; the ground rather confined in rear of the centre. The fire of the French riflemen se to have been effective at 1,500 paces.

To make a frontal attack on such a position as St. Privat, in any forma must necessarily have been attended with great loss, but to advan battalion columns close up to the enemy's line over such ground, a Prussian Guards did, appears to be most condemnable.

The King issued the following order on the subject four days aft battle:—

"I have gathered from the reports on the detail of the recent vic combats, that the serious losses arose partly from the fact that th frequently advanced to the assault in battalion columns following to on their skirmishers. I therefore point out the fact that the ass hostile position must in the first instance be sufficiently prepare

artillery, and a well-directed fire of skirmishers, and that in the infrequent cases when turning or outflanking the enemy is not possible, and a frontal attack over the open ground is therefore absolutely necessary, the formation of company columns and half battalions, as laid down by regulation, &c., must be employed.

"I bestow the fullest acknowledgment on the gallant forwardness of the infantry, to whom hitherto nothing has been too difficult, but expect from the intelligence of the officers that they will be able by taking closer advantage of the ground, by more thorough preparation for the attack, and by the employment of suitable formations to obtain in future the same results with inferior losses."

The French reserves seem to have been badly placed, 17,000 of their best troops, namely, the Imperial Guards, were held in reserve at Plappeville. When Canrobert found that he was so seriously attacked, and his flank was being turned he sent for help. Bazaine ordered the Guards to his assistance, but they were six or seven miles distant, and before they could arrive St. Privat was taken.

It has been considered, as a rule, unadvisable to keep all the reserve troops in one spot even with a much smaller force, and where such has been done, some central position has been chosen, but here we find the reserves some seven miles from the most exposed flank, the only part of the position indeed on which the attack was in any way successful. It can easily be imagined what would have been the result if the Guards had issued from the forest of Jaumont on the flank of the Saxons, whilst they were attacking St. Privat.

As a rule then, since a frontal attack against a strong position seems almost futile, and that all successes have of late been attained by outflanking movements, the flanks are the places where the reserves will be more particularly required—there concealed in some convenient place in rear, they may on a given signal from the commander, either by telegraph or otherwise, move forward on the flank of the attackers. Doubtless there will be found in every position some weak parts which require to be reinforced if attacked, near these also it will be advisable to retain some troops in hand, besides some for covering a retreat where such is likely to be necessary, as at Wörth.

MacMahon was using every exertion to form an army at Châlons. The object of the Germans was therefore to hold Bazaine's army in its present position, and, at the same time, move forward with a sufficiently strong army of operation to be able to defeat MacMahon.

August 19th. Metz was invested on both banks of the river Moselle by the 1st army and the 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th corps of the 2nd army, together with some Landwehr battalions; the whole force being placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles.

The 4th army was now formed, consisting of the Prussian

Guards, 4th and 12th corps, and the Crown Prince of Saxony was appointed to command it.

On the evening of this day the 4th army commenced its advance: the 12th corps on the right, Prussian Guards in the centre, and the 4th corps on the left.

August 21st. This army reached the river Meuse and crossed below Verdun unopposed; leaving a brigade here, they continued to move forward, and on August 25th they reached Lempire, Triaucourt, and La Heycourt.

The 3rd army having advanced after the battle of Wörth in the direction of Chalons, had, on the 18th August, nearly reached the river Meuse; on this day the Crown Prince received orders from head quarters to halt and await the issue of the engagement at Metz. On the 20th he received instructions to continue his advance. He passed the river, and on the 25th was in position as follows:

1st Bavarians at St. Mard, 2nd Bavarians at Charmont, 5th corps and Wurtembergers at Heiltz, 11th corps at Heiltz l'Eveque, and the 6th corps at Eclaron.

MacMahon had succeeded in organizing an army of about 140,000 men at Chalons. It consisted of the 1st Corps, under Ducrot, 5th corps, under de Failly, 7th corps, under Douay, and the 12th corps (lately formed), under Lebrun, with cavalry divisions, under Bonnemain a nd Margueritte. The Emperor was also at the camp.

MacMahon's desire was to retire on Paris so as to cover the capital, and with this object in view, on the 22nd August he moved to Rheims, but on reporting his intentions to the Minister of War he received peremptory orders to march to the relief of Bazaine.

Therefore, on the 23rd, for political reasons rather than strategical, he commenced his march on Montmédy, sending despatches to Bazaine to inform him of his intended movements in hopes that Bazaine would be able to break through the investing army at Metz, and join him in the north of France. MacMahon's army, however, made small progress, owing to its defective organisation and want of proper supplies;

on 25th August the greater part of it had only reached Rethel.

August 23rd and 24th. The German cavalry patrols sent back reports that Chalons was evacuated, and that the French army was at Rheims; on the 26th reports reached head quarters that there were large forces of the enemy near Vouziers, upon which information the corps were ordered to wheel to the right and march northward. The 4th army which was now nearest the enemy was directed to hold the line of the river Meuse, whilst the 3rd army was detailed to intercept any attempt that should be made by the French to retreat on Paris.

MacMahon being now aware of the dangerous position he was in, proposed to withdraw to the north-west, and on the 27th sent a telegram to this effect to Paris, in answer to which he received a peremptory order to march to the relief of Bazaine.

August 28th. In accordance with the above instructions he advanced towards the Meuse in echelon from his left: 12th corps on Mouzon, 1st corps echeloned to the right, then the 5th corps, followed by the 7th. On approaching the Meuse the 5th corps wheeled to the right to protect the passage of the river by the other corps, whilst the 7th corps passed in rear of it. General de Failly took up a position on some heights to the north of Beaumont, sending a division to the south of the town on outpost duty.

August 30th. At 10 a.m. this French division was surprised by two German divisions and driven back in the utmost confusion behind their corps, abandoning their tents, baggage, artillery and stores. The Germans attacked the 5th corps in their position, but they had to deploy a considerable force to dislodge them, and it was not until nearly 6 o'clock, after some hard fighting, that the French were compelled to retreat.

MacMahon continued to pass the Meuse, but finding himself thus intercepted he was of necessity obliged to abandon his movements towards Bazaine; he therefore ordered a concentration on Sedan, which was effected by August 31st.

On this day General Wimpffen arrived from Paris to take over the command of the 5th corps from de Failly, who was

placed on the retired list in consequence of the surprise of his advanced division at Beaumont.

(See Plate 44).

The town of Sedan is an unimportant fortress on the river Meuse, about seven miles from the Belgian frontier: it is exposed to the fire of modern artillery from commanding heights, it was badly supplied with stores. About one and a half miles to the south is the village of Bazeilles, and a stream running from the north passes through it. In the valley formed by this stream are the villages of Givonne, Daigny, and La Moncelle. To the north of Sedan there is another valley, which contains the villages of Illy and Floing. It was the ground between these two streams that MacMahon selected as a position on which to deploy his troops and to await the attack of the Germans.

The 12th corps occupied Bazeilles and the ground as far as La Moncelle; the 1st corps continued the line to Givonne; the 7th corps were placed in position on the heights between Illy and Floing; and the 5th corps was posted in the centre as a reserve.

The slopes towards the streams are gradual, open, and well adapted for defence, whilst the ground in the centre is undulating, and well suited for secreting troops; there is a somewhat thick wood in the centre, called the "Bois de Garenne."

MacMahon seems to have abandoned every line of retreat; the Germans could move freely round him in all directions: in the event, therefore, of a defeat, he had nothing to do but to capitulate.

On this night the German corps had all closed up ready for action.

The 4th army was on the right bank of the river Meuse, with their outposts about five miles from the French position. The 3rd army was on the left bank; they bivouacked even nearer to the French, their left being at Donchery and their right at Remilly.

In order to hold fast the French, and prevent them from re-

treating to Mèzieres, the 11th and 5th corps, and Wurtemburgers were to cross the Meuse at Donchery early on the following morning. The 2nd Bavarians were to take up a position about Fresnois, and the 1st Bavarians were to advance from Remilly across the river against the village of Bazeilles, connecting with the 4th army, which was to attack from the east, the 12th corps being on the left, the Prussian Guards on the right, and 4th corps in reserve. The 6th corps, which belonged to the 3rd army, was detached towards Mèzieres to protect the Germans' exposed flank.

Battle of Sedan.—(See Plate 44.)

September 1st. Before daylight the 1st Bavarian corps advanced to the attack of Bazeilles, in order to hold fast the French, whose retreat without fighting was to be apprehended.

At 4 a.m. they crossed the river by a military bridge at Remilly, and by the railway bridge lower down, which they had seized on the previous evening before the French could destroy it. The morning was very foggy, and the Bavarians reached the railway station without being seen; this building was occupied by the French, but being surprised they were easily driven out of it. It was not until 6 a.m. that the fog cleared sufficiently for the batteries on either side to open fire.

At 6.15 the 12th corps came up on the right of the Bavarians and deployed, extending as far as Daigny. There was now desperate fighting for the possession of Bazeilles, which was defended by French marines. The village was literally levelled to the ground. At 10.30 a.m. the Prussian Guards arrived on the field, and prolonged the line to the right as far as Givonne.

When Lebrun, commanding the 12th corps, found himself seriously engaged, he sent a report to that effect to MacMahon, who immediately came to the heights above Bazeilles to observe the German movements; but, before he could issue any orders, he received so severe a wound from the splinter of a shell, that he was compelled to give up the command of the army. Wimpffen was the senior general, but MacMahon handed over

Plate 44.


Virgne aux Bois
Defilé de St Albert
St Menges
Flagn
Illy
Floing
Bois de Garrenne
Givonne
Daigny
Terry
SEDAN
Donchery
Frenois
RAILWAY
R. Meuse
Balan
La Moncelle
Bazailles
Remilly
11th
5th
7th
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N
2 Miles

the command to Ducrot. At 7.30, Ducrot, whilst engaged in arranging his troops about Givonne, received this order to assume the command. He at once issued orders for the whole army to concentrate on the plateau of Illy in order to force its way to Mèzieres, being persuaded that the French were being gradually surrounded, and that if the army was to be saved there was no time to be lost. He rode to Lebrun, explained the necessity of immediate action, and ordered him to retire his corps in echelon of brigades from the right. The retreat commenced, but, before they had reached the heights above Bazeilles, Wimpffen came on the ground, and produced a letter from the War Minister which authorised him to take the chief command in case MacMahon should become non-effective; he did not approve of this retrograde movement, and ordered the 12th corps to resume its former position; he also directed Ducrot to go back to the command of his corps at Givonne, saying that in two hours he would drive the enemy back into the river Meuse. Such was the discord in the French camp.

The French 1st and 12th corps were now ordered to cross the rivulet and attack the Germans, but this only resulted in their being repulsed with great loss, pursued down the slopes, and driven out of the villages all along the valley.

The German 3rd army, on the left, commenced their advance about 6 a.m., having crossed the river at Donchery before daylight; the 5th corps marched on the road nearest the river, and the 11th corps on a parallel road to Vrigne-aux-Bois, the Wurtemburgers being left at Donchery. They advanced but slowly on account of the fog. At 7 a.m. the head of each corps reached the road leading to Sedan, and accordingly wheeled to the right.

This road passes between the loop of the river and some high impracticable ground which is called the defile of St. Albert, and here in the fog these two corps met. The confusion was considerable, all being anxious to press forward to the fight. The corps became mixed, divisions, brigades, and even regiments lost their places; artillery waggons were jammed or

the road, and we can imagine something of their state of disorder when we read: "The passage of the defile of St. Albert was not fully effected till near mid-day." Fortunately for the Germans they were here unopposed; their leading companies had little difficulty in driving the French picquets out of St. Manges and back on Floing. In course of time the artillery of both corps arrived, and took up positions without interference in one long line on the heights opposite the French; the infantry were formed in the valleys behind them.

The artillery continued to fire for three hours against the French position on the heights of Floing, especially in the direction of the Bois de Garenne, and the infantry made repeated attacks on both Floing and Illy, but on every occasion they were repulsed with great loss.

At 3 p.m. the 11th corps, having pushed some troops through Fleigneux, connected with the Guards; thus were the French completely surrounded.

The French now made several desperate efforts to break through at Illy, but were driven back.

At 2 p.m. Wimpffen collected together about 6,000 men belonging to the 12th, 1st, and 5th corps in the Bois de Garenne, near the heights of the Givonne, with the intention of forcing his way through the Germans in the direction of Montmédy; he wished the Emperor to accompany him, but he declined. Placing himself at the head of these troops he advanced against the Prussian Guards; his column, however, was beaten off after half an hour's fighting, and followed up by the enemy, who thus gained the wood.

Another desperate but useless effort was made by the French cavalry. They were all assembled behind the heights above Illy, under the command of Margueritte, who, on going forward to reconnoitre, was wounded. Gallifet, the next senior officer, assumed the command, and ordered an advance in echelon from the left: after penetrating the enemy's line, they were to wheel to the right and roll up his flank. As they advanced they came upon seventeen Prussian battalions, who were just formed for an attack on Floing; the cavalry broke

through the line of skirmishers, but were received by the battalions deployed in their rear by so murderous a fire at a short range that their squadrons were actually mowed down—heaps of killed and wounded, men and horses, were piled up in front of the Prussian lines. What was left of the cavalry fled in all directions, some to the Bois de Garenne and others to Sedan.

At 3.30 p.m., Ducrot and Lebrun, after vainly attempting to lead their troops against the Germans, went into the town to seek the Emperor. His Majesty informed them that he wished to enter into negotiations with the enemy, and desired Ducrot to sign an order that the fire should cease; but this the general refused to do, as he said he was not in command. Lebrun, however, was persuaded to become the bearer of a flag of truce. On his way he met Wimpffen, who determined to make another effort to break through at Balan. These two generals got together about 2,000 men, and managed to gain the streets of the suburb, but all their endeavours to advance further were in vain.

The Germans continued to shell the French till 5.20 p.m., when two flags of truce were hoisted, by some persons unknown, at Torcy and Balan. The King gave orders for all fire to cease, and sent one of his staff to summon the army and fortress to surrender.

The Emperor referred this officer to Wimpffen, as the Commander-in-Chief, who accompanied him to the German head-quarters near Donchery, and there arranged terms of capitulation. On the following morning the Emperor surrendered himself; and thus fell the Second French Empire, and the last army of regular soldiers in France were made prisoners of war.

The strength of the German armies engaged in this battle was about 200,000, and their losses in killed and wounded were about 10,000.

The French had about 70,000 men on the field, and lost in killed and wounded about 13,000.

NOTES.—MacMahon acted contrary to his own opinions in making this march on Montmédy, so there are no deductions to be made from that manœuvre.

The Germans regularly hemmed the French in between the river Meuse and the Belgian frontier surrounded them, and compelled them to surrender; their vast superiority in numbers enabled them to do this.

If Ducrot's order had been carried out, the French would have come on the German 5th and 11th corps in the defile of St. Alberts whilst they were in disorder, and at all events some of their army might have escaped, but they would have been hard pressed by the Prussian Guards and Saxons.

The system of massing artillery was in this battle carried out to a greater extent than in any of the previous ones; the circumstances of the situation and the position of the ground were particularly suited for such tactics.

The Germans had upwards of 600 guns in action against the French, they would occupy more than 6 miles. It is considered advisable in most cases to place a number of guns under the immediate command of one officer, in order that their action may be concentrated; no doubt scattered batteries can direct their fire at one object from different points, but concentrated action is not thereby so well assured.

The German infantry was not sent forward to the attack with such disregard of life as on former occasions. It was necessary that the Bavarians should attack vigorously at Bazeilles, to hold the enemy fast whilst the turning movement was being effected (at least it was reasonably supposed to be so). They suffered heavy losses accordingly, namely, 500 killed, and 2,700 wounded. The 12th corps also lost 250 killed, and about 1,000 wounded; whereas the Prussian Guards, who were not called upon to make any serious attack, had only 87 killed and about 500 wounded.

The 5th and 11th corps lost upwards of 3,000 men killed and wounded. Their attack on Floing must have been very destructive to them, and it is difficult to see the necessity of it, when the French were surrounded.

The final French cavalry charge appears to have been the most desperate enterprise, and availed nothing.

September 4th. The 1st Bavarians and 11th corps were left to guard the French prisoners, and the rest of the German armies moved on Paris.

September 15th. The Germans arrived in front of Paris, and the 1st Bavarians and 11th corps having been relieved of their prisoners, marched to rejoin the army.

September 19th. Paris was invested.

September 27th. Strasbourg fell, and the troops engaged in the siege moved towards Belfort and Dijon.

October 27th. At Metz, after several fruitless attempts to break through the investing army, the French capitulated.

A force of Bavarians and cavalry, under Von der Tann, was

detached to the river Loire to cover the investing army at Paris.

After the capitulation of Metz the 2nd army was moved to Troyes, also to assist in covering the communications of the Germans, whilst the 1st army occupied Metz and beseiged some of the smaller fortresses.

The French army of the Loire consisted of upwards of 200,000 men, but they were raw levies and quite unable to cope with the German troops. By December 18th they were completely broken up and driven into Switzerland.

Several sorties were attempted from Paris, but they all failed, and on the 28th January, 1871, the French capitulated, whereupon an armistice was agreed to, and eventually peace was signed.



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